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“The only real journey, the only Fountain of Youth, would be to travel not towards new landscapes, but 
with new eyes, to see the universe through the eyes of another, of a hundred of others, to see the hundred 
universes that each of them can see, or can be”. 
 
         Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time: The Prisoner and the Fugitive 
  
 
  “It is the mark of an educated man to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.”
    
  Aristotle, Metaphysics      
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Chapter 1 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
‘Is the mission that we have assigned to judges too heavy? While the mission is certainly difficult, one 
must ensure the knowledge and the independence of those who perform it. We are however led by 
necessity to accord judges this responsibility’. With these words, written as early as 1911, DEMOGUE 
depicted the rise of judges and their increasing roles in modern societies.
1
 For decades, judicial duties have 
extended far beyond the scope of traditional adjudication, judges being progressively called upon to 
occupy the role of social engineers.
2
 Meanwhile, contexts in which judges evolve have transformed. A few 
decades ago, CAPELLETTI predicted that the rise of ‘big businesses’ as by-products of ‘a massification 
of societies’ characterized by ever-increasing production and consumption and changes in social relations 
would, sooner or later, require the implementation of ‘big judiciaries’.3  Mass damage caused by corporate 
misbehaviour (e.g. anticompetitive practices, misleading market information), defective products, harmful 
pharmaceuticals, accidents or environmental disasters nowadays tend to multiply and create new 
challenges not only for legal actors but also for society at large. In spring 2011, the replies received by the 
European Commission to its public consultation on collective redress indicated European stakeholders’ 
strong interest in seeing judiciaries play ‘prominent’ and ‘leading’ roles in the supervision and monitoring 
of procedures which enable groups of claimants to seek together compensation for damage caused by 
                                                          
1
 R. DEMOGUE, Les notions fondamentales du Droit privé : essai critique pour servir d’introduction à l’étude des 
obligations, 1911, Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence Arthur Rousseau, at p.534 (translation from the 
author. In French : ‘cette mission, donnée par nous au juge, est-elle trop lourde ? Quelle soit difficile à remplir, je ne 
le nie pas, et il est certain qu’on ne saurait trop s’occuper de garantir le savoir et l’indépendance de ceux qui la 
remplissent. Mais on est amené par la force même des choses à donner aux juges ce mandat’). 
2
 Institut des Hautes Etudes sur la Justice (IHEJ), La prudence et l’autorité – L’office du juge au XXIe siècle, report 
for the Ministry of Justice, May 2013, 219 p. (available on www.ihej.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/rapport_office_du_juge_mai_2013.pdf, accessed May 2014 ; Sénat, L’office du juge, 
Symposium, September 2006 (report available on www.senat.fr/colloques/office_du_juge/office_du_juge.pdf, 
accessed May 2014) ; S.ROZES, ‘Un nouveau profil pour les juges’, in : Mélange en l’honneur de R.PERROT – 
Nouveaux juges nouveaux pouvoirs, Dalloz, 1995, pp.435-441 ; P. GERARD, F. OST and M. VAN DE 
KERCHOVE (Eds.), Fonction de juge et pouvoir judiciaire : transformation et déplacement, Publication des facultés 
universitaires de Saint Louis, 1983. 
 
3
 M. CAPPELLETTI, Le pouvoir des juges, Economica, Paris, 1999, at p.61; from the same author, ‘Vindicating the 
Public Interest through the Courts: a Comparativist’s Contribution, (25) Buffalo Law Review, 1975, pp.643-690. 
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mass events.
4
 In its 2013 Recommendations, the EU Commission further highlighted that ‘a key role 
should be given to courts in protecting the rights and interests of all the parties involved in a collective 
redress actions as well as in managing the collective redress actions effectively’.5 Judges are thus expected 
to be neutral and robust agents while assuming heavy responsibilities under a considerable burden.  
Contrary to DEMOGUE’s time at which judges remained an overlooked area of research, the study of 
judicial behaviour and judicial decision-making has recently pervaded social sciences and successively 
been embraced by lawyers, economists and psychologists. These different branches of study have shed 
light on the way judges manage and decide cases beyond a so-called ‘mythology of legal decision-
making’, which traditionally posits that judges are neutral decision-makers simply applying law to facts.6  
Legal scholars have in turn progressively perceived the mutual benefits brought by these alternative 
viewpoints which contribute to renew the role of the judiciary by discussing judges’ strengths and 
weaknesses. As POSNER suggests, ‘achieving a sound understanding of judicial behaviour is thus of 
more than merely academic interest; it is a key to legal reform’.7  
  
1.1 Research Question 
 
The research question addressed in this thesis is the following: 
 
What do policymakers expect from judges when managing and resolving mass disputes, and based on 
social sciences, are these expectations ultimately realistic? 
 
1.2. Problem Definition 
 What Does ‘Mass Litigation’ Stand For? 
 
The concept of mass litigation is broad and, in recent years, many competing terms such as ‘aggregate 
litigation’, ‘mass disputes’, ‘group litigation’, ‘class litigation’ or ‘mass claims’ have multiplied 
                                                          
4
 Public Consultation (EC), ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’, 2011, 
www.ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html (accessed May 2014, see 
specifically Question 23: ‘What role should be given to the judge in collective redress proceedings’). 
5
 Recommendation (EC) on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanism in 
the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted under Union Law, (21), 2013/396/EU, 11 June 2013; 
see also: EU Parliament, Resolution ‘Towards a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress’, 2 February 2012. 
6
 V. J.  KONECNI and E. B. EBBESEN, ‘The Mythology of Legal Decision-Making’ (7) International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry, 1984,  pp.5-18. 
7
 R.A. POSNER, How Judges Think, Harvard University Press, London/Cambridge, 2008, at p.5. 
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throughout the literature.
8
 In this research, mass litigation will be used as a generic term referring to cases 
that involve many claimants and large-scale damage.
9
 In other words, mass litigation follows mass 
damage provoked by mass accidents or mass torts.
10
 From a procedural point of view, tools to handle 
mass litigation are numerous. They encompass class action, representative action, group action, mass 
action and other collective devices. Terminology varies across countries and differences between these 
procedures will timely be addressed. In an effort to propose a common definition, the European 
Commission emphasized in its 2011 public consultation that these notions refer to ‘any mechanism that 
may accomplish the cessation or prevention of unlawful business practices which affect a multitude of 
claimants, or the compensation for the harm caused by such practices’.11 The role of judges in mass 
procedures will be the red thread of this research. 
 
 Judges and Mass Litigation: Investigating a Double-Sided Relationship  
 
Policymakers have a view of the relationship between judges and mass claims that is mostly one-sided: 
judges have a key role to play for the management and resolution of mass disputes. Insights from social 
sciences however suggest that this relationship might actually be double-sided: judges do not only have an 
important role in mass litigation, but mass claims might also have a great impact on judicial attitudes and 
decision-making. The personality of judges might therefore significantly contribute to shaping the 
outcomes of mass disputes. This thesis aims to clarify how and why judges may influence mass disputes. 
Mass litigation can concern various fields and different branches of substantive law, including tort, 
financial law and securities, consumer law, health or environmental law. This research is however not 
limited to a specific and delimited area, but instead remains transdisciplinary.  
 
                                                          
8
 For a reference to the term 'mass litigation', see notably: D.HENSLER, 'Justice for the Masses? Aggregate 
Litigation & its Alternatives', (143) Daedalus, summer 2014, n°3, pp. 73-82. 
9
 See: S.C. YEAZELL, ‘Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process’, Wisconsin Law Review, 1994, pp. 
631-678 (highlighting that the term litigation refers to the whole judicial process, i.e. in the American context, 
‘discovery, summary, judgment, settlement, negotiations, alternatives to judicial process, sanctions for lawyers 
misbehavior, and similar pretrial matters’, at p. 666). 
10
 P.H. GLENN, ‘Une justice de masse? Réflexions sur la responsabilité civile en Amérique du nord’, (26) Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review, 1996, pp.316. 
11
 2011 Public Consultation (EC), supra note 4. In the 2013 Recommendations (supra note 5), the European 
Commission further highlighted that ‘collective redress means: (i) a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility to 
claim cessation of illegal behaviour collectively by two or more  national or legal persons or by an entity entitled to 
bring a representative action (injunctive collective redress); (ii) a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility to claim 
compensation collectively by two or more natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed in a mass harm 
situation or by an entity entitled to bring a representative action (compensatory collective redress)'. 
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1.3. Law & Economics Relevance 
 
This research is related to two different branches of Law & Economics (L&E) literature. The first one 
deals with the L&E of mass litigation. The fact that the Law & Economics movement has principally 
emerged in the United States – a country where class actions have been for decades a topic of primary 
concerns among scholars and policymakers – partly explains the traditional interest of Law and 
Economics researchers for this new form of litigation. Since mass devices currently stand at the forefront 
of the political agenda of the European Union and many European countries, and since the Law and 
Economics movement has also progressively expanded in Europe, it is not surprising to observe that this 
topic has recently become of great interest for European Law & Economics scholars. By describing its 
economic rationale and identifying its associated risks, this literature aims to understand the conditions 
under which these proceedings may be viewed as optimal. This research will contribute to this branch of 
literature by addressing several European mass proceedings from a legal and economic perspective.  
The second body of literature relates to judges. Under the impulse of authors such as POSNER or 
COOTER, judicial behaviour has become an extensive object of investigation. This literature is 
nevertheless still prominently Common-law judges centred. The status of Common Law judges remains 
different from their Civil law counterparts.
12
 ‘Accepting the American legal process as an undisputed 
background’ would therefore constitute a mistake that one should be careful to avoid.13 This research 
consequently aims to contribute to the existing literature by extending these insights to Continental 
judiciaries and discussing their relevance when applied to the mass litigation framework.  
 
1.4. Social Relevance – the Targeted Audience 
 
Insights from social sciences offer complementary views that are worth considering in times where judges 
have been assigned increased responsibilities in our society. Expecting too much from judges who might 
not be able to live up to these expectations could be detrimental for the judiciary’s functioning and 
reputation, and ultimately for the whole treatment of mass litigation. Therefore, the first audience that this 
research seeks to target is policymakers at both EU and Member States levels who have recently 
implemented -or are currently discussing - the implementation of mass devices. The research notably 
                                                          
12
 J.H. MERRYMAN and R. PEREZ-PERDOMO, The Civil Law Tradition, 3
rd
 Ed., 2007 ; R.A POSNER, ‘The Role 
of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century’, (86) Boston University Law Review, 2006, pp.1049-1068 ; A. GARAPON 
and I. PAPADOPOULOS, Juger en Amérique et en France, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2010, 322 p. 
13
 U. MATTEI, Comparative Law and Economics, The University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp.69-101 (specifically 
Chapter 3: ‘the distinction between Common Law and Civil Law: doing away with legal positivism’).   
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argues that the viewpoints of judges should be better taken into account and an enhanced consideration 
should be given to judges’ strengths and weaknesses. The second audience targets judges themselves. It 
contributes to shed some light on their new roles in the treatment of mass claims. It highlights the pitfalls 
that they may face, and errors that they may be prone to make on such circumstances. It also draws their 
attention to the consequences of their attitudes in mass disputes. When considering the prominent roles 
played by judges in this field, these findings will finally be of interest for all parties likely to be involved 
in mass claims.  
 
1.5. A Note for the Sceptics 
 
The analysis of judicial behaviour might possibly be regarded with suspicion from the viewpoint of legal 
scholars unfamiliar with the economic analysis of the Law. When starting this research, I must admit that I 
tended to side with the sceptics. Coming not only from a country where the Law & Economics movement 
has in recent years only slowly emerged
14
 and is still contested in the legal literature,
15
 my views on the 
judiciary remained also essentially legalistic by nature. I was therefore reluctant vis-à-vis such new 
approaches inherited from the North-American tradition, and still regarded judges principally through the 
lens of the mouths of the law traditionally expounded by MONTESQUIEU.
16
 Yet, as GARAPON has 
pertinently observed: ‘why shouldn’t the judge be subjective, sentimental, or feeling positive or negative 
with respect to those subjects involved in the case at hand; why shouldn’t he feel attracted to or repelled 
by certain cases?’17 Analysing the human component underlying the Law and the function of judging 
turned out to be for me a veritable challenge, and, finally, a highly-valuable undertaking.  
Likewise, readers (and specifically if they have a legal background) may tackle this research with a similar 
initial reluctance. This, I believe, is mainly due to misunderstandings.
18
 In order to continue to bridge the 
                                                          
14
 A. OGUS and M.FAURE, L’analyse économique du droit: le cas français, Ed.Panthéon-Assas, Paris, 2002, 176 p.   
15
 R.E.DE MUNAGORRI, ‘L’analyse économique est-elle une source du droit ?’, Revue trimestrielle de droit civil, 
2006, p.505 ; A.BERNARD, ‘Law and Economics, une science idiote ?’, Recueil Dalloz, 2008, p.2806. 
16
 MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des Lois, 1st ed. 1748 (writing, in French : ‘le juge est la bouche qui prononce les 
paroles de la loi’). 
17
 A. GARAPON, J. ALLARD and F. GROS, Les vertus du juge, Dalloz, Paris, 2008 (translation from the author. In 
French: ‘pourquoi le juge n’aurait-il pas de subjectivité, de sentiments, positifs ou negatifs, face à de tels justiciables, 
pourquoi n’éprouverait-il pas de l’attraction ou de la repulsion pour certaines affaires ?’, at p.7).   
18
 Dialogues between legal scholars and Law & Economics researchers are often clouded by misunderstandings, the 
first usually considering that the second are keen to sacrifice justice to efficiency. Contra see: A.OGUS and 
M.FAURE, supra note 14 (claiming: ‘nous ne prétendons pas que l’efficience soit le but exclusive du droit, ni que 
les objectifs économiques doivent toujours l’emporter sur les autres valeurs. Mais même si l’on est en droit de 
préférer une solution juste à une solution efficiente, il n’est pas inutile de connaître le prix du sacrifice !’, at p.26); 
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gap between legal researchers and the Law and Economics literature, this research has sought to 
understand the doctrinal roots of this branch of literature and to clarify the reasons of its disaffection 
among Continental legal scholars. In addition, particular attention was devoted to highlight and question 
the methods and terminology used by economists and behavioural scholars. The goal is ultimately to 
facilitate dialogues between lawyers and economists. Lawyers may indeed take benefit from economic 
insights inasmuch as economists can find in the concerns expressed by legal scholars a way to enrich their 
analysis.
19
 
 
1.6.   Structure 
 
As a way to set the background, Chapter 2 investigates the economics of mass litigation and shows that 
its rationale is dependent on a third-party monitoring. Recent European claims tend to assign these 
cornerstone duties to judges. Chapter 3 scrutinizes in greater details the roles of judges in the treatment 
and resolution of mass disputes. The comparative analysis of five different mass litigation procedures 
highlights convergences in judicial intervention, and helps clarify the type of judges that policymakers 
nowadays expect to monitor and resolve mass disputes. Referring then to rational choice theory, Chapter 
4 proposes a view ‘from the inside’ of judges dealing with mass litigation. It discusses the issue of judicial 
incentives and points out the influence of judicial attitudes on the outcomes of mass claims. Going then a 
step further, Chapter 5 assumes that individuals do not behave as rational utility maximizing agents but 
have a bounded rationality and may be prone to biases. Insights from behavioural law & economics show 
how contexts – here, the ‘mass’ context – can influence judicial decision-making, and question whether 
decision-makers tend to behave differently when facing groups or numerous individuals. Consequences 
for the treatment of mass claims are subsequently discussed. Since the analysis would not be complete 
without empirical testing, Chapter 6 proposes two reality checks in order to test the theoretical 
developments previously set forth. The first check consists of an online questionnaire conducted with 
French judges aiming at collecting judicial viewpoints on the French group action. The second is an 
experiment intended to discuss the impact of multiple claimants on legal decision-making. Chapter 7 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
see also B. DEFFAINS, 'Pour une theorie economique de l'imprevision en droit des contrats', Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Civil, 2010, p.719 (highlighting: 'the long-lasting incomprehension between economists and jurists regarding 
their object of study and their methodologies', translation from the author). 
19
 A. OGUS, ‘What Legal Scholars Can Learn from Law and Economics’, (79) Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2004, 
pp.383-401 (observing: ‘because Law and Economics cuts across traditional legal conceptual structures as well as 
legal systems and cultures, it provides a valuable tool for understanding the relationship between different parts of 
the legal system and between systems’, at p.385); see also: R. COOTER and T. ULEN, Introduction to Law & 
Economics, AddisonWesley Longman,3
rd
 ed., 2000, pp. 4-7. 
 9 
 
analyses the learnings brought by social sciences and proposes policy recommendations to facilitate and 
enhance judicial intervention in mass litigation. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by highlighting possible 
paths for future research.  
 
 
*** 
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Chapter 2 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF MASS LITIGATION 
 
  A Need for Third-Party Monitoring: A Role for Judges? 
 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
When observing the idiosyncrasies of mass litigation devices in Europe, MILLER and ISSACHAROFF 
have noted that ‘analysing European class actions is like shooting at a moving target’.20 Regardless of 
their divergences in terms of procedural design,
21
 the Law and Economics literature has pointed out the 
common economic objectives pursued by mass proceedings which are ultimately perceived as a ‘legal 
machinery’22 aimed at correcting market failures and filling the gaps that individual litigation and 
regulation have left uncovered. Yet, their associated benefits tend to remain highly dependent on a third-
party monitoring and supervision. 
     
2.1.1 Methodology and Objectives   
 
A few preliminary observations must be addressed regarding the methodology used in this chapter. First, 
the economics of mass litigation devices is a topic which for decades has been extensively commented 
upon by American scholars, and more recently, also tackled in the European legal and Law & Economics 
literature. This chapter could therefore possibly be regarded as a redundant exercise from the viewpoint of 
informed readers. This step however constitutes here a first and necessary move to analyse the roles 
assigned to the judiciary in this field, to highlight the strong expectations nowadays placed on judges’ 
shoulders, and to sketch the particularities of the contexts in which judges make their decisions. In simple 
                                                          
20
 S. ISSACHAROFF and G.P. MILLER, ‘Will Aggregated Litigation Come to Europe?’, (62) Vanderbilt Law 
Review, 2009, n°1, p.177. 
21
 D. FAIRGRIEVE and G. HOWELLS, ‘Collective Redress Procedures-European Debates’, (58) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 2009, pp. 379-409. 
22
 A. CASSONE and G. RAMELLO, ‘The Simple Economics of Class Actions: Private Provision of Club and Public 
Goods’, (32) European Journal of Law & Economics, 2011, pp. 205-224. 
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words, this chapter is aimed at setting the scene and judges will lead the analysis. Second, the benefits 
associated with mass litigation devices are numerous. Although the goal is here to clarify the economic 
rationale of mass litigation, this section is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, the objective is to 
provide a clear overview. Therefore, some issues related to mass litigation, such as the optimal 
combination of public and private enforcement, or the use of punitive damages which is peculiar to the 
American experience and which per se could require lengthy developments, will only briefly be evoked. 
The primary focus of this dissertation is indeed the judge and facets of judicial behaviour. Third and 
finally, Law and Economics scholars addressing mass procedures have to this day principally referred to 
the model of the American class action as main object of investigation.
23
 At this stage, a higher level of 
abstraction is deliberately retained: the focus is on the common denominator shared by all mass litigation 
procedures.  
 
2.1.2. The Chapter in a Nutshell 
  
 The underlying objectives of this chapter are twofold. The first is to clarify the benefits (2.2) and costs 
(2.3) associated with mass litigation devices. The second is to highlight the importance of a third-party 
monitoring aimed at ensuring that such costs do not ultimately outweigh the benefits. In this respect, 
judicial monitoring and supervision is a solution nowadays spearheaded by a majority of stakeholders 
(2.4).   
 
   
      * 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
23
 See notably: J. BACKHAUS, A. CASSONE and G.B. RAMELLO (Eds.), The Law and Economics of Class 
Actions in Europe: Lessons from America, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, 400 p. 
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2.2  THE BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH MASS LITIGATION DEVICES 
 
When wrongdoings occur, plaintiffs are theoretically incentivized to file for damages and wrongdoers 
should face the consequences of their misconduct. In practice however, meritorious lawsuits are not 
necessarily filed due to a lack of plaintiffs’ incentives to sue. As a consequence, infringers do not entirely 
internalize the costs of their action. In this context, mass devices are tools aimed at bridging such gaps: 
they cure judicial market failures and provide cost-effective solutions for the enforcement of rights (2.2.1). 
Furthermore, they contribute to the goal of deterrence by curing the shortcomings of regulation and 
individual litigation, potentially leading to behavioural changes (2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1. A Remedy for Market Failures and a Cost-Effective Solution for the Enforcement   
          of Rights  
 
Mass proceedings are organizational devices aimed at facilitating the coordination of similar claims. Their 
benefits are multiple and can be analysed from claimants’ (a), defendants’ (b) and judges’ (c) 
perspectives. In economic terms, mass proceedings therefore contribute to enhancing the demand for legal 
services as well as structuring its supply.  
 
 
a) Benefits of Mass Litigation Devices from the Viewpoint of Claimants 
 
An analysis of the benefits associated with mass litigation first requires a consideration of the problems 
that individuals encounter when such proceedings are not available. For this purpose, the Law & 
Economics literature usually classifies claimants involved in mass litigation into two categories: negative-
expected value claimants and positive-expected value claimants
24
. Admittedly, further segmentations 
within this broad framework can be drawn since claimants often remain unaware of the real value of their 
claims. As a consequence, mass claims are in practice more likely to mix indifferently these two groups of 
claimants. For a matter of both simplicity and clarity, these two types of plaintiffs will here be considered 
successively. 
 
 
                                                          
24
 T. ULEN, ‘An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Class Action Litigation’, (32) European Journal of Law 
& Economics, 2011, pp. 185-203. 
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 Negative and Positive-Expected Value Claimants 
 
A negative-expected value claimant is described as a ‘small claim plaintiff’: his expected costs of filing 
will exceed the expected value of his claim. Small claims are commonplace in securities and competition 
law where wrongdoers can spread the losses caused by their misconducts over an atomistic demand.
25
 In 
such circumstances, claimants taken individually only bear a small portion of a larger harm. As pointed 
out by the 1982 Commission on the reform of French consumer Law at that time conducted by CALAIS-
AULOY, ‘consumer disputes are small only if taken separately one from another; globally considered they 
represent considerable interests. The dispersion of those small injuries allows some traders to realize, 
without great risks, important illegal profit’.26  
Conversely, positive-expected value claimants have high-merit claims: their expected benefits from 
prevailing at trial are higher than their expected litigation costs. As suggested by SCHAEFER, in such 
circumstances ‘the issue of bundling rights does not serve to enable compensation by surmounting rational 
apathy, but also to find a cost-effective and procedurally efficient method to enforce rights that will be 
claimed in any event’. 27 
   
 Overcoming Rational Apathy, Reducing Administrative Costs,  Achieving Economies of Scale 
   
 
According to the Law and Economics literature, a rational plaintiff decides to sue if he anticipates that his 
expected benefits (his chance of prevailing at trial multiplied by the benefits that he may receive) will 
exceed the expected costs of his action. Conversely, he remains passive in situations where the expected 
costs of filing exceed the expected benefits associated with the lawsuit. This situation known as rational 
apathy and rational disinterest and their importance in mass litigation was initially described by KALVEN 
and ROSENFIELD in 1941.
28
   
From an economic point of view, procedures enabling the bundling of similar claims can be viewed as a 
solution for overcoming an anti-commons problem resulting from high transaction costs among 
                                                          
25
 H.-B. SCHAEFER, ‘The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation- The Incentives for Class Action and Legal 
Actions Taken by Associations’, (9) European Journal of Law & Economics, 2000, pp. 183-212. 
26
 N. LHEUREUX, ‘Effective consumer access to justice: Class actions’, (15) Journal of Consumer Policy, 1992, pp. 
445-462 (citing the CALAIS-AULOY report, at p.71). 
27
 H.-B SCHAEFER, supra note 25. 
28
 H. KALVEN and M. ROSENFIELD, ‘The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit’, (8) University of Chicago 
Law Review, 1941, n°4, pp. 684-721. 
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plaintiffs.
29
 As a mirror image of the so-called commons problem first identified by HARDIN in his 1968 
seminal paper,
30
 an anti-commons problem arises when a fragmentation of rights over a same thing leads 
to an under-utilization of resources. CASSONE and RAMELLO have compared plaintiffs involved in 
mass claims as ‘owners of property rights over a specific litigation’ whose action is ultimately precluded 
by high transactions costs.
31
 Plaintiffs are rarely eager to initiate disputes that many compare to a fight of 
David against Goliath. Uncertain, risky and lengthy trials, high litigation costs, expensive scientific 
expertise, as well as a perspective of facing powerful companies usually deter claimants from bringing 
their claims. As an illustration, a 2009 Euro-barometer study pointed out a general reticence shared by a 
vast majority of European consumers about filing complaints.
32
 Similarly, the EU 2013 Consumer 
Conditions Scoreboard revealed that limited sums at stake and length of the proceedings were generally 
the two main cited reasons for not complaining.
33
 Finally, high costs of legal procedures are also often 
cited as one of the major explanations for not going to courts.
34
 Even though surveys on consumer 
behaviour must be considered carefully since they are constructed from samples which may not 
adequately be representative from their parent population, they nonetheless convey interesting indications 
on a general tendency.
35
 It ultimately turns out that the costs of filing a lawsuit make it harder for smaller 
claims to be brought without aggregation.  
Mass proceedings are a solution to cure plaintiffs’ rational apathy: they allow a pooling of resources and 
restore claimants’ incentives to sue. Going a step further, CASSONE and RAMELLO have described 
these procedures as ‘local public goods’ – or ‘club goods’ – whose main task is to provide the claimant 
group with a set of common specific services that would not have been created otherwise.
36
  Economies of 
                                                          
29
 Mass proceedings can be viewed as tools aiming at aggregating similar but fragmented claims. See also: T.RAVE, 
'Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation', (66) Vanderbilt Law Review, 2013, pp.1183-1258. 
30
 G.HARDIN, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, (162) Sciences, 1968, pp. 1243-1248.  
31
 A. CASSONE and G. RAMELLO, supra note 22. 
32
 EU Commission, ‘Consumers Redress in the European Union: Consumers experiences, Perceptions and Choices’, 
Euro-barometer, August 2009; see also: report from Civic Consulting commissioned by DG SANCO, 'Study 
Regarding the Problems faced by consumers in obtaining redress for infringements of consumer protection 
legislation, and the economic consequences of such problems', August 2008. 
33
 EU Commission, Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, July 2013, 9
th
 ed. (pointing out that respectively 37.4% of 
respondents cited the limited sums and 36.6% cited the length of the procedure, at p.47). 
34
 EU Commission, ‘European Union Citizens and Access to Justice’, Euro-barometer, 2004. 
35
 A. TVERSKY and D. KAHNEMAN, ‘Belief in the Law of Small Numbers’, (76) Psychological Bulletin, 1971, 
n°2, pp. 105-110; M.RABIN, ‘Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers’, (117) The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 2002, n°3, pp.775-816. 
36
 A. CASSONE and G. RAMELLO, supra note 22. 
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scale, risk- and cost- sharing
37
 and common investments are part of the benefits rendered possible by mass 
devices which ultimately strengthen the plaintiff’s litigation toolbox.38  
 
 A Remedy for Informational Asymmetries 
 
 
Mass proceedings are also a remedy for curing the informational asymmetries which plague the litigation 
process when large-scale damage occurs. Such informational asymmetries can be found at different stages.  
First, asymmetries plague the relationships between plaintiffs themselves. They are particularly salient in 
small claims where many plaintiffs remain unaware of the occurrence of an infringement, of the 
magnitude of the damage, or of the identity of others victims. DEFFAINS and LANGLAIS have for 
instance pointed out that class action procedures can be regarded as tools enabling a pooling of 
knowledge: They facilitate a better transmission of information among group members, and enable 
plaintiffs to better assess their chances of prevailing at trial.
39
 The same authors also view these 
procedures as mechanisms for internalizing the informational externalities that are inherent in any 
litigation process
40
. Indeed, in situations where suits are filed individually and repeatedly, the first mover 
must bear a degree of uncertainty regarding the merits of his case and his chances of success. This grey 
area is nonetheless likely to progressively be clarified when subsequent plaintiffs decide to file. The 
positive informational externalities created by the litigation process are thus likely to benefit later 
plaintiffs while deterring the first mover from stepping forward. When group devices are available, the 
first mover can retain parts of the benefits that subsequent plaintiffs will draw from such informational 
externalities.     
Second, informational asymmetries moreover concern the relationship between defendants and claimants. 
According to ROSENBERG, the civil procedure is affected by a ‘systemic bias’ which favours defendants 
over plaintiffs when large claims are at stake.
41
 When anticipating that his conduct has caused harm to 
                                                          
37
 T. EISENBERG and G. MILLER‚‘The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and 
Empirical Issues’, (57) Vanderbilt Law Review, 2004, p.1529 (showing that legal costs tend to decrease when a high 
number of claimants takes part in the procedure). 
38
 S. KESKE, A. RENDA and R. VAN DEN BERGH, ‘Financing and Group Litigation’, in: L.T.VISSCHER and 
M.TUIL (Eds.), New Trends in Financing Civil Litigation in Europe: A Legal, Empirical and Economic Analysis, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, pp.57-90. 
39
 B. DEFFAINS and E. LANGLAIS, ‘Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigation’, (32) 
European Journal of Law & Economics, 2011, pp.241-262. 
40
 Idem. 
41
 D. ROSENBERG, ‘Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t’, (37) Harvard Journal 
on Legislation, 2000, n°2, p.393. 
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multiple victims, a defendant is incentivized to invest immediately and to a larger extent into costly 
scientific evidences and expertise which will help him support his line of defence and prevail in early 
cases which later will constitute a basis for case law on similar issues.
42
 Thereby, by taking advantage of 
the information in his possession - and hence by treating independent claims as ‘a de facto class’43 - the 
defendant spreads the cost of his large initial investment over the number of plaintiffs. Obviously, a single 
plaintiff is unlikely to support alone such an investment
44. By increasing the plaintiffs’ confidence and - 
symmetrically -decreasing the defendants’ beliefs in their chance of prevailing at trial45, these proceedings 
therefore lead to a levelling of the playing field between litigants. 
 
 Facilitating Access to Justice and Contributing to a Victims’ Empowerment 
 
 
Mass procedures are a cornerstone contribution to a broader ‘victims’ empowerment’46 nowadays 
spearheaded by the European Union.
47
 It also reflects the current interest for a ‘victims’ time’, a general 
tendency observable in several European countries which tend to place weak individuals at the core of 
policy agenda.
48
 European institutions have furthermore been interested in the positive externalities that 
mass procedures can have on consumers’ confidence vis-à-vis economic integration. Indeed, the current 
lack of adequate protection tends to exacerbate European citizens’ mistrust vis-à-vis the European 
institutions and the Single Market,
49
 which ultimately jeopardizes the overall functioning of the 
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economy.
50
 Additionally, attempts of European citizens to seek compensation outside Europe have 
highlighted a lack of adequate protection of consumers and shareholders in Member-States. This situation 
was notably evidenced in the Vivendi case where French shareholders attempted to join the US class 
action lawsuit filed by American shareholders against the company which was suspected of disclosing 
erroneous and misleading information. In its 2010 Morrison decision,
51
 the US Supreme Court however 
dismissed the claims from French parties and limited the participation of foreign litigants to US class 
actions. This decision left many claimants uncompensated, and thus called for European interventions.
52
   
Mass proceedings contribute to renovate and strengthen the role of plaintiffs within the civil justice 
scheme. The pooling of services is likely to overcome the plaintiffs’ rational apathy problem by making 
small claims economically viable. In addition, a reallocation of wealth among litigants permits a balance 
of litigation powers between defendants and claimants, which theoretically should lead to a more efficient 
enforcement of plaintiffs’ rights.  
 
b) Benefits of Mass Litigation Devices from the Viewpoint of Defendants  
  
 
 
 
Although they are more rarely recalled and remain often overlooked, mass litigation devices have also 
positive implications for defendants.
53
 As NAGAREDA observed, ‘even in the United States, where 
defence-side criticism of class actions is commonplace, defendants in a settlement posture routinely prefer 
a class definition that is as broad as possible in order to maximize the preclusive effect of the desired 
deal’.54 From an economic perspective, the benefits for defendants are twofold. First, mass proceedings 
are organizational devices aimed at coordinating and rationalizing companies’ strategies when they face a 
large number of similar plaintiffs. Second and relatedly, they are tools lowering companies’ transaction 
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 18 
 
and reputational costs that arise from successive and independent litigation. However, as later discussed, 
this second argument remains controversial and an opposite view could also be defended. 
Here again, the analysis of the benefit associated with mass proceedings from the companies’ viewpoint 
first requires spending time considering the situation where mass proceedings are not available. When a 
defective product has caused harm to a large number of individuals, a company faces a zone of uncertainty 
regarding the extent of its liability, the number of potential plaintiffs and, as a consequence, the amount of 
financial reserves to be kept aside to ensure plaintiffs’ compensation.55 The company may also be forced 
to hire numerous counsels to deal with scattered lawsuits. Finally, its management may be interested in 
clarifying a litigious situation through a pooling of claims in order to meet the legal duties imposed 
notably by company law (such as, for example, the information to shareholders) and to avoid further 
coordination costs.
56
 In other words, a company may want to clarify the boundaries of the dispute so as to 
avoid additional and later costs. In this view, mass proceedings enable companies to settle and clear a 
dispute, providing thus certainty for the future. Through a global ‘bill of peace’,57 companies lower 
transaction costs associated with future litigations and their subsequent reputational costs, ‘improving [on 
this occasion] the financial posture of the business itself’.58 In this respect, NAGAREDA highlighted that 
‘making peace in mass torts literally means creating new wealth’.59 As shown at later stage in this 
research, the implementation of the Dutch Act on Collective Settlement was for instance a salient 
illustration of a mass procedure enhancing the interest of companies. As a scholar has indeed pointed out, 
the Dutch proceeding was in practice an ‘idea [coming] from the industry’60 itself. 
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c) Benefits of Mass Litigation Devices from the Viewpoint of Judges 
 
From the judiciary’s viewpoint, mass devices aim at coordinating judges’ intervention so as to avoid the 
costs arising from duplicate lawsuits
61
. They thus contribute to an efficient justice and reduce the costs of 
the judicial system.  
 
 Claims for Efficient Justice 
 
 
Current European discussions about mass proceedings must be understood in a broader context in which 
courts are required to ‘deliver justice’ while in the same time ‘operat[ing] efficiently’, meaning faster and 
at lower costs.
62
 This quest for judicial economy is not novel. MARCUS for instance regards the process 
of consolidation as a mere ‘sleeping giant’ whose origins can be traced back to the nineteenth-century 
England where similar concerns vis-à-vis judicial expenses and delays were already addressed.
63
 In current 
days, the multiplication of similar claims has drastically endangered the functioning of judiciaries. In 
Germany, the Deutsche Telekom case involved more than 15,000 individual claimants who filed against 
the company for alleged misleading and erroneous information, and more than 700 counsels. This affair 
drastically over-burdened the Frankfort Trial Court.
64
 Similarly, while presiding over the Bendectin class 
action, Judge RUBIN calculated that adjudicating separately and individually all pending Bendectin cases 
would approximately require approximately 182 years of the judge’s time.65 These situations are contrary 
to actual concerns where minimizing judicial expenses and reducing delays have become objectives that 
modern systems of justice seek to achieve.
66
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 Reducing Organisational Costs 
 
 
From the perspective of courts, cases in which plaintiffs file independently similar suits are an example of 
a commons problem where the uncoordinated actions of numerous claimants lead to an over-utilization – 
and a subsequent depletion - of the judiciary’s limited resources. In an attempt to shed light on the 
difficulties arising from the judicial treatment of multiple similar claims, the French consumers’ 
organization UFC-Que Choisir supported in 2006 the filing of 12,521 independent lawsuits from 
individual plaintiffs seeking damages for an anti-competitive cartel agreement in the French mobile 
communication market.
67
 Detrimental consequences associated with the treatment of similar lawsuits 
generally focus on courts’ congestion and waste of human, material and financial resources in already-
tight budgets. Obviously, such situations are likely to produce negative externalities on the judiciary’s 
own functioning. More specifically, delays of procedures may deter future claimants from bringing their 
suits.  
In cases involving standardized large damages where plaintiffs’ claims are considered as homogenous 
enough, mass litigation devices tend to be useful management tools for lowering judiciary’s high 
coordination costs.
68
 They enable judges to exploit economies of scales by adjudicating common issues 
once-for-all, and hence contribute to enhance courts’ administrative efficiency69. An empirical study 
conducted by BERNSTEIN in 1978 with the American class action tends to substantiate this assumption,
70
 
even though - as it will be addressed below- it might be difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions on this 
point.        
 Encouraging a Better Coherence of Legal and Judicial System 
 
  
The pooling of claims can lead to a better coherence and convergence of the entire legal system and helps 
minimizing the risks of adjudicating multiple similar claims in divergent ways. Consider for instance the 
divergent decisions issued by French tribunals regarding the vaccine against hepatitis suspected of causing 
multiple sclerosis. From similar factual proofs, judges ruled differently and decided that, in some cases, 
scientific evidence was not sufficient to hold pharmaceutical companies liable, while in others, that this 
                                                          
67
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causal link could be established. Plaintiffs put in similar factual situations were therefore suffering from a 
lack of legal coherence. Depending on the decision taken by judges, some plaintiffs were ultimately 
compensated while others were not. A collective proceeding may therefore enable an equal treatment of 
claimants placed in identical or similar situations.
71
  
 
2.2.2. The Added Value of Mass Litigation Devices from a Deterrence Perspective  
 
 
Mass devices are aimed at restoring the full effect of the liability system. Among the multiple objectives 
associated with tort law, two of them are here particularly noteworthy: ensuring compensation of plaintiffs 
and enhancing deterrence.
72
  In this section, particular attention is given to this second objective, namely 
the issue of deterrence. Group devices are remedies for the shortcomings of individual litigation from a 
behavioural perspective (a) and for a failure of regulation (b). They can contribute to enhancing 
behavioural changes among infringers and promoting a higher degree of compliance with legal rules (c).  
 
a) A Remedy for the Shortcomings of Individual Litigation – a Behavioural Account  
 
As earlier explained, the Law and Economics literature explains the sub-optimal deterrence of individual 
litigation in terms of plaintiffs’ rational apathy, rational disinterest and informational asymmetries: 
plaintiffs’ incentives to sue are diluted and defendants’ misbehaviour remains unpunished.73 In addition, 
behavioural research tends to provide complementary insights to explain the reasons of this failure of 
individual litigation. LUTH has for instance discussed consumers’ bounded rationality and highlighted 
some of the biases that may affect their decision-making. Her research points out the vagaries of 
consumers’ decisions which lead them to take sub-optimal decisions, although their own welfare may be 
at stake
74. In the same vein, a 2012 report from the French Prime Minister’s Economic Analysis Council 
has also reported the principal biases affecting consumers’ behaviour.75  A status quo bias leading 
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individuals to stick to previous situations
76
, or an aversion to decision-taking (a so-called ‘choice 
avoidance’) are – among many others –biases plaguing consumers’ behaviours. It can be concluded from 
these behavioural insights that the deterrence effect of individual litigation appears per se limited since it 
strongly relies on the behaviour of fragile protagonists. This vacancy is a source of impunity enabling 
wrongdoers to take advantage of plaintiffs and lead them to not fully internalize the costs of their actions.  
These costs are ultimately transferred to a third party. Thereby, by considering that the main objective 
associated with aggregate litigation was to confront the violator with the costs of his misconduct
77
, the 
academic analysis one more time substantiates the idea that mass proceedings can be a response to market 
failures. 
 
b) Relationships Between Regulation and Litigation  
 
 
It is not here the objective of these developments to extensively address the details of the complex 
relationship between litigation and regulation. Readers may refer to specialised literature to obtain 
comprehensive views on this important topic.
78
 Yet, a brief overview is nonetheless necessary to 
understand the role assigned to mass litigation devices vis-à-vis deterrence. 
 
 Litigation as a Complement to Regulation 
 
 
The Law & Economics literature addresses the relationship between regulation and litigation in terms of 
substitutability and complementarity.
79
 A perfectly informed regulator is able to determine ex ante the 
right set of incentives which leads individuals to take the optimal level of precaution. When harm occurs, 
victims seek ex post full compensation through the liability system. In both cases, regulation and litigation 
are viewed as substitutes, and both should theoretically incentivize wrongdoers to take the optimal level of 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Conseil d’Analyse Economique, La Documentation Française, 2012, 92 p. (www.cae.gouv.fr/La-protection-du-
consommateur-rationalite-limitee-et-regulation.html?lang=fr, accessed 26 June 2013). 
76
 W. SAMUELSON and R. ZECKHAUSER, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’, (1) Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 1988, pp.7-59. 
77
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th 
ed, pp. 567-572; M. GILLES and G.B. FRIEDMAN, 
‘Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: the Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers’, (155) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 2006, pp.103-164 (arguing that ‘the deterrence of corporate wrongdoing is what we can 
and should expect from class action’). 
78
 See for instance: F.WEBER, Towards an Optimal Mix of Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Law, 2012, 
519 p. (doctoral dissertation). 
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care.
80
 In a 1984 seminal work, SHAVELL however highlighted that neither regulation nor litigation alone 
enables an efficient control of risks, because neither can alone force parties to take the desirable level of 
precaution. Rather, he observed that a joint and complementary use of both regulation and litigation could 
be socially beneficial.
81
 This idea is nowadays particularly salient in competition law where private 
enforcement is presented as a useful complement to the public enforcement conducted by competition 
agencies.
82
  Additionally, as pointed out by the French Economic Council, in simple and static situations 
where contracts and products remain unmodified throughout long periods, detailed regulation could 
theoretically allow better consumers’ protection. However, in practice, it appears that regulation at the 
time when it is implemented is already one-step behind when compared to the evolutions of products. 
Therefore, ‘it is while facing ex post litigation that ex ante regulation may adapt’.83    
    
 Mass Devices: a Catalyst for Regulatory Changes?  
 
   
Literature proposes a third path of analysis which focuses on the dynamic interactions between mass 
litigation and regulation. In this view, mass devices are considered as both a catalyst for regulatory 
changes and a tool for circumventing legislative inertia. HARNAY and MARCIANO for instance argue 
that mass procedures are rent-seeking technologies which enable groups to enhance their own political 
agenda.
84
 Similarly to traditional rent-seeking models where litigants’ legal expenditures are compared to 
a private investment aimed at influencing the court’s final decision, mass procedures are employed by 
large groups to target and achieve identified policy outcomes. These devices may thus force potential 
infringers to comply with specific rules in a way that would be similar to lobbying in the political arena.  
                                                          
80
 J. KLICK and E. HELLAND, ‘The Trade-offs between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class 
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On a broader scale, RAMELLO also considers that aggregate litigation can play a cornerstone role in 
fostering regulatory innovation.
85
 It produces a set of inputs - such as knowledge and information on a 
particular event or product - that are necessary to the implementation of any further regulation. Group 
procedures are therefore viewed as ‘incubators’ or as an ‘R&D laboratory in which plaintiffs act as a 
proxy for society and the judicial solution serves as a prototype for regulatory change’. Whether this role 
of catalyst is actually due to mass litigation or more broadly to litigation itself remains nonetheless an 
open question. Indeed, in countries where mass litigation devices were until very recently not available, 
simple (individual) litigation has already driven important regulatory evolutions.
86
 In any case, both in the 
form of individual or mass disputes, litigation may enhance regulatory evolutions. The high number of 
persons involved in mass disputes may strongly incentivize policy-makers to adapt their legislation. 
 
c) Changes in Behaviour: Contrasted Evidence 
 
\ 
An increase in the likelihood of being sued should incentivize wrongdoers to internalize the costs of their 
misconduct. This may a fortiori lead to changes in defendants’ behaviour.87 Additionally, legal scholars 
have pointed out that group procedures can have positive externalities, for instance, on contractual terms 
or on companies’ information obligation to consumers.88  To this day, it remains however difficult to draw 
clear-cut conclusions regarding Europe since most of the existing European mechanisms have only been 
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recently implemented.
89
 To avoid the analysis being blocked at its threshold, the American experiment can 
here be used as a laboratory. Insights from empirical research conducted on Securities Class Actions 
(hereafter ‘SCA’) - albeit drawn from a specific context which may ultimately depart from other mass 
torts - have revealed contrasted evidence on the effectiveness of mass devices for changing behaviour. 
On the one hand, while analysing the banking sector, DALLA PELLEGRINA and SARACENO found 
evidence that SCAs tended to incentivize bank managers to reduce their excessive risk positions.
90
  
Moreover - and contrary to previous researches which claimed that shareholders’ litigation was an 
inefficient instrument for corporate governance
91
 - HUMPHERY-JENNER used the analysis of 416 SCAs 
over a period covering 1996-2007 to shed light on its disciplinary effect on companies’ chief executive 
officers and chief financial officers.
92
          
On the other hand, other empirical research has suggested that the degree of behavioural changes may be 
in practice more limited than foreseen. HELLAND for example found that, on average, there is little 
evidence of   SCAs’ negative effect on board members’ reputation93. Furthermore, in their investigation of 
827 SCAs filed between 1996 and 2005, ROGERS and VAN BUSKIRK found no evidence showing that 
companies responded to litigation by increasing disclosure to investors.
94
 Instead, when comparing pre- 
and post- litigation companies’ behaviour, they reported a significant decrease in the post-litigation 
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disclosure, showing a companies’ willingness to reduce the probabilities of being later held accountable 
for the information issued.    
Finally, on an intermediate level, BAI, COX and THOMAS found empirical evidence revealing the 
dubious effect of SCAs. Even though SCAs resulted in no significant decline in sales opportunities for 
defendant companies, the authors nonetheless shed some light on the negative consequences associated 
with class lawsuits, such as notably liquidity problems or a reduced efficiency when the lawsuit is 
pending.
95
 As a matter of fact, additional empirical research is needed to clarify this matter.  
 
2.2.3. Preliminary Conclusion 
 
 
This first section was aimed at shedding light on mass devices viewed as a remedy for market failures. 
Among the many benefits that have been discussed, mass proceedings are likely to decrease plaintiffs’ 
rational apathy and rational disinterest; enhancing compensation; enabling a better coordination through a 
pooling of resources and knowledge; altering the balance of powers and levelling the playing field 
between litigants; promoting judicial economy; filling the gaps left uncovered by individual litigation and 
regulation; increasing deterrence; enhancing behavioural changes and fostering regulatory evolution. As it 
will be discussed in this research, a prioritization of these objectives is still often lacking and this may 
importantly influence the behaviour of those who are in charge of the monitoring of mass disputes. Yet, as 
the Roman two-faced god Janus, benefits and costs of mass litigation are the two sides of the same coin.
96
 
A clear understanding of those costs is therefore necessary.  
 
*  
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2.3. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH MASS LITIGATION DEVICES 
 
European discussions about the undesirable effects of mass proceedings have extensively been clouded by 
the American experience with class actions. Their alleged detrimental consequences have been overstated 
in the literature: the spectre of a ‘Frankenstein Monster’, which came to life for good reasons but 
ultimately turned out to have unexpected and disastrous effects for business and companies, is often 
referred to by those who fiercely oppose the implementation of similar tools in Europe.
97
 Conversely, 
others have viewed the abuses of the American class action as mere by-products of the American legal 
system and of its ‘toxic cocktail’ mixing punitive damages, contingency fees, pre-trial discovery and opt-
out system.
98
 Between these two extremes, a more balanced and nuanced approach lies in the middle: 
While pointing out that ‘abuses [can be found] everywhere’, HODGES argues that the main issue that any 
mass proceeding fundamentally faces is ‘the role that is played by money, who gains it at whose 
expense’,99 or, in economic jargon how wealth and risks are ultimately distributed among participants in 
such circumstances. A sound understanding of the costs induced by mass procedures is therefore an 
important step.
100
 Such costs can be assessed from the viewpoints of claimants (2.3.1), defendants (2.3.3), 
and judges (2.3.3).  
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 2.3.1. Costs from the Viewpoint of Claimants 
 
Costs and abuses may result from the group structure (a) and/or from its monitoring (b). 
 
 
a) Costs and Abuses associated with the Group Structure 
 
Two main points can be a source of costs and abuses regarding the group’s structure: The first concerns 
the potential high transaction costs to which plaintiffs are exposed when they want to proceed as a group; 
the second focuses on the lack of homogeneity within the group which may ultimately undermine the 
efficiency of the whole proceeding.   
 
 
 Coordination Costs 
 
 
When compared to a succession of individual lawsuits, mass proceedings enable plaintiffs to benefit from 
economies of scale. Yet, at the same time, they also create new transaction and coordination costs within 
the group which can have detrimental effects for plaintiffs. Noticing such ambivalence, CASSONE and 
RAMELLO have compared aggregate litigation to ‘congestible goods’101 where an increase in the number 
of plaintiffs may at some point negatively affect the benefits that are drawn by its members. Obviously, 
the nature of such costs depends on the design of the procedures: they may be pecuniary and refer to the 
participation fees that plaintiffs can have to pay when they want to take part in the action; or, as stressed 
by SARACENO, can also be non-pecuniary, such as the time that plaintiffs have to wait before the 
prerequisites allowing plaintiffs to proceed as a group are met.
102
 Crucially, the question is therefore 
whether the costs arising from the structure of the group ultimately outweigh the economies of scale that 
have previously been identified. In this respect, SARACENO has observed that even though mass 
proceedings may enable economies of scale from defendants’ viewpoint, they also tend to increase 
plaintiffs’ transaction costs. In such circumstances, she concludes, mass litigation does not necessarily 
improve deterrence but rather produces new asymmetrical relationships between litigants.
103
 Obviously, 
one of the main objectives that had initially been attached to mass proceedings – i.e. levelling the playing 
field between defendants and plaintiffs – may not be reached. Far from being suppressed, the systemic 
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disequilibrium between litigants previously identified by ROSENBERG
104
  is here simply transposed to a 
higher stage. 
 
  
 Heterogeneity of Claimants 
 
The legal and economic literature on mass litigation posits that a degree of homogeneity among claimants 
is a prerequisite for the success of the proceeding.
105
 Conversely, heterogeneity among claimants may 
make more difficult standardized judicial intervention. Interestingly, in his historical outlook, YEAZELL 
has shown that the question of group’s heterogeneity was initially not an issue in the infancy of mass 
litigation. During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, group litigation in England took place in stratified 
and hierarchical feudal societies where groups already existed as social entities independently of the 
lawsuit.
106
 They were composed of peasants working under the authority of same tenants, parishioners 
belonging to the same parish or neighbours living in the same village. Group lawsuits focused on issues of 
status rather than on individual claims. They were also strongly associated with pre-existent and well-
structured social bodies. A comparable analysis has been conducted in other countries, such as for instance 
Japan.
107
 During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the social link in modern and industrial societies 
however weakened. Two doctrines then competed to become the rationale of the class action theory. The 
first one, known as 'the community of interest theory', posited that claimants shared a common legal right. 
The second, known as 'the consent theory', focused on the sharing among parties of common questions of 
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fact and laws.
108
 Under the impulse of social and economic developments, former structured social groups 
which stood at the core of seventeenth century’s group litigation were progressively replaced by atomized 
individuals sharing fewer similarities. Modern group litigation artificially recreated a form of group 
cohesion via the notion of shared harm and shared interest which progressively became the main link 
between group members.
109
 This evolution is nowadays visible in the terminology that has progressively 
been employed to refer to collective litigation: aggregate litigation (‘aggregate’ referring to a mere 
collection of single items)
110
 has progressively challenged the use of the holistic concept of group 
litigation. 
While being aware that the question of homogeneity among plaintiffs was pivotal, American policymakers 
were initially reluctant to extend the use of class actions to mass tort and mass accidents. As the 1966 
Advisory Committee note on the amendment of Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
highlighted, ‘a mass accident resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a 
class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and 
defences of liability, would be present, affecting the individual in different ways, as a class action would 
degenerate in practice in multiple lawsuits separately tried’.111  
From an economic perspective, the problem of heterogeneity is also cornerstone since group devices may 
potentially act as a magnet for weak and frivolous claimants tempted to use the procedure to obtain more 
than their lawsuits are worth. A lawsuit is deemed ‘frivolous’ if a plaintiff is aware of the weakness of his 
claim, which is for instance due to a lack of evidence supporting the claim.
112
 Economic models of 
frivolous lawsuits usually consider that such opportunistic behaviours result from cost and informational 
asymmetries. In their model of frivolous litigation focusing on asymmetric costs, SHAVELL and 
ROSENBERG have for instance shown that even in situations where both plaintiff and defendant are fully 
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informed about the merits of the claim, frivolous lawsuits may subsist because of the cost that the 
defendant still has to bear to defend itself (costs of responding).
113
 In such a situation, the claimant files a 
frivolous lawsuit while assuming that the defendant will be tempted to propose a settlement offer for an 
amount less than or equal to the company’s costs of responding.114 Other economic models have focused 
on situations of informational asymmetries between litigants. In such circumstances, plaintiffs or 
defendants are likely to take advantage of the private information that they have in their possession. For 
instance, a plaintiff may be willing to file because he anticipates that the defendant knows nothing or only 
little about the merits of his claim.
115
  
Importantly, the presence of weak plaintiffs can have detrimental effects on the claimant group. First, 
weak plaintiffs may be tempted to free ride on high-value claimants and to take benefit from the presence 
of outliers (stronger claimants) in the group. This point will be further discussed in the behavioural 
developments of this research (Chapter 5).  Second, ULEN has argued that a company anticipating that 
weak claims are likely to predominate within the group may theoretically be tempted to offer lower 
settlement amounts. This situation leads to ‘a transfer of wealth from those with strong claims to those 
with weak claims’.116 Therefore, the pressure of weak claimants acts as ‘a death spiral’ where strong 
plaintiffs are incentivized to opt out in order to file individually. Put simply, the group may adversely 
attract weak and low-value claims, while deterring high-value claimants.
117
 In this race-to-the-bottom, 
defendants are incentivized to offer lower and lower amounts since they anticipate that the overall value of 
the group is continuously decreasing in the absence of strong claimants. Even though such a situation 
might in practice be unlikely since strong claimants are neither necessarily aware of the value attached to 
their claims nor of the weaknesses of others, this argument highlights the risks associated with the group’s 
heterogeneity.   Third, psychological insights have revealed that heterogeneity within the group can 
exacerbate plaintiffs’ asymmetric attitudes towards risk. When referring to the Prospect Theory’s fourfold 
pattern of risk attitudes aimed at depicting individuals’ decision-making under risky conditions, it appears 
that high-merits claimants are more likely to be risk-averse whereas low-merits claimants are more likely 
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to be risk-seeker.
118
 Therefore, an increase in the group’s heterogeneity leads to an increase in plaintiffs’ 
risk-preferences asymmetries. This point may be a source of concern since ‘litigation risk preferences (…) 
create perverse results: plaintiffs with shoddy claims have a negotiation advantage, and plaintiffs with 
strong claims face a negotiation disadvantage’. 119 As a matter of fact, heterogeneity within the group of 
claimants may jeopardize settlement negotiations, leading ultimately to suboptimal deterrence. 
For these reasons, the group structure is a key issue upon which the whole efficiency of the procedure can 
ultimately depend. Therefore, an external supervision aimed at filtering weak from stronger claims so as to 
ensure a degree of homogeneity within the group appears necessary.  
 
b) Costs and Abuses vis-à-vis Group Monitoring 
 
 
In the context of mass disputes, specificities of individual cases tend to be diluted in order to allow 
plaintiffs to proceed as a group. From a strict legal point of view, this is as a revolution since the 
traditional paradigm of civil justice usually focuses on the individual and his autonomy as reference 
point.
120
 From an economic point of view, the disappearance of individual claimants behind the group 
poses several problems. The first regards their apathy with regards to the group monitoring and their 
incentives to free-ride on the costs borne by other group members. The second concerns the risk of seeing 
class counsels, either lawyers or associations, acting as an agent departing from the interests of his 
principals. 
 Free-riding 
  
OLSON has pointed out a key issue which has important implications for the understanding of mass 
proceedings: group’s latency tends to increase with the number of participants. 121 Individuals are not 
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incentivized to take the lead because they anticipate that their sole intervention has only a small impact on 
the final decision. Facing the risk of apathy from its members, the group suffers from a lack of monitoring 
and no plaintiff is alone willing to bear monitoring costs. Instead, each participant has a strong incentive to 
free-ride on the costs borne by the others.
122
 The role played by the group counsel, or by the association if 
this latter is in charge of the group’s coordination, appears then pivotal to reducing this apathy.  
 
 Principal-Agent Problems with Lawyers 
 
From a legal perspective, concerns have been expressed regarding the prominent role assigned to class 
counsels, specifically in the framework of the American class action. As an observer pointed out, ‘in a 
dispute where the lawyer has one hundred clients, he has in reality none. He is his own client and the 
master of the dispute since he is the one who has the greatest economic interest in the dispute’.123 
Interestingly, this remark finds an echo in the Law and Economics literature: SCHAEFER considers 
indeed that in such circumstances ‘the client takes a backstage position and ceases to be the determining 
factor in the litigation’. In this situation, he adds, ‘the behaviour of the lawyer will almost entirely be 
influenced by the incentives of the fee system’.124  Points of view however diverge on whether 
entrepreneurial lawyers seeking their own financial profit through mass proceedings adversely affect or, 
conversely, enhance the efficiency of mass procedures.
125
. 
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Agency costs between counsels and clients already exist in individual litigation: informational 
asymmetries usually make sound assessment of lawyers’ performance hardly feasible.126 In the framework 
of mass litigation, the Law and Economics literature also considers this topic as a cornerstone question 
upon which the benefits associated with the proceeding may depend.
127
 The principal-agent problem will 
be more extensively addressed in the coming developments of this thesis (Chapter 4). At this point, one 
should nonetheless already note that principal-agent problems occur when the incentives of a principal 
(here, the plaintiffs) and their agent (the counsel) are not fully aligned. The lack of monitoring allows 
rational group counsels to seek their own financial interest at the expense of the plaintiffs’ one. 
Represented claimants indeed cannot be certain that their lawyers fully dedicate the necessary amounts of 
time and effort to defend their claim.
128
  Furthermore, just as few, if any, of the individual plaintiffs would 
have incentives to file the lawsuit, few, if any, would have any incentive to monitor the lawyers who 
represent the class. As previously suggested by SCHAEFER, the counsel’s system of remuneration is 
decisive and will be one of the driving force leading counsels to eventually digress from their clients’ 
interest.
129
 More specifically, fees are likely to have an impact on lawyers’ incentives to drive the group, 
to speed up or slow down the proceeding
130
.  
Principal-agent problems can have detrimental effects on settlement agreements and on compensation 
amounts awarded to plaintiffs. It is indeed a commonplace in the American literature to highlight the 
controversies arising from the so-called sweetheart settlements where the group counsel tends to maximize 
his fees while settling the dispute for amounts that are inferior to the aggregated value of the plaintiffs’ 
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claims.
131
 Another well-known example regards the use of coupons where the compensation of plaintiffs 
takes the form of discounts on future purchase of services or goods, while representative lawyers in turn 
benefit from large monetary fees.
132
 As a general rule, economists have been opposed to the use of this 
compensation technique because it enables defendants to escape the financial burden of the settlement, 
mostly through an ex post increase in the prices paid by other consumers who are alien to the dispute.
133
 
 
 Principal/Agents Problems with Associations 
 
Finally, since mass proceedings in Europe may ask for an enhanced intervention of associations, one may 
wonder whether principal-agent problems are reduced, or conversely increased, due to the intervention of 
associations.
134
 On the one hand, one may argue that litigation in which a representative organization 
litigates on behalf of its members may suffer less from agency problems than the American style class 
action where a lawyer litigates on behalf of a few named plaintiffs, especially if the members can impact 
the way in which the organization acts, and if the organization is truly representing the interest of its 
members.
135
 Representative organizations have also reputational reasons to act in the interest of their 
clients (the members of the organization), more so than lawyers in class actions, where the individual 
plaintiffs are rationally apathetic and hence will not monitor the lawyer adequately. Third, one could 
reserve standing for organizations which have already proven to be truly representative for their members. 
In practice however, many ad hoc organizations are created in order to represent the interests of victims. It 
is thus difficult or impossible for victims to assess the quality of these organizations.
136
 Finally, in 
settlement negotiations with the defendant(s), a representative organization has a better bargaining 
position as compared to the plaintiffs in class actions (because the association as a repeat player has an 
information advantage over the one-shot individual victims and because the association will be less risk 
averse than individual plaintiffs), so that the settlement result will likely be better for the represented 
victims. However, notwithstanding these issues, one cannot rule out the possibility that a representative 
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organization will not always act in the best interest of its members, for example because of publicity 
reasons or simply because the costs and benefits of the organization are not perfectly aligned with those of 
the members. As SCHAEFER has observed, the agency chain may be extended with associations: 
opportunistic behaviour may emerge not only from the group’s counsel but also from the association 
whose behaviour can also be driven by its own interest.
137
  
From the point of view of deterrence, the latitude given to lawyers and/or associations may thus 
undermine the overall efficiency of the proceedings and render necessary a sound supervision of the 
group’s monitor.      
 
 The Funding of Mass Litigation 
 
Abuses associated with mass litigation devices strongly depend on the way mass disputes are funded. This 
issue however seems nowadays still overlooked by many European policymakers.
138
 Funding has turned 
out to be a significant barrier to the functioning of mass procedures. These procedures are indeed usually 
long and highly costly for those who have initiated them and for defendants targeted by mass claims.
139
 It 
is unlikely that plaintiffs’ associations will alone be able to support such costs. Associations may thus 
refuse to support or file mass claims – and mass proceedings will therefore remain inefficient - as long as 
appropriate funding is not provided. However, uncontrolled funding may lead to problems too. This 
dilemma has been pertinently stressed by HODGES who writes that ‘concerns over excesses and abuses 
all arise from the consequences of unbalanced funding mechanisms when coupled with powerful mass 
procedures’.140 Put simply, funding has therefore progressively become the alpha and omega of mass 
litigation: without funding, proceedings will be doomed to failure, but too much funding will create wrong 
incentives for parties, and abuses may therefore multiply.  
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2.3.2 Costs from the Viewpoint of Defendants and Society at Large 
 
It is commonplace for companies and their representatives to denounce the considerable financial burden 
associated with mass devices.
141
 Racketeering and legalised blackmail, decrease in competitiveness, 
excessive reputational costs are among concerns that are usually set forth. On a broader scale, society at 
large can also be impaired by such abuses.  
Legal and Law and Economics scholars have extensively relied on the opinion of judge POSNER in In Re 
Rhône-Poulenc Rorer Inc. to illustrate the risks of legalised blackmail. In his decision, Judge POSNER 
argued that the certification of class action lawsuits could expose defendants to ‘an irresistible pressure to 
settle on disadvantageous terms’ regardless of the merits of plaintiffs’ claims142. This point of view has 
been completed by PRIEST who similarly suggested that enabling plaintiffs to proceed as a group 
provides them with ‘an extraordinary power even where the underlying claim is meritless’.143 This 
situation can be explained in terms of asymmetric relationship between plaintiffs and defendants: 
asymmetries of costs, asymmetries of information and risk-preferences asymmetries. It is also explained 
by the considerable reputational costs that defendants have to bear as soon as mass claims are filed. As a 
consequence, the idea previously stated which argued that mass litigation tends to cap companies’ 
exposure to reputational costs now appears more ambiguous when viewed from this new perspective. 
Empirical research conducted by KOKU on the American class action suggested that market’s reactions to 
class action litigation are, on average, twice as much as the market’s reactions to individual lawsuits. 
Indeed, the effects associated with class action lawsuits are likely to be spread over a longer period of time 
and, crucially, can be a source of extensive media coverage.
144
 Therefore, even when a claim appears 
meritless, defendants may be tempted to settle rapidly in order to minimize their reputational costs and 
circumvent the adverse effects of the dispute. 
The perspective of claimants extracting unjustified settlements from a potential non-wrongdoer is a source 
of concern among stakeholders. From an economic point of view, such abuses may indeed adversely 
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affect the entire rationale of mass devices and possibly lead to situations of over-deterrence. In response to 
these threats, companies may be incentivized to adopt strategic behaviour so as to reduce their exposure to 
risks. Companies may for instance rationally adapt their behaviour by increasing their prices or shifting 
from high-risk to lower-risk activities.
145
 As pointed out by DEFFAINS, DORIAT-DUBAN and 
LANGLAIS, companies may also be incentivized to seek liability evasion strategies by structuring their 
activities in such way that they will be less exposed to potential lawsuits.
146
 The social costs of deficient 
mass proceedings appear then considerable. External supervision is thus here again necessary to lower 
such costs.  
 
2.3.3. Costs from the Viewpoint of Judges 
 
As previously shown, from the judiciary’s viewpoint, mass proceedings enable economies of scale and 
avoid a depletion of judicial resources. Yet, as MARCUS has observed, this argument remains ‘an 
ambivalent justification’.147 A nuanced approach should therefore prevail for several reasons. 
First, easing the vindication of small claims forces the judiciary to deal with lawsuits that would not have 
been filed previously. As a direct consequence, it may increase judicial caseload. In economic terms, this 
concern can be better understood as a fear of seeing small claims causing a new commons problem from 
the judiciary’s viewpoint. This issue appears thus closely connected to another which goes beyond the 
scope of this research, namely the socially optimal amount of civil litigation. A few empirical studies 
conducted so far tend nonetheless to suggest that the implementation of mass proceedings in European 
countries has neither been followed by a ‘plaintiffs’ rush to the courts’ nor by the emergence of a so-called 
‘litigation culture’.148  
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Second, the assumption stating that mass proceedings can facilitate judicial economies of scale tends to 
consider all mass claims as fungible or similar. It does not take into account their obvious idiosyncrasies 
in terms of complexity. Yet, many mass disputes are likely to be burdensome for judiciaries and may 
consequently require more time and resources than individual lawsuits.
149
 Empirical research on this 
question provides no clear indication. The added-value of mass proceedings from the judiciary’s angle 
will ultimately depend on the judge’s ability to monitor the procedure, on its efforts to drive litigants’ 
behaviours, and ultimately, on the nature of the legal issues that they will have to tackle. Further 
developments of this research will shed light on these important issues.  
 
2.3.4. Preliminary Conclusion 
 
Depending on the peculiarities of the procedure, the costs attached to mass litigation devices may differ.
150
 
Mass procedures’ design can be regarded as a trade-off between several and legitimate objectives that 
Legislature may want to achieve. More specifically, CALABRESI notes that ‘the choices about the shape 
(…) hence reflect foundational judgments about the proper allocation of costs’.151 This section was 
intended to shed light on the fact that costs and abuses may emerge at different stages of the procedure 
(namely, before, during and at the end) and between different stakeholders (within the group, between the 
group and its counsel/association, between the group and the defendants and vis-à-vis the judiciary).   
 
      * 
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2.4. CONCLUSION - A NEED FOR THIRD-PARTY MONITORING: A ROLE FOR 
JUDGES? 
 
This chapter was aimed at discussing the benefits and costs attached to mass proceedings in order to 
finally highlight the need for a sound third-party monitoring. Filtering weak claims, gate-keeping, setting 
the bargaining process between litigants and between litigants and their counsels, supervising settlement 
agreements and the distribution stage are among the key steps necessary to ensure that mass proceedings 
meet their social objectives at lower social costs. Selecting the right supervisor and the right set of 
monitoring tools is therefore as a second key step.  
Several safeguards can be envisaged.
152
  While arguing that ‘class action litigation may have net social 
benefit but only under relatively narrow circumstances that requires relatively close court supervision’, 
ULEN has suggested that judges could be an interesting option.
153
 COOTER shares a similar opinion and 
supports judicial intervention in cases ‘whose effects are diffuse’. He observes, in this respect, that public 
judges are more likely to take into account the interests of a dispersed class of individuals, than private 
judges who often will merely focus on the two parties standing in front of them with little consideration 
for third parties.
154
 Relying on judges is the choice made in the United States where, as shown in coming 
developments, judges usually play active roles for the conduct and management of class action lawsuits. 
Interestingly, current discussions in Europe tend to follow a similar approach. A strong judicial 
monitoring is indeed an option discussed and spearheaded by many European stakeholders. Despite the 
wide diversity of replies that the EU Commission received to its 2011 public consultation on collective 
redress, a majority of  participants ‘unanimously agree that the judge should have a central role as a case 
manager and gatekeeper’.155 Furthermore and as already highlighted, the EU Commission also indicated in 
its 2013 Recommendations the essential role that should fall on courts in this domain.
156
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One may however wonder why policymakers do ultimately rely on judges. This question is an important 
one because referring to judges seems to be nowadays paradoxical.
157
  In recent times, a strong emphasis 
has indeed been placed on out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms in order to disengorge courtrooms 
and lower judicial workload.
158 One may however find in judges’ neutrality and independence a first 
possible explanation. As judge WEINSTEIN - who was personally involved in several class action 
lawsuits - has observed, ‘when so many discordant voices are heard and so much money is at stake, a hand 
with no financial interest in the outcome is necessary to impose order and discipline and avoid chaos’.159 
Moreover, claims for judicial intervention tend to be strongly supported by politicians who believe that 
‘courts can [ultimately] do it better’.160 SCHUCK has pertinently noticed such a legislative inertia, and 
argued that legislatures might ‘refuse to confront so controversial an issue as mass tort policy, involving as 
it does powerful political interests, enormous sums of money, serious human sufferings, conflicting values 
and so forth (…)’. 161 The author furthermore stressed that ‘the scientific, legal, economic, political and 
social conditions relevant to mass injuries are too complex and fluid to permit an adequate legislative 
response’.162 The subsequent chapters of this research will investigate the different roles assigned to 
judges for the conduct of mass proceedings and, later on, referring to economic theories, question their 
abilities to fulfil such tasks. 
 
*** 
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Chapter 3 
  
   JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN MASS LITIGATION 
 
What Kind of Judges Do Policymakers Expect to Resolve Mass Disputes? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When writing that ‘the judiciary (…) has no influence over the sword or the purse, no direction of either 
of the strength or of the wealth of a society and can take no active resolution whatever’,163 HAMILTON 
could not have anticipated the increasing role assigned to the judiciary in modern societies, and still less in 
the particular framework of mass litigation. As ROTHSTEIN and WILLGING have commented on the 
American experience, class actions have progressively required judges ‘to play a unique role: the high 
stakes of the litigation heighten [their] responsibilities’.164 A similar observation also applies to European 
judiciaries when monitoring mass proceedings.
165
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Sérénité’, Petites Affiches, 10 June 2005, p.11 (for an insight from Québec). 
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 S. AMRANI-MEKKI, ‘Rapport spécial dans le domaine de la justice’, in: C. PRIETO (Ed.), Cohérence 
Européenne des recours collectifs – Réponse à la Consultation publique de la Commission Européenne, Trans 
Europe Experts, Société de législation comparée, vol.2, 2011, p.269 (highlighting :‘the role of the judge is 
undeniably strengthened in the realm of collective redress proceedings’. Translation from the author. In French:‘il est 
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‘What the courts should be doing, how they should act in these 
cases, and how they should cooperate present very difficult 
problems. I hope in the future more academics will come into the 
field to see how we are operating’.                               
                  J.B.WEINSTEIN* 
‘Clarity of an idea is more a need of the mind yearning for security 
than a representation of the complex realities of life.’ 
       R.DEMOGUE ** 
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3.1.1. Where Are We?  
 
The preceding chapter stressed the underlying economic rationale of mass litigation requiring a strong 
monitor in order to ensure that its associated costs do not outweigh its associated benefits. On this 
occasion, it was highlighted that a majority of European stakeholders nowadays wants to give to judges 
this key role. 
 
Going a step further, this chapter focuses on the anatomy of mass proceedings as a way to clarify the roles 
that are expected from judges by the law. The admissibility of the claim, the case management, the 
settlement and distribution stages are among the most critical duties that judges must endorse when 
monitoring mass cases. For matters of clarity, a choice is made to refer to a pastoral allegory featuring a 
watchdog, a cattle driver and a good shepherd as an attempt to canvass the different dimensions of the 
expected judicial intervention. Like the watchdog protecting the herd against external threats, the judiciary 
is asked to behave as a filter ensuring the group’s viability and scrutinizing the overall admissibility of the 
proceeding. Like the cattle driver who actively leads the herd to its final destination, judges should ensure 
that cases make orderly progress and avoid the pitfalls associated with these complex and lengthy 
procedures. Finally, just as a good shepherd keeps track of his stray sheep, judges must take care of the 
parties’ different interests and supervise a final outcome deemed fair and equitable to all participants, and 
specifically to those who are absent or represented throughout the proceeding. Portraying judges as 
watchdogs, cattle drivers and good shepherds is obviously a simplification. This classification is motivated 
by a desire to propose to readers an alternative to a lengthy list cataloguing all judicial tasks which, 
without any red thread, could be perceived as piecemeal. As suggested by DEMOGUE’s words 
introducing this chapter, proceeding this way may help better understand complex realities.   
 
A clarification must be addressed regarding the parameters employed to construct these three categories. 
The judge-watchdog mostly intervenes at the initial steps of the procedure. Under the heading ‘watchdog’ 
are encompassed all tasks by which judges control and screen the admissibility of the group claim and 
filter weaker or frivolous parties. The judge-cattle driver principally concerns the judicial case 
management. The category ‘cattle driver’ encompasses cases management techniques as well as all tasks 
by which judges ensure that cases make orderly progresses towards their final resolution. Finally, the 
judge-shepherd mostly refers to the denouement of the procedure. This category encompasses all tasks by 
which judges ensure that the interests of absent or represented parties are respected. In this view, judges 
will scrutinize possible opportunistic behaviour which could ultimately deprive parties from the benefits 
of the procedure. For matters of clarity, these three roles are hereafter successively addressed, even though 
they remain closely intertwined in practice. 
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3.1.2..Methodology and Objectives  
 
There are many procedural ways to handle mass disputes. The choice is made to narrow down the analysis 
by specifically focusing on five selected mass proceedings. They are drawn from three European countries 
- namely France, the Netherlands and England - and from the United States. They are namely the French 
Group Action, the Dutch Collective Settlement of Mass Claim (WCAM), the English Group Litigation 
Order (GLO) and the US Federal Class Action. The British Draft on Court Rules for Collective 
Proceeding is also retained, even though this proceeding has not been formally implemented into the 
English legal system. Among many others, these five procedures are different examples of a so-called 
‘procedural collectivization’.166 Their respective procedural designs importantly diverge.167 Yet, despite 
their particularities, they tend to share more similarities than divergences when viewed from the 
perspective of judicial intervention. Indeed, as shown in Chapter 2, mass litigation tends to raise the same 
type of concerns across jurisdictions.   
 
Inevitably, every choice induces opportunity costs. Readers might therefore object that other procedures 
could have been included into these developments.  Several reasons can nevertheless be set forth to justify 
and defend this choice. First, these proceedings have been implemented or discussed in countries with 
different legal cultures and traditions. Even though significant divergences may exist between legal 
systems, France and the Netherlands can be regarded as Civil Law countries, whereas England and the 
United States are representatives of the Common Law tradition. Traditionally, judges do not play the same 
roles nor have an identical status in both legal systems.
168
 Second, these proceedings greatly differ in 
terms of design. As later explained, some of them may be viewed as collective actions, other as 
representative proceedings or finally as consolidation tools. Despite their respective particularities, 
cornerstone roles have each time been assigned to the judiciary for the conduct and supervision of the 
proceeding. Third, under the impulse of different European actors, comparative studies have recently 
mushroomed in order to clarify the scope of judges’ powers in European mass proceedings.169 These 
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 S.C. YEAZELL, ‘Collective Litigation as Collective Action’, University of Illinois Law Review, 1989, n°1, pp.43-
68. 
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 EU Commission, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794 Final, 27 November 2008. 
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 J. MERRYMAN and R. PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 12 (observing that Civil Law judges are ‘not culture 
heroes or parental figures (…). Their image is that of civil servant who performs important but essentially uncreative  
function, at p.34); A.GARAPON and I.PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 12. Differences between Civil and Common 
Law judges regarding status within the judiciary will be more extensively discussed in Chapter 4.  
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 E. FALLA, A. PUTTEMANS and H. BOULARBAH, ‘Powers of the Judge in Collective Redress Proceedings’, 
Research Paper submitted to the European Consumers’ Organization -BEUC, February 2012, hereafter referred to as 
‘Report –Powers of Judges’ (their analysis focuses on collective proceedings available in Italy, Portugal, Germany, 
England & Wales, Sweden and Spain). 
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studies constitute a key starting point. Yet, they have omitted some national proceedings that are of great 
interest. This is for instance the case of the Dutch WCAM which is unique and unprecedented in Europe. 
Importantly, the Dutch proceeding has also recently shown long-lasting cross-borders implications. This is 
also the case of the French group action recently adopted by the French Legislature after decades of 
hesitations. When selecting these different procedures, this chapter is ultimately intended to enlarge the 
scope of the existing comparative research in this field. Fourth and finally, the American class action has 
been a source of a considerable attention from academics and policymakers. As further highlighted, 
judicial intervention in mass claims in both Europe and the United States shares interesting similarities. 
Insights about its functioning may thus provide valuable lessons for its understanding in the European 
context.
170
   
 
 
 
3.1.3. The Chapter in a Nutshell  
 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. The various missions assigned to judges in the monitoring of 
mass claims are first clarified. As a way to preliminary set the background, the design of mass proceedings 
– first, on a broader stage; then, narrowed down to the particular proceedings here retained– is presented 
(3.2). Then, based on the comparative analysis of procedural rules and – if applicable - case law, the roles 
of judges as watchdogs (3.3), cattle drivers (3.4) and good shepherds (3.5) are presented. In doing so, the 
goal is to encapsulate the main elements constituting the backbone of the judicial intervention in mass 
claims, and to show that, from the perspective of the judicial intervention at least, there are in this field 
more similarities than divergences (3.6). Then, extrapolating from this initial analysis, the chapter 
ultimately attempts to identify the kind of ‘mass litigation judges’ that policymakers ultimately expect on 
such circumstances (3.7).  
 
 
 
 
 
* 
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 R.  MARCUS, ‘America’s Dynamic and Extensive Experience with Collective Litigation’, in: C. HODGES and 
A. STADLER (Eds), Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and settlements of Mass Claims, Edwar Elgar Publishing, 
2013  (observing : ‘the US experience is both a target for criticism and a source of ideas that might be usefully 
adopted or adapted’, at p.148). 
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3.2.  THE DESIGN OF MASS PROCEEDINGS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
In order to preliminary set the background, the theoretical classifications usually made to address mass 
proceedings’ design are first clarified on a general level (3.2.1). The contextual and procedural 
characteristics of the specific mass proceedings retained as red threads are then presented (3.2.2).  
 
 
3.2.1. Theoretical Classification  
 
 
a) Collective Action, Representative Proceeding and Consolidation Tool 
 
 
Different categorizations may be retained to define mass litigation devices. Noteworthy is a willingness 
among European policymakers to exclude the term class action from their vocabulary since this 
terminology appears too closely associated with the controversial American experience.
171
 Following the 
path taken by several Law and Economics scholars,
172
 the concepts of collective action led by private 
individual(s), representative proceeding brought by associations or specified bodies, and consolidations 
tool 
173
 are hereafter clarified.
174
    
 
 
 Collective action 
 
 
 A collective action is brought by one or several harmed individuals (named ‘leading plaintiffs’) on behalf 
of a group of people with related or similar claims. All group members are bound by the final judgment or 
the approved settlement. They are ultimately entitled to enforce their rights in accordance with the judge’s 
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 E. KODEK, ‘Collective Redress in Austria’ in: D. HENSLER, C. HODGES, M. TULIBACKA (Eds.), ‘The 
Globalization of Class Actions’, (622) The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 
2009, p.86-94 (observing that, in Austria, drafters purposely avoided the term class action and preferred the term 
group litigation).   
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 R. VAN DEN BERGH and L.T. VISSCHER, supra note 73; S.KESKE, supra note 82. 
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 C. HODGES, supra note 56, at pp.2-3 (from a legal perspective, the distinction between collective action and 
representative action is blurred since both types of actions may per se be regarded as representational lawsuits. 
Following a different classification,  the author considers for example that there is mainly two broad models of court-
based aggregated procedures: ‘one in which a single claim represents a group of others, and a second in which a 
number of individual claims are brought and grouped together because of their similarities’).  
174
 For an alternative classification, see for instance:  J. STUYCK, ‘Class Actions in Europe? To Opt-In or to Opt-
Out, that is the Question’, (20) European Business Law Review, 2009, pp.483-505 (distinguishing ‘joint actions’ 
where individual claims are merely bundled in a single trial; ‘representative actions’ where rights are assigned to one 
entity that acts on behalf of the individual plaintiffs; ‘test cases’ where a judgement on one individual claim serves as 
a model for similar cases; ‘real group actions’ where a plaintiff acts on behalf of a group of individuals who will be 
bound by the outcome of the procedure if they have ‘opted-in’ or ‘opted-out’). 
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decision. A well-known example of collective action brought by private individuals is the American class 
action. This type of action is nowadays rare in Europe.
175
 The term collective redress – notably employed 
by the European institutions
176
 – is sometimes referred to as a substitute for the notion of collective action. 
As pointed out by HODGES, a distinction should nonetheless be drawn between these two notions. The 
term collective action emphasizes the procedural aspect of the proceeding, whereas the notion of collective 
redress more specifically targets the substantive objectives that policy-makers seek to achieve through 
such tools.
177
  
 
 
 Representative proceeding  
 
 
Representative proceeding refer to claims filed by ‘a representative’ – associations such as consumer or 
shareholders associations for instance, or others specified bodies- on behalf of their members or of a wider 
audience. According to FAIRGRIEVE and LOWELLS, association-based actions tend to be currently a 
salient characteristic of European-style collective proceedings.
178
 
 
 
 Consolidation tool  
 
 
 Consolidation tools enable judiciaries to combine independent but similar claims principally for 
managerial purposes. This notion encompasses a wide range of mechanisms such as joinder or the use of 
test and model cases by which judges deliver a unique judgment which ultimately serves as reference for 
the treatment of similar cases. 
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 For instance, Section 1 of the Swedish Group Proceeding enacted in 2002 states that ‘a group action means an 
action that a plaintiff brings as the representative of several persons with legal effects for them, although they are not 
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176
 See for instance the 2011 European Commission’s Public Consultation on Collective Redress (supra note 4). 
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 D.FAIRGRIEVE and G. LOWELLS, supra note 21. 
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b) Opt-in and opt-out systems 
  
An essential procedural clarification regards the mechanisms employed to establish group membership. 
Even though other mechanisms – albeit rare in Europe – may also be used, the traditional distinction 
principally distinguishes the opt-in from the opt-out systems.
179
   
 
According to the opt-in system, only plaintiffs who have individually stepped forward and expressed their 
desire to be part of the group are entitled to obtain compensation once the final judgment is delivered. 
Conversely, according to the opt-out procedure, all similar plaintiffs are regarded as being part of the 
group regardless of their formal approval. Only those who specifically express their wish to leave the 
proceeding are not bound by the final decision. Put differently, the opt-in system requires plaintiffs to 
express their wish to be included into the group, whereas the opt-out system requires them to express their 
desire to be excluded from it.       
 
Experts have extensively debated the benefits and drawbacks associated with the opt-out and the opt-in 
systems. A 2008 comparative empirical research from the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales has 
showed that claimant groups are usually larger in opt-out than in opt-in systems.
180
 A 2004 study indicated 
that the rate of opt-outs depends on the type of case: more plaintiffs opt out in mass tort cases than in 
consumer class actions. However, the authors of the study observed that, as a general rule, ‘opt out (…), 
despite their fundamental place in the structure of class action practice, in fact are exceedingly 
uncommon’.181 Going a step further, a set of empirical studies has investigated the underlying reasons of 
opting out. It notably pointed out that an increase in the loss suffered lead plaintiffs to consider individual 
claims. In addition, class members are more likely to file individually if they know the outcome of the 
settlement rather than if the outcome is still uncertain when they take their decision.
182
 On the basis of 
these findings, policymakers aiming to encourage the deterrent function of class action should preferably 
adopt the opt-out system. Indeed, opt-out systems make use of rational apathy since rationally apathic 
claimants will not leave the group.
183
 Importantly, the choice between opt-in and opt-out appears to 
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principally be a political trade-off. It consists of identifying which interests, - between the one of victims 
and the one of companies - will by default be protected. For instance, when favouring the opt-in system, 
the current French action de groupe appears to be more protective of companies’ interests. This point was 
indeed clearly indicated in a 2010 Group Action report which stated: 
 
‘[The working group] retains the principle of voluntarily membership to the group, which shows the 
commitment of the victim, rather than an alleged membership maximizing on an uncertain basis, the risk 
to which the company is exposed’. 184  
 
The opt-out system is also sometimes depicted as being contrary to procedural rules - such as for example 
in France the rule forbidding legal standing for absent and unknown plaintiffs, known as ‘nul ne plaide 
par procureur’ – and to constitutional principles.185  These legal obstacles may however not be as 
insurmountable as they have been presented. Views expressed by several French legal scholars have 
indeed substantiated the idea that the actual opposition vis-a-vis the opt-out mechanism is, once again, 
more a political issue than strictly a legal one.
186
  For this research, differences between the opt-in and the 
opt-out systems will matter: they will importantly influence the roles and duties expected from judges and 
alter the scope of their intervention. 
 
 
3.2.2 Presentation of the Selected Mass Proceedings  
 
This section is intended to give readers clear -albeit non extensive- views about the functioning of the 
mass litigation devices retained for this analysis, as well as the contexts in which they have been 
implemented (or are discussed). These proceedings are respectively the French group action (a), the Dutch 
                                                          
184Sénat, Rapport d’information n°499, L’action de groupe à la française - Parachever la protection du 
consommateur, 2009-2010, at p.72 (Translation from the author. In French : ‘[Le groupe de travail] retient par 
ailleurs le principe d’une adhésion volontaire au groupe, qui manifeste l’implication de la victime, plutôt que celui 
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 Critics agains the opt out mechanism,in France refer to the decision of the Constitutional Council (decision n°89-
257 DC , 25 July 1989 sur la loi modifiant le code du travail et relative à la prévention du licenciement économique 
et au droit à la conversion) where the Council decided that ‘s’il est loisible au législateur de permettre à des 
organisations syndicales représentatives d’introduire une action en justice a l’effet non seulement d’intervenir 
spontanément dans la défense d’un salarie mais aussi de promouvoir a travers un cas individuel, une action 
collective, c’est a la condition que l’intéressé ait été mis à même de donner son assentiment en pleine connaissance 
de cause et qu’il puisse conserver la liberté de conduire personnellement la défense de ses intérêts et de mettre un 
terme à cette action’).  
186
 M. VERPEAUX, ‘L’action de groupe est-elle soluble dans la Constitution’, Recueil Dalloz, 2007, p.258 ; D. 
COHEN, ‘Introduire des actions de groupe en droit francais ? Reactions a l’analyse du Professor Demougin’, in : D. 
COHEN (Ed.), Droit & Economie du Procès Civil, LGDJ, 2010, pp.105-117. 
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Collective Settlement of Mass Claims (b), the English Group Litigation Order (c), the English Draft Court 
Rules for Collective Proceeding (d) and the American federal class action (e). 
 
 
a) The Thorny Emergence of a French Group Action 
 
 
 Context  
 
Since the mid-eighties and the reforms of consumer law at that time conducted by CALAIS-AULOY,
187
 
the implementation of a group action has been a controversial and extensively debated issue in France. For 
decades, the topic has fuelled political statements of public officials,
188
 was supported by successive 
governments, has been defended by regulatory bodies, and addressed many times by Parliament. Until 
2014 all these attempts were made in vain,
189
 partly because of the fierce opposition of lobbies. Noticing 
these repetitive failures, French scholars compared the thorny emergence of the group action to the myth 
of Sisyphus who was sentenced by gods to push an immense boulder on the top of a hill before seeing it 
rolling down, and ultimately being forced to restart endlessly the same task all over again.
190
  
Yet, France has a long-standing history with representative actions, more specifically known as the action 
in the interest of consumers (action dans l’intérêt des consommateurs) and the representative action 
(action en représentation conjointe), respectively enshrined in Article L.421-7 and L.422-1 of Consumer 
Code (Code de la consommation). Practice has however revealed the paucity of these mechanisms and 
highlighted their procedural pitfalls.
191
 As an illustration, since 1992, less than 10 representative actions 
have been filed and a 2006 report from the Senate has pointed out the ‘extreme heaviness attached to the 
management of individual mandates which leads to the paralysis of the action’.192 In 2010 a case brought 
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192
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J.HYEST, 14 March 2006, n°249, spéc. p.16 et 17 (‘l’extrême lourdeur de la gestion des mandats individuels reçus 
conduisant à une paralysie de l’action’). 
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by the consumer association UFC-Que Choisir in the aftermath of an anticompetitive cartel agreement on 
the French mobile phone market significantly contributed to highlight the shortcomings of these tools.
193
 
Although dismissed for procedural matters by a decision of the Paris Court of Appeal afterwards 
confirmed by the Court of Cassation,
194
 this case stressed the lack of adequate mechanisms for 
compensating large numbers of claimants. As a French scholar pointed out, the representative action tends 
to be traditionally not particularly appreciated among judges (l’action mal-aimée des juges).195 
Meanwhile, recent scandals about large-scale damage such as the one associated with the drug Benfluorex 
(also known under its brand name Mediator) or the defective breast implants world-widely 
commercialised by the company PIP have caused long-lasting public emotional arousals.
196
 The slowness 
and failures of compensation funds have exacerbated the need for alternative tools to compensate 
plaintiffs and deter wrongdoers.
197
 Recent impetus at the European level has finally contributed to renew 
discussions.
198
  
In 2010, a step was made with the report conducted by senators BETEILLE and YUNG and their renewed 
proposal for the implementation of a group action à la française.
199
 In 2013, the group action was included 
into the bill proposal reforming consumer law (loi relative à la consommation). After successive readings 
by the National Assembly and the Senate, the text was finally adopted on 13 February 2014.
200
 In March 
2014, the Constitutional Council gave its green light to the implementation of the group action into the 
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parlement_4365812_3238.html (accessed 14 February 2014). 
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French legal system.
201
 The enforcement decree was finally adopted in September 2014.
202
 The group 
action is thus effective in France since 1 October 2014, and the very first day a group lawsuit was filed by 
the Consumer association UFC Que Choisir against the company Foncia Groupe for undues fees paid by 
318 000 tenants.
203
 
Regarding its scope of application, the proceeding has been restricted to consumer and competition law, 
and can exclusively be used to claim compensation for material damages.
204
 Such a restriction was mainly 
justified by a desire to exclude personal damages, which, in the mind of French policy-makers, may call 
for more individualised approaches. This choice has however been criticized by French legal scholars.
205
 
In addition, extension of the group action to others fields of substantive law is nowadays discussed: in 
April 2013, a bill proposal unsuccessfully suggested to include public health within the scope of the group 
action.
206
 Relatedly, during the summer 2013, the French Health Ministry also restated its deep 
commitment to extend the action to resolve public health issues. Another bill proposal on this topic is 
expected in 2014.
207
 In parallel, the Ministry in charge of environmental matters also expressed her wish 
to extend the proceeding to environmental issues.
208
  Finally, besides environment and public health, an 
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(accessed October 2013). 
 53 
 
extension of the group action to others fields such as securities or employment law tends to be also 
envisaged.
209
 
In subsequent developments, the referent documents used to describe the French group action will 
principally be the 2014 bill reforming consumer law. The 2010 report on group action (hereafter referred 
to as the ‘2010 group action report’) will be used as a complementary source of information. To 
summarize, the thorny emergence of the group action until 2014 can be described as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
209
 J. SIMON, C. FOULON and A. FERRER, ‘Faut-il introduire l’action de groupe en droit du travail ?’, Revue de 
droit du travail, 2012, p.603. 
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Bill proposal 
 
Date 
Loi n°2014-344  relative à la consommation  17 March 2014 
Proposition de loi n°1692 visant à instaurer une action de groupe étendue aux 
questions environnementales et de santé (by M.Bonneton & al., National 
Assembly) 
14 January 2014 
Proposition de loi  n°811 visant à instaurer un recours collectif en matière de 
discrimination et de lutte contre les inégalités (by E.Benbassa & al., Senate) 
25 July 2013 
 
Projet de loi n°1015 relatif à la consommation (by P. Moscovici, Government) 2 May 2013 
Proposition de loi n° 484  portant création d'une action de groupe en matière de 
consommation, de concurrence et de santé (by J.P.Plancade & al., Senate) 
5 April 2013 
Proposition de loi  n°110 visant à instaurer les recours collectifs de 
consommateurs (by J.P.Giran, National Assembly) 
 
24 July 2012 
 
Proposition de loi n° 277 sur le recours collectif (by N.Bricq & R.Yung., Senate) 9 February 2010 
Proposition de loi n° 1897, relative à la suppression du crédit revolving, à 
l’encadrement des crédits à la consommation et à la protection des 
consommateurs par l’action de groupe (by J.M.Ayrault & al., National 
Assembly) 
2 September 2009 
Loi n° 2008-776 de modernisation de l'économie (amendment rejected) 4 August 2008 
Loi n°2008-3 pour le développement de la concurrence au service des 
consommateurs (amendment rejected) 
3 January 2008 
Proposition n° 324 relative a l’action de groupe en France (by A.Montebourg & 
al., National Assembly) 
24 October 2007 
Proposition de loi n° 118 tendant à créer une action de groupe (by O.Terrade & 
al., Senate) 
7 December 2007 
Proposition de loi n°3775 tendant à créer une action de groupe (by 
J.Desallangre & al.,National Assembly) 
13 March 2007 
Proposition de loi n° 3729 relative à l’introduction de l’action de groupe en 
France (by A.Montebourg & al., National Assembly) 
15 February 2007 
Projet de loi n° 3430 en faveur des consommateurs (by T.Breton, Government) 8 November 2006 
Proposition de loi n°3055 visant à instaurer le recours collectif de 
consommateurs (by L.Chatel & al., National Assembly) 
26 April 2006 
Proposition de loi n° 322 sur le recours collectif, (by N.Bricq et al., Senate) 25 April 2006 
 
Reports 
 
 
Date 
Rapport relatif à l’indemnisation des préjudices subis par les epargnants et les 
investisseurs’ (Financial Market Authority - AMF) 
25 January 2011 
 
Rapport d’information sur l’action de groupe (by L. Beteille & R. Yung) 26 mai 2010 
Rapport ‘l’action collective en droit administratif’ (by P.Belaval & al.) 5 May 2009 
Rapport Coulon sur la depenalisation de la vie des affaires February 2008 
Rapport Attali pour la Libération de la croissance francaise (décision n°191) 2008 
Avis relatif à l’introduction de l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques 
anticoncurrentielles (Competition Council) 
21 September 
2006 
Rapport ‘Les actions de groupes, Étude de législation comparée’, n° 206 
(Senate) 
6 May 2006 
Rapport d’information n° 249 sur les class actions  (by M. J.J. Hyest, Senate) 14 March 2006 
Rapport sur l’action de groupe (by MM. G. Cerutti, M. Guillaume & al.)     December 2005 
*Texts and reports before 2005 are not included in this list.  
     The Thorny Emergence of the French Group Action in a Nutshelll (2005-2014)* 
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 Functioning  
 
  
The French group action has been portrayed by legal scholars as a procedural monster.
210
 In simple words, 
it can be described as a representative action built on a three-step approach conducted by two main actors: 
the court and the association. The proceeding follows a line of reasoning which has been presented as 
being contrary to the American class action: the constitution of the claimant group must only occur after a 
judicial decision establishing liability.
211
 This choice was motivated by the wish to find an alternative to 
the US class action model and to postpone to later stages the administrative burden associated with a 
‘massification of the dispute’.212   
 
In a first phase, a group claim is filed by an association.
213
 Associations have been given monopoly for 
legal standing. Such a measure - which at first sight tends to limit the roles of lawyers - has been viewed 
as side-effects of a growing suspicion vis-à-vis lawyers, and thus unsurprisingly vividly criticized by the 
Bar.
214
 Substantiating this idea, previous drafts dealing with the group action went as far as simply entirely 
excluding lawyers from the conduct of the proceeding.
215
 Conversely, the prominent role assigned to 
associations is viewed as a result of their growing importance and recognition in the French legal 
system.
216
 However, it would be erroneous to argue that lawyers are fully absent from the actual French 
group action. Indeed, since group lawsuits are filed in High Courts of First Instance (Tribunal de Grande 
Instance, also referred to as TGI in French), representation of claimants by lawyers will necessarily remain 
mandatory. Furthermore, new Article R.423-5 Consumer Code, as resulting from the enforcement decree 
of September 2014, explicitly states that lawyers and bailiffs will help and assist associations, notably 
                                                          
210
 N. MOLFESSIS, ‘L’exorbitance de l’action de groupe à la française’, Recueil Dalloz, 2014, p.947 ; E. 
CLAUDEL, ‘Action de groupe et autres dispositions concurrence de la loi consommation : un dispositif singulier’, 
Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial, 2014, p.339; L. BORE, 'Le projet d'action de groupe: action mort-née ou 
premier pas?', Gazette du Palais, 16 May 2013, p.29. 
211
 2010 Group Action Report, supra note 199, recommendation n°9, at p.63. 
212
 Idem, at p.66. 
213
 New Article L.423-1 Consumer Code (16 associations are currently entitled to file group actions). 
214
 J.D. BRETZNER, ‘Ombres et Lumières autour de la Qualité pour Agir dans l’Action de Groupe’,  Gazette du 
Palais, 16 May 2013, n°136, p.31 ; A. PORTMANN, ‘Il est inacceptable de réserver l’action de groupe à 17 
personnes morales’, Dalloz actualité, 29 avril 2013 ; See also an article from the former President of the National 
Bar Council (Conseil National des Barreaux) C. CHARRIERE-BOURNAZEL, ‘L’action de groupe à la française: un 
leurre’, 2 May 2013, available on www.cnb.avocat.fr/L-action-de-groupe-a-la-francaise-un-leurre--Editorial-du-
President-Charriere-Bournazel--2-mai-2013_a1589.html (accessed 26 May 2013). 
215
 Projet de loi en faveur des consommateurs presented by T.BRETON, n°3430, 14 November 2006 (see proposed 
Article L.423-6 al.2). 
216
 M.-A. FRISON-ROCHE, ‘Le Pouvoir Processuel des Associations et la Perspective de la Class Action’, Petites 
affiches, 24 April 1996, n°50, p.28 (observing that associations had initially only limited roles in French procedural 
law). 
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when representing claimants.
217
 The distribution of roles between lawyers (and/or bailiffs) and 
associations however remains to be clarified in practice. 
 
During a second phase, the High Court of First Instance delivers a declaratory ruling on liability in which 
judges establish liability on the basis of the model cases brought by the filing association(s).
218
 Judges 
circumscribe the scope of defendant’s liability, and ensure the publicity of the case in the media at the 
expenses of defendants.
219
 Finally, in a third phase, the group of plaintiffs is constituted under judicial 
supervision via an opt-in mechanism: individuals must step forward to be included into the claimant 
group.
220
 Judges ultimately determine the amount of damages awarded to each individual plaintiff.
221
 The 
particularity of the opt-in system in the French model is that its design appears significantly attractive for 
claimants since the claimant group is constituted only after the judicial declaratory ruling on liability. In 
others words, potential claimants may have clearer views on the success of their claims, and thus will be 
incentivized to step forward.
222
   
 
Whenever a compromise is found between litigants, judges must review the terms of the proposed 
settlement agreement. Interestingly and as discussed in the coming sections, new Article L.423-16 
Consumer Code which clarifies judicial intervention in this respect closely resembles the Dutch WCAM 
proceeding: French judges are here also required to carefully scrutinize that the interests of represented 
members are ultimately taken into account in the final settlement agreement.
223
 Finally, an amendment to 
the initial legislative text has created a ‘simplified group action’, a sort of fast-track proceeding applicable 
to situations where plaintiffs can easily be identified and suffer from identical harms.
224
   
 
From a Law and Economics perspective, two observations regarding the procedural design of the French 
group action can be formulated. The desire to postpone the constitution of the group once the decision on 
                                                          
217
 See new Article L.423-9 Consumer Code. 
218
 New Article L.423-3 Consumer Code (in French : Jugement déclaratoire de responsabilité, sometimes also 
referred to as déclaration de responsabilité or action déclaratoire de responsabilité). Claims supporting the 
implementation of a declaratory judgment on liability are by no means recent. This idea was already discussed in the 
work of CALAIS-AULOY. The same procedural architecture was followed in the successive proposals. 
219
 New Article L.423-4 and R.423-6 Consumer Code. 
220
 New Article L.423-5 Consumer Code. 
221
 New Article L.423-3, al.2 Consumer Code. 
222
 Noticing this ambivalence, the French legal literature has stressed the existence of a ‘hybridization’ between opt 
in and opt out systems in the current French group action (see E.CLAUDEL, supra note 210). 
223
 New Article L.423-16 reads as follows: 'tout accord negocié au nom du groupe est soumis a l'homologation du 
juge, qui vérifie s'il est conforme aux interêts de ceux auxquels il a vocation à s'appliquer et lui donne force 
exécutoire. Cet accord précise les mesures de publicité nécessaires pour informer les consommateurs concernés de la 
possibilité d'y adhérer, ainsi que des délais et modalités de cette adhésion'. 
224
 New Article L.423-10  and R.423-8 Consumer Code (in French : procédure d’action de groupe simplifiée).  
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liability is delivered could first be contested. According to the Learned Hand Formula used in tort Law & 
Economics,
225
 a breach of duty of care is constituted when the marginal costs of taking precautions borne 
by the alleged defendant (B) are lower than the decrease in expected losses (i.e. the probability of loss P 
multiplied by the gravity of loss L).
226
  When the group of plaintiffs is constituted after the decision on 
liability, judges do not have a clear view on the magnitude of the total losses when they decide on the 
issue of negligence. Assuming that judges follow the Hand formula, they may try to assess the number of 
plaintiffs anyway in an attempt to figure out the size of the total loss.  It would therefore be more 
appropriate to define the group before the ruling on liability. Supporting this viewpoint, a 2011 report 
from the Financial Market Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers) has suggested that the group 
should be constituted before the decision fixing the defendant’s liability.227 Second, this two-step approach 
is an interesting example of sequential trial and bifurcation technique applied to the field of mass 
litigation. As discussed later in this chapter, bifurcation enables tackling separately two or more 
dispositional issues, such as liability and then damages. In the field of mass litigation, bifurcation is 
viewed as a tool for segmenting aggregate litigation.
228
 One of its principal advantages is to encourage 
settlement between parties at different stages: the defendant held liable in the declaratory ruling on 
liability is strongly incentivized to make a settlement offer.
229
 Additionally, informational asymmetries 
between litigants tend to be reduced. As emphasized by DEFFAINS, LANGLAIS and DORIAT-DUBAN, 
the information disclosed during the liability stage enable claimants to strengthen their bargaining powers 
during the compensation stage.
230
 In his economic analysis of sequential v. unitary trial, LANDES adds 
that sequential trial lowers the expected costs of litigation since the costs of litigating damages will be 
saved if the defendant prevails on the decision about liability.
231
  Other experimental evidence has 
nonetheless revealed that the use of bifurcation could lower the chances of plaintiffs to prevail when 
compared to unitary trials.         
 
 
 
                                                          
225
 United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,159 F, 2d 169 (2
nd
 Circ., 1947). 
 
226
 According to the so-called Hand Formula, there is breach of duty of care when B<PL. 
227
 AMF report, supra note 199, at p.32; see also: Y.BALENSI, ‘Modalités de mise en œuvre de l’action de groupe : 
des corrections à apporter au projet du gouvernement’, Gazette du Palais, 16 May 2013, n°136, p.50. 
228
 E .F. SHERMAN, ‘Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial 
Process’, (25) Review of Litigation, 2006, pp. 691-718. 
229
 See on this point: M.BACACHE, supra note 205 (highlighting: 'l'action de groupe nous place ici a mi-chemin  
entre la responsabilite individuelle  et l'indemnite transactionnelle'). 
230
 B. DEFFAINS, M. DORIAT-DUBAN, E. LANGLAIS, supra note 146. 
231
 W.M. LANDES, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, (22) Journal of Legal Studies, 1993, 
n°1, pp.99-134. 
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b) The Dutch Collective Settlement of Mass Claim (WCAM): an Unique Proceeding in Europe 
 
 
 Context  
 
 
In the Netherlands, two distinctive - but related - procedures for the resolution of mass disputes exist.
232
 
Article 3:305a of the Civil Code states that a foundation or association with full legal capacity that, 
according to its articles of association, has the objective to protect specific interests, may bring to court a 
legal claim that intents to protect similar interests of other persons. Such claim can however not be filed to 
obtain compensatory damages. Therefore, whenever claimants want to have their losses compensated, 
they have to find other ways, which (notably due to the abovementioned problems of rational apathy) 
might turn out to be problematic. Even if the collective claim would result in a declaration that the 
tortfeasor(s) acted wrongfully, it would still take a separate procedure to claim damages. This being said, a 
draft reform to remove this prohibition is currently in its consultation phase.
233
 The second procedure is 
known as the Collective Settlement of Mass Damage (Wet Collectieve Afhandeling Massaschade, 
hereafter abbreviated to WCAM). This latter will stand as main object of investigation in subsequent 
developments. 
 
The WCAM was implemented in 2005 as a practical and emergency solution to the diethylstilbestrol 
(DES) affair. After a 1992 landmark decision in which the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) held 
pharmaceutical manufacturers jointly and severally liable,
234
 the Dutch civil system revealed its paucity by 
rejecting any pooling of claims. Plaintiffs had therefore to individually step forward to obtain 
compensation while companies had to deal with cases on a one-to-one basis.
235
 Given the thousands of 
victims involved in the dispute, transaction costs were high and encouraged the Ministry of Justice and the 
industry to urge for the implementation of a new procedural tool.
236
 The WCAM was thus imagined as a 
mechanism combining justice and efficiency: it enabled claimants and defendants to settle all claims in 
one single venue, decreased litigation and administrative costs and facilitated a global ‘bill of peace’ 
between parties.
237
  
 
                                                          
232
 L.T. VISSCHER and A.P. BIARD, supra note 134. 
233
 See https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/motiedijksma/document/1177 (visited 11 July 2014). 
234
 Hoge Raad, 9 October 1992, NJ 1994,535 (DES Daughters). 
235
 W.H. VAN BOOM, supra note 120. 
236
 I.N.TZANKOVA, supra note 60, at p.5. 
237
 Referring to a concept used by R.NAGAREDA, supra note 57. 
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In 2006, the DES case was the first judicially approved mass settlement.
238
 Several observers at that time 
nonetheless considered that the proceeding was a ‘one day fly’ with no further implication for the 
future.
239
 Contrary to initial expectations, the WCAM has progressively been extended to various fields of 
substantive law, such as financial products in the 2007 Dexia case
240
, securities in the 2009 Shell
241
 , 
Vedior and 2012 Converium
242
 cases, or to deal with the bankruptcy of an insurer in the 2009 Vie d’Or 
case.
243
 In July 2013, the proceeding was also extended to handle insolvency issues in the DSB case 
(currently under judicial review). A detailed list of WCAMs is hereafter provided: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
238
 Stichting DES Centrum v X, 2006, LJN 6440. 
239
 I.TZANKOVA and D.HENSLER, ‘Collective Settlements in the Netherlands: Some Empirical Observations’, in: 
C.HODGES and A.STADLER (Eds.), Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and Settlements of Mass Claims, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2013, pp.91-105. 
240
 Dexia Bank Nederland  v Stichting Platform Aandelenlease, 2007, LJN AZ7033 (hereafter Dexia case). 
241
 Shell Petroleum v Dexia Nederland, 2009, LJN BI5744 (hereafter Shell case), see the sworn translation from 
Dutch to English by A.J.B Burrough, 15 June 2009. 
242
 Stichting Converium Securities Compensation v Liechtensteinsche Landesbank, 2012, LJN BV1026 (hereafter 
Converium case), see the sworn translation from Dutch to English by A.J.B Burrough, 12 November 2012. 
243
 Stichting  Vie d’or, 2009, LJN BI2717. 
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List of WCAMs (2006 – March 2014)244 
 
 
Case 
 
Date 
 
Areas 
Number of 
claimants  
 
Amounts 
 
Particularities 
 
DES 
 
2006 
Personal injuries 
caused by the DES 
molecule 
approximately 
34,000 
 
35 million euros 
 
1
st
 WCAM 
 
DEXIA 
 
2007 
Financial losses 
associated with 
Investment 
products 
 
approximately 
300,000 
 
1 billion euros 
Around 25 000 
opt outs (97% 
participation rate) 
 
VIE D’OR 
 
2009 
Financial losses 
associated with the 
bankruptcy of an 
insurance company 
 
approximately 
11,000 
 
45 million euros 
 
 
SHELL 
 
2009 
Financial losses 
associated with 
misleading market 
information 
 
More than 500,000  
 
352 million euros 
Extensive cross-
borders 
implications 
(numerous parties 
located outside 
the Netherlands) 
 
VEDIOR 
 
2009 
Financial losses 
associated with the 
late disclosure of 
takeover 
discussions 
 
2000 
 
4.25 million euros 
 
 
CONVERIUM 
 
2012 
Financial losses 
associated with 
misleading market 
statements 
 
Approximately 
12,000 
 
Around 58 millions 
USD (in total) 
Extensive cross-
border 
implication 
 (numerous 
parties located 
outside the 
Netherlands) 
DSB 2013-2014 Insolvency  Currently under 
judicial review 
 
 
 
Importantly, the WCAM has progressively shown long-lasting cross-borders implications, even though 
such evolutions were not initially foreseen by policymakers.
245
 In the Shell and Converium cases, 
settlement agreements were declared binding upon parties who were in their majority located outside the 
Netherlands (mostly in the United Kingdom and in Switzerland). National and European media have 
reported the rampant extra-territoriality of the proceeding: the Dutch newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad 
                                                          
244
Information was collected directly from the Shell and Converium agreements, in the newsletter issued by the 
lawfirm Nauta Dutilh ‘global settlement approved by Dutch court’ (available on: www.newsletter-
nautadutilh.com/NL/xzine/class_actions/global_settlement_approved_by_dutch_court.html?cid=4&xzine_id=4286 
(accessed March 2014), and in G. VAN DIJCK, supra note 182. 
245
 H.VAN LITH, The Dutch Collective Settlement Act  and Private International Law/Aspecten van Internationaal 
Privaatrecht in de WCAM, 2010. 
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for instance wrote in 2011 that the ‘Netherlands [was becoming] a paradise for mass claims’.246 As an 
echo coming from France, an article from the French newspaper Le Monde highlighted in the spring of 
2013 that ‘the Dutch law on class action threatens French companies’ (‘le droit néerlandais sur les class 
action menace les entreprises françaises’).247 WCAM’s cross-border implications are among the most 
debated issues currently discussed by Dutch and European experts working in this field.   
 
 
 Functioning  
 
 
The proceeding is enshrined in articles 7:907-910 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) and 
articles 1013-1018 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering). It 
has been described as an ‘intricate mechanism that operates on the crossroads of tort law, substantive 
contract law and civil procedure’.248 Formally, there is no litigation since the proceeding is based on a 
contractual agreement. There are consequently neither plaintiffs nor defendants, but merely parties.
249
    
 
In simple words, the proceeding can be described as follows. First, representative associations or 
foundations (in Dutch, stichting or vereniging) and the alleged wrongdoer(s) must reach an out-of-court 
settlement on a voluntarily basis. There is no possibility to force a company unwilling to settle. Rationally, 
an alleged-wrongdoer may nonetheless be willing to do so after assessing the strengths of the claims, his 
chance of prevailing or being defeated and his expected costs, weighed both in terms money and 
reputation.
250
 Other factors such as political pressure may also weigh in his final decision.
251
 In practice, 
this assessment may turn out to be uneasy. Informational asymmetries and/or differing perceptions 
between parties about the final outcome may block or slow down the bargaining process.
252
 By no means, 
                                                          
246
 Financieele Dagblad, ‘Nederland wordt straks paradijs voor massaclaims’, 29 December 2011 (also cited in 
I.TZANKOVA and D.HENSLER, supra note 239). 
247
 Le Monde, ‘Le droit néerlandais sur les class actions menace les entreprises francaises’, 19 April 2013. 
248
 W.VAN BOOM, supra note 120. 
249
 X.E.KRAMER, ‘Enforcing Mass Settlements in the European Judicial Area: EU Policy and the Strange Case of 
Dutch Collective Settlements (WCAM)’, in: C.HODGES and A.STADLER (Eds), Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR 
and settlements of Mass Claims, Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 63-90. 
250
 T.MICELI, The Economic Approach to Law, Stanford University Press, 2004, 379 p., (specifically Chapter 8: The 
Economics of Dispute Resolution). See also R.COOTER and T.ULEN, supra note 19. In the Netherlands, A 
relatively small-size country where stakeholders are likely to frequently interact, reputation concerns are likely to be 
particularly salient.   
251
 W.VAN BOOM, supra note 120. 
252
 T.MICELI, supra note 250; B.DEFFAINS, M.DORIAT-DUBAN, E.LANGLAIS, supra note 146. W.VAN 
BOOM, supra note 120 (highlighting: ‘actual practice shows that it is quite difficult for all parties concerned to 
assess beforehand the pros and cons of settling’. The author notably refers to the DEXIA case where the bank, at the 
initial stage, ‘[denied] any request for leniency and [insisted] on the payment of [its clients’] debts’. DEXIA finally 
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defendants acknowledge their liability when settling. As for instance stated in the DSB WCAM, the 
settlement agreement is indeed closed ‘sans prejudice and without acknowledging liability’.253 
  
Once the agreement is concluded, parties must petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeal which has 
exclusive jurisdiction for a ‘judicial trust mark’ sealing their agreement.254 The fairness and reasonability 
of the proposed settlement agreement are then scrutinized by the Amsterdam Court. Practice has revealed 
that this judicial review has been ‘less marginal’ than what was expected when the proceeding was 
implemented in 2005.
255
 If approved, the settlement agreement becomes binding upon all potential 
claimants on an opt-out basis. Claimants have at least three months to express their wish to be excluded 
from the agreement. After the expiry of this period, funds are distributed among claimants. If there is a 
remaining sum after the end of the distribution process, the paying party may petition the Court to recover 
the remaining sum.
256
  As a general rule, VAN BOOM observes that ‘the position of the Amsterdam Court 
is unmistakably crucial for the credibility of the WCAM as an instrument for the efficient and fair 
settlement of mass claims’.257 Interestingly, the WCAM is the European proceeding that is to this day the 
closest to the US class action. Both proceedings indeed usually terminate with opt-out mass settlements 
placed under judicial scrutiny.
258
 
 
 
 
c) The English Group Litigation Order (GLO): A Management Tool by Essence  
 
 
 Context  
 
 
Starting in the 1980’s, English judges faced a multiplication of cases on related or similar issues involving 
numerous plaintiffs against the same defendants. To avoid being overburdened, judges created 
management techniques to efficiently deal with such claims.
259
 Further developed by Lord WOOLF in his 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
changed its strategy after a growing external pressure and the multiplication of lower courts’ rulings favouring 
consumers.  
253
  At p. 3 of the ‘Akkoord op hoofdlijnen’. 
254
 W. VAN BOOM, supra note 120. See also: F.WEBER and W.VAN BOOM, ‘Dutch Treat: the Dutch Collective 
Settlement of Mass Damage Act (WCAM 2005)’, (1) Contratto e Impresa – Europa, 2011. 
255
 I.TZANKOVA, supra note 70. 
256
 Dutch Civil Code, article 7:910; see also: M.V.HOOIJDONK and P.EIJSVOOGEL, Litigation in the Netherlands 
– Civil Procedure, Arbitration and Administrative Litigation, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012, pp.104-110. 
257
 W. VAN BOOM, supra note 120; A.P.BIARD and L.T.VISSCHER, ‘Judges and Mass Litigation: Revisiting the 
Judicial Cathedral through Rational Choice Theory and Behavioural Economics’, Aansprakelijkheid, Verzekering & 
Schade, 2014/7, pp.39-48. 
258
 E. FEESS and A. HALFMEIER, supra note 64. 
259
 C.HODGES, supra note 56, at p.53. 
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two seminal reports on Access to Justice,
260
 this practice was named Group Litigation Order (abbreviated 
to GLO) and enshrined in 2000 in the English rules of civil procedure (‘CPR’) at part 19, section III and 
further completed with Practice Directions. 
 
GLOs have been used to handle employment cases, environmental disputes, children home abuses, health 
issues or defective products.
261
  As an illustration, a GLO was conducted in the landmark Corby case 
depicted as an ‘Erin Brockovich-style multi party action’.262 The factual background of this affair was a 
decontamination and rehabilitation campaign of former steelworks sites in the city of Corby. 18 claimants 
whose mothers had been exposed to harmful dust grew up with birth defects.
263
 They filed against the 
District Council for breach of duty of care, public nuisance and breach of statutory duty. In 2009, the court 
in charge of this GLO held the council liable and a settlement was agreed between parties in 2010.
264
  
 
 
 Functioning  
 
 
GLO is not a representative action,
265
 but rather the paramount example of a consolidation tool enabling 
judges to manage together similar or related claims.
266
 As ANDREWS expresses it, the GLO is ‘a compact 
form of macro-justice because it allows common issues to be decided efficiently, with finality, with an 
equitable allocation of responsibility for costs and with due speed’.267    
 
                                                          
260
 WOOLF, Interim Report on Access to Civil Justice, 1995, Chapter 4 ‘Major Reforms’ , available on 
www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interim/woolf.htm, (accessed 18.12.12); and 
Final Report on Access to Civil Justice, 1996, chapter 17 ‘Multi-Party Actions’, available on 
www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm, accessed 18.12.12 (in 
1994, Lord Chancellor MACKAY appointed the Master of the Rolls Lord WOOLF to review the English civil 
procedure which at time was regarded as plagued by delays and expenses.  The reform notably called for an 
enhanced judicial case management.  
261
  A list of GLOs is available on www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rolls-building/queens-bench/group-litigation-orders 
(accessed 18 December 2013). 
262
 Mondaq Business Briefing, ‘Environmental Toxic Tort Actions Lurk in the UK’, 10 December 2009. 
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264
 Corby Group Litigation v. Corby District Council, [2009] EWCH 1944 (TC), 29 July 2009. 
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2008, p.18. 
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 See C.HODGES, supra note 56. 
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In simple words, the process can be described as follows. GLOs can be initiated ‘at any time’ by an 
application submitted by plaintiffs, defendants,
268
 or by the court of its own initiative.
269
 Higher judges 
must prior give their consents.
270
 The GLO application must contain a summary of the nature of the 
litigation, the number and nature of claims already issued, the number of parties likely to be involved, the 
common questions of fact or law (referred to as ‘GLO issues’) and possible distinction of smaller groups 
within the broader claimant group.
271
 Claimants may join the proceeding via an opt-in mechanism. A 
single judge (a so-called ‘managing judge’) is appointed to monitor the case. He may be assisted with a 
master or a district judge to deal with specific issues or procedural matters.
272
 The briefness and flexibility 
that characterize GLO rules give the judiciary a considerable leeway and discretionary powers to conduct 
and manage the dispute.  
 
 
d) The English Draft on Court Rules for Collective Proceeding: A Path for Future Reforms? 
 
 
 Context  
 
 
As a complement to GLOs, particular attention is here given to the 2009 proposal known as the Draft 
Court Rules for Collective Proceedings (hereafter, ‘English Draft Court Rules’).273 It arose from a desire 
to implement a generic collective action in England as a way to enhance plaintiffs’ access to justice. This 
proposal was a direct consequence of criticisms made vis-à-vis the GLO regime. In a 2007 report 
addressed to the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales (CJC), MULHERON urged for the 
implementation of a generic, opt-out style, collective proceeding by pointing out a lack of claimants 
participation in opt-in systems. The report further stressed some procedural flaws affecting the efficiency 
of the GLO regime and impacting on courts’ resources and time.274 Furthermore, on a broader scale, the 
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collapse of two complex cases after lengthy and tremendously costly proceedings monitored by the 
Commercial Court also shed light on a need for greater judicial case management at earlier stages of the 
procedure.
275
    
 
 Functioning  
 
 
The proceeding blurs the distinction previously made between collective action and representative 
proceeding. It can ultimately be brought by a wide range of parties, including individuals with a direct 
interest, collective interest bodies or other specified bodies. The draft establishes a claim certification 
process supervised by the court. Drafters have explicitly pointed out that ‘the court is the most appropriate 
body to ensure that any new collective procedure is fairly balanced as between claimants and defendants 
(…)’.276 Importantly, the draft also leaves to judicial discretion the decision to follow an opt-in or an opt-
out approach considering the needs of the case at stake.  
 
The proposal was included into the 2010 Financial Services Act. However, as MULHERON observes, the 
bill ‘was a casualty of the legislative “wash-up” which followed the calling of the general election on 6 
April 2010 and the final version of the Bill omitted any reference to the proposed collective actions 
regime’.277 To this day, the proposal remains thus unimplemented. It may however revive at later stages, 
notably regarding infringements of competition rules.
278
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e) The American Federal Class Action: The Influential Proceeding  
 
 Context   
 
Enshrined in 1938 in Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the class action 
remained mostly unnoticed and rarely applied until the 1966 amendments which, according to the 
doctrine, was a turning point inaugurating the ‘modern US class action’.279  The procedure was 
progressively employed to deal with the flood of civil rights cases which followed the enactments of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
280
 to handle mass securities litigation,
281
 to tackle 
mass toxic tort like asbestos, or to deal with infringements of consumer law. As MILLER observed in 
1979, ‘the current density of these cases is a function of forces set in motion by Congress, the Supreme 
Court, the courts of appeal, societal changes, and the evolving structure of the legal profession’.282  
 
Rules regulating class action procedures have progressively emerged from practice. Initially, as the 
reporter of the 1966 Advisory Committee pointed out, ‘neither the earlier federal equity rules nor state 
code provisions had paid any attention to the details of the procedural management of class actions’.283 
Successive reforms each time partially contributed to fill in this blank. As MARCUS has noticed, even 
though it requested judges to supervise class action settlements, the 1966 committee ‘said nothing more 
about how the judge was to make his decision’.284 Noticing that class actions had led to abuses, the 
proceeding was amended in 2003 and in 2005 with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
285
  These 
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reforms encouraged higher judicial vigilance vis-à-vis settlements and greater scrutiny, notably over class 
action lawyers’ fees.286  
 
 Functioning   
 
 
In practice, there is not a single and unique model of US class actions.
287
 For matters of clarity, a broader 
level of analysis will here be retained. The proceeding can schematically be described as follows. A 
limited number of plaintiffs who are individually named seek remedies on behalf of themselves and of all 
absent and unknown individuals who have suffered similar harm. Plaintiffs’ attorneys file a motion for 
certification requesting the court to certify the class, that is, to examine the admissibility of the class 
claim. As at length developed in the coming section, Rule 23 FRCP states that at least 4 requirements 
must be fulfilled for the class action to be certified. These criteria are known as numerosity,
288
 
commonality,
289
 typicality
290
 and adequacy of representation.
291
 Other requirements may apply depending 
on to the type of the class action.
292
 Once certified, the case proceeds in a manner that is comparable to 
individual litigation. A crucial difference consists nevertheless in the number of plaintiffs and the 
considerable financial stakes which often strongly incentivize defendants to settle.
293
 The settlement 
agreement negotiated between litigants is supervised by the court which assesses its fairness, ensures its 
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publicity to give plaintiffs a chance to opt out, and determine the amounts awarded as lawyers’ fees. 
Finally, the judge plays essential roles when monitoring class actions. HENSLER has clearly encapsulated 
their functions in a passage that is worth stating here in its entirety:  
 
‘Without the judge’s decision to grant certification, a class lawsuit does not exist. Without the judge’s 
approval, a lawsuit cannot be settled. Without a judge’s decision to award fees, the class action attorneys 
cannot be paid. Moreover, judges have special responsibilities while the litigation is ongoing: they 
approve the form and content of notice to class members that a class action has been certified or settled: 
they determine when and where fairness hearings will be held, how long they will be, and who can 
participate; they decide whether non-class members can intervene in the litigation, and whether lawyers 
representing objectors will receive any compensation. Even after a case is resolved, judges may continue 
to play a role by overseeing the disbursement of settlements funds’. Importantly, she adds, ‘how judges 
exercise their responsibilities determines the outcomes of the class actions that come before them, but 
even more important (…) the shape of class actions to come’. 294 
 
 
From the analysis of these five proceedings, it is possible to highlight clear convergences regarding 
judicial monitoring and supervision. 
 
 
* 
 
 
3.3. JUDGES AS MASS CLAIMS’ WATCHDOGS 
 
The role of watchdogs is a function already falling upon judges in individual litigation. As MARCUS has 
pertinently observed, ‘judges have always been gatekeepers but their gatekeeping tasks have changed a 
good deal over time’. 295 In the framework of mass litigation, judges are expected to behave as watchdogs 
when verifying the admissibility of mass claims (3.3.1) and when determining the shape and suitability of 
the claimant group (3.3.2). 
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3.3.1. Watchdogs regarding the Admissibility of Mass Claims  
 
 
 
As the European Commission pointed out in its 2013 recommendations, ‘in order to avoid an abuse of the 
system and in the interest of the sound administration of justice, no judicial collective redress action 
should be permitted to proceed unless admissibility conditions set out by law are met’.296 Several 
certification criteria indeed regulate the admissibility of mass proceeding and, as a general rule, judge 
must verify the existence of common issues between claimants (a), sometimes review the merits of the 
claim (b), ensure that the proceeding is appropriate given the particularities of the case at stake (c), 
ascertain that parties are numerous enough (d), verify the representativeness of lead plaintiffs or 
associations (e).  For matters of clarity, these criteria are successively addressed concerning the French 
group action, the Dutch WCAM, the English GLO, the English Draft Court Rules, and finally the US 
Federal class action. 
 
 
 
a) Judicial Control over Common Issues  
 
 
 Rationale  
 
 
Judges should verify that claims are all legally or factually related. This step is aimed at highlighting the 
factual and/or legal elements which constitutes the denominator common to all plaintiffs. In other words, 
the principal objective pursued is here to determine the spine of the claimant group. From an economic 
point of view, the identification of common issues can be assimilated to a specialization of the case around 
a limited number of key questions. The economic literature has for decades stressed that specialization 
could facilitate economies of scale and, as CASSONE and RAMELLO have indeed suggested, such 
economies of scale are only possible in ‘the presence of significant indivisibilities in production (…)’.297  
In the selected proceedings, the judiciary benefits in this respect from a certain degree of flexibility. 
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 In the Selected Mass Proceedings 
  
o The French Group Action 
 When reviewing the admissibility of the group action, the court must verify that plaintiffs are in ‘similar 
or identical situations’.The difference  made in the text between 'similar' and 'identical' situations tends to 
create uncertainty and possible room for judicial interpretation and appreciation. Importantly, the alleged 
harm must have been caused by a breach of duty regarding sales of goods or provision of services, or by 
an infringement to competition rules.
298
 The 2010 report actually had proposed to go a step further and 
required judges to verify whether the group action is not used to compensate heterogeneous individual 
damage.
299
 
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
Article 7:907 of the Civil Code provides that the settlement agreement presented by parties must be 
concluded for the purpose of ‘compensating damages caused by an event or by similar events’. As an 
illustration, in the Shell case, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal controlled the commonality of claims by 
considering that ‘the possible incorrectness of the information disclosed by Shell concerning the 
categorization of oil and gas reserves (…) can be regarded as events which cause damage to third 
parties’.300   
 
o The English GLO 
Rules governing GLOs require judges to identify common issues of fact and law. This step is more 
commonly known as the determination of GLO issues. The 2006 GLO Ashton Morton Slack Solicitors is 
an interesting example of judicial supervision in this field.
301
 In this affair, miners and ex-miners had been 
required to make payments to trade-unions from compensation received for respiratory injuries. They filed 
against their trade-union and several firms of solicitors. In their GLO application, claimants specified that 
all claims were (i) brought by miners or ex-miners, (ii) who had entered into an agreement with a trade 
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union or claims handler, (iii) who has been required to make a payment from the received 
compensation.
302
 While assessing whether these points indeed could constitute a common ground between 
all plaintiffs, the managing judge finally rejected the application, arguing notably that ‘the only unifying 
feature [was] that all respondents are solicitors and all claimants are ex miners or miners, [which is] 
plainly insufficient to a GLO support’. By contrast, he further noticed that disparities tended here to 
prevail since ‘the agreements made between individual claimants and the unions were in different form, 
being, as they were, made between different parties occupying different positions with regard to each 
other’.303 
 
o The English Draft on Court Rules 
The draft established a commonality requirement and further precises that common issues meant ‘the 
same, similar or related issue of fact or law’.304   
 
o The American Class Action 
US FRCP Rule 23(a)(2) requires judge to verify the existence of ‘questions of law or fact common to the 
class’. This criterion is known as the commonality requirement. The 2011 class action Wal-Mart stores 
Inc. v. Dukes filed by one and half million of current and former women employees against Wal-Mart 
company for gender discrimination is here instructive about the possible controversies arising from the 
commonality criterion. Unlike the 9
th
 Circuit Court of Appeal which, on the basis of experts’ opinions and 
factual/statistical evidence, decided to confirm the class certification,
305
 the Supreme Court ultimately 
denied class certification by following a strict interpretation of the commonality criterion.
306
 Supreme 
Court judges indeed highlighted that ‘commonality requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the class 
members “have suffered the same injury”’ and further noticed that ‘the common contention (…) must be 
of such nature that it is capable of a class-wide resolution’. After having discarded statistical proofs and 
noticed the absence of established discriminatory policies, the court ruled that a ‘glue’ – the word glue is 
here particularly revealing - which must necessarily hold all plaintiffs’ claims together was insufficient in 
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this case.
307
 The simple fact that Wal-Mart employment policy had given managers large discretion which 
could have facilitated discrimination was not sufficient to prove commonality.
308
  Interestingly, Supreme 
Court judges however disagreed within the panel itself. In her dissenting opinion, Justice GINSBURG for 
instance observed that ‘the dissimilarities approach [led] the Court to train its attention on what 
distinguishes individual class members, rather than on what unites them’.309 
 
b) Judicial Review of the Merits of the Claim 
 
 
 Rationale  
 
 
From a legal perspective, a preliminary judicial assessment on the merits of the claim is aimed at 
screening out and discarding unmeritorious cases. Arguably, reputational costs for companies and risks of 
blackmail arising from weak claimants will thus be minimized. As HENSLER and ROWE have pointed 
out, such a filter is intended to reduce the ‘in terrorem effect’ that companies usually associate with mass 
proceedings.
310
 This test can also be regarded as an early-warning signal addressed to the judiciary and to 
litigants: it lowers the uncertainty associated with the case’s final outcome, since the fundamental 
objective is to identify at earlier stages cases that are not worth proceeding.
311
 Interestingly, despite its 
justification, control on the merits remains a controversial issue.  On the one hand, scholars have 
highlighted a risk of proliferation of ‘mini-trials’312 or ‘satellite litigation’313 which could be burdensome, 
lengthy and costly for both judiciaries and litigants.
314
 On the other hand, other voices have defended the 
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preliminary test as being a strong safeguard against frivolous litigation.
315
 Debates seem nowadays 
polarized between, on the one hand, a need for flexibility and, on the other hand, a request for security. 
 
 In the Selected Mass Proceedings 
  
 
o The French Group Action 
 
 Lying at the outer extremes of the spectrum, the French group action is built on a strong preliminary 
ruling on the merits: judges must establish liability and define the scope of defendant(s)’ liability at the 
very first stages of the proceeding.
316
 This judicial control was strongly advocated by business 
representatives who were afraid of frivolous lawsuits and their associated reputation costs.
317
 
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
 
 A preliminary ruling is not requested in the actual WCAM regime. Current discussions however tend to 
encourage a preliminary intervention of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) in order to clarify the 
merits of the case at earlier stages, and thus to facilitate negotiations.
318
 Recent developments appear to 
pave the way in this direction. The 2012 Preliminary Question to the Supreme Court Act (Wet Prejudiciële 
Vragen Aan de Hoge Raad) already allows lower courts to ask the Supreme Court for a preliminary 
decision as long as the claim at stake is relevant for a significant number of similar cases.
319
 As VAN 
BOOM has nonetheless expressed it, ‘the road to a final verdict of the Supreme Court on points of law as 
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p.184, available on www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/publications/discussion-papers-and-consultative-memoranda/1990-
1999/, accessed 27.11.2012). 
315
 English Draft for Court Rules, supra note 273, pp.6-7. 
316
 New Article L.423-3 Consumer Code. 
317
 2010 Group action Report, supra note 199, at p.69 (in French : ‘les représentants des entreprises ont exprimé la 
crainte qu’en l’absence de contrôle préalable de la recevabilité de la demande, les actions puissent se multiplier sans 
que le juge puisse écarter celles qui seraient manifestement abusives ou infondées, alors que, pendant toute la durée 
de l’instance, une exploitation médiatique qui nuirait aux intérêts du professionnel injustement mis en cause pourrait 
se développer’). 
318
 F.WEBER and W.VAN BOOM, supra note 254. 
319
 Wet van 9 februari 2012 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering en de Wet op de 
rechterlijke organisatie in verband met de invoering van de mogelijkheid tot het stellen van prejudiciële vragen aan 
de civiele kamer van de Hoge Raad - Wet prejudiciële vragen aan de Hoge Raad). On the use of the preliminary 
ruling in the framework of the WCAM, see: M.V. HOOIJDONK and P.  EIJSVOOGEL, supra note 256 (considering 
that this mechanism ‘will likely act as an instrument to get parties at the negotiating table’). 
 74 
 
a precursor for a settlement is [still] a long and slippery one’.320 Finally, the WCAM can also be combined 
with the collective action of article 3:305a Civil Code. The judgement pronounced on this occasion will 
serve as a starting point for future negotiations between parties.  
 
  
o The English GLO 
 
 There is formally no preliminary review on the merits of the case. However, some scholars have 
considered the fact that GLOs needed to proceed an approval from higher judges could be viewed as ‘a 
kind of’ test on the merits.321  
 
 
o The English Draft on Court rules 
 
 
When the draft was discussed, vivid debates took place on the opportunity to establish a control of 
merits.
322
  The draft provides a preliminary test on merits and states that ‘a claim that was weak, but not so 
weak that it could be struck out, could fail certification because, ‘in all the circumstances’, it should not be 
certified.
323
 In addition, the representative claimant is required to state in its application that ‘it is believed 
that the claim has real prospects of success’.324 
  
 
o The American Class Action 
 
Theoretically, there is formally no test on the merits of the case. To illustrate this point, the 1974 decision 
Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin from the Supreme Court is usually set forth. In this affair, judges pointed 
out that there is ‘nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained 
as a class action’.325 Here again, this point has been a source a vivid debate among American legal 
scholars.
326
 In practice, it appears that issues about merits are sometimes addressed before or during the 
                                                          
320
 W. VAN BOOM, supra note 120. 
321
 Practice Direction 19B-Group Litigation, point 3.3 (stating: ‘GLO may not be made in the Queen’s Bench 
Division, without the consent of the Lord Chief Justice, in the Chancery Division, without the consent of the Vice-
Chancellor, or in a county court, without the consent of the Head of Civil Justice.Report’). See also Report ‘Powers 
of the Judge’, supra note 169, at p.49. 
322
 English Draft Court Rules, supra note 273, at pp.6-7.  
323
 Proposed CPR  19.20(2)(c) 
324
 Proposed CPR 19.18 (3)(c) 
325
  Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin 417 US 156, 177-78, 94 S Ct 2140 – 1974) 
326
 R. MULHERON, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – A Comparative Perspective, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2004 , pp.131-136. 
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certification stage simply because factual questions are intertwined with issues about merits. If not 
formally enshrined in the law, this preliminary control is in practice often performed to assess the criteria 
contained in Rule 23 FRCP.
327
  While reviewing the commonality criteria in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the 
Supreme Court for instance pointed out that ‘proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents’ 
merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination’.328 Interestingly, in the 
2007 antitrust class action Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
329
 the Supreme Court heightened the pleading 
requirements for federal civil cases by rejecting a claim which was grounded on mere allegations and 
failed to provide sufficient evidence which could make it plausible that companies had indeed engaged in 
anticompetitive practices.  This rule was restated in the 2009 case Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
330
 All lawsuits filed in 
federal courts must therefore now be screened for 'plausibility'.  
  
 
c) Judicial Control over the Superiority of the Group Procedure  
 
 
 
 Rationale  
 
Some collective proceedings require judges to perform a sort of cost/benefits analysis to ensure that suing 
as a group is indeed the most suitable solution – or is ‘superior’ - when compared to individual litigation 
or other solutions. HODGES and MONEY-KYRLE have in this respect observed that, in the European 
context, such a superiority principle tends to be a ‘pathway prioritization’ where judges and parties are 
urged to consider the use of ADR, third-party or regulatory intervention.
331
 The main objective is ensuring 
that collective procedures remain exceptional, and that the costs associated with such proceedings remain 
justified given the needs of the case at stake. 
 
 In the Selected Mass Proceedings 
 
o The French Group Action 
Formally, there is no mention of a superiority criterion in the French group action. This absence should 
however in practice be nuanced. Even though not explicitly stated, the declaratory judgment on liability 
                                                          
327
 R.MARCUS, supra note 170 (referring to a 1978 decision from The US Supreme Court – i.e Coopers & Lybrand 
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978)  which highlighted that ‘the class determination generally involves 
considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs’ cause of action’, at p.341).  
328
 Wal-Mart decision, supra note 306, at p.11. 
329
 Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 US, 544, 566 (2007). 
330
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US, 662 (2009). 
331
 R.MONEY-KYRLE and C.HODGES, ‘European Collective Action: Towards Coherence’, (4) Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, 2012. 
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can implicitly encourage a judicial control over the superiority of the group procedure. On this occasion, 
judges might for instance channel the proceeding towards ADR if they deem it appropriate. On a broader 
scale, recent reports about the reform of the French Civil procedure have clearly encouraged the use and 
development of alternative dispute resolution.
332
 
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
 The superiority criterion is here irrelevant since the settlement agreement is brought forward to the court 
by parties themselves.   
 
o The English GLO 
 According to the overriding principle which irradiates English Civil procedures in its entirety,
333
 judges 
are already required to deal with cases in a fair, proportional and cost efficient way.
334
 This should notably 
lead them to consider the use of alternative disputes resolution whenever they deemed it appropriate.
335
 In 
this view, the GLO Ashton Morton Slack Solicitors is again illustrative. In this affair, the judge decided to 
dismiss the GLO application on the basis that ‘any serious thought [had not been] given to alternative 
means of adjudication of the underlying claims’.336  
 
o The English Draft on Court Rules 
 Also strongly influenced by the overriding principle, the draft requires judges to verify that proceeding as 
a group ‘is the most appropriate means for the fair and efficient resolution of the common issues’.337 The 
draft also provides a cost/benefit principle stating that courts should take into account ‘the costs and 
benefits of the proposed collective proceeding when deciding whether it remains the most appropriate tool 
for a fair and efficient resolution of common issues’.338  
 
                                                          
332
 S.GUINCHARD (Ed.), L’ambition raisonnée d’une justice apaisée, report, July 2008, 344 p., and notably Title 3, 
Chapter 1 ‘Le développement des modes alternatifs de réglement des conflits’ (available on 
www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/084000392/index.shtml, accessed 27 February 2012). 
333
 CPR 1.1. 
334
 CPR 1.2 
335
 CPR 1.4(e) 
336
 Ashton GLO, at point 71. 
337
 Proposed CPR 19.20 (2) (b) 
338
 Proposed CPR 19.20 (3) (a) 
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o The American Federal Class action 
 In 1966, the Advisory Committee clarified the superiority criterion’s rationale by pointing out that its 
objective was to determine ‘whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and 
burdens of class litigation’.339 According to MULHERON, the control over the superiority principle is a 
key step which gives American judges extensive discretionary powers in order to weigh competing 
interests.
340
 According to Rule 23(b) FRCP, the fulfillment of the superiority principle is required only for 
certain type of class actions. Article 23(b)(3) provides a non-exhaustive list of indicators helping judges 
when applying this criteria.
341
 
 
d) Judicial Control on the Number of Claimants Involved 
 
 
 
 Rationale  
 
 
Control on the number of participants who are involved in the proceeding is justified by a willingness to 
ensure that mass claims will concern a body of people that is large enough to justify its monitoring costs. 
In addition, the number of plaintiffs will also justify ‘the anomalous form of representation’ performed by 
the representative body or leading plaintiff which contrasts with individual litigation.
342
 Even though this 
remark does not apply to the proceeding retained in this analysis, it is interesting to notice that some 
European proceedings have established a threshold of plaintiffs that has to be met at minima to declare the 
proceeding admissible. The Austrian Gruppenverfahren for example can be initiated only when ‘at least 
three persons raise large number of claims’.343 
 
                                                          
339
 On this occasion, the Committee proposed several amendments to Rule 23(b) (3) requiring judges to verify 
‘whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and burden of class litigation’. See also on 
this point D.R.HENSLER and T.D.ROWE, supra note 310. 
340
 R. MULHERON, supra note 326, at p .220. 
341
 Article 23(b) (3) FRCP mentions the following indicators: (1) the class members' interests in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by or against class members,(3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (4) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
342
J. BRONSTEEN and O. FISS, The Class Action Rule, (78) Notre-Dame Law Review, pp.1419-1454 (at p.1423). 
343
 E.KODEK, supra note 171. Similarly the German capital market model case requires from claimants ‘to 
substantiate that the decision on the application for the establishment of a model case may have significance for other 
similar cases beyond the individual dispute concerned’ (section 1(2). Then, German judges must verify that ‘at least 
nine other proceedings related applications’ have been submitted (Section 4(1)2).). 
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 In the Selected Mass Proceedings 
 
o The French Group Action 
The current framework of the group action does not explicitly mention any control on the number of 
plaintiffs. Previous drafts nonetheless required judges to verify that associations filing a group claim 
brought evidence that the damage was in practice ‘a mass damage’ affecting a wide range of plaintiffs.344 
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
 Article 7:907(3)(g) provides that the Court shall reject the settlement agreement if ‘the group of persons 
on whose behalf the agreement was concluded is not large enough to justify a declaration by the Court 
that the agreement is binding’.345 As an illustration, in the Converium case the court ultimately observed 
that the group ‘could be asserted to be well-over 3,000 individuals’, and hence considered its size as being 
sufficient.
346
  
 
o The English GLO 
CPR 19.11(1) provides that GLO application can be submitted only when a number of claims are, or are 
likely to be made. 
  
o The English Draft Court Rules  
Proposed CPR 19.20(2)(a) provides that judges must ensure that claims are brought ‘on behalf of an 
identifiable class of persons’. 
 
o The American Class Action 
 FRCP rule 23(a) (1) identifies a numerosity principle and provides that judges must verify that filing 
parties are indeed so numerous that joinder remains in practice impracticable. As recalled by 
                                                          
344
 2010 Group Action Report, supra note 199, at  p.72. 
345
 Article 7:907 (3)(g)   Dutch Civil Code. 
346
 Converium case, at point 9. 
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MULHERON, the analysis of the US class action suggests that several methodologies may be employed 
to assess the numerosity principle.
347
  
 
 
e) Judicial Control On Lead Plaintiffs’ or Associations’ Representativeness 
 
 
 Rationale  
 
 
Judicial control on the representativeness of lead plaintiffs or associations is aimed at protecting the 
interests of represented claimants. As MULHERON observes, ‘the representative plaintiff, or applicant, is 
“the face” of the action being brought on behalf of all class members’.348 Judicial control first ensures that 
the representative entity has the knowledge, financial and human resources to conduct the litigation on 
behalf of the claimant group. Second, it is aimed at reducing the risks of opportunistic behaviour of non- 
or partially representative entities. Third and relatedly, it reduces the risks of principal-agent problems 
potentially arising between the representative body and represented claimants whose interests might not 
fully be aligned. Unlike traditional litigation, the personal link between counsels and represented 
claimants does not exist.The scope of the judicial control on this issue tends to diverge in the proceedings 
here retained. 
 
 In the Selected Mass Proceedings 
o The French Group Action 
In the 2010 Group Action report, associations which wanted to file a group lawsuit had to be entitled with 
a ‘strengthened accreditation’349 (accréditation renforcée) which completed the existing legal 
requirements that already regulated the legal standing of associations. This accreditation could eventually 
be given by judges during the procecedure. However, the final text of the 2014 bill reforming Consumer 
Law does not make any reference to such strengthened accreditation. In January 2014, while asked by 
MPs whether the introduction of a group action procedure will be followed by modifications of the 
prerequisites for legal standing of associations which have not been modified since 1988,
350
 Government 
                                                          
347
 R. MULHERON, supra note 326, at p.116. 
348
 Idem, at p.275. 
349
 2010 Group Action Report, supra note 199, recommendation n°6. 
350
 Réponse ministérielle n° 32648 to L. Tardy, Journal Officiel de l’Assemblée Nationale (question), 21 January 
2014, p. 703. 
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claimed that changes were currently not on the agenda.
351
  One may therefore today still refer to the 
existing prerequisites listed in Articles L. 411-1 and R. 411-1 to R. 411-7 Consumer Code.
 352 
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
 
 The WCAM procedure relies on a strong representativeness test enshrined in Articles 7:907 (1) and 7:907 
(3) Dutch Civil Code.
353
 This test is of particular importance since the settlement agreement – according to 
the opt-out system - will not only bind the representative associations and/or foundations, but also 
unknown and absent group claimants. Closely scrutinized by the Amsterdam court, judges must verify the 
statutory object of the association. This test has been given a considerable weight during the review of 
settlement agreements.
354
 To this day, despite a few exceptions, this test has however not been seen as a 
source of major concern for the Dutch judiciary.
355
 Noteworthy, a 2013 amendment to article 3:305a(2) of 
the Dutch Civil Code has reinforced the control over representative associations by stating that 
representative associations will not obtain standing if the interests of individuals are not sufficiently 
guaranteed and preserved. As recalled in the Converium agreement, indicators that can be used to assess 
the representativity of associations/foundations were notably further mentioned during parliamentary 
discussions about the WCAM.
356
  
                                                          
351
 Dépêche Lexis Nexis Juris-Classeur Actualités, 28 January 2014 (‘associations de consommateurs agrées et 
actions de groupe’). 
352
 See Article R.411-1 French Consumer Code (stating that ‘the approval of consumer associations (…) may be 
granted to any association: which can prove on the date of request that its has been in existence for one year; which, 
during this period of existence, provides evidence of effective and public activity with a view to the protection of 
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regular and information meetings; which brings together, on the date of the application for approval, a number of 
individually paid-up members: at least 10,000 for national associations (…). Article R.411-2 Consumer Code further 
provides that Approval of national organisations is granted by joint order of the minister for consumer affairs and the 
Keeper of the Seals (Garde des Sceaux). It is published in the Journal officiel de la République française’. 
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 According to Article 7:907 (3) (f) Dutch Civil Code, the court must reject the agreement seeking judicial approval 
whenever the association is ‘not sufficiently representative’ with regards to the interests of claimants. In the Shell 
agreement, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled that ‘the law does not require them to be [representative] 
separately with regard to all these persons, as long as each of them is sufficiently representative for a sufficiently 
large portion of said persons’ (see point 6.22). 
354
 H.V. LITH, ‘Cultural Dimensions of Group Litigation – Netherlands’, International Association of Procedural 
Law, Moscow conference, 2012. 
355
 In the Shell decision, the Court considered that two of the four associations/foundations were not representative 
enough. Remarkably, the Court noted that ‘even when interpreted in the widest sense of the word, [the object 
statement of these two entities could] not be understood to include the representation of the interests of persons to 
whom damage has been caused by the events (point 6.4). 
356
 Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29414, n°3, p.16; also recalled in the Converium 
settlement agreement at point 6.2 (observing: ‘the representativeness of the interest group may be inferred, for 
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o The English Group Litigation Order 
 The rules regulating GLOs provide that the court may appoint ‘lead solicitors’ for claimants and 
defendants.
357
 In practice, this rule is however rarely applied and lawyers often by themselves reach an 
agreement on the identity of the lead counsel.
358
  
 
o The English Draft on Court Rules 
The draft leaves to judicial discretion the assessment of the ‘most appropriate person’ likely to adequately 
represent the group. English judges are asked to verify whether the representative ‘fairly and adequately 
represents the interest of the class’, has ‘no conflict of interest’ and can provide a ‘security for costs’.359 
Going a step further, the Draft also explicity requires from judges to ensure that the full representativeness 
of the group’s representative remains ensured during the entire litigation process.360  
 
o The American Federal Class Action    
The FRCP rule 23(g) provides that when certifying a class, judges must appoint class counsel. In doing so, 
they may notably consider any matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class.
361
 As highlighted by the American Supreme Court, the class action must remain ‘an 
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only’.362  
      
                                                                                                                                                                                            
example, from other activities which the group has performed in order to serve the interests of aggrieved parties, 
from the number of aggrieved parties who have joined or are member of the group  or from the extent to which the 
aggrieved parties themselves accept the group as representative. The representativeness may also be inferred from 
the fact that the group has acted as a negotiating partner in relation to the damage causing event(s), not only in 
relation to the party or parties causing the damage but also, for example, in relation to the government authorities. 
Acting as spokesperson in the media may also be an important indication’). 
357
 CPR 19 II, Rule 19.13 (b) See also Practice Direction 19B 2.2 (‘the lead solicitor’s role and relationship with the 
other members of the Solicitors’ Group should be carefully defined in writing and will be subject to any directions 
given by the court under CPR 19.13(c)’).  
358
 C.HODGES, supra note 89. 
359
 Proposed CPR 19.21(1), (2) and (3) ‘Approval of the Applicant to Act as Class Representative’. 
360
 Proposed CPR 19.28 (stating: ‘it at any time after a collective proceeding is made it appears to the court that the 
class representative is fairly and adequately representing the interest of the represented parties (…)’. 
361
 See also FRCP 23 (a) (4) (stating: ‘the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class). 
362
 US Supreme Court, Wal-Mart Inc v. Dukes, supra note 306, at p.8. 
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3.3.2. Watchdogs Regarding the Shape of the Group 
 
Judges must behave as watchdog vis-à-vis the shape of the group. In this view, they are asked to control 
the size of the group (a), as well as to manage information and to regulate cut-off dates to join or leave the 
group (b). 
 
a) Judicial Control over the Size and the Shape of the Group  
 
 
 Rationale  
 
 
Shaping the group is a decisive moment. Judges must ensure homogeneity within the claimant group. 
Whenever deemed necessary, they may define sub-groups in order to take into account related claims 
brought by plaintiffs with different interests, status or harm. From a legal point of view, defining the group 
of plaintiffs is aimed at determining and circumscribing those who will be bound by the final judgment 
and entitled to compensation. From an economic point of view, it was previously shown that homogeneity 
within the claimant group has long-lasting consequences: it facilitates economies of scale, reduces the 
risks of opportunistic behaviours such as free-riding, and enhances the group’s bargaining power by 
notably reducing the risk of adverse selection.
363
 Further developments of this research will also reveal 
that homogeneity is a prerequisite for the use of case management techniques such as bellwether trials, 
statistics or samples, and that heterogeneity within the claimant group can in turn exacerbate outlier 
effects.
364
 Remarkably, in all the proceedings here analysed, the judiciary is required to perform a central 
role.  
 
 In The Selected Mass Proceedings 
 
 
o The French Group Action 
 
In line with previous proposals, group actions give to judges and associations a prominent role for 
determining the shape of the claimant group.
365
  New article L.423-3 Consumer Code states that the court 
defines the claimant group and clarifies the criteria and conditions of its membership. Furthermore, judges 
must establish a time-planning determining the period during which plaintiffs can adhere to the group. 
This delay cannot be less than 2 months, and cannot exceed six months after the case has been advertised 
                                                          
363
 See Chapter 2 ‘Costs and Abuses associated with the Structure of the Group’. 
364
 See Chapter 5, ‘ Outlier Effect’. 
365
 2010 Group Action Report, supra note 199, recommendation n°15, at p.72. 
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in the media.
366
 Based on an opt-in system, plaintiffs must then voluntarily step forward to be included 
into the claimant group. Even though the technique of sub-grouping is not explicitely mentioned, this 
possibility remains implicitly contained in new Article L.423-3 al.2 Consumer Code which makes a direct 
reference to the existence of different ‘categories of consumers that constitute the group’.367  
 
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
 
According to Rule 7:907 (2) (d) Civil Code, parties seeking for a judicial clearance of their settlement 
agreement must clearly identify ‘the conditions which these persons must meet to qualify for 
compensation’. In the Shell case, judges for instance referred a specific timeframe to control and limit the 
scope of claimants concerned by the settlement agreement.
368
   
 
o The English Group Litigation Order 
 
GLO applications must similarly establish the boundaries of the claimant group. CPR 19.13(f) provides 
that the managing judge ‘gives directions for the entry of any particular claim which meets one or more of 
the GLO issues’ previously identified. As observed by HODGES, this definition is essentially a 
‘generalised description’ where the judge can take for example the occurrence of a particular event as 
point of reference.
369
 GLOs may also further distinguish subgroups if this strategy helps the case to 
proceed.
370
 Since GLOs are based on the opt-in system, plaintiffs who want to join the claimant group 
must step in. Their files are reported on a group register kept under judicial control.
371
 
 
o The English Draft Court Rules 
 
The draft provides that judges must ‘describ[e] or otherwise identif[y] the class’. Yet, when doing so, the 
draft precises that judges will not have to specify all members in details.
372
 Importantly, while noticing 
                                                          
366
  New Article L.423-.5 Consumer Code. 
367
 New Article L.423-3 al.2 Consumer Code (in French : ‘le juge détermine le montant des préjudices pour chaque 
consommateur ou chacune des categories de consommateur constituant le groupe qu’il a défini, ainsi que leur 
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368
 Shell case, at 6.1 and 6.2 (the agreement targeted ‘persons who acquired Shell shares in the period from the period 
8 April 1999 up to and including March 2004 may have suffered losses, as they purchased the securities for the share 
price which did not correspond with the real volum of the reserve held by Shell’). 
369
 C. HODGES, supra note 56, at p.56 (for example: ‘any claims AB Limited in relation to [alleged effects of autism 
arising from] use of the drug X’). 
370
 Practice Direction 19B – Group Litigation, 3.2.5 
371
 Practice Direction 19B- Group Litigation 6.1 
372
 Proposed CPR 19.22 (3) 
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that ‘the size and composition of any potential class could vary broadly’, the draft drastically increases the 
power of judges with regards to the group definition. Judges may notably decide that the group can be 
constituted via the opt-in or via the opt-out system depending on the needs of the case at stake.
373
  
 
o The American class action: 
According to FRCP Rule 23(c) (1) (b), the judicial certification order ‘must define the class and the class 
claims, issues or defences (…)’. If ever deemed appropriate, the class may also be divided into sub-classes 
to take into account particularities of plaintiffs’ claims.374 In the asbestos class action Cimino v. Raymark 
Industries which concerned 2,298 plaintiffs, the court for example decided to sub-group plaintiffs into five 
categories depending on the characteristics and severity of their respective illnesses. These five categories 
were respectively mesothelioma, lung cancer, other cancer, asbestosis and pleural disease.
375
 
 
b) Judicial control over Information, Notification & Cut-Off Dates to Join or Leave the   
       Group 
 
 Rationale  
 
 
Judges must ensure that the case is widely and adequately publicized in the media. This step is aimed at 
ensuring what has been sometimes referred to as a ‘democratisation of mass litigation’.376 Judicial 
management of information has here a double function.  
The first concerns the ‘external democratisation’ of mass disputes: all potential claimants should have a 
possibility to leave the proceeding (in case of opt-out system) or to step in (in case of opt-in). A recent 
study conducted by VAN DIJCK interestingly found that plaintiffs who have been informed that a 
majority of other plaintiffs have decided to start individual procedures tend themselves to leave the 
collective procedure to start an individual procedure of their own.
377
 
                                                          
373
 Proposed CPR 19.22 (1) (f) (the working group ultimately observed that ‘the matter was best left to the court to 
decide at large. It is intended that the rules could be applied to a broad range of collective proceedings which may 
cover many different types of claims.’, at p.10). 
374
 FRCP Rule 23 (c)(3)(5) (‘subclasses’). 
375
 Cimino v. Raymark Industries Inc., 751 f. 649 (1990) 
376
 K.R.FEINBERG, ‘Democratization of Mass Litigation: Empowering the Beneficiaries’, (45) Columbia Journal of 
Law and Social Problems, 2012, pp.481-497. 
377
 G.VAN DIJCK, ‚supra note 182. 
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The second regards the ‘internal democratization’ of mass disputes: all potential claimants should be 
informed of their possibility to be heard and to present objections during hearings.
378
 Judicial control on 
information is essential to ensure that the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is respected. While doing so, judges help bridge the gap between 
the ‘inevitable anonymity that goes with the aggregation of claims’ and the individualised situations of 
claimants.
379
 Furthermore, spreading information is not only necessary to respect the rights of involved 
parties, but more generally it also contribute to the overall credibility and legitimacy of the resolution of 
mass disputes vis-a-vis society at large. As FEINBERG observes, ‘if the litigation itself, and the 
accompanying settlement reached behind closed doors, are not viewed as credible or “just”, we citizens 
lose faith in the ability of the courts to dispense and deliver “justice”.380  Judges therefore are given large 
discretionary powers to fulfil this important task.  
 
 In the Selected Mass Proceedings 
 
o The French Group Action 
 The 2010 Group Action report already stated that judges must select the most appropriate venues for 
advertising the case, depending on the circumstances at stake.
381
 In the same vein, new Article L.423-4 
Consumer Code provides that judges must take all ‘adapted measures’ to inform potential plaintiffs about 
the content of the declaratory ruling on liability. Such a mediatisation must occur only after the decision 
on liability is not subject to appeal or cassation anymore. The advertising costs are borne by defendant(s) 
who have previously been held liable in the declaratory ruling on liability. Furthermore, whenever a 
settlement agreement is found between litigants, venues for informing claimants about the content of the 
agreement must also be clearly indicated.
382
  
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
 The mediatisation of the proposed settlement agreement must occur two times: first when the agreement 
is brought to the court by parties so as to give to all potential claimants a possibility to present objections 
                                                          
378
  K.R.FEINBERG, supra note 376. 
379
 J.B. WEINSTEIN, ‘The Democratization of Mass Actions in The Internet Age’, (45) Columbia Journal of Law 
and Social Problems, 2012, pp.451-471. 
380
 Idem. 
381
 2010 Group Action Report, supra note 199, recommendation n°16.  
382
 New Article L.423-16 Consumer Code. 
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or modifications; second when the agreement is approved by the court so as to give all potential plaintiffs 
a possibility to leave the proceeding.
383
  As pointed out by TZANKOVA, the court may choose between 
different ‘case-tailored approaches’.384 The notification process may turn out to be costly when parties are 
located outside the Netherlands. In the Converium case, the agreement indicated a list of French, Swiss, 
English and Dutch newspapers along with a list of websites where the case had to be notified.
385
 As 
KRAMER more generally points it out, judges presiding over the Shell and Converium cases ‘gave strict 
instruction in relations to the notification [:] advertisements were placed in dozens of newspapers, special 
websites were established, and banners were placed on websites’.386 
 
o The English GLO 
CPR 19.13(e) provides that the managing judge must [specify] a date after which no additional claim may 
be added to the group register (…)’. Practice Directions 19(B) give further information on the way judges 
must establish cut off dates to join the group depending on the type of case at stake.
387
.
 
As observed by 
HODGES, fixing cut-off dates can indeed turn out to be a tricky and uneasy exercise. As he further 
highlights:  
[The Court] ‘tries to avoid setting cut-off dates that give claimants too short a time to investigate their 
claims, since this can produce a rush of bad claims that have to be weeded out later and give a false 
impression of the viability of the group as a whole. There can sometimes be good reasons for not imposing 
a cut-off date, such as where there are difficulties over bringing the case to the attention of people who 
may be affected’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
383
 H.VAN LITH, supra note 245.  
384
 I. TZANKOVA, supra note 60. 
385
 Converium case, at point 11.13 
386
 X. KRAMER, supra note 249, at p.89. 
387
 Practice Directions 19(B), (Point 13 stating that ‘the management court may specify a date after which no claim 
may be added to the Group Register unless the court gives permission. An early cut-off date may be appropriate in 
the case of ‘instant disasters’ (such as transport accidents. In the case of consumer claims, and particularly 
pharmaceutical claims, it may be necessary to delay the ordering of a cut-off date’). 
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o The English Draft Court Rules 
Judges must ensure the publicity of the case and specify cut-off dates for the opting-in or opting-out of 
potential claimants.
388
 Here again, judges must behave as key interface in charge of verifying the adequate 
circulation of information across all potential claimants.  
 
o The American Class Action: 
 In its 1974 decision Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the US Supreme Court ruled that notification should 
be conducted ‘through reasonable effort’.389 Interestingly, WEINSTEIN in the Agent Orange class action 
also pointed out that ‘particular emphasis should be placed to communicate with class members who are 
outside the mainstream of society’. 
 
3.3.3. Preliminary Conclusion  
 
 
In the framework of mass litigation, judges must go through a kind of certification process where they will 
notably verify the number of involved claimants, the existence of common issues, the representativeness 
of the lead entities, the adequacy of the proceeding given the needs and particularities of the case at stake. 
In some cases, they may also be required to conduct a preliminary assessment of the merits of the claim. 
These different steps exist in every mass proceeding regardless of the idiosyncrasies of their procedural 
design. A difference however remains regarding the way judges will formally fulfil their duties. Their 
intervention may go from a strict control over established criteria as the one conducted by American 
judges when certifying class actions to a more flexible approach as the one adopted by English judges 
when reviewing the admissibility of Group Litigation Orders.
390 
 
       
 
* 
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 Proposed CPR 19.23 and 19.24 
389
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin - 417 U.S. 156 (1974) 
390
  C. HODGES, supra note 56 (noticing: ‘the absence of formal criteria in the English GLO system contrasts with a 
number of other jurisdictions which have defined criteria’ and that ‘since the GLO is a broadly conceived managerial 
tool, the certification requirements are deliberately relaxed and the court has wide discretion over how to handle the 
cases in the group’, at pp.55-56). 
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3.4. JUDGES AS MASS CLAIMS’ CATTLE DRIVERS 
 
 
 
As the cattle driver whose assigned duty is to lead the herd safely and promptly to its final destination, 
judges must assist parties and ensure that cases make orderly progresses. As OST observes on a more 
general level: ‘the social game [has become] essentially a game of performance [where] the judge is asked 
to leave his role of passive arbitrator to adopt the one, [more] active of a coach who, by his advice and his 
decisions, pushes the competition towards a collective and shared victory’.391 The case management 
philosophy is known in Continental systems where judges must already take active steps for the resolution 
of civil disputes. Interestingly, a similar tendency is also noticeable in Common Law systems even though 
judges are there portrayed as being traditionally more passive. As indeed pointed out by ZUCKERMAN, 
‘Common Law countries and Civil Law countries display a shift towards the imposition of a stronger 
control by judges over the progress of civil litigation’.392 Remarkably, this tendency takes its full and 
comprehensive meaning in the realm of mass litigation (3.4.1). Innovative but controversial case 
management techniques have progressively emerged as an attempt to deal efficiently with mass claims 
(3.4.2).  
   
 
 
3.4.1. A Case Management Philosophy in Individual Litigation Reinforced in Mass 
Ltigation 
 
 
 
Case management practices in individual and mass litigation are hereafter clarified with respect to France 
(a), the Netherlands (b), England and Wales (c) and the United States (d). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
391
 F.OST, ‘Le Juge Pacificateur, Juge-arbitre et Juge entraineur. Trois modèles de justice’  in : P.GERARD, F.OST 
and M.VAN DE KERCHOVE, Fonction du Juge et Pouvoir Judiciaire : Transformation et déplacement, Publication 
des facultés universitaires de Saint Louis, 1983 (translation from the author). 
392
 A.S. ZUCKERMAN, Civil Justice in Crisis: Comparative Perspectives of Civil Procedure, Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
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a) Case Management Practices in France  
 
 
 Case management philosophy in individual litigation 
 
 
The role of the French civil judge in the 1806 Code of Civil Procedure was traditionally limited. The 
proceeding was mostly left to parties’ control.393 Further legislative developments have however 
progressively departed from this model, and enshrined into the law an active judicial intervention in the 
conduct of civil litigation.
394
 An essential step was made in the 1975 Code of Civil Procedure which 
inaugurated a new judicial era with the creation of the so-called juge de la mise en état (judge in charge of 
monitoring civil proceedings) seating in High Courts of First Instance (tribunal de grande instance).
395
 
Viewed as ‘the manager of civil proceedings’,396 his core function is to promote ‘an effective relationship 
between the judges and the parties’ and to supervise ‘the loyal conduct of the the procedure’.397  He 
ensures a timely exchange of pleadings and transmission of documents’.398 he fixes a calendar with time-
limits for the examination of particular issues,
399
 can require from parties to issue factual information on 
points that remain shadowy,
400
 may require the intervention of third parties whose intervention are deemed 
necessary for the resolution of the dispute.
401
 Importantly, he has also the authority to order production 
and transmission of documents and evidence.
402
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
393
 C.H. VAN RHEE, (Ed.), European Traditions in Civil Procedure, Ius Commune: European and Comparative 
Law Series, Intersentia, vol.54, 2005.  
394
 See notably the 1935 and 1965 Legislative Decrees creating a judge whose main task is to ‘follow the civil 
procedure’ (decree n°65-872 of 13 October 1965 modifiant certaines dispositions du code de procédure civile et 
relative à la mise en état des causes). 
395
 V. MAGNIER, ‘Report on France’, (622) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (The 
Globalization of Class Actions), 2009, pp.114-124. 
396
 J.C. MAGENDIE, Rapport au garde des sceaux ‘Célérité et  qualité de la justice – La gestion du temps dans le 
proces’,15 juin 2004 (citing R.PERROT who described the juge de la mise en état as the ‘gestionnaire de 
l’instruction civile’). 
397
 A. WIJFFELS, ‘Powers of the Judge – France’, in: C.H. VAN RHEE, (Ed.), European Traditions in Civil 
Procedure, Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law Series, Intersentia, vol.54, 2005, pp.269-280. 
398
 Article 763 French Code of Civil Procedure 
399
 Article 764 French Code of Civil Procedure 
400
 Idem 
401
 Article 768-1 Code of Civil Procedure 
402
 Article 770 Code of Civil Procedure 
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 Case Management Philosophy in Mass Claims 
  
 
 The French group action does not provide specific powers to judges for the treatment of mass cases. Yet, 
new Article L.423-3 al.3 Consumer Code may rapidly become the key textual references grounding and 
justifying an enhanced judicial intervention in mass claims. This Article provides that at any stage of the 
proceedings the court can take any orders which are legally admissible or deemed necessary for the 
preservation of evidence and the production of documents, including those held by professional.
403
 In 
addition, particular attention has been given to the use of model and test cases which may help judges 
when resolving mass disputes.
404
 Finally, the powers of French judges are determined by the traditional 
rules of civil procedure. All the powers of the juge de la mise en état previously mentioned will also be 
used for the monitoring of mass disputes.  
 
 
 
b) Case Management Practices in the Netherlands  
 
 
 Case Management Philosophy in Individual litigation  
 
 
Dutch legal scholars have pointed out that ‘case management [was] a more recent phenomenon in the 
practice of civil procedure.’405 Even though the intervention of the Dutch civil judge was initially 
restricted by the principles of judge’s passivity (lijdelijkheid van de rechter) and party autonomy 
(partijautonomie),
406
 reforms have successively - albeit slowly -
407
 encouraged an enhanced judicial 
intervention.
408
 Judicial case management techniques have moreover progressively emerged from judicial 
                                                          
403
 New Article L.423-3 al.3 Consumer Code (In French: ‘à tout moment de la procédure le juge peut ordonner toute 
mesure d'instruction légalement admissible nécessaire à la conservation des preuves et de production des pièces, y 
compris celles détenues par le professionnel’). 
404
 2010 Group Action Report, supra note 199, recommendation n°11 ‘Presentation of model cases’: ‘the recourse to 
this technique of model cases would permit judges to define the group of potential victims with the help of the 
determinant characteristics of cases that would be transmitted to them’ - in French : ‘le recours à cette technique des 
cas exemplaires permettra au juge de définir le groupe possible des victimes a partir des caractéristiques 
déterminantes des cas qui lui auront été transmis’).  
405
 I.TZANKOVA, supra note 60. 
406
 R.VERKERK, ‘Powers of the Judge- the Netherlands’, in: C.H. VAN RHEE (ed.), European Traditions in Civil 
Procedure, Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law Series, Intersentia, vol.54, 2005, pp.281-293. 
407
 C.H.VAN RHEE, European Traditions in Civil Procedure, Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law 
Series, Intersentia, vol.54, 2005, pp.281-293 (highlighting that the Netherlands is with England  ‘one of the countries 
that have been extremely slow in adopting a more modern, efficient approach to civil litigation’). 
408
 See notably the 1920 GRATAMA proposal which supported a more active judge, see A.W.JONGBLOED, ‘The 
Netherlands’, in: C.H. VAN RHEE (Ed.), European Traditions in Civil Procedure, Ius Commune: European and 
Comparative Law Series, Intersentia, vol.54, 2005, pp.64-96; R. VERKIJK, ‘Beyond Winning: Case Management 
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practice itself. An interesting example is the use of the Personal Appearance after Statement of Defence 
(Comparatie na Antwoord) developed by the Rotterdam Court of First Instance (rechtbank) in the 
1960s.
409
 Codified in 1989 in Article 131 Code of Civil Procedure,
 
this technique enables judges to order 
parties to appear in court at early stages so as to investigate whether the case should be settled, or whether 
further information or documents are necessary for a prompt resolution of the case. An important step was 
also made in 2001 with the creation of a working group aimed at renovating the Dutch civil procedure.
410
 
Among the many propositions that were formulated in the 2006 report, a clear willingness to re-evaluate 
and rebalance the role of judges and parties during the litigation process was presented as a cornerstone 
topic.
411
  
    
 Case Management Philosophy in Mass Claims  
 
 
The monitoring of WCAMs requires important case management skills.
412
 Some case management 
techniques have progressively emerged from judicial practice.
413
 LOS, vice-president of the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeals and involved in several WCAM rulings, pointed out that, even though the WCAM is in 
principle an individual procedure where the parties set the stage, the fact that third parties are affected by 
the ruling as well justifies that judges take a more active role in which they do not restrict themselves to 
the mere information brought by parties, but rather ensure that third parties have a possibility to take part 
in the debates since their own interests are in play.
414
 Even though judges cannot unilaterally modify the 
content of the agreement jointly presented by parties, in practice they may do so by signalling to parties 
that some changes regarding the content of the agreement are necessary if they want it to be ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and The Roles of Lawyers in the Principles, in: C.H. VAN RHEE (Ed.), Judicial Case Management and Efficiency in 
Civil Litigation, Antwerpen/Oxford, Intersentia, 2007, pp.57-65. 
409
 The comparitie Na antwoord is a request from the judge ordering a parties’ appearance at early stage (namely, 
once the submission of the statement of defence has been made). 
410
 W.D.H. ASSER, H.A. GROEN, I.N. TZANKOVA and J.B.M. VRANKEN, Uitgebalanceerd. Eindrapport 
Fundamentele herbezinning Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht, The Hague, 2006. 
411
 C.H. VAN RHEE, ‘Dutch Civil Procedural Law in an International Context’, in: M. DEGUCHI and M. STORME 
(Eds.), The Reception and Transmission of Civil Procedural Law in the Global Society – Legislative and Legal 
Educational Assistance to other countries in Procedural Law, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, 2008, p.191-212 (stressing that 
the idea spearheaded by the working group was that ‘civil litigation serves goals to go beyond the private interests of 
litigants (…). Consequently, parties involved in a civil action before state courts not only have certain 
responsibilities and obligations toward each other, but also toward society at large’). 
412
 W. VAN BOOM, supra note 120. 
413
 I. TZANKOVA, supra note 58 (observing that ‘the court can exercise certain discretionary powers’). 
414
 W.J.J. LOS, ‘Toepassing Van De WCAM – Bespiegelingen Over De Rol En Taak Van De Rechter’, in 
W.J.J.LOS, Collective Acties in Het Algemen en de WCAM in Het Bijzonder, NVvp, n°28, Den Haag, BJu, 2013, 
p.26. 
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judicially approved.
415
 Judges may send a list of detailed questions to parties so as to clarify the points of 
the settlement that remain shadowy (used notably in the Dexia and Converium cases) or may refer to 
experts to clarify factual elements deemed crucial for the resolution of the case (used in the Dexia case 
with the intervention of the Financial Market Authority - Authorities Financiële Markten).
416
 On a broader 
scale, this judicial activism is necessary so as to give judges enough information to perform their control 
over the terms of the final settlement agreement. Official records of case management conferences held in 
the Converium case are in this respect illustrative: judges have showed on this occasion a readiness and 
willingness to clarify the terms of the settlement, to provide more information on the identities of 
petitioners and interested parties, to scrutinize the scope of attorney fees or to discuss the appropriate 
venues for notification.
417
  
 
 
 
c) Case Management Practices in England and Wales 
 
 
 Case Management Philosophy in Individual Litigation  
 
 
The paradigm shift encouraging a more active judicial case management was one of the key features of the 
reform of civil procedure initiated by Lord WOOLF in 1995-1996. Even though some techniques of 
judicial case management already existed before this period,
418
 Lord WOOLF’s reports were explicitly 
driven by the consideration that ‘there is now no alternative to a fundamental shift in the responsibility for 
the management of civil litigation from litigants and their legal advisers to the courts’.419 When supporting 
an active judiciary, WOOLF drastically challenged the traditional paradigm of the English adversarial trial 
and its associated judicial passivity.
420
 These reforms tremendously contributed to bridge the gap between 
English judges and their Continental counterparts.
421
 On a broader scale, HODGES has also pointed out 
                                                          
415
 W.VAN BOOM, supra note 120. 
416
 In the Dexia case, the Court asked for the opinion of the Dutch Financial Market Authority (Authorities 
Financiële Markten). 
417
 Amsterdam Court of appeal, Official Record of the Public Hearing in the Converium case  of the Second Three-
Judge Chamber for Civil Matters ( on Tuesday 24 August 2010 (English Translation from Dutch). 
418
 C.H. VAN RHEE, ‘English Civil Procedure Until the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), in: C.H. VAN RHEE (Ed.), 
European Traditions in Civil Procedure, Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law Series, Intersentia, vol.54, 
2005, pp.129-159 (in the Court of Chancery, a court official named ‘Master’ was in charge of conducting early 
factual investigations). 
419
 WOOLF, supra note 260 (see Chapter 4 ‘The Major Reforms’). 
420
 C.H. VAN RHEE, ‘Civil Litigation in Twentieth Century Europe’, (75) The Legal History Review, 2007, n°3, 
pp.307-319 (English judges’ main duty was traditionally to ‘oversee the case as an umpire’).  
421
 Idem (observing that these ‘new rules bring English civil procedural law closer to its continental counterparts that 
it has been in centuries’). 
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the actual activist role of the English judge who must nowadays be viewed as being interventionist by 
essence.
422
 English judges have notably key roles concerning the administration of evidence. Disclosure 
gives judges active and cornerstones roles concerning the control of evidence. Disclosure technique 
contained in CPR Part 31 is reserved to certain types of cases that notably encompass multi-track 
litigation. This category – which involves ‘court claims and claimants that seek award that value more 
than 15,000£ or court cases that will result in a lengthy trial with considerable documentation’ - 423 
encompasses GLOs. 
 
 Case Management Philosophy in Mass Claims  
 
  
As Lord WOOLF observed it, ‘multi-party actions, of whatever description, will almost invariably merit 
the full hands-on judicial control’.424 The GLO regime and the English Draft on Court Rules are 
remarkable for the considerable flexibility that they give to judges in the conduct of the proceeding. The 
draft provides that judges can give case management directions ‘at any time’ and can ‘dispense any 
procedural step that [they] consider unnecessary’.425 Similarly, GLO ‘empowers the managing judge to 
exercise his or her powers with considerable flexibility depending on the need of a specific case’.426 
Among many techniques, judges can schedule case conferences and hearings, order test cases
427
 formulate 
non-binding indications so as to let litigants know about the content of future meetings and the elements 
that, from the judge’s viewpoint, will require further clarifications,428 or keep a case register accessible to 
all potential parties.
429
  Crucially, judges may use test cases or lead cases whenever they consider that their 
resolution can help the case to proceed.
430
 As a matter of fact, this global evolution tends to substantiate 
                                                          
422
 C. HODGES and N. CREUTZFELD-BANDA, ‘Parallels Tracks in Mass Litigation: Public and Private 
Responses to the Buncefield Explosion in England’, in:  D. HENSLER, C. HODGES, and I. TZANKOVA (Eds), 
Class Actions in Context: How Economics, Politics and Culture Shape Collective Litigation, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Forthcoming, 2014. (according to the authors, the 2005 Buncefield litigation is a striking illustration of 
the way judges of the commercial Court followed an ‘interventionist style of management’ by using their large case 
management prerogatives, while – and it is an interesting precision - not referring to the GLO mechanism). 
423
 hwww.sfla.co.uk/litigation/multi-track.htm 
424
 WOOLF, supra note 260. 
425
 Proposed CPR 19.31 (‘Case Management of the Collective Proceedings’) 
426
 C.HODGES, supra note 56. 
427
 Practice Direction 12.3 and CPR 19.15  
428
 C. HODGES, supra note 56,  at p.57. 
429
 GLO – Practice Direction 19B, point 6.1 
430
 C. HODGES, supra note 56, at p.58 (observing an extensive use of test claims in GLOs in product liability cases. 
As the author highlights, ‘the court [ordered] some individual cases to be pleaded fully so that a view could be taken 
of the issues that are common to most cases and resolved on the basis that that would be the most effective way of 
resolving the greatest number of individual cases in the group’). 
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Lord WOOLF’s suggestion that ‘in multi-party actions there is a need for the court to exercise control at a 
much earlier stage’.431 
 
  
 
d) Case Management Practices in the United States 
 
 Case Management Philosophy in Individual Litigation  
 
 
Traditionally, American judges are said to be more passive in the adversarial system than their Continental 
counterparts.
432
 The concept of managerial judging has however progressively expanded in the American 
legal literature. It refers to judges’ abilities to channel parties’ behaviours in an attempt to reduce litigation 
costs, court delays and judicial workload.
433
  As observed by RESNIK, ‘managerial judging’s proponents, 
blurring organizational theories and utilitarianism, believe that their new system of management will 
permit improved allocation of judicial resources’.434 When commenting on American judging, 
HELLERSTEIN, HENDERSON and TWERSKI have observed that judges now ‘routinely exercise 
managerial control over evidentiary and procedural aspects of the cases brought before them’.435 The 
development of mass litigation in the United States has indeed drastically favoured active judges.  As 
SCHUCK expresses it, ‘the movement of courts toward managerial judging spurred by mass tort litigation 
has entailed some of the most far-reaching innovations in judicial history’.436  
 
 Case Management Philosophy in Mass Claims  
 
  
FRCP Rule 23(d) lists some of the steps that judges may undertake to manage class actions. Examples of 
judicial case management can for instance be found in the practice of Judge WEINSTEIN in the Agent 
                                                          
431
 WOOLF, supra note 260. 
432
 C. HODGES and A. STADLER, ‘Introduction’, in: C.HODGES and A.STADLER (Eds), Resolving Mass 
Disputes – ADR and settlements of Mass Claims, Edward Elgar, 2013, at p.10. 
433
 J. RESNIK, ‘Managerial Judges’, (96) Harvard Law Review, 1982, n°374; see also S.C. YEAZELL, ‘The 
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process’, Wisconsin Law Review, 1994, pp.631-678 (noticing that 
‘seen from a more distant historical perspective, virtually all of modern litigation is more managerial than was 
litigation in earlier periods’, at p.674). 
434
 J. RESNIK, Idem. See also E.E. DONALD, ‘Managerial Judging and the Evolution of the Procedure’, 1986, 
Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2197 (observing  that asking judges to behave as manager ‘implies that they must 
take into account the hard economic reality that procedural resources are limited and that decisions must be made on 
a sound, business-like basis as to which opportunities to pursue and which to pass by’). 
435
 A.K. HELLERSTEIN, J.A. HENDERSON, A.D. TWERSKI, ‘Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort 
Litigation’, Brooklyn Law School Legal Studies Research Papers, n°298, October 2012. 
436
 P.H SCHUCK., supra note 160. 
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Orange class action litigation extensively analysed by SCHUCK.
437
 In this affair, American veterans who 
had been exposed to a harmful herbicide used to defoliate forested land during the Vietnam War suffered 
from various health problems. A wide range of innovative - formal and informal - case management 
techniques were handled by Judge WEINSTEIN whose primary objective was to keep the work of parties 
under time-pressure and closed scrutiny. As anecdotal evidence, SCHUCK for instance reports that the 
judge ‘placed a huge calendar, with the trial date circled, on a large blackboard that he kept in prominent 
view of the lawyers and to which he often pointed for emphasis’.438 Other mass cases have required judges 
dealing with massive amounts of evidence and supervising extensive data collection. For the needs of the 
Asbestos class action Jenkins v. Raymar, Justice PARKER appointed Mc GOVERN as Special Master 
who prepared a list of 109 questions addressed to litigants in which he also requested the communication 
of several hundreds of documents and evidence so as to have a clear view on the different facets of the 
litigation (among others, plaintiffs’ age, sex, time of exposure to asbestos, or previous medical 
background). Mc GOVERN reports that ‘approximately 2.3 million items of information were 
gathered’.439 Recently, the lawsuits filed by more than 10,000 plaintiffs seeking compensation for diseases 
and health problems due to their work and exposure at New York City’s World Trade Centre disaster site 
(‘Ground Zero’) was also a remarkable example of managerial judging. However, in this case, plaintiffs 
were ultimately not certified as a class since the court considered that individual issues here prevailed over 
common issues. Despite the formal absence of a class procedure, this example is nevertheless worth taking 
into account as an illustration of the concrete steps that judges can undertake to deal with mass disputes of 
considerable scope and unprecedented complexity.
440
 In an attempt to obtain a clear and precise overview 
of the situations of all involved parties, judge HELLERSTEIN urged for the creation of a comprehensive 
database including 368 questions in which plaintiffs were asked on various and numerous issues such as –
among many - the symptoms of their disease, the identity of their medical providers or the identity of their 
insurers.
441
 
 
 
 
                                                          
437
 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985 part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Reviewed and discussed in: P.H. SCHUCK, Agent Orange on Trial – Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1986 (here at p.119). 
438
 Idem (highlighting that ‘[the judge] also conspicuously ordered carpenters to expand the jury box to accommodate 
extra alternate jurors. In these and other ways, he constantly reminded the lawyers that he meant business’). 
439
 F. Mc GOVERN, ‘Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation’, (69) Boston University Law Review, 1989, pp.659. 
440
 A.K. HELLERSTEIN, J.A. HENDERSON, A.D. TWERSKI, supra note 435 (pointing out: ‘no other tort 
litigation, whether based on widespread environmental contaminants or on mass-marketed prescription drugs, has 
ever presented so many different injuries caused by such varying degrees of exposure to such indeterminate toxins’).  
441
 Idem 
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3.4.2. The Use of Innovative and Controversial Case Management Techniques  
 
Judges dealing with mass litigation have progressively used innovative case management techniques to 
cope with the massive amounts of evidence and the number of involved parties.
 442
 The main justification 
for this is obviously economic efficiency: in a context of scarce judicial resources, these mechanisms are 
intended to reduce the costs associated with a systematic and individualized analysis of each single 
claimant and scattered data (a). They remain however sources of extensive debates and controversies (b). 
Ultimately, they renew the visionary observation of HOLMES who, as early as 1896,  already posited that 
‘for the rational study of the law, the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the 
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics’.443 
 
a) Innovative Case Management Techniques – a Short List  
 
 
 Test and Model Cases  
 
In many jurisdictions, test cases (also referred to as ‘bellwether trials’) are already used as case 
management techniques. They consist of selecting and adjudicating a limited number of cases deemed 
representatives. The resulting verdicts are not binding upon the rest of the group, but they provide parties 
with information about the weaknesses and strengths of their claims, and inform on the way judges are 
ultimately likely to decide similar cases.
444
 Test cases therefore encourage settlements. Representative 
cases may be chosen by the parties themselves (who in this case will present their stronger cases) or 
selected by judges who may be willing to diversify their point of view about the litigation.  
 
 Samples & Extrapolation 
 
 In his report on Access to Justice, Lord WOOLF highlighted that dealing with mass claims requires the 
use of ‘statistically valid samples of the wider group [to establish] criteria which individuals must meet to 
join the action’.  In the previously mentioned Cimino v. Raymark Industries class action lawsuit in which 
the 2,298 plaintiffs were divided into five categories depending on the characteristics of their respective 
                                                          
442
 E.F. SHERMAN, ‘Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial 
Process’, (25) The Review of Litigation, 2006, pp.691-718. 
443
 O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, 1896. 
444
 A.D. LAHAV, ‘Bellwether Trials’, (76) George Washington Law Review, 2008, pp.576 (observing: ‘the results of 
bellwether trials represent the likely outcome of their cases as well’). 
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illness, the court selected random samples of plaintiffs to have their cases tried by juries. The court then 
established an average verdict for each category and extrapolated these amounts to the remaining cases 
that had not been heard. This sampling technique was however rejected by the 5
th
 Circuit.
445
 Another 
illustration can be found in the 1996 class action lawsuit Hilao v. Estate of Marcos which involved 9,541 
plaintiffs suing the State of former President Ferdinand Marcos for torture and disappearances. The court 
retained a sample of 137 claimants chosen randomly and then extrapolated the averaged amount of 
damages to individual non-sample class members.
446
 The main rationale was that this technique ‘would 
achieve a 95 percent statistical probability that the same percentage determined to be valid among the 
examined claims would be applicable to the totality of the claims filed’.447  
 
 Trial bifurcation  
 
Bifurcation technique is notably enshrined in US FRCP Rule 42 which provides that ‘the court, in 
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition 
and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim’. This method consists of addressing separately 
several dispositional issues, such as for instance the questions of liability and damages. It is employed to 
‘segment’ aggregate litigation.448 As noted before, the French group action is built on the model of a 
bifurcated trial where the issue of liability and damages are tackled successively and separately. 
Contradictory evidence tends to reveal that decisions to bifurcate may impact on verdicts. It is however 
unclear whether they tend to benefit more to defendants or to plaintiffs.
449
   
 
 Statistical evidence  
 
 
While facing extensive amounts of data issued by large number of parties, judges have been more and 
more prone to use statistical evidence to deal with and manage mass litigation. Statistical tools have 
                                                          
445
 Cimino v. Raymark Industries Inc., 1998 WL, 480147, 5
th
 Circuit, 17 August 1998 
446
 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F., 3d 767, 9
th
 circ., 1996 
447
 Idem 
448
 E.F.SHERMAN, supra note 442 (this method is named ‘trifurcation’ when three issues are separately addressed, 
such as for instance liability, causation and damages). 
449
 H. ZEISEL and T. CALLAHAN, ‘Split Trials and Time Savings: A Statistical Analysis’, (76) Harvard Law 
Review, 1963, n°8, pp.1606-1625 (finding evidence that defendants win in 79% of trials when liability is bifurcated 
and only in 42% in unitary trials). On the contrary, see: I.A. HOROWITZ and K.S. BORDENS, ‘An Experimental 
Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials’, (14) Law & Human Behaviour, 1990, pp.269-285 
(finding evidence that mock jurors were more likely to hold the defendant liable in an unitary trial than mock jurors 
in bifurcated trials). For a broader analysis see: D.A. SHOEMAKE, ‘Bifurcation: A Powerful but Underutilized Tool 
in South Carolina Civil Litigation’, (59) South Carolina Law Review, 2008, pp.433-453. 
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notably been used as a way to prove causation. As Judge WEINSTEIN has expressed it, statistics in such 
circumstances ‘are often the major proof offered to establish causation’.450 In the class action lawsuit In re 
Simon II Ligation filed against Tobacco companies, WEINSTEIN authorized statistical sampling to prove 
causation and further argued that ‘sampling and survey techniques are a well-accepted alternative for the 
trial judge’.451 The probative weight given to statistical evidene may however differ depending on cases. 
In the previously mentioned class action Agent Orange, the court for instance decided that statistical 
evidence was insufficient to establish a clear causal link between the herbicide and American veterans’ 
diseases. More recently, judges similarly discarded statistical evidence in the class action Wal-Mart Stores 
Inc. v. Dukes and considered it insufficient to prove the existence of gender discrimination practices at 
workplaces.
452
 Interestingly, in his proposal for a class action code for Civil Law countries, GIDI proposed 
to enshrine this practice in his Article 23 entitled ‘statistical proof’ which provides that the use of 
statistical proof is permitted ‘as a complement to direct evidence, or when the production of direct 
evidence is costly, difficult, or impossible’.453  
 
b) Innovative Case Management Techniques: Controversies 
 
 
 
Legal scholars have expressed concerns vis-à-vis such innovative techniques.
454
 An underlying tension 
exists between a need to preserve parties’ rights and autonomy on the one hand, and a desire to promote a 
group’s efficiency on the other.455 The Debate 'rights v. efficiency' is cornerstone in mass litigation, where, 
as HENSLER points out, plaintiffs tend to be treated 'more as object than as subjects'.
456
 When 
commenting on GLOs, Lord WOOLF already observed that ‘the effective and economic handling of 
group actions requires a diminution, compromise or adjustment of the rights of individual litigants for the 
greater good of the action as a whole’.457  Concerns have notably been expressed regarding the risks of 
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(31) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 2003, pp.161-163. 
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 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, Supreme Court, 2011 
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 A. GIDI, ‘The Class Action Code: a Model for Civil Law Countries’, in: J.BACKHAUS, A. CASSONE.and G. 
RAMELLO (Eds.), supra note 23, pp. 351-370 (here at p.359). 
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 J. GIESEN, ‘De rol van de rechter in massaschade: aangepaste of partijautonomie? Een nota van een scepticus’, 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 2128, 2007. 
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 C. HODGES, supra note 56, p. 88-89. 
456
 D. HENSLER, supra note 8. 
457
 WOOLF, supra note 260; see also S.C.YEAZELL, ‘Collective Litigation as Collective Action’, University of 
Illinois Law Review, 1989, n.1, pp.43-68 (observing: ‘collective litigation (…) involves some compromise of the 
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encouraging a ‘rough’ and inaccurate justice. The key interrogation consists of determining whether 
samples indeed reflect an accurate image of the parent population from which they are drawn, and 
consequently, deciding whether their use increases – or conversely decreases – the risks of errors. Points 
of view on this issue still diverge. SAKS and BLANCK consider for instance that an average of samples is 
likely to be more accurate than a sequence of individual trials.
458
  Their opinion was recently substantiated 
by CHENG who observed that the choice to proceed either by sampling or by the handling of individual 
cases ultimately depends on the homogeneity of the group.
459
 According to the author, the use of samples 
would ‘borrow strength’ from several individual cases. Despite plausible extrapolation errors, this 
technique would lead to a reduced variability between individual cases. On the other hand, BONE casts 
some doubt on the sampling’s contribution to accuracy and observes that, in many mass disputes, rulings 
based on individual cases better contribute to accurate outcomes.
460
 
 
 3.4.3. Preliminary Conclusion 
 
As STADLER and MICKLITZ have observed, in all jurisdictions where group proceedings are made 
available judges must ultimately perform a role that is different from the one that they usually play in 
individual litigation. They must indeed behave as active ‘managing judge’. 461 The use of economic tools 
and statistic reasoning (such as samplings) tend to become useful tools to deal with extensive data and 
numerous parties.  
 
 
* 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
autonomy of the individual litigant, some reduction in the freedom of choice she would have if separately 
represented’, at p.45). 
458
 M.J. SAKS and P.D. BLANCK, ‘Justice Improved: the Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in 
the Trial of Mass Torts’, (44) Stanford Law Review, pp.815, 1992.  
459
 E.K. CHENG, ‘When 10 Trials are better than 1000: An Evidentiary Perspective on Trial Sampling’, (160) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2012, pp.955-966,. 
460
 R.G. BONE, ‘Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity’, (46) 
Vanderbilit Law Review, 1993, pp.561-662.
 
461
H.-W. MICKLITZ and A. STADLER (with H. BEUCHLER and A. MOM), ‘Gruppenklagen in den 
Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft & Den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika‘, Gutachten im Auftrag des 
Vereins für Konsumenteninformation Wien, 12 August 2005, p.110 (noticing: ‘in allen Rechtsordnungen mit 
Gruppenklagen besteht Einigkeit, dass dem Richter in diesen Verfahren eine andere Rolle zu kommt als in 
Individualverfahren, er stärker als managing judge agieren, insbesondere aber sich in gewisser Weise aus seiner 
sonst neutralen Position lösen muss‘). 
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3.5. JUDGES AS MASS CLAIMS’ GOOD SHEPHERDS 
 
The compensation and distribution stages have been a source of multiple concerns. They notably 
encompass a risk of seeing individuals’ interests being diluted into the group; a risk of neglecting the 
interest of represented claimants; a risk of fixing under-compensation amounts that would undermine the 
overall deterrent effect of the proceeding,
462
 or - on the contrary- of establishing over-compensation 
amounts that would be detrimental for business and companies; or the risk of seeing compensation 
amounts kept by opportunistic intermediaries. In each mass proceedings here retained, parties are 
incentivized to settle.
463
 Hence, the roles of judges concerning final settlements are first addressed (3.4.1). 
Closely associated with this point, the judicial control over intermediaries’ fees is then clarified (3.4.2). 
 
 
3.5.1. Judicial Supervision of the Fairness of Mass Settlements 
 
 
From both an economic and a legal perspective, judicial intrusion within the content of an agreement 
freely agreed by parties might at first sight not be justified. This remark however neglects the nature of 
mass settlements which importantly differs from private settlements (a). The scope of judicial intervention 
is then analysed in the five mass proceedings here selected (b).  
 
 
a) Justifying Judicial Intervention: Mass Settlements Are Not Private Settlements  
 
 
 A Limited Judicial Intervention in Private Settlements  
 
 
Insights from the Law & Economics literature suggest that settlement occur when discussions between 
plaintiffs and defendants have reached a common ground. Specifically, an agreement is concluded when 
                                                          
462
 See Chapter 2. In the United States, These concerns and potential abuses justified the adoption of the 2005 Class 
Action Fairness Act. The Act highlighted that ‘class members often receive little or no benefits from class actions, 
and are sometimes harmed, such as where – (a) counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with 
coupons or other awards of little or no value; (b) unjustified awards are made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of 
other class members; and (c) confusing notices are published that prevent class members, from being able to fully 
understand and effectively exercise their rights’. 
463
 On a broader scale, the settlement of mass claims has gained increase attention in Continental Europe. At the 
European level, a 2011 Communication from the EU Commission recommended the implementation of ‘collective 
alternative dispute resolutions’(EU Commission, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers Dispute in the 
Single Market', COM(2011)791 final); In countries like in France, the legal literature has also started to question the 
relevance of mass settlements to resolve mass claims (see for instance: L.ASCENSI and S. BERNHEIM-
DESVAUX, ‘La médiation collective, solution amiable pour résoudre les litiges de masse ?’, Contrats, concurrence, 
consommation, n°8, 2012). 
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the offer lies above the minimum amount that plaintiffs are willing to accept (that is, the minimal amount 
of plaintiffs’ claim expected value) but below the maximum amount that defendants are willing to propose 
(the maximum value of defendants’ expected liability).464 When ultimately agreed by both sides, the 
settlement agreement is theoretically regarded as benefiting to both parties. Therefore, if ever the 
agreement has to be subject to judicial review, this latter should remain merely marginal to avoid judges 
interfering with the terms of the agreement. From a legal perspective also, such a judicial intervention 
could a priori be contested. As highlighted by the Association of European Administrative Judges (AEAJ) 
in its reply to the EU Public consultation on collective redress, ‘a fairness control of a free bargained 
agreement by a court sounds contradictory’.465 The principle of contractual freedom deeply enrooted in 
most modern legal system traditionally forbids judges to modify in-depth contractual terms.
466
 The very 
peculiar nature of mass settlements however justifies an enhanced and careful judicial intervention.  
 
 Towards an Enhanced Judicial Intervention in Mass Settlements  
 
 
Mass settlements have first an important political dimension (in the Greek sense of polis, i.e. concerning 
the interests of society). Defective products, large-scale events or corporate misbehaviour with long-
lasting implications on the society are likely to be highly-mediatized social issues with considerable public 
attention. In this view, the American literature has notably pointed out the ‘quasi-public components’ of 
mass litigation that go beyond the mere private interests of the parties who agreed the settlement 
agreement.
467
 Following the terminology used by Professor CHAYES, mass cases are therefore not 
‘bipolar’ but ‘multipolar’ cases by essence.468 Going a step further, other authors have suggested that the 
key debate concerned the identity of the party (private parties or society as a whole) who ultimately has 
‘property’ of a particular dispute, and is therefore entitled to decide how it should be resolved.469 The 
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 R.COOTER and T.ULEN, supra note 19. 
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 Replies available on www.ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/aeaj_en.pdf, accessed 
28 January 2012). 
466
 In French civil law, the 1876 landmark decision of the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation known as the 
Canal de Craponne affair remarkably rejected any form of judicial intervention aimed at reviewing unfair 
contractual terms.. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the predominance of Article 1134 Civil Code which provides that 
agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those who have made them (Cass.civ., 6 March 1876, 
Commune de Pelissanne c./Marquis de Galiffet - affaire dite du ‘Canal de Craponne’). 
467
 E.C. BURCH, ‘Procedural Justice in Non-class Aggregation’, (36) Wake Forest Law Review, 2009; J.T. 
GRABILL, ‘Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements’, (42) Seton Hall Law Review, 2012, pp.123-183. 
468
 A. CHAYES, ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’, (89) Harvard Law Review, 1976, p.1281. 
469
 C. MENKEL-MEADOW, ‘Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of 
Settlement (In Some Cases)’, (83) Georgetown Law Review, 1995, pp.2663-2696 (also cited in J.T.GRABILL, supra 
note 26). 
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long-standing consequences, sometimes at both national and international levels of mass settlements 
justify the intervention of a neutral third-actor. Additionally, and as further addressed below, judicial 
intervention is particularly cornerstone in mass proceedings using the opt-out system in which the 
agreement is negotiated on behalf of absent and represented claimants. By endorsing the role of 
spokespersons for the absentees, judges ensure that their interests are properly taken into consideration. 
These insights on the particular nature of mass settlements justify the actual interest of the European 
Commission for a judicial scrutiny on the fairness of mass settlements.
470
 
 
 
 
b) Judicial Control over Settlements in the Selected Mass Proceedings 
 
 
o The French Group Action 
 
 
New article L.423-16 Consumer Code provides that any agreement negotiated on behalf of the group must 
be judicially approved. When doing so, judges must verify and ensure that the interests of represented 
claimants are correctly protected.
471 Importantly, one should notice that such a ‘settlement philosophy’ is 
often closely associated with the Common Law tradition and remains nowadays a relatively recent idea in 
France. This tendency has nonetheless progressively pervaded the French legal system through, for 
instance, the new Articles 2062-2068 of Civil Code about the ‘convention de procédure participative’ by 
which parties can decide to settle their dispute out-of-court. A similar tendency is also observable with 
regulators. Since 2011, the Financial Markets Authority (AMF) can for example propose a settlement 
agreement (named ‘composition administrative’) to financial intermediaries who infringe their 
professional duties. The settlement of mass claims appears therefore in line with such evolutions.  
  
o The Dutch WCAM 
 
 
Judicial control on the settlement agreement is cornerstone in the WCAM procedure. According to Article 
7:907(3) (b) and (e) Civil Code, the Amsterdam Court must reject the proposed settlement agreement ‘if 
the amount of the compensation awarded is not reasonable having regard, inter alia, to the extent of the 
damage, the ease and speed with which the compensation can be obtained and the possible causes of the 
damage’. It further requires the court to verify that the interests of those on whose behalf the agreement 
                                                          
470
 EU Public Consultation on Collective Redress (see specifically question n°17 ‘how can the fairness of the 
outcome of a collective consensual dispute resolution best be guaranteed? Should the court exercise such fairness 
control?’). 
471
 2010 Group Action Report, supra note 199, at p.79 (in French : ‘le juge doit s’assurer que la réparation proposée à 
l’issue de la médiation est bien conforme aux intérêts de toutes les personnes lésées’). 
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was concluded are correctly safeguarded. As highlighted by VAN BOOM, this mission ultimately requires 
the Court to behave as the ‘negotiorum gestor’ for the absent and represented parties.472 This task 
undeniably constitutes an important responsibility falling on the Amsterdam Court.
473
 It was previously 
said that, because of a comparable judicial supervision over the settlement agreement, class action and 
WCAM shared similarities. Yet, the wording of the reasonability test conducted by Dutch and American 
judges differs. On the one hand, Article 7:907(3) (b) Civil Code states that the Amsterdam Court must 
reject the settlement if the amount is not reasonable. On the other hand, US FRCP rule 23(e) (2) provides 
that American judges may approve a settlement on finding that is inter alia reasonable. At first sight, this 
difference could appear simply rhetoric. This may however matter in practice. In the WCAM context, 
judges are not required to define what reasonability is. The American experience had indeed shown that 
this may constitute a very difficult exercise.
474
 Indeed, on a broader scale, judges usually ‘[know] what is 
excessive or derisory, but cannot determine accurately where the equilibrium is’.475   
 
The scope of the judicial review is also be subject to controversies. LOS was recently asked whether 
WCAM judges should execute a full evaluation of the settlement agreement (which requires, among 
others, information on the relevant circumstances of the case), or ‘merely’ a marginal evaluation 
(assessing if there are reasons to reject the settlement agreement).
476 
In his view the WCAM evaluation in 
practise tends towards a marginal evaluation, which is strongly based on what the parties present. 
According to KLAASSEN however, the goal of the WCAM in principle would justify and require a more 
independent research of the judge.
477
 She stated in this respect that ‘the (desirable) task of the judge 
regarding the WCAM-procedure is not fully clear and can be debated’.478 The choice between both types 
of evaluation clearly affects what exactly is expected from the judge. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
472
 W. VAN BOOM, supra note 120. 
473
 C. HODGES, supra note 56, at p.73 (observing: ‘ensuring the fairness of the final agreement is undoubtedly a 
‘heavy responsibility placed on the court’). 
474
 As the American judges highlighted in Reynolds, ’we do not know whether the $25 million settlement that the 
district judge approved is a reasonable amount given the risk and likely return to the class of continued litigation’. 
475
 F.J. PANSIER,  ‘Transaction et rôle du juge’, Cahiers Sociaux du Barreau de Paris, 01 may 2004, n°160, p.223 
(‘comme  dans d’autres domaines du droit, une logique floue permet de parvenir à des résultats satisfaisants : le juge 
sait dire ce qui est excessif ou dérisoire, mais ne peut mesurer avec précision où se situe le point d’équilibre’). 
476
 W.J.J. LOS, supra note 414, at pp. 25-29. 
477
 C.J.M. KLAASSEN, ‘De rol van de (gewijzigde) WCAM bij de collectieve afwikkeling van massaschade ‘en nog 
wat van die dingen’, Ars Aequi 2013, p. 633. LOS agrees on this, see: W.J.J. LOS, 2013, supra note 414, at p. 25. 
478
 Idem, p. 634 (translation from the author) 
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o The English GLO 
 
The GLO regime does not indicate that settlement agreements must ultimately be judicially approved. As 
HODGES observes, ‘in stark contrast to the rules of class actions in the most active jurisdictions, the 
English and Welsh GLO rules and practice is that there is no requirement for the court to approve a 
settlement or to scrutinise its fairness’. This, as the author interestingly further points out, ‘is a striking 
omission, difficult to justify, and should be remedied’.479  
 
 
o The English Draft Court Rules 
 
 The draft corrects such an omission and provides that settlement agreements must be judicially approved. 
After hearings during which all potential claimants have a chance to formulate and present their 
observations, the judge must decide whether the agreement is indeed fair and appropriate.
480
  
 
 
o The American Class Action 
 
 Initially, the 1966 Advisory Note on FRCP Rule 23 did not provide any clear indication or guidance 
concerning the scope of judicial review. Judicial control on the ‘fairness’, ‘adequacy’ and ‘reasonableness’ 
of settlement agreements -nowadays enshrined in FRCP Rule 23(e) (2) – emerged from practice.481 
Importantly, American judges have progressively extended the scope of their intervention by suggesting 
that judges should endorse ‘fiduciary duties’ to protect the interests of absentees.482 As POSNER 
expressed it in Re Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank, judges should perform a ‘high duty of care’ with 
regards to absent parties who will ultimately be bound by the final agreement.
483
 Judges must notably be 
particularly alert vis-a-vis so-called ‘blackmail settlements’ where defendants are forced to settle for 
amounts that are far greater than the value of plaintiffs’ claims, or alternatively, ‘sweetheart settlements’ 
where class counsels ‘sold out’ the class and settle the case for amounts that are far less than what 
                                                          
479
 C. HODGES, ‘Settlement and Its Pitfalls in England and Wales’, in: C.HODGES and A.STADLER (Eds), 
Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and settlements of Mass Claims, Edward Elgar, 2013, at p.129. 
480
 Proposed CPR 19.37 (compromise or discontinuance) and CPR 19.38 (a)(2) (hearing to determine approval of 
compromise or discontinuance). 
481
 R. MARCUS, supra note 170 in: C.HODGES and A.STADLER (Eds), Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and 
settlements of Mass Claims, Edward Elgar, 2013 at p.155. 
482
 P.H. SCHUCK, supra note 437 (observing ‘for the judge in a class action is in a sense the trustee for the class, 
obligated to ensure that they receive adequate legal representation and to otherwise protect their interests’, at p.127). 
483
 Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 - 7th Cir. 2002 (stating ‘we and other courts have 
gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is 
subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries’). 
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plaintiffs’ claims are worth.484 Experience has shown that such a task usually constitutes one of the 
greatest challenges that judges face when dealing with class actions.
485
 The vagueness of the terms 
contained in Rule 23(e) (2) has been a source of uncertainty.
486
 MACEY and MILLER consider that this 
rule could be understood as establishing three criteria which each time lead to consider the proposed 
settlement agreements from a different perspectives: the reasonability test requires judges to verify that the 
settlement is ‘the product of a considered judgment and not arbitrary’; the adequacy test is aimed at 
ensuring that the negotiated agreement provides sufficient compensation to claimants; the fairness test 
finally intends to verify that there is no ‘discrimination between similar claimants’.487 As an attempt to 
guide judicial intervention, American courts have developed a series of points requiring judicial 
vigilance.
488
 In the same vein, WILLGING and ROTHSTEIN have listed some ‘hot button indicators’ - 
such as for example the use of coupons - whose presence is likely to indicate the possible unfairness of the 
settlement.
489
   
 
 
3.5.2. Judicial Control over Intermediaries’ Fees  
   
a) Rationale  
 
 
 The American literature has extensively discussed the need for a judicial supervision of intermediaries’ 
fees as a way to prevent opportunistic behaviours such as conflicts of interest and others principal/agent 
problems.
490
 This control is also necessary to ensure that gains are not ultimately kept by intermediaries at 
the expenses of plaintiffs.
491
 The intervention of judges is therefore essential. As judge WEINSTEIN 
                                                          
484
 B.HAY and D.ROSENBERG, supra note 41. 
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 B. ROTHSTEIN and T. WILLGING, supra note 164. 
486
 J.R. MACEY and G.P. MILLER, ‘Judicial Review of Class Action Settlement’, (1) Journal of Legal Analysis, 
2009, n°1, p.167.(observing: ‘the review of settlement takes the form of a list of factors uncertain in scope, 
ambiguous in meaning and undefined in weight’). 
487
 Idem. 
488
 Idem (referring to a ‘laundry lists of items that the trial courts should evaluate’). 
489
 B. ROTHSTEIN and T. WILLGING, supra note 164 (suggesting that judges should give a particular attention to 
the use to coupons whose cash value may be difficult to estimate). 
490
 J.MACEY and G.P MILLER, supra note 486 (claiming that ‘enhanced judicial scrutiny of conflict of interest 
considerations, specifically attorney fees proposals, where there is a direct conflict of interest between class counsel 
and the class members’ is needed). 
491
 S.AMRANI-MEKKI, ‘Inciter les actions en dommages et intérêt, le point de vue d’un processualiste’, 
Concurrences, 2008, n°4, at p.9 (citing a study revealing that for each dollar perceived only 46 cents are ultimately 
given to claimants ). 
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indeed observes, ‘concept of fair fees, settlement negociations, and other aspects of representation are not 
clear to most laypeople’.492 
 
b) In the Selected Mass Proceedings 
 
 
o The French Group Action 
 
 There is no indication concerning a possible judicial review of intermediaries’ fees. The rules regulating 
French lawyers’ professional ethics and their code of conduct apply on such occasions.493 Regarding fees, 
success fees (also called pact of quota litis in which lawyers’ remuneration is exclusively dependent on 
the final success of the case) remain prohibited. Lawyers can only perceive result-based fees as a 
complement to hourly-based fees.
494
  
 
 
o The Dutch WCAM 
 
In the Dutch context, WEBER and VAN BOOM have observed that ‘as far as attorney remuneration is 
concerned, the Dutch model is a far cry from the USA type class action [since] Dutch attorneys do not 
gain excessively from the mass settlement’.495 Lawyers’ deontological principles should here again be a 
safeguard against the rise of entrepreneurial lawyering. Abuses may however remain.
496
  On certain 
occasions, the court may be asked to review the amounts awarded as lawyers’ fees. This is notably the 
case when fees are directly taken out from the settlement fund. As highlighted in the Converium case, ‘if 
the agreements are declared binding, a portion of the total settlement payment will also be used to 
remunerate principal counsel for the legal services provided in litigating, negotiating and achieving the 
agreements’. In the Converium WCAM, counsel’s fees which corresponded to 20% of the total settlement 
amounts were ultimately judicially approved.
497
 Parties may however exclude such judicial control if they 
do not mention the conditions of payment of counsels’ fees within the content of their settlement 
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 J.B. WEINSTEIN, supra note 379. 
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 Theses rules are contained in the National Internal Regulations (RIN), in the Act n°90-1259 of 31 December 
1990, in the Act n°71-1130 of 31 December 1971 and the implementing decree n°91-1197 of 27 November 1991 
(see also http://cnb.avocat.fr/Being-a-Lawyer-in-France-Professional-Regulations-the-Texts_a1739.html, accessed 
May 2014). 
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495
 F.WEBER and W.VAN BOOM, supra note 254. 
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 I.TZANKOVA and J.KORTMANN, supra note 42 (mentioning a scandal involving a Dutch law firm where 
numerous plaintiffs were asked to pay a contribution of between 750 and 1500 Euros for the conduct of an 
hypothetic collective action).  
497
 Converium case, at point 7.45 
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agreements. This freedom left to parties to escape judicial scrutiny has been criticized by legal scholars. 
TZANKOVA and VAN LITH have argued that ‘on a more general level the question remains whether an 
explicit statutory provision with regard to the oversight of funding issues in mass disputes can be omitted 
and whether a legal system can afford to be entirely dependent on the competence and discretionary 
powers of individual judges deciding on a case whether or not pay attention to funding dynamics in mass 
claim disputes’.498   
 
 
 
o The English GLO and the Draft on Court Rules 
 
 For matters of coherence, the two procedures are here jointly analysed because they do belong to the 
same legal system. English judges may intervene to avoid possible conflicts of interest and other 
opportunistic behaviours.
499
 Interestingly, proposed CPR 19.42 expressly indicates that judges may be in 
charge of controlling the amounts awarded as counsel’s fees. 
 
 
o The American Federal class action 
 
 According to FRCP Rule 23 (h), the court must award ‘reasonable attorney’s fees’. To do so, judges can 
apply the so-called ‘lodestar method’ where awarded fees correspond to the number of hours that class 
counsels have spent on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate taking, for example, into 
consideration the quality of the work performed. This technique has however been contested since the 
longer the case the more counsels are paid. Another technique is known as the ‘percentage-of-the-recovery 
method’ in which counsels’ fees depend on the amounts awarded as class’s recovery.500 A study 
conducted by FITZPATRICK has revealed that in 2006-2007 federal judges used the percentage-of-the-
recovery method in nearly 70% of class actions lawsuits.
501
 
 
* 
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 108 
 
3.6. RECAPITULATIVE TABLE- JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: MORE 
CONVERGENCES THAN DIVERGENCES 
 
Once again, the underlying philosophy and the procedural design of these five proceedings differ. The 
French group action is based on a three-stage approach, the WCAM is a contractual agreement between 
parties, the English GLO is mainly a management tool left to judicial hands, and the US federal class 
action is built upon a key certification stage. Yet, e pluribus unum, there are similarities and convergences 
with regards to the scope of the required judicial intervention. The following table may be helpful to 
capture these convergences in a glimpse: 
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         France 
    
    Group Action 
     Netherlands 
        
       WCAM 
     UK (1) 
          
     GLO 
     UK (2) 
  
 Court draft  
       US 
Federal 
Class Action 
 
 
 
Texts 
 
2014 Bill Reforming 
Consumer 
Law(Articles L.423-
1 to L.423-19 
Consumer Code 
Articles 7:907-910 
Civil Code and 
Articles 1013-1018 
Code of Civil 
Procedure 
CPR 19 and 
Practice 
Directions 19B 
Proposed CPR 
19-16 to 19.18 
US FRCP 23 
 
 
                                         
   
Specificities 
 
 
three-step approach 
(group constituted 
after the declaration 
on liability) 
 
 
Settlement 
agreement 
requesting a judicial 
approval 
 
Flexible 
certification 
criteria 
 
Strict 
certification 
stage 
 
Strict 
certification 
stage 
                                 
                                                  
                                              THE COURT MUST … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WATCHDOG 
 
 
Control the 
commonality of 
claims 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
Control the merits   
 
Y 
 
NB 
 
NB 
 
 
Y 
 
NB 
Control the 
superiority of the 
proceeding 
 
NB 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Control the 
number of 
claimants  
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Control the 
adequate 
representativeness 
of the 
representative 
entity 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Control/establish 
the group’s 
criteria 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Can (if necessary) 
determine 
subgroups 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Control/ensure 
the case good 
mediatisation 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
 
CATTLE 
DRIVER   
  
Actively manage 
the case (with 
hearings, test 
cases or case 
management 
conferences) 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
     
 
GOOD  
SHEPHERD 
 
Approve final 
Mass Settlements  
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Control 
intermediaries’ 
fees  
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 Y:  Yes              N:  No  NB:   No But (flexibility in practice or issue currently debated)    
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Since convergences accross these proceedings have been addressed at length, concluding remarks must be 
made regarding their divergences. Once again, important divergences remain between these proceedings. 
Even though the role of judges as watchdogs, cattle drivers and good shepherd appears significant in each 
of the five mass proceedings here analysed, each of them assigns to one of these functions a particular 
importance. Put simply, between the roles of watchdogs, cattle drivers and good shepherds, differences 
can remain concerning prioritization. The French group action focuses particularly on the role of judge-
watchdog. The declaratory ruling on liability is viewed as a safeguard against potential abuses. GLOs 
emphasizes the role of judge-cattle driver. This mechanism indeed mostly remains a managerial tool.  The 
Dutch WCAM focuses on the role of judge-good shepherd. Here again, the particular design of the 
proceeding – a contractual agreement reviewed by the court – is here the key explanation. Finally, the 
English Draft Court Rules and the American class action tend to address the three facets of the judicial 
intervention in a comparable manner. This first descriptive part now enables us to draw some general 
remarks about the key features of judging that are deemed necessary to efficiently deal with mass claims. 
   
 
* 
 
 
3.7. CONCLUSION - WHAT KIND OF JUDGES DO POLICYMAKERS EXPECT TO    
        RESOLVE MASS DISPUTES?  
 
These developments have shown that the monitoring of mass disputes require judges to leave their 
comfort zone so as to perform tasks which may differ from their traditional practice. Among others, they 
must manage and spread information, ensure group’s efficiency while respecting individuals’ rights, 
channeling flows of money, monitoring long and complex cases, preserving companies reputation, 
ensuring that representative entities can be trusted, endorsing active roles, performing fiduciaries duties 
vis-à-vis absent or represented parties (specifically in opt-out mass proceedings), taming parties 
incentives, reviewing principal-agent problems or ensuring the fairness of mass settlements. As a matter of 
fact, it seems therefore that ‘the implementation of any collective redress regime will impose greater 
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responsibility on the courts compared with traditional civil proceedings’.502 In her inaugural lecture, 
professor STADLER raised an important question: what type of judges do we ultimately need to deal with 
mass litigation?
 503
 These developments aim at proposing a possible response by sketching ‘the mass 
litigation judge’ (3.7.1). It ultimately appears that policymakers nowadays tend to expect Herculean 
judges to resolve mass disputes (3.7.2).
 
 
 
3.7.1. Sketching the Mass Litigation Judge 
 
Mass litigation judges should be active and connected managers (a), pragmatic and innovative decision-
makers (b) and be able to handle mass claims’ variable geometry (c). 
 
 
 
a) Judges Should Be Active and Connected Managers 
  
The need for robust judges-manager is a salient characteristic of mass litigation judging common to all 
mass proceedings. This evolution was already carefully noticed by CHAYES in the 1970s when  
highlighting that ‘the trial judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms of 
on-going relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the judge’s 
continuing involvement in administration and implementation’.504 Reference to the term ‘manager’ is 
noteworthy. Associated with organization theory, this term usually describes the functioning and 
monitoring of companies. This notion is however not uncommon to the public sphere. The so-called new 
public management theories have indeed already deeply influenced the reform of administration in general 
and of Justice in particular.
505
  A brief outlook to the definitions that other disciplines give to the word 
manager inform us that a manager is a person able to assist and cooperate with parties, to control and 
                                                          
502
 C.HODGES and A.STADLER (Eds.), ‘Introduction’, in: C.HODGES and A.STADLER (Eds), Resolving Mass 
Disputes – ADR and settlements of Mass Claims, Edward Elgar, 2013, pp.1-37. 
503
 A.STADLER, ‘Collective Redress Litigation – A New Challenge for Courts in Europe’, in: A.BRUNS (Ed.), 
Festschrift für Rolf Stürner zum, 70. Geburtstag, Morh Siebeck, Tübingen, 2013, Teilband 2, pp.1801-1816.  
504
 A.CHAYES, supra note 468 (discussing the rise ‘public law litigation’ that he defines as ‘lawsuit(s) [that do] not 
merely clarify the meaning of the law, remitting the parties to private ordering of their affairs, but (…) establishes a 
regime ordering the future interaction of the private parties and absentees as well’) requires a new model of judging 
that ultimately departs from the traditional paradigm of adjudication’). 
505
 The so-called new public management theories have deeply influenced the reform of the administration in general 
and of the justice in particular (see on this issue: G.PETERS, ‘Nouveau Management Public (New Public 
Management)’, in: L.BOUSSAGUET (Ed.)., Dictionnaire des Politiques Publiques, Presses de Sciences Po – 
Références, 2010, pp. 398-404;  For a point of view against the rise of ‘managerial justice’, see for instance 
G.SAINATI, ‘Vers une Justice managériale?’, in: W.PELLETIER and L.BONELLI (Ed.), L’Etat démantelé, La 
Découverte – Cahiers Libres, 2010, pp.129-138. 
 112 
 
supervise their behaviour, and also – importantly – to assume his leadership.506 The judge-manager acts 
simultaneously as guide, support and arbiter. As said before, the active judge should also become ‘a 
connected judge’ able to use hardware and software and other new communication tools such as the 
internet to communicate efficiently with all parties involved.
507
 This point will further be discussed in the 
coming developments of this research.
508
 Such judicial activeness however raises two sets of questions.  
The first regards its compatibility with the tradition of Civil Law judging. As previously observed, Civil 
Law judges are already prone to endorse active case management decisions vis-à-vis parties who are 
actually taking part to the proceeding. However, as CAPPELLETTI noticed, ‘Civil Law judges, typically 
bureaucratic ‘career judges’ are less suited than their American counterparts to handle a type of 
adjudication that reaches far beyond the parties present in the proceeding (…). The education and training 
of Civil Law judges, rooted in many layers of Civil Law history and in a rigid conception of separation of 
powers, makes them even more wary of too evident manifestations of law-making  through the court’. 509 
Adding to this debate, others authors have also suggested that Common Law judges who are not bound by 
Codes would remain more innovative than their Civil Law counterparts who are principally trained to 
follow statutes.
510
 Later in this research, the questionnaire conducted with French judges will be an 
interesting occasion to substantiate or to nuance such views.
511
 
The second concerns the scope of such judicial activism. Active judging may indeed turn out to be 
problematic and require from judges enhanced vigilance. Active judges should notably avoid becoming 
activist judges. As pointed out by FALLA, PUTTEMANS and BOULARBAH, a conflict can arise 
between the need for active judging and ‘the risk that the judges perform an investigating role, shifting 
                                                          
506
 In the field of human resources, HENRY and NOON note that a (staff) manager is ‘someone who assists and 
advises (…) in attaining (…) objectives’. Second, referring this time to sports, KENT stresses that a manager is ‘a 
person who is responsible for the leadership, coordination and control of a (…) team’ (M.KENT, Oxford Dictionary 
of Sport, Sciences and Medicine, 3
rd
 ed., 2012).  In the financial domain, MOLE and TERRY define the manager as 
the ‘senior participant in a transaction’ (P.MOLES and N.TERRY, Handbook of International Terms, Oxford 
University Press, 1999). Other definitions also portray managers  as individuals ‘responsible for the control or 
direction of people, a department, or an organization’ (J.M.ROSENBERG, Dictionary of Business & Management, 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1995). 
 
507
 J.B. WEINSTEIN, ‘The Democratization of Mass Actions in The Internet Age’, (45) Columbia Journal of Law 
and Social Problems, 2012, pp. 451-471. 
508
 See Chapter 7. 
509
 M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 3 (at p.676). 
510
 P.H. SCHUCK, supra note 160, at p.975; J. G. FLEMING, ‘Mass Torts’, (42) American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 1994, n°3, pp.507-529.  
511
 See Chapter 6. 
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from being adjudicators to being investigating judges’.512 If active judging is necessary, judicial activism 
may however impair judicial impartiality. In practice, differences between active and activist judging may 
be difficult to draw. Active judging requires a high degree of trust in the judiciary from claimants and 
society at large. 
513
 In Central Europe and former socialist countries – notably Poland where the judiciary, 
for historical reasons, still suffers from a lack of trust and credibility among citizens,
514
 notions like ‘active 
judges’ or ‘enhanced judicial case management’ may turn out to be problematic. Active judges should 
consequently be careful to remain accessible, prone to communicate with all claimants and subject to 
public scrutiny.  
 
b) Judges Should be Pragmatic and Innovative Decision-Makers  
 
Judges should behave as pragmatic decision-makers, and avoid being numbed by the number of people or 
the magnitude of mass claims. They must also find appropriate ways to deal with numerous claimants. 
While commenting on GLOs, Lord WOOLF highlighted that ‘the need for imagination and creativity in 
dealing with such litigation is attested to by every judge who has tried such a case’.515 POSNER defines as 
pragmatic a person who is fully aware of the practical consequences of his decisions,
516
 or - in economic 
jargon - who weighs the costs and benefits of his choices. As the author interestingly further notices, ‘the 
economist, like the pragmatist, is interested in ferreting out practical consequences rather than engaging in 
a logical or semantic analysis of legal doctrines’. In the framework of mass disputes, judges should remain 
fully conscious of the immediate effects of their decisions. Their choices may first have considerable 
financial implications. European and American scholars have therefore urged judges to ‘no longer ignore 
the economic implications of their rulings’.517 They may also considerably impact on case management. 
As HODGES observes about GLOs, ‘in some types of case some [judicial] management issues can make 
                                                          
512
 Report Powers of the judge, supra note 169. 
513
 C.H ODGES, supra note 56, at p.86 (observing that models which adopt ‘a less prescriptive and rights-based 
approach (…) can only operate within the background of a legal system that has a high degree of confidence in its 
judges and ability to deliver fair and just outcomes’). 
514
 Idem, at p.85 (highlitghting, about Poland, that there ‘the debate was influenced by a desire to avoid giving judges 
increased discretion in view of the experiences of the previous Communist system in which judges were mistrusted 
and sometimes corrupt, and a current desire to prescribe procedure as fully as possible’).  
515
 WOOLF, supra note 260. 
516
 R.A. POSNER, Overcoming the Law, Harvard University Press, 1995, 597 p. (see notably p.287-298); R.A. 
POSNER, supra note 7, specifically chapter 9 Is Pragmatic Adjudication Inescapable? pp.230-265.  
517
 J. RESNIK, ‘Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in 
Individual and Aggregate Litigation’, (48) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2000, pp.2119. From an 
European perspective, See S.AMRANI-MEKKI, ‘La rengaine de l’action de groupe’, Gazette du Palais, 8 
September 2012, n°252, p.3. 
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the difference between the success and the failure of a case or a defence’. 518   Judges should thus be able to 
handle case management techniques, and importantly, should know how and when usig them.  
Two examples highlight the need for judicial pragmatism regarding case management. The first regards 
the definition of the group. A too-widely defined group may turn out to be unmanageable, can jeopardize 
the judiciary’s efficiency and increase the risk of heterogeneity among claimants. Alternatively, a too-
restricted group will undermine plaintiffs’ access to justice and limit the deterrent effect of the 
proceeding.
519
 In the United States, this last point has been highly discussed with regards to the 
participation of foreign claimants to American class action lawsuits.
 520
 As BUSCHKIN summarizes, ‘in 
order to protect the deterrent function of the class action device, the court must allow the maximum 
number of potential claimants’, [but] ‘those judges who prioritize deterrence (…) are permitting foreign 
claimants access to class action lawsuits despite the increased enforcement and procedural risks that 
foreign claimants may introduce’.521 
The second illustration regards the communication with potential claimants. As Judge WEINSTEIN 
already pointed it out, ‘judges presiding over mass tort cases must carefully consider the utility and 
wisdom of communicating with the public.’522 Similarly, in its 2013 recommendations on collective 
redress, the European Commission also highlighted that dissemination of information to claimants may 
turn out to be a challenging exercise.
523
 As already pointed out, judicial mediatisation of mass disputes has 
an external function (informing all potential claimants of their rights to take part/to leave the proceeding) 
and an internal function (informing all potential claimants of their rights to be heard and to make 
objections). External democratization may however impair internal democratization of mass disputes. As 
WEINSTEIN observes, ‘greater contact with large numbers adds complexity to the litigation.’524 An 
                                                          
518
 C. HODGES, supra note 56. 
519
 R. VAN DEN BERGH, S. KESKE, A. RENDA, supra note 38. 
520
 Even though American courts tend to maintain a restrictive view on the participation of foreigners to US class 
actions (see for example the recent Vivendi case where European shareholders’ claims against Vivendi  were finally 
dismissed),  some law and economics scholars have nonetheless considered that this generalized point of view as 
‘flawed’ and argued for a more flexible approach (see notably L.S. SIMARD and J. TIDMARSH, Foreign Citizens in 
Transnational Class Actions’, (97) Cornell Law Review, 2011, pp. 87-129).   
521
 I.T.BUSCHKIN, ‘The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy – Permitting Foreign 
Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, (1990) Cornell Law Review, 2005, 
pp. 1564-1599 
522
 J.B. WEINSTEIN, supra note 159, at p.101. 
523
 Recommendations (EC), supra note 5 (pointing out: ‘the dissemination methods [of information] should take into 
account the particular circumstances of the mass harm situation concerned, the freedom of expression, the right to 
information, and the right to protection of the reputation or the company value of a defendant before its 
responsability for the alleged violation or harm is established by the final judgement of the court’). 
524
 J.B.WEINSTEIN, supra note 159, at p.460. 
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example can be found with the Gulf Coast Claims Facilities created in the aftermath of BP’s Deep Water 
Horizon explosion in 2010. As FEINBERG points out, ‘as the magnitude of the claims increased, 
individual hearing become impractical [,] the ability to provide individual hearing and tailored one-to-one, 
face-to-face meetings with claimants was undercut by claims volume’.525  
 
 
c) Judges Should be Able to Handle Mass Disputes’ Variable Geometry 
 
At a macro level, judges should be able to categorize and homogenise claimants fairly.
526
  At a micro 
level, they should also be able to scrutinise and take into account individualised claims. Mass justice in 
mass litigation should thus remain multi-layered. Depending on the particularities of the case at stake, 
judges should favour the collective or the individualized dimension of mass litigation. Put simply, judges 
should be able to balance the group’s efficiency with a need to preserve claimants’ individual rights. As an 
illustration, KRAMER highlights that in the Dexia case the Amsterdam court ‘found it sufficient that the 
group as a whole had been served properly’, whereas in subsequent WCAM cases, the court made 
‘extensive effort’ to serve parties with unknown domiciles.527 Finding equilibrium between macro and 
micro levels will be a subtle exercise. As ALLEMEERSCH observes, ‘the larger the class and the more 
dispersed it is, the higher the chances that that interests of minority groups will not be sufficiently 
preserved’.528 To fulfil this task, judges may not be helped by parties who rather will set forth polarised 
arguments. On the one hand, claimants will actively support the existence of a claimant group to benefit 
from economies of scale.  Internally, claimants may however disagree with the parameters retained to 
shape the group. High-value plaintiffs may encourage restricted criteria in order to avoid their claims 
being mixed and averaged with low-value claimants. Conversely, low-value claimants may ask for more 
flexible and lower criteria in order to take benefit from the presence of high-value claimants.
529
 On the 
                                                          
525
 FEINBERG, supra note 361 (the GCCF was established by the Obama administration and BP. The company 
agreed to pay 20 billion to compensate victims 
526
 W. VAN BOOM, supra note 120 (observing ‘categorizing [plaintiffs] fairly and then deciding the case’ turns out 
to be the key steps that judges must perform in the realm of mass litigation’. He further argues that ‘the law tries to 
categorize individuals into groups in order to deal with the need for mass justice effectively and swiftly whilst 
providing an adequate level of individual’; see also I.GIESEN, ‘De rol van de rechter in massaschade: aangepaste of 
partijautonomie? Een nota van een scepticus’, Nederlands Juristenblad, 2128, 2007 (pointing out a ‘customization at 
macro level’ (translation from the author. In Dutch: 'maatwerk op macroniveau).  
527
 X. KRAMER, supra note 249, at pp.88-89 (emphasis added). 
528
 B. ALLEMEERSCH,‘Transnational Class Settlements – Lessons from Converium’, in S.WRBKA, S.Van 
UYTSEL and M.SIEMS (Eds), Collective Actions – Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer 
Interests, Cambridge University Press, 2012  pp.364-384, at p.381. 
 
529
 Idem (observing: ‘plaintiffs’ attorneys with large number of cases will likely to increase the size of the group and 
diminish the distinguishing variables to obtain the benefits of the economy of scale achieved by the procedure’). 
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other hand, defendants have an interest in a ‘balkanization of the group and the diminishment of group 
typicality’.530 They will therefore argue that individual issues tend to prevail over common one.531 Since 
the size of the group is obviously cornerstone for the management and the resolution of mass cases, some 
scholars have been a step forward and proposed to let judges defining in each case an ‘optimal class size’ . 
In this view, they have suggested to make the optimality of class size a relevant consideration that should 
guide the judicial certification of class action lawsuits.
532
 
 
 
3.7.2 Mass Litigation Judge or Revisiting the Herculean Judge Model 
 
 
Legal doctrine is often prone to borrow tools and concepts from mythology to canvass the different facets 
of legal decision-makers.
533
 Hercules is known for his incredible strength and intelligence used to fulfil his 
legendary labours. In the seventies, DWORKIN used the image of the Herculean judge to describe the 
way judges should ideally behave and to depict the great expectations falling on their shoulders. The 
Herculean judge, OST further highlighted, is everywhere, carries out his missions efficiently and behaves 
as a ‘social engineer’. 534  Adding to this edifice, OST suggested the model of the judge-Hermes. In 
Ancient mythology, Hermes was the god of transitions, an intercessor, a messenger and a platform 
between other gods and humans, two worlds between which he could freely navigate so as to facilitate a 
mutual communication.
535
 These two mythological figures are today instructive to understand the missions 
                                                          
530
 A.D.LAHAV, supra note 444. 
531
 See: WOOLF, supra note 260 (pointing out: ‘the positions of claimants and defendants appear inevitably to 
become polarized over strategy: the claimants’ wish to broadly focus on the common or generic issues, the 
defendants’ wish to identify and investigate each individual case’). 
532
 D.BETSON and J.TIDMARSH, ‘Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Invisible” Remedies’, (79) George 
Washington Law Review, 2011, pp.542-576 (proposing ‘in deciding whether to certify a particular class, and in 
deciding which among numerous competing classes to certify, a court should make optimal class size a relevant 
consideration’, at p.568). 
533
 R.DWORKIN, Law’s Empire, Belknap Press, 1986; P.MALAURIE, ‘La Mythologie et le Droit’, Defrénois, 15 
August 2003, n°15, p.951. 
534
 F.OST, ‘Jupiter, Hercule, Hermès : Trois Modèles du Juge’, in : P.BOURETZ (Ed.), La Force du Droit, 
Ed.Esprit, 1991, pp.241-272 (in French : ‘on retiendra ici l’appellation d’Hercule, particulièrement bienvenue pour 
designer ce juge demi-dieu qui s’astreint à d’épuisants travaux de justicier et finit par porter le monde sur ses bras 
tendus, p.243 ; ‘Hercule est présent sur tous les fronts : il tranche et adjuge encore, comme le faisait son prédécesseur 
qui s’abritait derrière l’ombre du code ; mais il s’acquitte aussi bien d’autres travaux/ Au pré-contentieux il 
conseillle, il orient, il prévient ; au post contentieux il suit l’évolution du dossier, il adapte ses décisions au gré des 
circonstances et des besoins ; il contrôle l’application des peines. Le juge jupitérien était homme de loi, Hercule 
quant à lui se dédouble en ingénieur social (p.250). 
535
 Idem (claiming – in French - : ‘le juge HERMES toujours en mouvement, (…) est à la fois au ciel, sur la terre, et 
aux enfers. Il occupe résolument l’entre-deux des choses ; il assure le passage des unes aux autres. dieu des 
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falling on judges in mass litigation.As the judge-Hercules, judges have been assigned great responsibilities 
when monitoring mass disputes. Expectations from all stakeholders are high. As the judge-Hermes, judges 
should facilitate communication between all parties and ensures a dialogue between the private interests of 
interested parties and the public interest of society. As Justice PARKER has expressed it, ‘litigants and the 
public rightfully expect the courts to be problem solvers’. The problem is that judges are neither gods nor 
half-gods, but merely simple human beings.
536
 There may thus be limits to what judges can effectively 
do.
537
 Using economic theories - namely rational choice theory and behavioural economics - the coming 
chapters will be dedicated to understand how judges, as human beings, may in practice deal with mass 
claims.     
 
  *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
marchands, il préside aux échanges psychopompes, il relie les vivants, et les morts, dieu des navigateurs il force des 
passages inconnus. Hermes est le médiateur universel, le grand commmunicateur’, at p.244). 
536
 Also cited in R.G.BONE, supra note 460. 
537
 Idem 
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Chapter 4 
WHAT DO JUDGES WANT? JUDICIAL INCENTIVES IN MASS LITIGATION 
 
 
Questioning Judicial Attitudes from a Rational Choice Theory Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
                                                                                                            ‘ 
 
  
 
 
 
4.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
While commenting on the considerable burdens falling upon American judges when they deal with mass 
claims, PETERSON and SELVIN have observed that judges cannot on such circumstances simply be seen 
as ‘disinterested administrators of justice’, but should rather be viewed as ‘deeply interested 
participants’.538 In the same vein, MC GOVERN  further argues that judges monitoring class action 
lawsuits leave their role of external and neutral managers to ultimately act as restless ‘players’.539 
KONIAK and COHEN finally add that ‘although the court has no monetary interest in the [class action] 
settlement, its interests are not perfectly aligned with the interests of class members’.540 Interestingly, 
these different insights challenge the traditional views of judges behaving as mere neutral umpires, and 
conversely point out the likelihood of strategic judicial behaviour.
541
 They invite us to further investigate 
                                                          
*A. FRANCE, On Life & Letters: 1st Serie, 1922, at p.9. 
538
 M. SELVIN and M.A. PETERSON, ‘Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited Powers of Courts’, (54) Law & 
Contemporary Problems, 1991, n°3, pp.227-247.  
539
 F. Mc GOVERN, ‘An Analysis of Mass Tort for Judges’, (73) Texas Law Review, 1995, pp.1821-1845 (at 
p.1839). 
540
 S.P. KONIAK and G.M. COHEN, ‘Under Cloak of Settlement’, (82) Virginia Law Review, 1996, n°7, pp.1051-
1280. 
541
 A.GARAPON and I.PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 12, at p.231. 
‘All those who deceive themselves into the belief that they put 
anything but their own personalities into their work are dupes of 
the most fallacious of illusions. The truth is that we can never get
outside ourselves’.   
               A. FRANCE* 
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the complex issue of judicial incentives in order to better understand what judges may want to achieve in 
the context of mass disputes.   
 
  4.1.1 Where Are We?  
 
The preceding chapter shed light on the expectations that different legislatures have placed on judges’ 
shoulders for the conduct of socially efficient mass proceedings. Theoretically, judges should behave as 
active and pragmatic watchdogs, cattle drivers and good shepherds helping minimize mass litigation’s 
costs while ensuring its benefits. Judges dealing with mass litigation were ultimately compared to the 
figure of the ‘Herculean judge’ who has been assigned titanic tasks by society. Yet, as suggested by Judge 
EASTERBROOK, ‘much of the judge- centred scholarship in contemporary law schools assumes that 
judges have the leisure to examine subjects deeply and resolve debates wisely’.542 Less consideration has 
been given to judges’ incentives to efficiently fulfil their tasks. From a Law and Economics perspective, 
the analysis therefore remains incomplete, and specific attention must be given to judges’ incentive 
structure.
543
  
 
4.1.2. Methodology & Objectives – The Rational Choice Theory 
 
The methodology used in this chapter is based on the rational choice theory. Rational approaches to judges 
and court organization and their associated attempts to clarify judges’ incentives have been extensively 
used by Law and Economics scholars since the 1990s. Following POSNER’s assumptions aimed at 
understanding what judges want, the critical starting hypothesis is that judges act as rational and interested 
individuals. Responding to incentives as all other human beings do,
544
 they have a utility function which 
includes a set of preferences (referred to as ‘arguments’) that they seek to maximize under constraints. 
Considering the judiciary in this light presents two advantages. First, it allows the observer to lift a bit the 
legalistic curtain which traditionally shadows judicial behaviour. Second, it helps formulating hypotheses 
                                                          
542
 F. EASTERBROOK, ‘What’s so special about judges?’,(61) University of Colorado Law Review, 1990, pp.773-
782. 
543
 K .ZAJCZ and M. KOVAC, ‘What Do the European Judge Strive For – An Empirical Assessment’, International 
Journal for Court Administration, April 2011 (deploring the lack of consideration of policy-makers for the incentives 
of its agents). 
544
 E. MACKAAY, Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013 (see 
notably pp.35-50). 
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and predictions about judicial intervention.
545
 From a methodological perspective, a key issue remains to 
decide whether it is possible to apply economic theories – such as rational choice theory – to non-market 
behaviour, such as that of judges. On the one hand, the market is undeniably the basic and natural 
analytical framework of economics and transplanting its assumptions beyond its original scope could at 
first sight be questionable. On the other hand, economics have nowadays also been portrayed as an 
‘imperialist science’546 whose methodologies have progressively extended far beyond their initial areas of 
study. They are applied to various fields and topics, including politics, sociology and – more crucially for 
this research - Law. Law and Economics scholars are therefore reluctant to draw a formal barrier which 
separate market from non-market behaviour.
547
 Defending the view that elements of rationality may exist 
in every human decision,
548
 they follow the assumption of the Nobel Prize Laureate BECKER who argued 
that ‘the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behaviours’.549What 
ultimately distinguishes economics from other social sciences is not the object of study but the method. 
Even though there may be possible limitations to the use of rational choice theory when applied to judicial 
behaviour,
550
 the use of the homo economicus is not intended to depict – or to describe - how individuals 
will always behave, but rather to predict how they could rationally behave in a given set of circumstances. 
In simple words, rational choice is not about correct or real descriptions or explanations, but about 
predictions.
551
 Thereby, the homo economicus echoes WEBER’s ideal-type whose main added-value 
                                                          
545
 S.D.R. STRAS, ‘Incentives Approach to Retirement’, (90) Minnesota Law Review, 2006, n°5, p.1417 (observing: 
‘one of the major advantage of the rational choice approach is that it does not rule out the possibility that judges are 
motivated by goals other than policy’). 
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G. STIGLER, ‘Economics: The Imperial Science’, (86) Scandinavia Journal of Economics, 1984, pp.301-313. 
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 R.A. POSNER, The Economics of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1981, at p.2 (claimining: [it is] ‘implausible 
and counterintuitive the view that the individual’s decisional processes are so rigidly compartmentalized that he will 
act rationally in making some trivial purchase but irrationally when deciding to go to law school or get married or 
evade income taxes or have three children rather than two or prosecute a lawsuit’). 
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 K. POPPER, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972, 6
e
 Ed., at p.140 (considering 
that ‘in most social situations, if not all, there is an element of rationality; (…) human beings hardly ever act quite 
rationally’). See also A.SMITH, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759, p.304 (suggesting already that human beings 
tend to behave as self-interested individual, noticing notably that ‘we are not ready to suspect any persons of being 
defective in selfishness’). 
549
 G.S.  BECKER, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, University of Chicago Press, 1976 (at p.8). 
550
 R. SMYTH, ‘Do Judges Behave as Homo Economicus, and if so, Can We Measure their Performance? An 
Antipodean Perspective on Tournament of Judges’, (32) Florida State University Law Review, 2005, pp.1299-1330 
(questioning whether the Homo Economicus could possibly be ‘a distorted lens through which to view judicial 
behaviour’); see also L. MONTADA, ‘Justice: Just a Rational Choice?’, (11) Social Justice Research, 1998, n°2, 
pp.81-101. 
551L.T.VISSCHER, ‘The Duty of Lawyers to Serve Their Clients’Interests – An Economic and Psychological 
Account’, RILE Working Paper Series, 2014/03 (echoing FRIEDMAN’s seminal paper ‘The Methodology of 
Positive Economics’ -in: Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, 1966, pp.3-16- who, as early as 
1966, observed that ‘the relevant question to ask about the "assumptions" of a theory is not whether they are 
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remains to help formulate hypotheses, even though, ‘in its conceptual purity’, this model of man cannot 
obviously be found anywhere.
552
 Importantly, its use has conducted scholars to make throughout last 
decades key findings with respect to judicial behaviour which are worth here investigating.
553
 
From an historical perspective, the Law & Economics literature on judicial behaviour has been strongly 
influenced by the early works of US Legal Realists who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
proposed alternative views for looking at judicial behaviour. In those days, the economic approach to the 
judiciary is still often considered as a controversial issue.
554
 Legal scholars are indeed usually sceptical 
vis-à-vis attempts aimed at desacralizing a legal institution such as the judiciary,
555
 or at highlighting the 
extra-legal factors influencing judicial decision-making.
556
 By no mean is this chapter intended to seek any 
form of reconciliation between economists and lawyers on this point. However - and as restlessly 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
descriptively "realistic," for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in 
hand’); see also: A.M. PACCES and L.T. VISSCHER, ‘Law & Economics – Methodology’, in:  B. VAN KLINK 
and S. TAEKEMA, Interdisciplinary Research into Law, 2011, Berlin:Mohr, pp.85-107; H. KERKMEESTER, 
‘Methodology:General’,Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, 1999. 
552
 M. WEBER, ‘The Area of Economics, Economic Theory and the Ideal Type’, in: M. WEBER, Essays in 
Economic Sociology (Ed.by R.SWEDBERG, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp.242-248); see also N.GIOCOLI, 
Modeling Rational Agents, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003 (observing that the ideal-type is aimed at ‘offer[ing] 
guidance to the construction of hypotheses [even though] in its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be 
found empirically anywhere’, at p.58). 
553
 S.D.R. STRAS, supra note 545; R. EPSTEIN, ‘Independence of Judges, the Use and Limitations of Public Choice 
Theory’, (1990) Brigham Young University Law Review, 1990, n°3 (observing that ‘self-interest may not be the 
whole truth, but it is a large part of the truth nonetheless, too big for any theory to ignore’).  
554
 G.S. BECKER, supra note 549, at p.169 (remembering in the 1970s that ‘the application of the economic 
approach  to fertility, marriage, employment, and other interaction among family members continues to encounter 
open hostility. When [the paper suggesting] at a conference on population that children could be treated as durable 
consumer goods, it was greeted with derision by many participants’, before observing that afterwards many papers 
followed a similar approach’). 
555
 G. CALVES, ‘Mieux connaitre les contentieux de masse: l’apport des travaux sociologiques’, Revue Francaise de 
Droit Administratif, 2011, p.477 (while commenting on the insights drawn from sociological works on the 
functioning of judiciaries, the author observes that judges are envisioned as mere normal workers. Therefore, she 
adds, ‘from the point of view of lawyers, this conclusion is fundamentally embarrassing (…), it contributes to 
objectivize, desacralize and to modify the perceptions that are traditionally held (translation from the author. In 
French: ‘pour nous autres juristes, cette conclusion est fondamentalement désagreable (..) elle objectivise, 
désacralise, relativise’), also on this point: H.-B. SCHAEFER and C. OTT, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005 (particularly Chapter 4: ‘Rationality and Economic Behaviour’). 
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 M. DEMERGUE, ‘Des influences sur les jugements des juges’, Symposium organised by the French 
Senate L’office du juge, 29 Septembre 2006, p.371, available on www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2005/office_du_juge-
notice.html, accessed 15 May 2013 (pointing out that ‘envisager l’existence d’influences peut signifier que 
l’objectivité de leur jugement en droit est remise en cause et que leur subjectivité peut l’emporter sur l’application 
des règles de droit. De ce fait, l’étude des influences est un sujet qui dérange : oser évoquer la raison d’Etat, la 
défense de certaines valeurs, l’utilité économique et sociale, voire la pression des groupes d’intérêts n’est pas de bon 
aloi’). 
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ascertained by Law and Economics scholars - lawyers can take benefit from economic insights, as well as 
economists can find in the expressed legal concerns a way to enrich their analysis.
557
  
 
4.1.3. The Chapter in a Nutshell  
 
 In essence, the objectives of this chapter are twofold. The first is to introduce readers to the economics of 
the judiciary on a broader scale, taking notably into account differences between the American judiciary– 
upon which most of the Law and Economics literature is built– and Continental judiciaries. Importantly, 
the category ‘Continental judiciaries’ encompasses different types of European judiciaries whose 
structures and organizations may each time strongly diverge. Without denying their own particularities, 
this chapter deliberately maintains a higher level of analysis. When focusing on their convergences while 
leaving aside their divergences, it is assumed that judiciaries belonging to a same legal tradition may share 
a common ground of principles and values.
 558
 Hence, for matters of clarity, the American judiciary is 
viewed as representative of the Common Law tradition and Continental judiciaries as representative of the 
Civil Law tradition. Further distinctions within these two categories will timely be adressed. From this 
broad initial picture (4.2), the analysis is then narrowed down to the economics of the judiciary involved 
in mass litigation which remains to this day an angle still overlooked in the literature (4.3). The principal 
objective of this chapter will be to shed light on the incentives structure of judges when dealing with mass 
claims, and to show that judges’ rational attitudes may ultimately depart from policymakers’ expectations 
and importantly influence the outcomes of mass disputes. In doing so, the chapter is aimed at shedding 
alternative lights on the work performed by judges when monitoring mass claims. Final remarks conclude 
this chapter (4.4). 
  
    
* 
 
 
 
                                                          
557
 R. COOTER and T. ULEN, Introduction to Law & Economics, AddisonWesley Longman,3
rd
 ed.,2000, pp.4-7 
558
 A. GARAPON and I. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 12, p.49. 
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4.2.   ECONOMICS OF THE JUDICIARY – ANOTHER WAY OF LOOKING AT JUDGES 
  
Since the topic could be unknown to (Continental) legal scholars, and is still relatively under-developed in 
the work of (European) economists, this first part is intended to introduce and familiarize readers to the 
economic approach of the judiciary. This step turns out to be necessary before narrowing down the 
analysis to the behaviour of judges involved in mass litigation.  
The rest this section is divided as follows: the preliminary remarks describe the shift of paradigm operated 
by the economic approach which – as opposed to the legal tradition – considers individuals involved in the 
litigation process as interested participants. These introductory comments are an opportunity to introduce 
readers to basic notions of economics such as rationality, self-interest, and maximization which lie at the 
core of this chapter (4.2.1); the analysis then goes a step further by considering the peculiarities of judicial 
incentives. Particular attention is given to the doctrinal roots of the economic approach to judges and to 
challenges faced by economists. The arguments composing the judges’ utility functions – notably in the 
European context - are ultimately discussed (4.2.2). Preliminary conclusions follow (4.2.3).  
 
 
4.2.1. Preliminary Remarks - Alternatives Views on the Litigation Process:  
           Disinterested v. Interested Protagonists 
  
Legal and economic approaches suggest two different views on the behaviour of actors involved in the 
litigation process, namely judges and lawyers. Whereas legal scholars traditionally consider these 
protagonists as being immune to self-interest (a), the economic approach conversely suggests that - like 
every human being - they may behave in rational and interested ways (b).  The example of lawyers is used 
as a first ice-breaking example (c). Unsurprisingly, this shift of assumptions from disinterested to 
interested participants has important economic implications (d).   
 
a) Legalism or ‘The Legal Candour’- a Focus on Disinterested Participants 
 
 
The traditional legal approach (hereafter referred to as legalism)
559
 is rooted in the well-known assumption 
that the litigation process is conducted and monitored by disinterested individuals. Judges are docile 
                                                          
559
 Literature sometimes refers to the term ‘formalism’ (see R.A.POSNER, supra note 7, pointing out: ‘formalism is 
the conventional, one might say, the official conception of the judicial role’, at p.1051). 
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agents of the Law and of their legislatures. Lawyers in turn behave as faithful representatives of their 
clients. Both have no preferences and take no decision other than the one dictated by their principals. 
   
 Denying judges’ Personality  
 
 
In the Federalist Paper n°78, HAMILTON asserted in 1788 that judges have neither preference nor ‘force 
[or] will, but merely judgement, and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for 
the efficacy of [their] judgement’. At the same period, a similar viewpoint was spearheaded in Continental 
Europe where –under the impulse of the French Revolution – the question of the judges’ personality was 
simply ‘denied’,560 their role being confined to the one of automatons applying the rule of law previously 
voted upon by the sovereign people through the voice of its representatives (the so-called bouche de la 
loi). Any attempt to tackle the issue of judge’s personality and preferences was viewed as a threat likely to 
overthrow and challenge the will of the People, and therefore fiercely rejected.
561
 As importantly pointed 
out by EHRLICH in 1903, ‘the very peculiarity of the judicial office is the assumption that the judge’s 
utterance represents, not his personal opinion but the law [which can be found primarily] in the legal 
records of the past, in statutes, in decisions of courts, in legal literature’.562 Such a denial of judicial 
personality has remained particularly striking in Continental Europe where judges are usually viewed as 
anonymous civil servants who are part of a broader administration.
563
 The judge - as an individual - simply 
does not exist and fully disappears behind the institution to which he belongs. The situation is different in 
Common Law countries where judges are nominally identified in their judgments, and may express their 
personal views through, for example, the use of dissenting opinions. As further explained, these 
institutional differences will also matter from an economic point of view.    
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 J. KRYNEN, L’Etat de Justice en France, XIIIe-XXe siecle – L’Emprise Contemporaine des Juges, Bibliothèque 
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 E. EHRLICH, ‘Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects’, in: E. BRUNCKEN  and L.B. 
REGISTER (Eds.), Science of Legal Method: Selected Essays by Various Authors, Boston, The Boston Book 
Company, 1917, Chapter 2. 
563
 A. GARAPON and I. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 12  (see in particular : Chapter 6 ‘Le Juge Arbitre ou 
Enquêteur’). 
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 Lawyers as Candid Legal Advisers  
 
 
When shifting from judges to lawyers, the candour required from attorneys when representing their clients 
is also noteworthy.
564
 Ethics and rules of professional conduct strongly emphasize a duty to ‘render candid 
advice’, to behave as disinterested agents,565 fully devoted to their clients566 and ultimately carrying work 
‘that [they] would not [have performed] for [themselves]. 567 Anecdotal evidence from the French 
lawyering tradition is illustrative. For example, French lawyers were traditionally not paid for the work 
performed. Their fees depending on client’s satisfaction were compared to ‘a spontaneous donation in 
recognition of their work’.568 The notions of devotion and impartial judgement underlying the work of 
lawyers and judges have interestingly led several authors to draw parallels between the legal profession 
and religion.
569
 Both legal and religious oaths require from their agents a full commitment and sacerdotal 
vocations which would distinguish them from their fellow counterparts. Yet, the legal standpoint which 
                                                          
564
 L.G. LERMAN, ‘Lying to Clients’, (138) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1990, n°3, pp.659-760; J. 
LADINSKI, ‘The Traffic in Legal Services: Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the Channeling of Clients’, (11) Law & 
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(règle 1.3- www.cnb.avocat.fr/Reglement-Interieur-National-de-la-profession-d-avocat-RIN_a281.html#1 (accessed 
5 March 2013) ; Similarly, see also Rule 5 Code of Conduct of the Dutch Bar Association.  
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C. FRIED, ‘The Lawyer as Friend: the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation’, (85) Yale Law Journal, 
, 1976, n°8, pp.1060-1089. 
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 A.G. CAMUS, supra note 565  (L’honoraire est alors vu comme ‘un don spontané de la reconnaissance du client’; 
see also A. STEFF, ‘Les Contestations en Matière d’Honoraires d’Avocats’, Report for the French Court of 
Cassation,1999,availablewww.courdecassation.fr/publications_cour_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_1999_91/etudes
_documents_93/antoine_steff_5799.html (accessed 7 April 2013). 
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 A. GARAPON, J. ALLARD and F. GROS, supra note 17 (observing that historically the act of judging was 
viewed as ‘a judicial miracle’); Relatedly, A.LUCIEN, ‘Staging and the Imaginary Institutions of the Judge’, (23) 
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 2010, pp.185-206 (highlighting that ‘according to the classical 
paradigm of the judicial act, the Courthouse is a temple and the hearing is a ceremony’); W.F.MURPHY, Elements 
of Judicial Strategy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1965, p.13 (emphasizing that ‘the cult of the 
robe, the concept of the judge as a high priest of justice with special talents for elucidation of the law, that sacred and 
mysterious text which is inscrutable even to the educated layman, forms a sort of institutional charisma which is 
bestowed on judges with their oath of office’). 
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simply considers judges and lawyers as altruistic agents has been challenged, and is often nowadays 
regarded as misleading.
570
 
 
  b)  The Economic Approach- a Focus on Rational and Self-Interested Protagonists 
 
While adopting an approach diametrically different, the economic analysis has tried to provide some 
insights through the legal smokescreen. To do so, economists have posited that participants are rational 
individuals pursuing their individual interest. For matters of clarity, these two basic terms are hereafter 
briefly clarified. 
     
 Defining ‘Rationality’ 
  
 
In common language, individuals are said to behave rationally whenever their actions and decisions are 
‘based on or [are] in accordance with reason or logic’.571  Rational behaviour can principally be envisaged 
as being goal-oriented.
572
 In this view, one may envisaged different ways for looking at rational 
behaviours.
573
 An act can first be regarded as rational if it serves to achieve the person’s immediate 
goal(s). It may also be considered as rational if it serves the individual’s long-term objective(s) or 
value(s). As a consequence, a course of action might be regarded as irrational from the point of view of an 
external observer who does not necessarily share the same values or the same objectives. As a matter of 
fact, this induces a second key question concerning the criteria through which rationality should ultimately 
be weighed.
574
 However, in order to avoid the meanders induced by an in-depth definition of rationality,
575
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 A.GARAPON, J.ALLARD and F.GROS, supra note 17 (in French : ‘on imagine aisément que ce mythe ne 
correspond pas à la réalité de la pratique judiciaire. On peut même se demander si, par une ruse de la raison, ce déni 
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solution’ , at p.2). 
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 Oxford Dictionary, entry: ‘rational’. 
572
 H.-B. SCHAEFER and C. OTT, supra note 555 (suggesting that ‘the most elementary definition would be the one 
that defines rationality in terms of purposeful choices’). 
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 H. KHATCHADOURIAN, ‘What is Rationality?’, (24) Theoria, 1958,  n°3, p. 172 
574
 H.A. SIMON, Administrative Behavior -  A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 
The Free Press, 1997, 4
th
 Ed., see notably pp.84-85 ‘Definitions of Rationality’. 
575
 Idem (observing: ‘in terms of what objectives, whose values, shall rationality be judges? Is behavior of an 
individual in an organization rational when it serves his personal objectives, or when its serves the organizational 
objectives? Two soldiers sit in a trench opposite a machine-gun nest. One of them stays under cover. The other, at 
the cost of his life, destroys the machine-gun nest with a grenade. Which is rational?’). 
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the solution here retained is to maintain a higher level of analysis by considering an attitude as rational 
whenever individuals ultimately seek to achieve their goals in a coherent manner,
576
 meaning that they 
ultimately ‘[employ] the available means to achieve [their aims] in such a way that the means are used 
with the least possible waste’.577   
 
 The Self-Interested Man Model and its Controversies 
 
 
The interested individual assumption which traditionally characterizes the homo economicus has been a 
source of numerous misunderstandings. The notions of interest or self-interest have often been confused 
with moral or value judgments. Seen as avatars of egoism or selfishness - both attributes to which no one 
is unsurprisingly eager to be associated with - this assumption has been fiercely rejected,
578
 notably by 
non-economists.
579
  Yet, when defending the homo economicus, KIRCHGAESSNER suggests that this 
latter ‘might [nonetheless] not be so unpleasant’.580 Modifying our perception of the homo economicus 
nevertheless requires two preliminary steps. First, it is essential to disentangle the homo economicus – and 
its associated individual interest- from any moral connotation. The assumption of interested individuals 
should rather be considered as being essentially neutral. Arguing therefore that individuals pursue their 
individual interest simply means that they seek to achieve their own goals. The assumption does not 
prejudge what these objectives are.
581
  Second, the fact that individuals seek their personal advantages is 
presumably a trait of human nature. A possibility is then to simply ignore this reality; another is to avoid 
blaming this behaviour and to incorporate it into the analysis.   
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 I. GILBOA, Rational Choice, MIT Press, 2010, 176 p 
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 H.-B. SCHAEFER and C. OTT, supra note 555, at p. 52 
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 G. KIRCHGAESSNER, Homo Oeconomicus: The Economic Model of Behaviour and Its Applications in 
Economics and Other Social Sciences, Springer,2008, pp.11-58 (poiting out that ‘self-interest and especially 
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people refuse to accept this quality as a general behavioural assumption. After all, we should be able to recognize 
ourselves in such an economic model of behavior, and we do not like to see ourselves too unpleasantly’).  
579
 H.-B. SCHAEFER and C. OTT, supra note 555, at p.55 (stressing that ‘this model of man is obviously one that 
can create a stir among non-economists who are unaware of the reason for this particular set-up, finding strong 
egoism to be either morally repugnant or blatantly unrealistic’). 
580
 C. KIRCHGAESSNER, supra note 578. 
581
 H.-B. SCHAEFER and C.OTT, supra note 555, at p.54. 
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c)  The Economic Approach of Lawyering as Ice-Breaking Example 
 
 
The choice is here made to briefly address the case of lawyers as ice-breaking example and as a way to 
familiarize readers with the methodology employed in this chapter.
582
 The following developments shed 
some light on the arguments that rational and interested lawyers may seek to maximize.
583
 They are 
principally twofold: financial and non-financial incentives. 
 
 Lawyers’ financial incentives  
 
 
The first argument of lawyers’ utility function is financial. Lawyers seek to maximize the financial return 
of their caseload while working under the pressure of many and potentially conflicting deadlines. Since 
monetary incentives are usually considered to play a key role in lawyers’ behaviour, the structure of their 
fee arrangements has a significant impact on their work, and more specifically on their level of exerted 
effort, on their incentives to sue or to early settle cases, or on their effort to filter and screen weak and 
low-quality claims. Empirical works discussing divergences between hourly-paid lawyers and contingency 
fees lawyers are on this point illustrative.   
KRITZER, FELSTINER, SARAT and TRUBEK found evidence that civil lawyers paid on a contingency 
fees basis put in less effort for the conduct of small cases (i.e. cases whose amount at stake is below 
US$6,000) than hourly-paid lawyers. Conversely, they observed that the amounts of time and effort 
devoted by contingency fees lawyers tended to increase for the conduct of big cases.
584
 These findings 
substantiate the theoretical predictions: contingency fees lawyers who are paid only if the lawsuit is 
successful exert more effort as long as the expected benefits associated with an additional hour of work 
outweigh the expected costs that they ultimately have to bear. In other words, contingency lawyers tend to 
work harder as long as the game is worth the candle, i.e. for the conduct of cases where higher amounts 
are at stake. Additionally, an empirical research conducted by STEPHEN, FAZIO and TATA focusing 
this time on behaviours of criminal defence lawyers involved in plea bargaining procedures sheds some 
light on lawyers’ responses to economic incentives. Taking as starting point changes that occurred in the 
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 H.M.KRITZER, W.L.F FELSTINER, A.SARAT, D.M.TRUBEK, ‚’The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer 
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Scottish Legal system with regards to legal aid payment for defence lawyers
585
, the authors notice that 
attorneys tend to behave as rational utility maximizers by notably increasing the number of legally-aided 
cases.
586
  
While fuelling the debate concerning the benefits and drawbacks associated with contingency fees, 
HELLAND and TABARROK found empirical evidence revealing that hourly-fees lawyers have higher 
incentives to support the filing of low-quality claims and to delay settlement.
587
 By referring to the fact 
that certain jurisdictions have limited the use of contingency fees in certain types of litigation, the authors 
highlight that hourly-paid lawyers exert lower monitoring, mostly by advising their clients to file without 
a prior in-depth assessment of their initial chances of prevailing at trial. Additionally, lawyers paid on an 
hourly basis who have a financial interest in extending the number of billable hours unsurprisingly tend to 
postpone settlement.           
   
 Lawyers’ non-financial incentives  
 
 
 Even though some may certainly behave this way in practice, portraying lawyers as greedy individuals 
merely driven by financial incentives remains an oversimplification. Considering the non-financial 
arguments which, beside the financial one, may also affect the way lawyers behave is therefore a second 
necessary step. Career concerns, reputation within the legal profession, duty to clients or professional 
standards are traditionally on the list of the non-pecuniary lawyer’s incentives,588 and they may indeed 
influence their daily work. As for instance reported by SCHUCK when commenting on the Agent Orange 
class action litigation, ‘some of the lawyers (…) saw [the case] as a high-visibility, high-stakes contest in 
which they could seek fame and fortune’.589 Scholars such as FERRER have interestingly examined the 
impact of lawyers’ reputational concerns on litigation,590 and unsurprisingly found that lawyers with 
higher reputation concerns tended to put in more effort than their counterparts with lower reputation 
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 P.H. SCHUCK, supra note 437, at p.256 
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concerns. The author additionally noticed that lawyers’ behaviour appears to be influenced not only by 
their own career concerns, but also by those of the opposing counsel.
591
     
As a matter of fact, it remains impossible to define in advance and with accuracy which arguments will 
prevail in lawyers’ decisions. The respective weights given to each argument depend on lawyers’ 
decisions to favour their interests upon the one of theirs clients.
592
 Yet, once again, economics is not 
essentially about its object, but about its method. By shedding light on lawyers’ internal motivations, the 
economic analysis has contributed to renew and challenged the traditional legal view. Crucially, this 
change of paradigm from disinterested to interested individuals has economic implications.  
 
d)  Shifting from Disinterested to Interested Protagonists – Economic Implications 
 
From an economic point of view, shifting the analysis from the angle of disinterested to interested 
participants raises questions about the possible vagaries potentially affecting the relationship between the 
principal and his agent (known in the literature as ‘principal-agent problems’). Principal-agent problems 
arise in situations of imperfect information where principals cannot perfectly observe – and therefore fully 
and correctly monitor - the behaviour of theirs agents.
593
 This zone of uncertainty characterized by 
asymmetric information creates a leeway for potential conflicts of interest and opportunistic behaviour 
where agents seek to maximize their own utility function possibly to the detriment of their principals.
594
 
As pointed out by ANDERSON, conflicts of interest can be regarded as by-product of the multiplication 
of specialised exchanges in which principals tend to heavily rely on the skills of theirs agents to perform 
specific tasks. An increase in the difficulty - or degree of specialization - of the service rendered leads to 
an increase in the difficulty to detect opportunistic behaviour.
595
 Conflicts of interest between principals 
and agents plague numerous relationships, such as those existing between managers and shareholders, 
employers and employees, or landlord and tenants. In the litigation framework, principal-agent problems 
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between lawyers and their clients are well-known.
596
 Extensive billing or unnecessary works conducted by 
lawyers for their own profit are for instance illustrative. From interviews conducted with twenty American 
lawyers, LERMAN reported that ‘lawyers most frequently deceived clients in an attempt to increase 
earnings, expand business, or cover up error or neglect – in short to protect profits and professional 
reputation’.597 Designing a compensation scheme to ensure that the interests of principals are faithfully 
defended by their agents has therefore become a cornerstone issue in the Law & Economics literature.
 598
 
Importantly, in the field of mass litigation, and as shown in coming developments, the widespread use of 
standards to regulate judicial behaviour in mass cases creates leeway where judges can express their own 
preferences and pursue their own interest, potentially at the expenses of their principals.
599
  
 
4.2.2.  Targeting the Incentives of Rational Utility Maximizing Judges 
 
Preliminary remarks suggested that the economic approach envisages participants involved in the 
litigation process as rational maximizing agents pursuing their own agenda. The example of lawyers was 
briefly introduced as ice-breaking illustration. The analysis now focuses on judges who are the key 
protagonists of this research. The issue of judges’ interest is cornerstone.  As emphasized by KOCKESEN 
and USMAN, ‘even a small degree of self-interest on the part of judges (…) can have an enormous 
impact’.600   
First of all, the economic approach to the judiciary must be regarded as being closely associated with the 
American reaction against Legalism which took place during the twentieth century. This brief detour is 
principally aimed at explaining the original assumptions formulated by Law and Economics researchers 
that may potentially puzzle Continental legal scholars (a). A basic understanding of US Legal Realism is 
indeed essential to clarify the methodology and assumptions of economists but also, as later shown, also 
of behavioural economists working on judicial behaviour.
601
 Then, justifications on why economists 
                                                          
596
 A.LEMPEREUR and M.SCODELLARO, ‘Conflits d’Intérêts Economiques entre Avocats et Clients : La 
Question des Honoraires’, Recueil Dalloz 2003, p.1380  
597
 L.G.LERMAN, ‘Lying to Clients’, (138) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1990, n°3, pp.659-760 
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 R.COOTER and D.L.RUBINFELD, ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, (27) Journal 
of Economic Literature, 1989, , n°3, pp.1067-1091;  for an analysis of Pareto-optimal fees arrangements enabling 
principal to monitor agents’ behaviour, see notably S.SHAVELL, ‘Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal 
Agent Relationship’, (10) The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, n°1, pp.55-73. 
599
 See Chapter 3 
600
 L.KOCKESEN and M.USMAN, ‘Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency’, (32) International Review of 
Law & Economics, 2012, pp. 300-308. 
601
 See Chapter 5: ‘Judges and Emotion: the Sensitive Judge’. 
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usually tend to view judges as UFOS (Unidentified and Fuzzy Object of Study) will be set forth (b). 
Finally, the arguments that rational judges may seek to maximize are presented. The analysis will notably 
take into account the particularities of European judiciaries (c).  
 
a) An Historical Detour - Another Way of Looking at the Judiciary: American Reactions to 
Legalism  
 
 Bringing Judges Back to Earth: Judging as Perceived by Legal Realists  
 
 
The roots of the economic approach to the judiciary can be traced back to the American doctrinal reactions 
to Legalism, and more specifically to the Legal Realism movement which emerged in the US during the 
first half of the twentieth-century.
602
 The movement blossomed in the 1920-1930’s but failed to fully 
structure itself. It notably remained without clear research agenda or manifesto.
603
 As TUMONIS 
observes, ‘realists were a sundry group: there were more differences between some realists than between 
some realists and formalists’.604 
 As opposed to the traditional legal doctrine which principally treated Law as a science – that is an 
autonomous discipline governed by a set of abstract principles -
605
 Realists viewed it as being strongly 
embedded in social, economic and political contexts. Some Realists such as FRANK, HUTCHESON 
(who were themselves two famous judges) or RADIN asserted that legal rules may not be the principal 
                                                          
602
 R.N.M. GRAHAM, ‘What Judges Want: Judicial Self-Interest and Statutory Interpretation’, (30) Statute Law 
Review, 2009, pp. 38-72 (observing: ‘the realist vision of statutory construction is perfectly aligned with the 
economic notion of self-interested utility maximization. According to the realist vision, judges interpret text in ways 
that give effects to their own preferences. According to microeconomics, people choose to perform these actions 
which they think will promote their own interest’). 
603
 L. FULLER, 'American Legal Realism', (82) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1934, p.429 (highlighting: 
there is no ‘realist school’ and therefore ‘we lack  yet a comprehensive  work which will both  describe and apply the 
methods of legal realism, which can serve both as an exposition of the approach and as an exemplification of it’).  
604
 V.  TUMONIS, ‘Legal Realism & Judicial Decision-Making’, (19) Jurisprudencija, 2012, n°4, pp.1361-1382 (for 
an overview on Legal Realism); B.E. HARCOURT, 'Une généalogie de la rationalité actuarielle aux Etats-Unis aux 
XIXe and XXe siecle', Revue de Sciences Criminelle, 2010, p.31 (notably discussing the impact of Legal Realism on 
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605
 C.K. ROWLEY, ‘An Intellectual History of Law and Economics: 1739-2003’, in: F.PARISI and C.K. ROWLEY, 
The Origins of Law & Economics – Essays by the Founding Fathers, The Locke Institute, 2005, pp.3-32 (In the 
American legal history, the paradigm of legalism is usually associated with LANGDELL who was the Dean of the 
Harvard Law Faculty. He defended the view that the tasks of jurists should be to isolate and classify relevant legal 
issues in order to draw connections with previous relevant cases. This view had long-lasting effects on American 
legal teaching. As noted by ROWLEY, ‘this revolution in legal instruction swept through the American academy and 
provided the basis for a legal formalism that dominated American legal education for at least a half century’).  
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motivation influencing the way judges take their decision.
 606
 The main explanation, they argued, should 
rather be found in extra-legal factors such as the judge’s personality, his preferences, his ‘hunches’ or his 
social and economic views.
607
 If legal rules may still matter, they are often depicted as a manner to legally 
justify judges’ preferred outcomes.608  
By challenging the traditional judicial ideal, Legal Realists asked a critical question which turned out to be 
a source of extensive literature for several decades: if legal rules do not entirely determine the content of 
judicial decisions, what are then the other determinants influencing judicial decision-making?
609
 As a 
consequence, they crucially asserted the need for empirical research in order to shed light on this 
important issue.
610
   
 
 Legal Realism Facing Criticisms 
 
Unsurprisingly, Legal Realism faced hashed criticisms. The movement was rejected as promoting 
unethical assumptions, ‘threatening the maintenance of the American democracy’611 and discrediting the 
                                                          
606
 V. TUMONIS, supra note 604 (portraying J. FRANK as representative of the ‘radical version of legal realism’, at 
p.1370) 
607
 J. FRANK, Law and the Modern Mind, Anchor Book, 6
th 
ed., 1963 (1
st
 ed.: 1931) see notably Chapter 12 ‘The 
Judging Process and the Judge’s Personality’, pp.108-126);   J. FRANK, ‘Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through 
a Class Darkly’, (80) University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, 1931, n°2, pp.233-267 
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loosely named his personality, to form an incalculable mixture out of which comes the court order we call his 
decision’); J.C.Jr. HUTCHESON, ‘The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the ‘Hunch’ in Judicial Decision’, (14) 
Cornell Law Review, 1929, pp. 274-288 (defining the hunch as ‘that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the 
jump-spark connection between question and decision, and the point where the path is darkest for judicial feet, shed 
its light along the way, at p.278); M.RADIN, ‘The Theory of Judicial Decisions: Or How Judges Think’, (11) 
American Bar Association Journal, 1925, pp.357-362. 
608
 K.N. LLEWELLYN, The Bramble Bush: On our Law and its Study, 1930, at. p.14 (considering that legal rules 
are ultimately important  ‘so far as they help you see or predict what judges will do or so far as they help you get 
judges to do  something’ (…), they remain otherwise ‘pretty plaything’).  
609
 F. SCHAUER, Thinking like a Lawyer – a New Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Harvard University Press, 2012, 
at p.13. 
610
 U. MOORE and C.C. CALLAHAN, ‘Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control’, (43) Yale Law 
Journal, 1943 (cited in F. SCHAUER, supra note 591, at p.133. MOORE was among the first one to empirically test 
legal realist’s assumption and investigated whether parking enforcement in a city of Connecticut was primarily 
driven by legal rules or by extra legal factors such the day, type of car, street et cetera.) see also J.H. SCHLEGEL, 
‘American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Sciences: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, (29) Buffalo Law 
Review, 1980, pp.264-303). 
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 N. DUXBURY, ‘The Reinvention of American Legal Realism’, (12) Journal of Legal Studies, 1992, n°2, pp.137-
177. 
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core foundations of the American system,
612
 specifically in the 1930s during a period of tense international 
troubles.
613
 The movement was also sometimes caricatured by its opponents as an attempt to reduce the 
Law and the function of judging to what judges had for breakfast.
614
 These criticisms however failed to 
fully understand the core idea of Legal Realism.  Indeed, Legal Realists’ principal objective was to 
uncover the driving factors influencing legal decision-making as a way to increase the predictability of the 
Law.
 615
 Importantly, the movement must aslo be understood in the context of the Common Law tradition 
where judges, unlike their civil law counterparts, traditionally play prominent roles in law-making.
616
 
Investigating the human component underlying judicial decisions was therefore aimed at better 
understanding the way law was ultimately made.
617
 As original and innovative Legal Realists’ 
assumptions may appear, scholars have however considered that the novelty of their findings should not 
be overstated: similar ideas on the reality of judging had already been formulated at the end of the 
nineteenth century, simply because ‘they are plainly evident aspects of judging in Common Law systems’ 
where judges are required to be pragmatic and possess a ‘substantial degree of freedom when working 
with legal materials’.618  Furthermore, the vision of the Law as defended by Legal Realists can be viewed 
                                                          
612
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reality in the observation that the Civil Law is substantially code-centered while the Common Law continues to be 
substantially judge-centered’); on a broader scale, see J.CARBONNIER, Sociologie judidiciaire, Quadrige Manuel 
PUF, 1978 (pointing out  that it is not suprising to notice that judicial sociology developed in the United States given 
the key roles given to judges in the American society and in the Commom Law ([la sociologie judiciaire] a rencontre 
aux Etats Unis un terrain de predilection, si l’on reflechit a l’importance du juge dans la societe americaine et droits 
les droits de Common Law’, at p.41). 
617
 J. FRANK, supra note 607 (highlighting: ‘the peculiar traits, disposition, biases and habits of the particular judge 
will, then, often determine what he decides by the law’, at p.119, and further pointing out that ‘if the personality of 
the judge is the pivotal factor in law administration, then law may vary with the personality of the judge who 
happens to pass upon any given case’, at p.1200). 
618
 B.Z. TAMANAHA, ‘Understanding Legal Realism’, (87) Texas Law Review, 2009, p.731.(observing that ‘the 
standard portrait of the Legal Realists as a band of pioneering jurists shining a realistic light on judging to illuminate 
a previously darkened age advances a gross misunderstanding of our legal history’). 
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as by-product of the crisis that the American society faced in the early decades of the twentieth century.
619
 
At the same time, voices against the ‘established order’ had indeed started to mushroom in others fields of 
art and sciences.
620
 Like American muckraking journalists who investigated ‘the harsh, hidden realities of 
the American life’ by trying to reveal scandals behind official speeches,621 Legal Realists likewise 
challenged the traditional legalist approach.
622
  
      
 Legal Realism and its Legacy 
 
  
Legal Realism had long-lasting consequences on the manner Law and the judiciary were perceived. They 
notably encouraged the use of social sciences in the legal sphere.
623
 The so-called attitudinal theory 
defended by political scientists who view judges as politicians in robes deciding cases according to their 
own political views
624
 can for example be traced back to the Legal Realist movement. More crucially for 
the present research, scholars from both Europe and the United States tend to agree that the economic 
analysis has been – partly, at least - influenced by the legacy of Legal Realism.625 Therefore, as an echo to 
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 G. GILMORE, ‘Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cures’, (70) Yale Law Journal, 1961, n°7, pp.1037-1048 (noticing 
that the crisis of the American society was a mixture of several elements, such as drastic economic and social 
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an acceptable account of the law’s role in achieving a just society’). 
620
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to structure objective reality into a single determinate rationalizable order’, at p.125). 
621
 W.DE BEEN, supra note 613 (drawing a parallel between the rise of Realism in the legal field and the rise of 
‘muckraking’ investigating journalism). 
622
 C.K. ROWLEY, supra note 605 (noticing that ‘the mood of the realist was one of dissatisfaction with the notion 
that twentieth century legal thought should be dominated by a nineteenth century legal world view’ ). 
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 C.K.  ROWLEY, idem; see also:  F. SCHAUER, supra note 609, at p.144 (describing it as a Legal Realism in 
‘modern dress'). 
624
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7 (specifically Chapter 1: ‘Nine Theories of Judicial Behaviour’, pp.29-56). 
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 C. JAMIN, ‘Le rendez-vous manqué des civilistes français avec le réalisme juridique: Un exercice de lecture 
comparée’, Droits – Puf, 2010, n°51; similarly, ROWLEY observes that ‘the path towards law and economics 
undoubtedly was smoothed by the legal realist challenge to formalism that opened up American legal education to 
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ROWLEY, supra note 605, at p.12). 
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FRANK, who as early as 1931 considered that judges are human beings first and foremost,
 626
 and to 
RADIN, who already in 1925 questioned the way judges think,
627
 POSNER goes a step further in 1993 
and suggests that judges seek to maximize ‘the same thing everybody else does’.628  
 
 Legal Realism’s Limited Impact Outside the United States and Consequences for the 
Economic Analysis of the Judiciary in Europe (The French Example)   
 
 
 
Legal Realists did not manage to blossom outside the United States during the twentieth century.
629
 This 
doctrinal shift partly explains the scepticism that Continental legal scholars have maintained against 
movements further built on the legacy of Legal Realism such as the economic analysis of the Law,
630
 and 
a fortiori vis-a-vis the economics of the judiciary. Several reasons can be set forth to explain the 
permanence of the legalistic myth in Civil Law countries which traditionally defends the model of the 
dispassionate judge. Even though these insights may be transplanted to other European countries as 
well,
631
 the example of France during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries is here considered in greater details 
because of the pregnance of the legalistic myth in this country. 
Legal Realists considered that judge’s human components were decisive to understand legal decisions. 
Interestingly, thirty years before the rise of US Legal Realism, the so-called phénomène Magnaud had 
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 C. KIRCHNER,‘ The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany’, (11) International Review of Law 
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de Droit Comparé, July-September 1957, n°3, pp.528-536). 
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already revivified the issue of judicial subjectivity among French legal practitioners and scholars.
632
 The 
issue of judge’s subjectivity which could possibly lead to judicial arbitrariness had also been critical for 
several decades. As exemplified by the famous dictum still pregnant at the eve of the 1789 Revolution 
‘God save us from the equity of courts’ (Dieu nous garde de l’équité des parlements’), equity was viewed 
as a venue for judicial arbitrariness, ultimately placing judges above the Law and leaving individuals ‘at 
the mercy of the courts’.633 Reintroducing judge’s human component in judicial decisions, as Legal 
Realists did, actually reactivated historical fears vis-a-vis a subjective administration of justice.   
  
Legal Realism was in addition perceived as a source of instability.
634
 Discussion among French legal 
scholars which took place in France at the beginning of the 20
th
 century appears symptomatic of a tension 
between a willingness to encourage a new way of looking at the law and at judges on the one hand, and, a 
fear to open a Pandora’s Box creating chaos, weakening legal structures, reducing security and enhancing 
social disorder on the other.
635
 When refusing to depart from tradition, French authors were willing to 
preserve social order and concerned with a necessity of keeping the rise of judicial subjectivity under 
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du Juste’, Recueil Dalloz 1999, p.195. 
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634
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outgrowth of a subjective need for believing in a stable, approximately unalterable legal world-in effect, a child’s 
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As reported by JAMIN, the different viewpoints on the function of the law and the role of the judge defended by 
three famous legal scholars - SALEILLES, DEMOGUE and RIPERT – in the early twenty century have deeply 
influenced the French position to Legal Realism (see C.JAMIN, supra note 625).  
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close scrutiny, notably at a period time where society was experiencing drastic social evolutions such as 
the emergence of working classes.  
Furthermore, the structure of French Academia, the way law was taught, the role played by law professors 
also importantly kept the influence of social sciences away from legal reasoning.
636
 A similar conclusion 
can be made concerning Germany where the legal education system prevented the extensive use of social 
sciences in the realm of Law.
637
  Legal scholars were thus comparable to rent-seekers trying to protect the 
benefits associated with their initial investment. The progressive isolation of French law faculties from 
others departments of social sciences – notably sociology or economics - during the second half of the 
twentieth century is noteworthy. This situation limited any attempts to consider the judiciary from 
different and renewed perspectives
638
 , but privileged approaches that were mostly dictated by legal 
scholars. On a broader scale, GAROUPA considers this point as being a key explanation of the limited 
impact of the Law and Economics movement in Europe. The author compares the findings drawn from the 
economic analysis to ‘legal innovations’ and assimilates legal scholars to members of a cartel striving to 
restrict access to the ‘market for legal ideas’ to external and potentially intrusive competitors. The 
consequences of this ‘legal parochialism’, notes GAROUPA, are comparable to those traditionally 
associated with protectionist measures, and most specifically ‘an underdevelopment of new legal 
innovations [as well as] significant opportunity costs disseminated across society’.639  
Finally, KIRCHNER also suggests another explanation for the difficult reception of social sciences in 
German legal reasoning which is also of relevance when transplanted into the French context. As the 
author highlights, civil law judges - unlike their Common Law counterparts - have a secondary role in 
law-making. Since this task falls primarily on legislatures, judges principally ground their legitimacy on a 
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traditional codex of interpretation rules was not sufficient for a systemic and logical development of the legal system, 
the power of law courts and the legal education system, which in Germany is under the eminent influence of the 
judiciary, prevented the sociological approach from becoming a part of legal reasoning. It was banned to the 
periphery of the law, and in the legal education system, to the sociology of law’ (at p.284, emphasis added). 
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 M. GARCIA VILLEGAS, supra note  635. See similarly A. LEJEUNE, ‘Les Professionnels du Droit comme 
Acteurs du Politique : Revue Critique de la Littérature Nord-Américaine et Enjeux pour une Importation en Europe 
Continentale’, Sociologie du Travail, 2011, n°53, pp. 216-233. 
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 N. GAROUPA, ‘The Law & Economics of Legal Parochialism’, (10) Illinois Law Review, 2011, n°5, p.1517 
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strict application of the law. To avoid impairing their legitimacy and social status, courts have an interest 
in ‘[staying] within the boundaries of traditional legal reasoning [and] to keep their factual autonomy vis-
à-vis the legislature’. This point seems of importance to explain the behaviour of French courts since the 
judiciary is not officially recognised by the Constitution as a power, but as a mere authority.
640
 Including 
or emphasizing extra-legal arguments in judges’ decision-making would revivify criticisms and fears 
against the rise of the so-called gouvernement des juges. It may thus be in the judiciary’s self-interest to 
perpetuate the traditional legal approach which maintains its margin of manoeuvre vis-à-vis other political 
actors.   
Nowadays, renewed claims defending and urging for cross-disciplinary research on legal issues,
641
 
globalization of legal teaching and education,
642
 the increased role of the judiciary within the society –
notably in civil law countries, - as well as a quest for transparency associated with a palpable desire to 
better explain the way judges effectively take their decisions have contributed to renew the terms and the 
scope of the debate.
643
 In other words, current research tends nowadays to go beyond the legalist vision as 
a way to promote what FRANK used to call a ‘ modern mind’, that is a vision of the law freed from its 
myths.
644
 Among the alternative approaches to the judiciary, the economic perspective is a one likely to 
offer valuable insights that are worth further considering. 
 
b) From an Economic Standpoint: Judges as UFOS (Unidentified and Fuzzy Object of 
Study) 
 
From the standpoint of the economist, understanding judicial behaviours is a puzzle which requires 
overcoming several difficulties. The first problem concerns the heterogeneity existing between (horizontal 
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plus en plus large aux appreciations du juge’). See also A. LUCIEN, supra note 551 (arguing that ‘because of its 
desacralization, the abandonment of rites and decorum resulting from functionalists ambitions the search for more 
transparency and proximity, the voyeuristic eye of the media which projects the reality of the judge’s daily life and 
its weaknesses, the imaginary aspect of the institution has been mortally wounded’). 
644
 J. FRANK, supra note 607 (highlighting: a ‘modern civilisation demands a mind free of father-governance. To 
remain father-governed in adult years is peculiarly the modern sin. The modern mind is a mind free of childish 
emotional drags, a mature mind. And law, if it is to meet the needs of modern civilisation must adapt itself to the 
modern mind. It must cease to embody a philosophy opposed to change’, at p.269, emphasis added). 
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heterogeneity) and within (vertical heterogeneity) judiciaries. The second regards the institutional 
insulation characterizing judges which tend to distinguish them from other categories of workers. Finally, 
the third is associated with a palpable silence with regards to the reality of the judges’ work which may 
admittedly render the work of economists more complicated. These three difficulties (heterogeneity, 
insulation and silence) are hereafter successively discussed.  
 
 Vertical and Horizontal Heterogeneity 
 
 
The heterogeneity existing between and within judiciaries is the first challenge that economists dealing 
with the analysis of judicial behaviour must face. Undeniably, it would be erroneous to consider that the 
generic term ‘judges’ refers to a homogeneous class of individuals. Using a scalpel for the understanding 
of judicial behaviour is therefore certainly more appropriate than misleading oversimplifications.   
       
A first distinction can be made between American judges and their Continental counterparts. A majority 
of Law and Economics scholars have taken the analysis of the American judiciary as focal point. Yet, one 
should remain highly cautious when extrapolating or transplanting these findings to other systems where 
legal traditions as well as constraints on judiciaries may strongly diverge.
 645
 It is indeed commonly 
acknowledged that the idiosyncrasies and the structure of institutions strongly model and influence the 
incentives of their participants.
646
 While taking into account the inherent limits of such US-oriented 
studies, scholars have recently broadened the scope of their research by addressing the functioning of non-
American
647
 – and notably European648 - judiciaries. Crucially, unlike their American counterpart, 
Continental judiciaries are mainly composed of careerist judges who act as a part of broader 
bureaucracies. As hereafter discussed, envisioning Continental judges as career civil servants may have 
long-lasting consequences to predict judicial incentives.    
                                                          
645
 A.TSAOUSSI and E.ZERVOGIANNI, ‘Judges as Satisficers: a Law & Economics Perspective on Judicial 
Liability’, (29) European Journal of Law & Economics, 2010, pp.333-357 (observing: ‘ultimately the legal cultures 
that have grown up out of the different legal evolution processes make it quite difficult, if not impossible to propose 
a unifying model that will apply for both sides of the Atlantic’). 
646
See for instance H.A. SIMON, supra note 574;  G. LEVIT, ‘Careerist Judges and The Appeal Process’, (36) Rand 
Journal of Economics, 2005, n°2, pp.275-297. 
647
 J.M. RAMSEYER, ‘Talent Matters: Judicial Productivity and Speed in Japan’, (32) International Review of Law 
& Economics, 2012, pp.38-48. 
648
 M.R. SCHNEIDER, ‘Judicial Career Incentives and Court Performance: An Empirical Study of the German 
Labour Courts of Appeal, (20) European Journal of Law & Economics, 2005, pp.127-144; C. BOURREAU-
DUBOIS, M. DORIAT-DUBAN and J.-C. RAY, ‘Child Support Order: How Do Judges Decide Without 
Guidelines? Evidence from France’, European Journal of Law & Economics, 2012; A.TSAOUSSI and 
E.ZERVOGIANNI, supra note 645. 
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Differences within judiciaries also matter.  The American literature has abundantly focused on appellate 
and Supreme Court judges.
649
 Research has additionally addressed the idiosyncrasies of peculiar groups 
within the judiciary, such as for instance the case of federal judges with a senior status whose 
responsibilities and duties differ from the ones endorsed by their younger active colleagues.
650
 In the 
European framework where judges are usually considered as being more specialised than their American 
counterparts,
651
 research has focused on specialised areas of adjudication, such as for instance labour or 
family law. Furthermore, divergences in terms of workload are likely to be highly significant between 
First Instance, Appellate and Supreme Courts judges.
652
 The perspective of being reversed by a court of 
appeal is important to understanding the behaviour of First Instance judges, but remains secondary 
concerning Appellate judges, and is simply inexistent with regards to Supreme Court (Court of Cassation) 
judges
653
 who – when dealing with cases that are likely to arise greater public emotion - may rather be 
willing to ‘promote a coherent judicial philosophy’.654 Attempts to consider the different range of 
constraints influencing judges’ behaviour have led scholars to apply the principal-agent structure to the 
judicial hierarchy, and consequently to view the Supreme Court as a principal dictating policies to lower 
courts which are, in turn, agents in charge of their implementation.
655
     
In brief, judges face different constraints depending on their position on the judicial ladder.
656
   Hence, as 
suggested by BAUM, ‘models built on the assumption that all judges want the same thing are highly 
questionable’.657 
                                                          
649
 R.A. POSNER, The Federal Courts - Challenge and Reforms, Harvard University Press, 1999, 430 p. 
650
 A. YOON, ‘Senior Federal Judges and The Political Economy of Judicial Tenure’, (501) Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies, 2005. 
651
 R.A.  POSNER, supra note 7. 
652
 R.A. POSNER, Idem (noticing that Supreme Court justices have a lighter workload that lower court judges); C. 
FILLON, M. BONINCHI,A. LECOMPTE, Devenir Juge – Mode de Recrutement et Crise des Vocations de 1830 à 
nos jours, Droit & Justice PUF, Paris, 2008, p.230 (reporting that in France judicial workload varies considerably 
accross judges: ‘très forte dans beaucoup de tribunaux et notamment dans les fonctions du Parquet, elle s’amenuise 
fortement dans la plupart des juridictions du second degré, et se révèle extrêmement faible a la Cour d’appel de Paris 
ou les magistrats sont fortement sous-employés et parfois proche de la pré-retraite’ ). 
653
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 628. 
654
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7, at p.51. 
655
 D.R. SONGER, J.A. SEGAL, C.M. CAMERON, ‘The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of 
Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions’, (38) American Journal of Political Sciences, 1994, pp. 673-696; for a 
critical point of view concerning the use of the principal-agent theory applied to the judicial hierarchy see: P.T.KIM, 
‘Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy’, (105) Northwestern University Law Review, , 
n°2,2011, pp.505-535; L.EPSTEIN and T.JACOBI, ‘The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions’, (6) Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science, 2010, pp.341-358. 
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 S.J. CHOI, M. GULATI and E.A. POSNER,‘What do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, 
Citations and Reversals’, (28) Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 2012, n°3. 
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 Insulation 
 
 
 
The insulation which characterizes judicial work is the second difficulty that economists must overcome. 
As a general rule, economists assume that individuals respond to incentives. Behaviour can therefore 
usually be influenced through the use of sticks and carrots. Concerning judges however, the situation is 
different since these latter are institutionally insulated from any source of incentives.
658
 Insights from Law 
and Economics in developing countries have indeed highlighted the value of insulated judiciaries from a 
social welfare perspective.
659
 Like Ulysses who - tied to the mast – did not succumbed to the Sirens’ 
voices which diverted his vessel towards rocky coasts, insulated and independent judges should be less 
likely to be concerned by corruption, favouritism or any forms of conflict of interest. An independent 
judiciary is therefore a priceless ‘social and economic good’ for society.660 Obviously, from the standpoint 
of economists, the flipside of this situation remains a remarkable difficulty to explain judicial behaviour in 
economic terms,
661
 and, as pointed out by POSNER, a subsequent risk of seeing the analysis a priori 
‘blocked at [its] threshold’.662 The desire to shed some light on the judicial black box has led Law and 
Economics scholars to assume that judges are ‘all-too-human workers, responding as other workers do to 
the conditions of the labour markets in which they work’.663 Yet, if they are indeed regarded as simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
657
 L. BAUM, ‘Motivation and Judicial Behaviour: Expanding the Scope of Inquiry’, in: D. KLEIN and G. 
MITCHELL (ed.), The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.3-25. 
658
 T.J. MICELI and M.M. COSGEL, ‘Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making’, (23) Journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organization, 1994, pp.31-51 (observing ‘the difficulty that economists have had in developing 
satisfactory models of judicial behaviour apparently stems from the absence of a well-defined objectives function 
that self-interested can be viewed as maximizing’). 
659
 E. BUSCAGLIA and W.E. RATLIFF,   Law and Economics in Developing Countries, Hoover Institution Press, 
2000, 126 p., See also: E. GLAESER, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’, (41) American Journal of Economic 
Literature, 2003, pp.401-425 (focusing on the situation in 19
th
 century United States and observing that ‘it is often 
argued that the distortion of justice through legal and illegal forms of influence decided many cases and had a broad 
influence on the nineteenth-century economy. Courts often failed to address the grievances of the parties damaged in 
the new economy, such as workers suffering from accidents, producers suffering from abusive tactics by the 
railroads, or consumers poisoned by bad food, and ruled in favour of large corporations’). 
660
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7, at p.580 (observing: ‘not only is an independent judiciary a considerable social and 
economic good (…), but it is recognized as such by the dominant groups in our society. And it is not merely a diffuse 
social and economic value’). 
661
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 628 (highlighting: ‘the whole thrust of the rules governing the compensation (…) and 
conditions of judicial employment is to divorce judicial action from incentives, to take away the carrots and the 
sticks, the different benefit and costs associated with different behaviours, that [usually] determines human action in 
an economic model’). 
662
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7, at p.38. 
663
 Idem (see Chapter 2 ‘The Judge as Labor-Market Participant’).  
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workers, they obviously remain workers of a different kind,
 664
 rendering thus necessary the use of the 
wide range of available self-interested variables to explain judicial behaviour.   
 
 Silence 
 
 
Silence within the legal profession on the reality of the judge’s daily work is potentially another challenge 
that researchers could face when dealing with judicial behaviour. As SCHAUER humorously indicated, 
‘[raising] the topic of judicial self-interest in the company of judges is something like raising the topic of 
steak tartare at a convention of vegetarians’.665 Undeniably, judges – as every human being – are reluctant 
to publicly address issues such as judges’ concerns for their reputation.666 Additionally and at that time 
suggested by Legal Realists, the flexibility of the law and the use of legal standards offer judges easy way-
out for dissimulating their own preferences behind virtually any legal decisions.
 667
 Since the law is 
polymorphic – in the sense that it can indeed justify everything as long as it respects a given methodology-
, it remains highly difficult to know what, in the judge’s decision, is effectively due to his own 
preferences. As FRANK expressed it, rules and principles ‘may be the formal clothes in which [the judge] 
dresses up his thoughts’.668  From the viewpoint of economists, the facts that judges may not be 
willing to talk freely about their incentives or that the law may virtually justify any decision are not per se 
insurmountable obstacles. Indeed, as BECKER indicated, the economic approach to human behaviour 
does neither necessarily imply that individuals consciously seek to maximize the arguments of their utility 
functions, nor that they have to justify the underlying reasons of their behaviour.
669
 As suggested by 
                                                          
664
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7 (observing: ‘the judicial utility function is missing many arguments of usual 
workers’). 
665
 F. SCHAUER, ‘Incentives, Reputation and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behaviour’, (68) University of 
Cincinnati Law Review, 2000, n°3, p.615. 
666
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7 (reporting that ‘judges, like other refined people in our society, are reticent (…) 
about talking about judging, especially talking frankly about it, whether to their colleagues or to a larger professional 
audience’, at p.6); see also D.R. STRAS, supra note 545 (arguing: ‘’justices have an incentive to make the process 
appear as impartial as possible to bolster the court’s legitimacy and their own standing in the legal community)’; J. 
FRANK, supra note 607 (highlighting that the opinions of the courts are ‘worded as if correct decisions were arrived 
at by logical deduction from a precise and pre-existing body of legal rules. Seldom do judges disclose any contingent 
elements in their reasoning, any doubts or lack or whole-hearted conviction. The judicial vocabulary contains few 
phrases expressive of uncertainty’,at p.90). 
667
 F. SCHAUER, supra note 609 (claiming: ‘for the Realist challenge to be a genuine challenge, it needed to insist 
that legal doctrine was not nearly as constraining as the traditionalists believed, and that doctrinal justifications for 
virtually any outcome that a judge wanted to reach for virtually any reason could be supported by traditional legal 
sources’, at p.135). 
668
 J .FRANK, supra note 607, at p. 141. 
669
 G.S. BECKER supra note 549 (highlighting: ‘the economic approach does not assume that decision units are 
necessarily conscious of their efforts to maximize or can verbalize or otherwise describe in an informative way 
reasons for the systematic patterns in their behaviour’, at p.7). 
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DEMERGUE on a broader scale, ‘influences may be suffered or desired, declared or unspoken, assumed 
or denied’.670 From a methodological perspective, focusing solely on the elements that individuals are 
eager to acknowledge is consequently insufficient. 
 
c) Utility Maximizing Judges and Arguments of the Judicial Utility Function 
 
In a recent novel, a French writer portrayed the motivations of one of his key protagonist – a French first 
instance judge – in the following terms: ‘when explaining his profession, [he] mentions three topics. 
Although he likes the idea of defending widows and orphans, he was also drawn to saying what was true 
in rendering justice. He wanted to change society, but also to arrive at a more comfortable place for 
himself; without having to worry about making his fortune, being able to maintain an upper class lifestyle; 
finally, when judging, he exerted a power. Even though he had not quite a taste of power, he showed at 
least an appetite for power’.671 Interestingly, while reflecting concerns for power, pecuniary income or 
respect toward the judiciary as an institution, these words echo some of the arguments of the judicial 
utility function as notably set out by COOTER in 1983,
672
 and then by POSNER in his 1993 seminal and 
provocative paper.
673
  
POSNER claimed that the American federal appellate judges’ utility was a function of – notably - leisure 
(understood as a desire to decrease workload), pecuniary income, reputation, popularity and prestige. 
These arguments are hereafter discussed since they may importantly matter when transplanted to the field 
of mass litigation. A key assumption induced by the model of utility maximizing judges is that the judicial 
decisions may ultimately be influenced by determinants that are likely to affect the judge’s own utility674. 
Obviously – as it was also said for lawyers - different judges may weigh these arguments in different 
ways.   
 
                                                          
670
 M. DEMERGUE, supra note 556 (in French : ‘l’influence peut etre aussi consciente ou inconsciente, subie ou 
voulue, avouée ou inavouée, assumée ou reniée’ at p.372). 
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 E.CARRERE, D‘autres vies que la mienne, Pol éditeur, 2009, at p.129 (Translation from the author. In French : 
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qu’il a, sinon le gout du pouvoir, du gout pour le pouvoir’). 
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 R. COOTER, supra note 154. 
673
 R.A.POSNER, supra note 628. 
674
 D.R.STRAS, supra note 545. 
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 Pecuniary Income 
 
 
Admittedly, a first argument of the judicial utility function could be the financial incentive. There are 
however reasons to believe that money is not the key determinant of judicial behaviour. First, Common 
Law judges are often former lawyers who have decided to quit the Bar to join the Bench. This decision 
entails opportunity costs in the form of salary decreases since they could have earned more from private 
practice.
 675
 Similarly, in Civil Law countries where judges are – for a vast majority – appointed after a 
public competition occurring at the end of their legal education, financial reward is not the principal 
motivation. As suggested by Justice TRUCHE, ‘In France, those who choose this professional path (…) 
can know with accuracy what will be their financial resources for the coming years. These resources are 
enough to cover their needs. Money is not the reason for their choices’.676  Furthermore, they are 
forbidden from taking financial profit from judging and are not allowed to decide cases in which they have 
possible monetary interests. Leaving thus aside financial compensation, Law and Economics scholars 
usually consider that judges are less likely to work as hard as other legal practitioners.
677
     
    
A relevant question therefore turns out to be whether an increase in judicial wages can indeed motivate 
judges to exert harder efforts. Interestingly, recent research has cast some doubts on the positive effect 
associated with higher judicial salaries. Contrary to a common belief, CHOI, GULATI and POSNER have 
argued that an increase in judicial salaries would probably not induce judges to exert greater effort and, 
consequently, may not contribute to an increase in the quality of courts’ outputs. This situation can be 
explained by an adverse selection problem: higher salaries will attract people who would be both good and 
bad judges. Moreover, because of a lack of third-party monitoring, independent judges cannot be punished 
if they failed to exert the required level of effort.
678
 Going a step further, the idea of motivating judges 
with pecuniary incentives appears nowadays particularly interesting at a time when many European 
countries have implemented (or have discussed the implementation) of mechanisms inspired from private 
management as a manner to enhance the efficiency of their court system.
 679
 For instance, a system of 
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 R.COOTER, supra note 154 (observing: ‘becoming a federal judge usually involves an economic sacrifice, so the 
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Law Review, 2007, n°2.  
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bonuses and premiums aimed at rewarding judges for ‘their contribution to the good functioning of the 
judiciary’ has been implemented in France in 2003.680 Viewed as a performance bonus, this initiative is 
widely and harshly criticized within the French judiciary. Judges indeed tend to consider that judicial 
quality is sacrificed upon the altar of quantity and efficiency.
681
 Interestingly, the Law and Economics 
literature is similarly reluctant to the use of performance criteria since many aspects of the judge’s 
decision can neither be quantified nor easily observable. POSNER considers for instance that ‘it would be 
premature to embrace performance measures as a method of incentivizing or constraining judges. It would 
be downright absurd to suggest (…) that they should be used as the basis for awarding bonuses to judges 
who score well on them’. 682  Additionally, GAROUPA and GINSBURG have suggested that – even 
though ideally it could be desirable to reward judges on the basis of their individual contribution to the 
functioning of justice - initiatives aimed at valorising judges’ individual marginal output might 
nonetheless contribute to impair the collective output of courts. Rational maximizing and rent-seeking 
judges may indeed be tempted to invest more time and effort to pursue their individual interests by – for 
instance – expediting and privileging easier cases and spending less time on harder cases.683 Relatedly, an 
attempt to evaluate judges’ work on a basis of a list of fixed criteria may induce a risk of seeing judges 
trying to score high on those criteria while potentially neglecting other criteria which may not appear on 
the list. As a matter of fact, no unanimity has been found on this question yet. As a reply to the Spanish 
Supreme Court which – in its decision on a mechanism linking judges’ salaries to their individual 
productivity – ruled that the use of output measures may have a negative effect on the economic 
independence of the judiciary,
684
 a 2013 ruling of the French State Council (Conseil d’Etat) on the 
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 Article 3, décret n.2003-1284, 26 December 2003, relative au regime indemnitaire de certains magistrats de 
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 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7, pp.150-151. 
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of Comparative Law, 2010, pp.226-254. 
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 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo contencioso administrativo, 2004 (cited by F. CONTINI and R. MOHR, supra note 
679). 
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contrary held that the mechanism of premium and bonuses does not adversely impact the independence of 
the judiciary
685
. 
 
 Reducing Workload: the Controversial Argument  
 
 
 
A second argument usually included into the judicial utility function is the judge’s concern for decreasing 
his workload. 
686
 More specifically, the literature here often refers to the term ‘leisure’.687 The use of this 
term is however misleading and somehow problematic. Given the potential heavy workload that judges 
must face daily, there are reasons to believe that they have not chosen this professional path to become 
individuals solely maximizing their free-time.
688
  The literature however suggests that judges are likely to 
use a wide range of  tools  ‘for ducking issues presented by the parties to appeal’ and to ultimately avoid 
‘the hassles involved in arduous and political issues’.689  
In their empirical research conducted with Israeli courts, BEENSTOCK and HAITOVSKY observe for 
instance that an increase in the appointment of new judges induces incumbent judges who benefit from 
less case pressure to lower their level of exerted effort.
690
  Going a step further and building his theory on 
the assumption that judges may ultimately seek to reduce their workload, MACEY suggests that American 
procedural rules are shaped by judges’ self-interest and are principally aimed at increasing judges’ control 
over their agenda.
691
 The author therefore considers that judges are more likely to maximize the use of 
their generic procedural skills - for which they already have a high level of expertise - rather than to bear 
the costs of acquiring specific substantial skills when dealing with sophisticated issues of law.  The 
growing proceduralization of substantive areas of law - such as notably securities or company law - would 
thus reflect judges’ preferences for the use of generic skills that they can more easily master with lower 
efforts. As suggested by the author, this focus on the form rather than on the substance would 
                                                          
685
 Conseil d’Etat, 6e sous-section, Decision n° 353035, Inédit Recueil Lebon, 1 March 2013 
686
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687
 R.A. POSNER, supra note 7. 
688
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 M. BEENSTOCK and Y. HAITOVSKY, ‘Does the Appointment of Judges Increase the Output of the 
Judiciary’,(24) International Review of Law & Economics , 2004, pp.351-369 
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 J.R. MACEY, supra note 689. 
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unsurprisingly be problematic since – following this path of reasoning – judges could easily be misled by 
stakeholders’ strategies or decisions which merely have ‘an appearance of fairness’.692 
 
 Career Concerns  
 
 
A third argument of the judicial utility function concerns the perspectives of promotion and advancement 
within the judiciary, hereafter referred to as career concerns. Remarkably, promotion is likely to be a 
significant incentive for Continental judges, as opposed to their Common Law counterparts most of the 
time recruited after a first and significant professional experience.
693
Civil Law judges indeed usually start 
their career at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder. GUARNIERI and PEDERZOLI compare European 
judiciaries to pyramid-like organizational structure where judges’ promotion is mostly a function of two 
variables, seniority and performance.
694
  In the same vein, SCHNEIDER observes that the structure of 
Civil Law judiciaries could usefully be envisaged as ‘internal labour market’ where judges compete to 
reach higher positions.
695
 This being said, the perspective of promotion is also relevant for Common Law 
judiciaries where advancement remains mostly the result of the political process
696
. Interestingly, this 
approach tends ultimately to assimilate continental judges to employees hired by big companies
697
 or to 
civil servants working in administrations.
698
 Crucially, an agent with career concerns will actively seek to 
signal to his hierarchy his high ability to perform his tasks efficiently.
699
  Concerning the judiciary 
however, signalling remains an uneasy task. First, the final judicial output cannot per se be assessed as 
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  R.A. POSNER, supra note 7, at p.130. 
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699
 C. GUARNIERI and P. PEDERZOLI, supra note 694 (highlighting: ‘hierarchical superiors play a fundamentally 
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being simply ‘true’ or ‘false’ from the standpoint of an external observer.700  POSNER hence considers 
that European career judges are likely to be more legalists – or in other words, may more frequently stick 
to the law - than their American counterparts since a strict interpretation of statutes can be used as a 
possible indicator to evaluate the correctness of their decisions.
701
 Second, since judges may eventually sit 
in panels, it is difficult to distinguish the marginal contribution of each single judge. The signal sent by a 
careerist judge is therefore likely to be diluted within the final decision ultimately taken in accordance 
with the opinion of other judges who do not necessarily share the same career concerns. This last point is 
amplified by the non-existence of dissents in European judiciaries in which judges can expose their 
diverging points of view. In order to overcome these difficulties, researchers have regarded the appeal 
process as a manner to ultimately evaluate the way judges have reached their decisions.
702
 The perspective 
of being overturned by a higher court can therefore be seen as a disutility from the judges’ perspective 
since a reversal may ultimately contribute to slow down judge’s advancement. Finally, others have 
suggested the organization of a ‘tournament of judges’ as an objective way to appoint justices at upper 
levels of the judicial hierarchy, while ultimately inducing them to exert higher effort.
703
    
Empirical research tends to support judges’ concerns for their career and promotion and substantiate the 
idea that this peculiar incentive can usefully be manipulated by public officials to enhance courts’ 
performance. From the analysis of US Federal Antitrust sentencing between 1955 and 1980, COHEN for 
instance observes that the variance of the collected results can ultimately be explained by judges’ career 
concerns. Noticing indeed the continuous complaints formulated by politicians against the low amount of 
fines sentenced by judges, COHEN assumes that it is politically coherent for a judge seeking career 
advancement to impose harsher sentences.
 704
 Focusing on Japan, a Civil Law country, RASMEYER and 
RASMUSSEN notably report Japanese judges’ strong preferences for posts based in big cities such as 
Tokyo and suggest that politicians tend to manipulate judges’ career concerns by mostly favouring to 
upper position those judges who are the most productive.
705
 Ultimately, SCHNEIDER observes from the 
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analysis of data drawn from nine German Labour courts of appeal that judges’ career concerns and 
qualifications are likely to influence the court productivity.
706
 
  
 Reputation and Prestige  
 
 
While facing the puzzle of judges’ incentives, COOTER already suggested in 1983 that, ‘in the absence of 
a compelling alternative’, a quest for prestige and good reputation could be envisaged as a strong 
determinant of judicial behaviours.
707
 Going then a step further, GAROUPA and GINSBURG have 
suggested that the issue of reputation should be perceived from two different perspectives.
708
 The first 
focuses on the reputation of judges taken individually. Prestige is here envisaged as an instrumental 
mechanism by which individuals can express their high professional skills and performance. Prestige and 
good reputation are therefore primarily sources of non-monetary payoffs including personal satisfaction, 
self-esteem, deference from their peers, notoriety and/or influence on other judges or policy-makers. As in 
every occupation, individuals usually prefer to be recognized and praised for the quality of their work. As 
SMITH already pointed out in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, ‘we desire both to be respectable and to be 
respected [,] we dread both to be contemptible and to be contemned’ and, as a logic consequence, ‘to 
deserve, to acquire and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind are the great objects of ambition 
and emulation’.709 This non-monetary payoff may also turn out to be financial, notably at a time where – 
as previously explained–bonus or premium tend to be awarded on the basis of the judge’s own 
performance.  The second perspective regards the collective dimension of reputation, understood as a 
manner to convey information about the quality of the judiciary, this time envisaged as a whole. 
Depending on the subsequent structure of the judiciary, individual and/or collective reputation may be 
accentuated.  
In Common Law countries – and specifically in the American system - where judges notably sign their 
opinion and personally express their own views, individual reputation and opinion matter greatly and 
become a hallmark or signature for each individual judge. This observation has led some American 
scholars to propose methods aimed at measuring and evaluating the degree of prestige of individual 
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judges.
710
 On the contrary, in Civil Law systems, judge’s personal performance appears secondary and 
steps back in front of the performance of the court as a whole. From the public’s standpoint, a prestigious 
judge is therefore more likely to be recognized as such in Common Law countries than it is the case for 
their Civil Law counterparts. This being said, the dichotomy between careerists and bureaucratic Civil 
Law judiciaries mainly focusing on collective reputation, and Common Law judiciaries mainly focusing 
on individual reputation is misleading.  Individual reputation is also a strong incentive within civil law 
judiciaries. A major difference remains however the reference group from which the judge’s reputation 
and prestige are ultimately assessed. As pointed out by GUARNIERI and PEDERZOLI, in Civil Law 
countries, this reference group is mostly located within the judiciary itself.
711
Even though Civil Law 
judges often remain relatively unknown to the public’s eye, they may however be strongly incentivized to 
seek prestige among their peers, which means within their judiciary and the legal profession. Ultimately, if 
prestige and reputation are indeed arguments of the judicial utility function, one can rather safely predict 
that – as previously suggested regarding careerist judges – the perspective of being reversed by a higher 
court is a source of disutility since it cast some doubt on the judge’s performance to interpret and apply the 
law correctly. 
 
 ‘Playing the Judicial Game’ (Enjoying the Art of Judging) 
 
 
A fifth argument of the judicial utility function regards what POSNER refers to as judges’ taste for the 
‘judicial game’712. The act of judging is indeed ‘bound up with compliance with certain self-limiting rules 
that define the game of judging’. These rules encompass for instance efforts to consider litigants’ claims 
from an external and detached standpoint or to challenge the decisions that judges may a priori hold on a 
particular matter or issue.  Interestingly, considering the act of judging as a game has also been used by 
GARAPON who – while describing the ‘judicial ritual’ - suggests that ‘unlike a doctor or a CEO, a judge 
only adjudicates in peculiar and well-determined circumstances, within a courtroom and after a 
confrontation of arguments regulated by the rules of procedure (…)’, [he] decides the ‘rules of the game, 
fixes the objectives and names the protagonists’.713 The act of judging takes place in a highly codified 
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environment which notably contributes to the prestige and the particularities of the institution. One can 
therefore assume that attempts to disregard or to cheat with these rules is likely to be a source of disutility 
for judges, exactly – following POSNERS’s image - as cheating at chess ultimately reduces the pleasure 
of the chess amateur.
714
 
 
 The Challenging Question of Altruistic Incentives  
 
 
Altruistic motivations are problematic from the standpoint of rational choice theory. While questioning 
whether public interest should for instance be included in the judicial utility function, POSNER finally 
decides to discard this argument by considering it as ‘inconsistent’ with the view of judges behaving as 
ordinary human beings.
715
 There is indeed a palpable discomfort among rational choice theorists with 
regards to blurry notions such as fairness, justice or altruism which do not seem to perfectly fit the 
canonical assumption of the self-interested man.
716
 A possible – and often-used – way-out to this problem 
is to consider that judges behave altruistically as long as doing so contributes to maximizing the 
arguments of their own utility function, such as career concerns, reputation, self-esteem or prestige. 
Altruism would thus be nothing more than a mere disguised self-interest. This being said, one cannot 
ignore well-known evidence from experimental economics which has highlighted that individuals may 
effectively depart from the self-interested assumption – although at personal cost - in order to potentially 
act in the interest of others.
717
 Criticizing the individualistic approach of the judiciary defended by 
POSNER, some scholars have shifted from the posnerian approach, and propose different models where 
the emphasis is less on the personal motives of judges but rather on their interdependence and conformity 
with their peers and within the profession.
718
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 Judial Taste for Public Service 
 
Finally, even though subject to possible controversies, it is here firmly believed that taste for public 
service is also an argument that should be included in the judicial utility function. Insights from 
organization theory help support this claim. Public service is envisioned as a crucial organizational 
objective pursued by the judiciary and it can be assumed that judges – as agents of the judiciary – are 
eager to contribute to its good functioning. As importantly highlighted by SIMON, ‘all of us who are 
employees of organizations are governed in our actions not only by our immediate personal gain but (to an 
important extent) by an intent to contribute to the accomplishment of the goals of the organization’.719 The 
organization’s objective (in this case, public service) is therefore also an indirect personal objective that 
judges may want to achieve. The judges’ taste for public service does not appear to be contradictory with 
the Homo Economicus’ self-interested assumption. Conversely however, denying the existence of such an 
argument within the judicial utility function is likely to undermine judiciaries’ rationale. Indeed, as again 
pertinently suggested by SIMON, ‘it is only possible for organizations to operate successfully if, for much 
of the time, most of their employees, when dealing with problems and making decisions, are thinking not 
just of their own personal goals but of the goals of the organization. Whatever their ultimate motivations, 
organizational goals must bulk large in employees’ and managers’ thinking about what is to be done’.720 
To conclude – and again without denying that views may differ on this issue - it is here believed and 
assumed that a taste for public service is an argument of the judicial utility function that cannot and should 
not be neglected for a sound understanding of judicial incentives. 
 
4.3.3. Preliminary Conclusion   
 
These first developments were aimed at picturing, on a larger scale, the arguments of the judicial utility 
function by taking into account the idiosyncrasies specific to Continental and American judiciaries. On 
this occasion, it was pointed out that many arguments of the utility function of insulated judges 
(reputation, prestige, workload or career concerns) are likely to be mostly non-pecuniary and may diverge 
according to the status of judges within the judicial hierarchy. Furthermore, unlike the traditional 
posnerian approach, judges’ taste for public service was also perceived as being fully part of the judicial 
utility function. Finally, this first part suggested that differences between American and Continental 
judiciaries also have economic implications. Agency costs or free-riding are likely to be higher in 
                                                          
719
 H. A. SIMON, supra note 574, at p.21. 
720
 Idem, at p.15 and at p.21. 
 154 
 
Continental judiciaries where anonymous rational utility maximizing judges sit in panels, and may 
ultimately remain unconstraint behind their formalist legal decisions.
721
      
The analysis is now narrowed down to the peculiar field of mass litigation. In doing so, it is assumed that 
judges’ preferences remain constant: 722 judges dealing with mass claims are fully part of the judiciary. 
Their incentives can therefore be viewed as similar to those of their colleagues handling individual 
litigation. However, a crucial variable is the mass context which may potentially exacerbate –or on the 
contrary depreciate - some of the judges’ incentives that have been previously identified.  
 
         * 
 
 
4.3. ECONOMICS OF JUDGES INVOLVED IN MASS LITIGATION  
 
In many situations, decisions taken by insulated judges can be regarded as ‘low-cost decisions’: while 
having an effect on litigants, they induce neither direct nor personal costs on judges.
 723
 In the field of 
mass disputes, this assumption is however questionable: choices that judges make on such circumstances 
have direct and long-lasting consequences on their well-being. The decision to define a group broadly, to 
control the adequate and effective communication between class representatives and plaintiffs, to convey 
information to parties or to spend time scrutinizing individual claims rather than to focus on the group as a 
whole drastically increase their workload and their administrative burden. In other words, when managing 
mass claims, judges are nothing other than agents dealing with competing costly alternatives.
724
 Assuming 
that they behave as rational actors maximizing their individual utility, they reach their decisions after a 
cost-benefit analysis, and ultimately choose the option that yields them the highest personal reward at the 
lowest cost. The economic literature suggests that such situations can lead to agency problems where the 
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interests of rational judges pursuing their own agenda are ultimately not fully aligned with the interests of 
policymakers or with the one of parties.
725
  
Costs and benefits of mass disputes from the judges’ perspective are first discussed. Mass claims can 
indeed negatively or positively affect judicial well-being (4.3.1). Interestingly, the use of standards to 
regulate judicial monitoring of mass claims gives them leeway to express their own preferences (4.3.2).  
Judges may therefore be rationally tempted to follow three patterns of behaviour, namely behaving as 
gurus, as followers and/or as opportunistic managers. These different attitudes have important 
consequences on the outcomes of mass disputes (4.3.3). Empirical evidence drawn from the American 
experience tends to substantiate these views (4.3.4). 
 
4.3.1.  Costs and Benefits of Mass Litigation from the Judges’ Perspective  
  
One may a priori wonder whether, from a judicial perspective, mass litigation is truly different from 
individual litigation. As an American judge involved in several mass claims has highlighted,  ‘what 
renders a mass tort case different is the degree to which all participants – judges, lawyers, and litigants – 
must deal with the case as an institutional problem with sociological implications extending far beyond the 
narrow confines of the courtroom’.726  In this view, managing mass disputes induces costs (a) and benefits 
(b) which may alter judicial incentives.  
 
 
 
a) Costs Associated with the Management of Mass Disputes  
 
 
 The Number of  Parties  
 
The number of parties is an amplifying factor which has long-lasting implications on judges’ workloads 
and administrative burden.
727
 The larger the number of plaintiffs is, the lengthier and harder the lawyers’ 
detailed background of facts.
728
   Difficulties may also be stressed with regards to the process of 
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identification and notification when targeting many plaintiffs. As experienced by judge WEINSTEIN, 
‘when the courts deal with so many people, the expense of one-to-one contact can be substantial. Even a 
single direct mailing, putting aside the cost of production of document is great’. 729 As suggested in the 
preceding chapter, judges dealing with mass claims should adopt pragmatic approaches to deal with 
numerous claimants. The previously-mentioned international WCAMs which involved parties outside the 
Netherlands have shown that the process of notification to plaintiffs located in different countries could be 
cost-intensive and burdensome. 
 
 The Complexity of Legal Issues  
 
 
The complexity of legal issues and legal matters that are in play in mass disputes can also be costly from a 
judicial perspective. As SELVIN and PETERSON have expressed it, ‘in the context of mass litigation, 
issues such as choice of law, statutes of limitation, defences, punitive damages or causation can be 
exceptionally difficult. Court’s attempts to decide these complicated issues entail risks of criticisms and a 
risk of reversal’.730 As evidenced by the Dutch experience in the Converium WCAM, mass claims can also 
imply many transnational difficulties, and thus challenging questions of private international law.
731
 
Moreover, in complicated tort settings (e.g. toxic torts or defective products) questions regarding 
negligence, defect or causation will demand hard intellectual work. As illustrated by judge WEINSTEIN, 
on such occasions, ‘[judges] do not deal with pure economic reasonable person models. [They] deal with 
complex sociological, scientific, and psychological problems as well as economics’.732 Obviously, this 
substantial complexity ultimately depends on the intrinsic nature of the case that judges will have to 
manage. It is therefore difficult to draw a general statement on this point. However, even though it 
remains unclear whether mass disputes tend to induce more complex questions of law when compared to 
individual litigation, empirical evidence has nonetheless already pointed out the judges’ difficulties and 
limits when dealing with highly technical issues.
733
 By extension, it can be assumed that judges may for 
instance lack competences and erroneously assess the terms of a final settlement concluded between the 
parties, and consequently behave as ‘bulls in porcelain shops’.734 On a broader level, a difficulty for judges 
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indeed consists in correctly channelling large flows of money. As suggested by RESNIK, ‘by authorizing 
or presiding over aggregate litigation, judges [indeed] become allocators and purchasers of legal 
services’.735 
 
 Public exposure 
  
Public exposure can induce reputational costs. On the one hand, mass claims are likely to greatly attract 
media and public attention. An increase in judges’ public exposure may increase their risk-aversion. Their 
errors or lack of control can indeed have considerable consequences for litigants. As highlighted by 
RESNIK, ‘given the high degree of visibility of mass torts (…), judges should be particularly careful that 
their own image not be tarnished, either by criticisms that judges have not paid attention to how money 
has been distributed under their aegis or that through such distributions judges have created patronages 
systems’.736 Undeniably, potential costs induced by a higher public exposure may conversely turn out to 
be a benefit from the viewpoint of judges eager to develop their prestige or their reputation among their 
peers or vis-à-vis the legal profession. This issue ultimately hinges on the personality of the judge. Yet, a 
possible weakness of this observation is that it assumes that media and public are perfectly able to detect 
ex post judges’ errors. In many ways, this assumption appears questionable. As pointing out by KONIAK 
and COHEN while commenting on the American class action, ‘individual judges have little reason to 
expect negative reputational effect from approving bad class deals’.737 First, the authors observe that the 
complexity and length of documents render a comprehensive understanding of the case details highly 
difficult to laymen. A possible objection to this argument is to consider that laymen – regardless of the 
complexity of the case – may nonetheless have an opinion. Albeit possibly incorrect or incomplete, 
judges’ views may have long-lasting reputation effects. Second, the authors highlight that lawyers – and 
more rarely judges – are more likely to be viewed as scapegoats or to be held responsible for bad mass 
settlements.
738
 Third and relatedly, they also observe that attempts aimed at ‘criticizing judges for self-
interested behaviours (…) [are most of the time] considered by many to be as profane as accusing the 
Pope of a lecherous eye, a charge well-nigh outside the bounds of civilized discourse’.739 The authors 
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conclude that judges aware of such an information gap are ultimately incentivized to take advantage of 
this situation at only low personal risks.
740
  
 
 Lack of Information 
   
Access to information may also be costly from judges’ standpoint. To illustrate this point, one may go 
back to FULLER and WINSTON’s contribution which, in the seventies, highlighted the limits of 
adjudication in polycentric cases.
741
 They defined polycentric cases as ‘many centered’ situations where 
there are ‘interacting points of influence’. Mass claims nowadays fit in the category of polycentric 
cases.
742
 A key problem associated with polycentric cases, the authors argued, is that all affected parties 
cannot take part to discussions to express their opinions and ultimately be heard. The adjudicator therefore 
lacks information and has no clear views about the repercussions of his decisions.
743
 Furthermore, unlike 
lawyers or representative association which may have direct contact with several plaintiffs, the judge’s 
role is plagued by informational asymmetries.
744
 This situation is problematic since, as judge 
WEINSTEIN draws from his own experience, ‘in mass tort cases, the judge often cannot rely on the 
litigants to frame the issues appropriately’.745 Obviously, this situation does not preclude judges from 
seeking the needed information directly among plaintiffs. However behaving this way requires from 
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rational maximizing judges greater efforts and these latter may – theoretically at least - be reluctant to do 
so. 
 
b) Potential Benefits 
 
 
 Powers  
 
As a flipside of a same coin, mass claims have also benefits from a judicial perspective. The mass context 
gives notably judges a unique central authority. Commenting on the American experience, judge 
WEINSTEIN for instance argued hat judges’ great powers are essential so as to ‘impose scheduling 
decisions and procedural rulings on the parties’.746 
 
 Public Exposure (again) and Prestige  
 
Judges can find in mass claims a venue for promoting their prestige and reputation among their peers, but 
also within the larger legal profession. A judge able to deal efficiently with a mass claim may take benefit 
from career advancement. As an illustration, while actively managing and presiding over the Agent 
Orange lawsuit, judge WEINSTEIN received an extraordinary attention and prestige,
747
 his work being 
welcomed as a ‘virtuoso performance of judicial management’.748 In terms of visibility, public exposure 
and prestige, a useful comparison can be drawn between the situation of judges dealing with highly-
advertised public cases and those involved in mass cases: both types of disputes may attract considerable 
media attention or deal with burning societal issues. Interviews conducted by ROUSSEL with several 
French judges involved in various high-profile political scandals shed light on their overall satisfaction, 
higher degree of self-esteem, shared feelings of doing something crucial and becoming ‘someone 
important’ within and for the society, while in the meanwhile reaching the ‘peak of the judiciary’.749  As 
the author observed, these judges experienced great transformations regarding their social and professional 
status which were visible ‘not only through the judge’s personal lens, but more largely within and beyond 
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the judiciary’.750 The author finally concluded that dealing with such affairs contributed to renew ‘the 
judge’s social dimension’.751 As emphasized by one of the interviewees, he saw this experience as ‘a 
manner to say: ‘I am not [solely] a public servant of the judiciary; I am not only in charge of small cases 
(…); I am not a machine in charge of treating files; as a judge, I have [the duty] to ask questions that may 
go far beyond the scope of what I am actually doing’.752 There are reasons to believe that similar remarks 
may be made by judges when managing mass claims. The great notoriety that they withdraw from the 
treatment of cases covered by media leads many of them to write books and articles where they compile, 
synthesise and convey their past experience to target larger audience.
753
 
 
4.3.2 How do Judges Express their preferences? The Use of Rules v. Standards 
 
 
Law and Economics scholars have extensively debated the conditions under which the use of standards or 
rules 
754– in other words, the degree of precision that should be associated with the law - is more desirable 
to monitor behaviour (a). In the framework of mass disputes, preference is given to standards to monitor 
judicial behaviour (b). 
 
a) Regulating Behaviour via Rules or Standards: Law & Economics Discussions 
 
As POSNER observes, ‘rules and standards are addressed not only to the persons out there in the society 
whose behaviour the legal system wants to constrain but also within the legal system – the society’s 
agents.’ 755 Costs and benefits of rules and standards are actually the two sides of the same coin.   
                                                          
750
 Idem (in French : ‘c’est avant tout en tant qu’effets – largement non maîtrisés, du moins initialement – engendrées 
par les pratiques des magistrats dans les ‘affaires’ que se manifestent des transformations de l’identité sociale et 
professionnelle des magistrats. [Ces transformations] se réalisent non seulement à leur propres yeux, mais aussi 
beaucoup plus largement  dans le corps et en dehors de celui-ci’).  
751
 Idem 
752
 Idem (in French : ‘c’était une façon de dire: « je ne suis pas un fonctionnaire de la justice. Je ne me contente pas 
de traiter de petits dossiers que l’on m’envoie (…).  Je ne suis pas une machine à sortir des dossiers. J’ai un rôle en 
tant que magistrat de poser des problèmes  qui peuvent dépasser le cadre même de ce que je fais’). 
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 See for instance: L. GREILSAMER and D. SCHNEIDERMANN, Les Juges Parlent, Fayard, 1992, 574 p. 
(compiling the experience of judges involved in big and highly publicized cases); see also in other European 
countries: E. VAN FRAECHEM, Een Rechter Spreekt, Davidsfonds, Leuven, 2004, 191 p. 
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 L. KAPLOW, ‘Rules Versus Standards: an Economic Analysis’, (42) Duke Law Journal, 1992, pp.557-627; H.-B. 
SCHAEFER, ‘Legal Rules and Standards’, in: C.K. ROWLEY and F SCHNEIDER. (Eds.), Encyclopaedia of Public 
Choice, Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2004, pp.671-674; R.A.POSNER, supra note 77, specifically 20.3: ‘Statutory 
Production, Rules versus Standards'. 
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 R.A. POSNER, supra note 77, at p.544. 
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When compared to rules, standards avoid the costs of particularizing ex ante situations, and make it easier 
for judges to adapt ex post their behaviour to the peculiarities of the case that they have to manage. 
POSNER further points out such flexibility and argues that standards are ‘more apt to invite explicit 
balancing of competing interests’.756 In turn, standards induce several costs. First, they delegate a large 
extent of the work to the Judiciary. This situation can be desirable if the Legislature has ex post a limited 
knowledge and relies strongly on the interpretation of its judges. In doing so, standards nonetheless 
increase agency costs.
757
 Additionally, from a judicial perspective, broad standards increase uncertainty 
with regards to scope of the appropriate monitoring, and drastically increase discretionary decisions which 
– in the Law and Economics literature – are envisioned as a leeway for the expressions of personal 
preferences and biases.
758
 Even though renewed in the Law & Economics literature, this argument is by no 
means novel: in a famous quote attributed to Lord CAMDEN, judicial discretion was already said to be 
‘the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual and depends on 
constitution, temper and passion. At best it is often caprice. In the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion 
to which human nature can be liable’.759   
 
b) A Preference for Standards to Regulate Judicial Behaviour in Mass Claims  
 
 
In the framework of mass litigation, preference is given to standards for guiding and regulating judicial 
behaviour. This choice can be explained in two different ways. 
First, standards facilitate judicial case-tailored approaches to mass disputes. Taking into account ex ante 
all the contingencies of judicial monitoring is highly costly and can be viewed as waste.
760
 It is indeed not 
possible to draw ex ante general conclusions on the way judges should deal with mass disputes. How and 
how many test cases should be ordered, how and how many subgroups should be defined, on which 
criteria the group should be defined, how the case should be advertised in the media, how the merits of 
individual claim should be assessed or to what extent individual issues should prevail are – among many 
others – questions that will extensively depend on the nature of the dispute. Supporting this view, Mc 
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 Idem 
757
 Idem 
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 N. GENNAIOLI, ‘Judicial Fact Discretion’, in: A. SCHLEIFER, The Failure of Judges and the Rise of 
Regulators, Walras-Pareto Lecture, 2012, pp.23-52. 
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 Cited in: J. FRANK, supra note 607, at p.147.   
760
 H.B. SCHAEFER, supra note 754 (observing: ‘determining the appropriate content of the law for all such 
contingencies would be very expensive and, in many cases, simply a waste. It can therefore be concluded that in 
those areas of the law in which economic and social conditions change frequently and with them the optimal set of 
legal decisions standards are more efficient than rules’. 
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GOVERN warned against the risks of considering all mass disputes as ‘fungible’. 761 Defining a one size 
fits all judicial mass case management is not feasible. As HODGES further observes, ‘there are some 
situations in which a mass of individual claims may appear similar at first sight, but on closer inspection it 
appears that each contains individual issues that cannot effectively be resolved by deciding a generic 
question’.762 Since detailing judicial management is not feasible ex ante, legislatures have left discretion 
and flexibility to their judges in order to let them adapt their intervention to the peculiarities of the dispute 
in front of them. This discretion is visible in the French Draft which leaves to judges the decision to 
distribute damages on an individual basis or through a broader scheduling approach. This discretion is also 
noticeable in other proceedings – such as in the English Court Rules on Collective Proceedings   where 
judges can decide to proceed through an opt- in or an opt-out mechanism following the specificities and 
needs of the case at stake.
763
  
Second and more implicitly, standards tend to reveal the lack of policymakers’ clear views and opinions 
about what should be the role of judges in mass disputes. As an illustration, during an interview conducted 
in December 2012, Justice J.CHORUS who presided over two Dutch WCAMs was asked the following 
question: do you think that the legislature has realistic expectations regarding the tasks that the judiciary 
should or must perform in mass disputes? His reply was straightforward: If you understand the legislature 
as those who work there, I'm not sure that hey have a correct view about what judges must or should do. 
[However], if you consider the legislature in its broad meaning ('la loi'), yes it must have great 
expectations. These expectations are high, but they are justified.’764  
Importantly, the use of standards gives leeway to rational and utility maximizing judges to express their 
preferences and follow their own agenda when monitoring mass claims. 
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 F. Mc GOVERN, supra note 539 (observing that differences can be made between cases where (1) plaintiffs are 
known or unknown, (2) defendant(s) is (are) known or unknown, (3) the harmful event is single or multiple, (4) 
causation is known or unknown, (5) the value of the case is known or unknown, (6) there is or there is not access to 
funding opportunities). 
762
 C. HODGES, supra note 56, at p.88.  
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 See Chapter 3. 
764
 Interview conducted in Leiden on 11 December 2012 (cited with permission of the interviewee). 
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4.3.3 Rational Attitudes of Utility Maximizing Judges in Mass Disputes: Gurus, 
Followers and Opportunistic Managers 
 
 
 
When predicting rational attitudes of utility maximizing judges dealing with mass disputes a cornerstone 
issue consists in determining whether judges will ultimately consider mass litigation as an opportunity, or 
conversely as a misfortune. Differences between these two points of view matter. In the first scenario 
(mass dispute as an opportunity), rational judges behave as gurus maximizing the benefits previously set 
forth (a). In the second scenario (mass dispute as a misfortune), they behave as followers, mainly 
motivated by a desire to minimize their costs (b). As a complement to these two attitudes, the prediction of 
rational judges behaving as opportunistic managers seems to be a compromise that is also worth 
considering (c). The objectives of the following developments are twofold: the first is to predict how 
rational judges weighing differently the arguments of their utility function may behave when involved in 
mass disputes. The second is to identify the benefits and problems ultimately associated with each attitude 
so as to understand the one(s) that more likely to favour or to impair parties’ interests. 
 
a) Rational Judges Behaving as Gurus 
 
 
 Definition  
 
The term ‘guru’ is borrowed from by Mc GOVERN who observed that ‘the incentives of judges to be 
viewed as gurus of mass torts have become strong’.765 A guru is commonly defined as ‘a teacher and 
especially intellectual guide in matters of fundamental concern’. Alternatively, he is a person ‘with 
knowledge and expertise’.766 Remarkably, Judge WEINSTEIN clearly highlighted the moral authority 
associated with the figure of the judge by observing that ‘when so many discordant voices are heard and 
so much money is at stake, a hand with no financial interest in the outcome is necessary to impose order 
and discipline and avoid chaos’.767 In his words, the figure of the judge is presented as the last shield 
against the threats of anarchy and disorder.   
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 F. Mc GOVERN, supra note 539 (at p.1841). 
766
 Oxford Dictionary, entry:’guru’. 
767
 J.B. WEINSTEIN, supra note 159, at p.102. 
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 What Does the Judge-Guru Want to Maximise?  
 
 
A judge-guru is likely to maximize arguments of his utility function such as reputation, prestige, power, 
career concerns and his taste for public service. Conversely, his desire to decrease his workload or to 
maximize leisure will be secondary. A judge-guru may therefore be highly active in developing a 
comprehensive case management approach. Policymakers seeking to develop this facet of judicial 
behaviour may notably be tempted to clearly identify the judge(s) in charge of the group proceeding. It is 
indeed assumed that the judge-guru will exert a higher level of effort if he knows (or can anticipate) that 
his efforts will be recognized and ultimately rewarded as such. 
       
 Is the Judge-Guru Adapted to Mass Litigation?  
 
 
The attitude of the judge-guru seems at first sight particularly appropriate and compatible with the 
monitoring of mass litigation which, as discussed previously, requires and expects active managing 
judging.  Yet, the behaviour of the judge-guru can turn out to be costly for litigants and society. First, 
(already introducing an insight from behavioural economics, an approach to which I will return in Chapter 
5), a judge-guru may be subject to the egocentric bias defined as a tendency to consider oneself has being 
above-average, immunized against the mistakes usually made by fellow human beings. Substantiating this 
assumption, Judge WEINSTEIN for instance observes that ‘one danger that every judge must guard 
against is ego [since] the sense of power and prestige in supervising a mass tort or public interest case can 
be heady’.  Against this potential threat, he asserted the need for the court to ‘control its own sense of 
importance’, while acknowledging that this may be ‘sometimes a very difficult chore’.768 Second, attempts 
to control all the facets of the dispute may lead the judge-guru to leave his role of active judge to fully 
endorse the one of activist judge which may ultimately jeopardize his impartiality and independence.
769
 A 
judge can for instance be tempted to harshly defend or to impose his own opinions even though these 
latter may not perfectly be aligned with the expectations of parties.  
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 J.B. WEINSTEIN, supra note 159, at p.93 
769
  Idem, at p.94 (observing: ‘the core sense of being a judge, dispassionate, aloof and apart from it all, and only 
secondarily a participant in the litigation, is needed to preserve the continuing impartial judicial role in long-term 
institutional reform and mass torts’). 
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 Illustrations 
 
 
The example of judge WEINSTEIN monitoring the Agent Orange class action is here                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
again illustrative. In this case, WEINSTEIN faced two intertwined problems. On the one hand, the issue of 
causation between the Agent Orange herbicide and plaintiffs’ reported illness was not clearly established. 
On the other hand, Judge WEINSTEIN was nonetheless intimately convinced that the United States had a 
debt toward its Vietnam veterans. Therefore, he was perceived as using his powers in ‘an aggressive way’ 
by taking decisions that a majority of plaintiffs was not necessarily eager to adopt.
770
 In his comprehensive 
analysis of the Agent Orange litigation, SCHUCK furthermore highlighted that judge WEINSTEIN ‘made 
highly questionable decisions while working for a settlement that would render them invulnerable to 
appeal’.771 In other studies, scholars similarly suggested that ‘the Agent Orange case is one in which the 
judge candidly sacrificed the quest for truth (…) for a partial resolution of a national problem’.772  
 
b) Rational Judges Behaving as Followers 
 
 
 Definition  
 
 In a second scenario, the judge behaves as a follower when he primarily relies on litigants to frame and 
manage the dispute. He rationally adopts an attitude that can be qualified as being more passive. From the 
standpoint of the judge-follower, the management of mass cases induces great costs that he seeks to avoid 
or to minimize. Albeit still present in his utility function, a judge-follower is less influenced by arguments 
such as prestige, reputation or career concerns and he seeks primarily to decrease his workload. Facing 
great informational asymmetries, he strongly relies on the work performed by the class counsel or the 
representative association in charge of the claimant group.  
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 K. O’NEILL, ‘Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts – Book Review’, (15) Review of Law 
and Social Change, 1986-1987, pp. 415-428). Judge WEINSTEIN for instance insisted in keeping the government as 
a party to the litigation even though it had been dismissed by the preceding judge and even though a majority of 
litigants did not want to sue the government. As suggested by O’NEILL, judge WEINSTEIN fiercely ‘believed that 
the government had neglected the veterans and was determined to force it to participate in a benefit program for 
them’. Additionally, NOVEY observes that judge’s WEINSTEIN great involvement in the lawsuit was fiercely 
criticized by many US veterans who considered that the final settlement was ‘almost entirely his own construction’ 
(see L.B. NOVEY, supra note 748, citing the petition to the Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari, Krupkin v. Down 
Chemical Co., n°87-620, 1987). 
771
 P.H. SCHUCK, supra note 437, at p.249 (also quoted by K .O’NEILL, supra note 770). 
772
 L. WRIGHTSMAN, M.T. NIETZEL, W.H. FORTUNE, Psychology and the Legal System, Brooks Cole 
Publishing, 3
rd
 Ed, 1987. 
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 What Does the Judge-Follower Want to Maximize? 
 
 
The course of action of the judge-follower can be twofold. First, assuming that he is not eager to exert a 
high level of effort, he may essentially refer to focal points to drive the behaviours of litigants toward the 
final outcome.
773
 As PETERSON and SELVIN have observed, such a technique which consists in 
channelling parties’ behaviour turns out to be particularly useful in situations of uncertainty where the 
costs of investigating for judges are high. Parties lead the procedure and judges only intervene for the 
most serious or unresolved issues. Second, following the assumptions formulated by MACEY,
774
 a judge-
follower may spend time overviewing the procedural fairness of the litigation where he can use his general 
skills, rather than to spend time scrutinizing in-depth the substance of the case for which more technical 
and specific skills are required. Scholars have argued that judges, in an attempt to decrease their workload 
and reduce their dockets, may be tempted to clear or to facilitate settlements by simply agreeing to the 
work performed by litigants.
775
 Behaving differently are burdensome alternatives any of which could 
possibly impair judicial resources.
776
 As GARAPON and PAPADOPOULOS have observed while 
commenting on the American experience, judges are indeed strongly incentivized to clear without any 
contestation the class action settlement set forth by litigants.
777
  
 
 Is the Judge-Follower Adapted to Mass Litigation?  
 
Behaving as a follower has long-lasting consequences. Interestingly, KOCKESEN and USMAN have 
pointed out the negative impact associated with low-effort judging. In their model, the authors showed that 
low-effort judges tend to favour settlements at unequal terms which lead defendants to overinvest in 
prevention.
778
 Furthermore, even though passive attitudes may a priori be perceived as a solution from the 
viewpoint of rational judges seeking to decrease their workload, this strategy may in the long-run become 
greatly detrimental to judges’ well-being. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, litigants are likely to 
pursue diametrically opposed strategies which, as by-products, may increase delays and impair judicial 
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 T. SCHELLING, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960, p.57 (defining a focal point as ‘the person’s expectation of what 
the other expects him to expect to be expected to do’). 
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 J.R. MACEY, supra note 689. 
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 S.P. KONIAK and G.M. COHEN, supra note 540. 
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 Idem  
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 A. GARAPON and I. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 12 (In French: ‘on présentera [au juge] une convention bien 
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 L. KOCKESEN and M. USMAN, supra note 600. 
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resources
779
. On a broader level, the vision of the judge-follower can ultimately be viewed as a serious 
‘abdication of judicial responsibility’780 misunderstood by the legal profession and the public. As 
MARCUS expresses it, (…) judges’ substantive preferences in mass tort litigation may tempt them to be 
less rigorous at the very time when they should be most demanding’.781 
 
 Illustration 
 
 
As anecdotal evidence, a defendant’s lawyer depicted the attitude of Justice PRATT who was first in 
charge of the Agent Orange class action litigation as the one of an ‘absentee landlord’.782  Furthermore, 
authors analysing the behaviour of Judge WEINSTEIN in the Agent Orange case pointed out that  
‘throughout the litigation, [the judge] avoided issuing final decisions on potentially dispositive issues. 
Instead, he issues statements of preliminary decisions or indications of how he might rule on those 
issues’.783 While refusing to commit himself in a given and specific case management direction which 
would have precluded any possible way-out in case of unexpected obstacles or difficulties, SCHUCK 
reports the suggestion that Judge WEINSTEIN made to lawyers to ultimately ‘ask [him] anything [they] 
like and [he]’ll tell [them] how [he] will probably rule’. 784 Interestingly, this practice seems to echo the 
practice of English judges who may give broad ‘indications’ so as to channel the conduct of litigants 
involved in GLOs.     
 
c) Rational Judges Behaving as Opportunistic Managers   
 
 Definition 
 
 
Improving and enhancing efficient and cost-effective judicial case management of similar and multiple 
lawsuits is one of the many objectives that mass litigation proceedings seek to achieve. In the European 
context, this objective may be one of the most important, when compared to the United States where the 
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 M. SELVIN and M.A. PETERSON, supra note 538. 
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 J.B. WEINSTEIN, supra note 159 (claiming: 'a judge’s refusal to become involved in details of settlement or 
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 R.L. MARCUS, ‘They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23’, (80) Cornell Law Review, 1995, pp. 
858-908 (at P.901). 
782
 Cited in: P.H. SCHUCK, supra note 437, at p.117. 
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M. SELVIN and M.A. PETERSON, supra note 538 (observing: ‘this practice enabled the parties to get some 
indication of what to expect in the litigation, but maintained uncertainties about the final treatment of these issues). 
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 P.H. SCHUCK, supra note 437, p.125. 
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emphasis is essentially put on deterrence.
785
 Rational judges may therefore be incentivized to view mass 
proceedings principally through the lens of their own interest, i.e as a way to first and foremost save 
judicial resources. Contrary to an idealistic image, judges would consequently not behave as mere neutral 
arbiters since they have a personal interest in the litigation and they may be prone to defend it. However, 
previous developments discussing the judicial utility function have also shown that taste for public service 
as well as desire to respect the rules of the judicial game are arguments that judges may also seek to 
maximize. The model of the judge-opportunistic manager combines these alternative viewpoints. It here 
refers to a situation where judges attempt to reconcile their own interest with parties’ expectations. 
Despite the negative connotation associated with the term ‘opportunistic’, the notion is here employed in 
its neutral meaning. In a similar logic, recent research conducted on lawyers’ behaviours have developed 
the concept of ‘ethical indeterminacy’ to propose a dynamic view about lawyers’ behaviours where these 
latter attempt to align their own individual interests with the one of their clients.
786
 As for instance pointed 
out by TATA and his team, ethical indeterminacy arises in situations where ‘the choice is between two 
courses of actions, both of which have advantages and disadvantages, and where ethical practitioners 
genuinely differ about which is the better’. The authors further consider that ‘in making difficult and 
evenly balanced judgements, greater weight is placed on the advantages that flow from a course of action 
that is in one’s own interests, [while] less weight is placed on those that flow from actions that run 
contrary to one’s interests’.787 In other words, while facing such a grey area characterized by a doubt on 
the superiority of a given course of action compared to another, individuals may first enhance their own 
interest. Alternatively, they endorse the interest of others as long as doing so also enhances their own 
interest. In the framework of mass disputes, judges are similarly likely to face similar grey decisional 
areas where different courses of action are possible. They may therefore behave as opportunistic managers 
by finding a compromise between their own interest – the group proceeding as a management tool - and 
the one pursued by litigants. 
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 see Chapter 2. 
786
 See notably: C. TATA, ‘In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid, Supply, Demand, and ‘Ethical 
Indeterminacy’ in Criminal Defence Work’,(34) Journal of Law & Society, n°4, 2007, pp.489-519; C.TATA, T. 
GORIELY and al., 'Does Mode of Delivery Make a Difference to Criminal Cases Outcomes and Client 
Satisfaction?', (50) Criminal Law Review, 2004, n2. 
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 Illustration 
 
An illustration of judges behaving as opportunistic manager can be found in the class action lawsuit In Re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., which concerned a group of haemophiliacs suing manufacturers for HIV-
contaminated blood products.
788
 The seventh circuit court denied certification notably on the basis of a 
lack of homogeneity between claimants and of a lack of adequate manageability of the case. Yet, despite 
the rejection, claimants and defendants later on settled, and asked judges to clear their agreement. In 
contrast to their initial reaction, judges this time agreed with parties’ agreement. Such a change in judges’ 
attitudes – from an initial denial of certification to a judicial approval of the settlement agreement – was 
perceived as puzzling. As LAHAV for instance observes, ‘why would a court be disinclined to permit 
litigation of a mass production claim as a single case yet approve a settlement of that same series of 
claims?’ She further wonders whether ‘the heterogeneity of claims that was the basis for denial of 
certification [would not] require rejection of a settlement based on homogeneous awards (…).’789 
Arguably, this change of attitude can be better understood through the concept of judge behaving as 
opportunistic managers. It was indeed not in judges’ own interest to face considerable amounts of claims. 
However, they felt more at their ease when reviewing the settlement agreement. In a same logic, LAHAV 
claims that ‘[a] plausible explanation is that the court rejected the class as a result of resistance to 
overseeing the administration of masses of claims, whereas the court felt comfortable with private 
resolution that did not require it to do the administrating’. As a matter of fact, ‘the court preferred that the 
difficult trade-offs be made by someone else’.790  
 
4.3.4  Multi-Faceted Judges - Evidence from the United States 
 
The attitudes of judges behaving as gurus, followers or opportunistic managers shed some light on judges’ 
‘existential crises of role’ when facing with mass disputes.791 As MENKEL-MEADOW has pertinently 
observed, ‘judges must decide whether to take an activist role such as judges Jack.B.Weinstein (…), 
Robert R. Merhige (…), S.Arthur Spiegel (…), and others who actively engage in the settlement or case 
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 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). 
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 Idem, at p. 421. 
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 C. MENKEL-MEADOW, ’Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road’, (90) 
Cornell Law Review, 1995, pp.1159-1221 (at p.1183). 
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management process, or whether to remain more passive and disinterested from settlements’.792 Empirical 
evidence has furthermore substantiated the existence of judge-followers. HELLAND and KLICK have for 
instance investigated the judicial control over attorneys’ fees in class action lawsuits.793 From the judge’s 
viewpoint, simply approving attorney’s fees decreases his workload and facilitates the termination of the 
case. Conversely, rejecting the request requires judges to exert a higher level of effort and delays the 
termination of the case. In other words, the trade-off that judges face is simple: on the one hand, approving 
fees serves the judges’ desire to clear his docket and to enhance case expediency; on the other hand, it 
may impair his role of good shepherd in charge of maintaining the interest of absent members who are 
unlikely to monitor the behaviour of their counsel.  The authors interestingly observe a strong correlation 
between attorney fees and court congestion. In simple words, judges facing heavy caseloads are more 
likely to authorize higher amount of lawyers’ fees. These results sheds some light on the behaviour of 
rational utility maximizing judges incentivized to decrease their workload in order to increase their well-
being. CHOI, GULATI and POSNER have also investigated the behaviour of American district judges in 
securities class action lawsuits.
 794
 Hypothesizing that more competent judges are more likely to produce 
superior judicial output, the authors defined a set of indicators employed to assess judicial performance in 
the conduct of securities class actions
795
. They predicted that judges with higher ability will be more likely 
than lower-ability judges to handle class action lawsuits more easily, to reject lead plaintiff’s selection of 
attorney, to grant more frequent motions to dismiss since it creates more work and risks from the judges’ 
standpoint, and to reject attorney’s fees requests since they cannot expect the other party to do so. Their 
results - drawn from a securities class action dataset and a judge dataset - reveal interesting findings. In 
particular, it shows that judges with senior status (who are finishing their careers) do not shirk from effort 
when they deal with securities class actions. Even though senior judges are less likely than their active 
colleagues to preside over a class action, those of them who do preside over these cases appear more 
willing to reject the lead plaintiff motion. 
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    4.3.5. Preliminary Conclusion: Case Maturity and Judicial Attitudes 
  
This section was aimed at analysing different attitudes that rational and utility maximizing judges may 
adopt when they are involved in mass disputes. Readers may however object that such judicial attitudes 
will disappear when judges sit in panel. Later developments of this research (Chapter 7) will  address this 
point by showing that the effects of panels remain dubious in practice, and that they do not necessarily 
cancel out judicial interested attitudes.
796
 Attitudes portrayed in this Chapter may thus remain valid. 
Furthermore and importantly, the attitudes described in this Chapter will be in practice complementary 
depending on the needs of the case at stake.  The reader may have for instance noticed that the attitude of 
Judge WEINSTEIN in the Agent Orange class action was successively employed to illustrate the attitude 
of the judge-gure and the one of the judge-follower. As ascertained by scholars studying judicial 
behaviour, ‘models of decision-making that portray judges as pursuing single objectives and that do not 
account for these intricacies are likely to miss important facets of the process’, since judges are more 
likely ‘to balance numerous, potentially inconsistent goals’.797 
To conclude, the articulation between these different judicial attitudes can be better understood in the light 
of the concept of case’s ‘maturity’ developed by Mc GOVERN in the 1980s. The author indeed defended 
a dynamic vision of mass disputes by describing the difficulties associated with each different stages of a 
mass dispute.
798
 In its infancy, mass cases are plagued by numerous uncertainties regarding notably the 
number of litigants, the proof of causation or the scope of damage. SCHUCK has compared this early 
situation to the one of the ‘erratic adolescent’ struggling with parental authority.799  Judges may thus 
develop comprehensive case management techniques to solve such difficulties, and – as a way to extend 
the comparison - restore their full authority over the case. When maturity is reached, the range of 
uncertainties and vagaries affecting the case is reduced. In this new context, the role of judges is likely to 
evolve.
800
 To refer to the terminology used in this chapter, the idiosyncrasies of mass cases may lead 
judges to behave as gurus to deal with the difficulties of early stages, and then to pursue a backseat 
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 See Chapter 7. 
797
 J.K. ROBBENNOLT, R.J. MACCOUN and J.M. DARLEY, ‘Multiple Constraints Satisfaction in Judging’, in: D. 
KLEIN and G. MITCHELL (ed.), The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
pp.27-39. 
798
 F. Mc GOVERN, supra note 439. 
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 P.H. SCHUCK, supra note 160. 
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 F.Mc GOVERN, supra note 439 (arguing that maturity is reached when, in the American context, there has been 
‘full and complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, (…) a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs’ contentions’ and when 
‘little or no new evidence [have been] developed’). 
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approach – or to behave as follower – once these difficulties are overcome. As WILLGING ultimately 
observes, ‘different judicial strategies should be used at different stage of the life cycle’.801    
In any case, when commenting on the American experience, MC GOVERN suggested that there might be 
‘no way for a court to avoid being a player in an elastic mass tort. By accommodating cases, a judge 
increases the elasticity of the mass tort. By being more rigid, the court decrease elasticity. In either event 
the judge is a player’.802 Most of the costs and benefits faced by American judges are similarly faced by 
any judges dealing with mass cases. Built on the assumption that judges tend to behave as players, this 
second part was aimed at shedding some light on the trump cards that judges will play in such 
circumstances. 
 
    * 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding chapter has shed light on the heavy tasks falling upon judges in mass litigation. Adopting a 
new angle based on rational choice theory, this chapter has explored some rational attitudes that judges 
may endorse in such circumstances. This appears to be an important element that policymakers have until 
now omitted. As a response to the vision of judges acting as watchdogs, cattle drivers and good shepherds, 
it was shown that rational utility maximizing judges may in reality be incentivized to behave as gurus, 
followers and/or opportunistic managers.  
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
801
 T.E. WILLGING, ‘Beyond Maturity: Mass Tort Case Management in the Manual for Complex Litigation’, (148) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2000, pp.2225-2261. 
802
  F. Mc GOVERN, supra note 439. 
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Chapter 5 
 
                  
IUDEX NON CALCULAT? 
 
 
 
Judges & the Magnitude of Mass Litigation from a Behavioural Perspective 
       
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In an interview given to the Newspaper Le Monde in October 2012, the President of the German 
Constitutional Court was asked whether a lawsuit filed by 37,000 individuals weighs more than a lawsuit 
filed by a single plaintiff. His reply was blatantly negative: ‘we do not count but we ask ourselves whether 
the claim is meritless or not’.803  His response demonstrates the predominance of the legalist tradition 
which, in the western tradition at least, personifies Justice under the traits of a blindfolded goddess, 
omniscient, unbiased and insensitive to the identities of the parties and to the context in which decisions 
are taken. As the Latin maxim says: iudex non calculat.
804
 From the viewpoint of judges trying to protect 
their social prestige and impartiality, no other response could have been expected. Yet, as KONECNI and 
EBBESEN observe, ‘it is certain that what these decision-makers claim they do has very little 
                                                          
* P. MICHAUD, Quelques Arpents de Neige, 1961 (translation from the author. In French : ‘on a beau trouver la 
force dans le droit, celle du nombre restera toujours supérieure’). 
** J. FRANK, Law & the Modern Mind, 1931 at p.156 
803
 Le Monde, ‘L’Europe à l’épreuve des tribunaux’, interview with A.VOSSKUHLE, 1 October 2012 (his remark 
was made in a context different than the one described hereafter). 
804
 ‘Judges do not count’. 
‘While one may find strength in the law, the strength of 
number will always be superior.’ 
                                                           P. MICHAUD*   
Is it not absurd to keep alive the artificial, orthodox 
tradition of the “ideal judge”? The rational alternative is to 
recognize that judges are fallible human beings (…). Our 
law schools must become, in part, schools of psychology 
applied to law in all its phases’. 
                                        J. FRANK** 
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resemblance to what they actually do’.805 Insights from behavioural sciences may therefore offer an 
alternative view on this pivotal question.  
 
 
 
5.1.1 Where Are We?  
 
 
While referring to the rational choice theory, the preceding chapter challenged the legalist ideal of judges 
acting as mere neutral arbiters in the realm of mass litigation. Conversely, it suggested that, on such 
circumstances, they can be regarded as players trying to maximize their utility function, and that their 
courses of action have ultimately long-lasting implications on the monitoring of mass disputes. The 
chapter highlighted the lack of consideration that has so far been given to the judges’ incentive structure. 
In an attempt to further identify the vagaries and possible vulnerabilities of judicial decision-making - and 
therefore to nuance again the vision of Herculean judges spearheaded by legislatures – the present chapter 
adopts an alternative methodology based on behavioural law & economics.  
 
 
 
5.1.2. Methodology and Objectives – Behavioural Law & Economics  
 
Departing from the neoclassical paradigm grounded upon the model of the rational expected utility 
maximizer, this chapter aims at incorporating insights from psychology and cognitive sciences into the 
analysis. This literature indeed proposes a more realistic picture of human behaviour 
806
 and may also help 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of institutions, such as courts.
807
     
  
Past behavioural research has showed that decision-making is influenced by the idiosyncrasies of the 
decision-maker, by the characteristics of the tasks performed, but also importantly, by contexts.
808
 Hence, 
two reasons here justify the use of behavioural economics. The first regards its relevance to the subjects of 
this research, namely judges. Judicial decision-making constitutes a promising field of investigation for 
psychologists and behavioural economists seeking to identify the mental process and the cognitive 
                                                          
805
 V.J. KONECNI and E.B. EBBESEN, supra note 6. 
806
 C. JOLLS, C.R. SUNSTEIN and R. THALER, ‘A Behavioural Approach to Law & Economics’, (50) Stanford 
Law Review, 1998, n°5, pp.1471-1550. 
807
 J.J. RACHLINSKI, ‘The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters’, 
(85) Cornell Law Review, 2000, pp.739-766. 
808
 E. FANTINO and S. STOLARZ-FANTINO, ‘Decision-Making: Context Matters’, (69) Behavioural Processes, 
May 2005, n°2, pp.165-171. 
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limitations of legal decision-makers, and particularly of judicial brains.
809
 The second regards its relevance 
with the context of this research, namely the mass litigation framework. Even though mass claims are 
brought to courts by representative associations or leading lawyers, judges take their decisions in the 
shadow of numerous represented and absent parties.  Furthermore, mass cases are likely to be emotionally 
charged since they often deal with controversial societal issues such as large-scale accidents, diseases or 
defective products. They represent a psychological burden not only for parties, but also for judges.
810
   
 
This chapter therefore investigates the effect of the case magnitude on judicial decision-making. In doing 
so, it tries to shed some light on an issue that seems to be to this day still under-explored in the literature. 
The term magnitude which is commonly defined as ‘the great size or extent of something’811 here more 
specifically encompasses the large number of litigants, the scope of the dispute, or the perspective of 
dealing with groups. Behavioural studies have shed important light on ways groups are perceived by 
external observers, or on the impact of number and size on information processing. These issues are worth 
considering since they allow an alternative and dynamic perspective of judges dealing with mass claims. 
 
 
 
5.1.3. The Chapter in a Nutshell  
 
The objectives pursued in this chapter are twofold. The first part targets the decision-maker himself and 
discusses the features of the judicial brain as an attempt to ultimately nuance the myth of legalism. 
Behavioural economists and psychologists indeed consider that, like all human beings, judges are 
boundedly rational individuals influenced positively or negatively by biases and emotions (5.2). Going 
then a step further, the second part places the decision-maker into the peculiar context of mass litigation, 
and questions the effects associated with the magnitude of mass claim on the decision making-process of 
judges who, as shown before, tend to be receptive to bias and emotion (5.3). Final remarks conclude (5.4). 
 
Importantly, such insights are informative and relevant to all stakeholders. Vis-à-vis policymakers, they 
question and challenge the roles of watchdogs, cattle drivers and good shepherds that have been assigned 
                                                          
809
 L. BAUM, ‘Motivations and Judicial Behaviour: Expanding the Scope of Inquiry, in: D.KLEIN and 
G.MITCHELL (Eds.), The Psychology of Judicial Decision-Making, American Psychology-Law Series, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp.3-26 (observing: ‘students of judicial behaviour have taken only limited steps to 
incorporate psychological theory into research on judicial decision-making. (…) This represents a missed 
opportunity’). 
810
 J.B. WEINSTEIN, supra note 159 (highlighting: in the US ‘mass tort cases and public litigations both implicate 
serious political and sociological issues. Both are restrained by economic imperatives. Both have strong 
psychological underpinnings. And both affect larger communities than those encompassed by the litigants before the 
court’, at p. 41). 
811
 Oxford Dictionary, entry:‘magnitude’. 
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to judiciaries. Vis-à-vis litigants, they point out matters where judges are likely to make erroneous or 
misleading decisions, and possible ways for influencing judges. Finally, and crucially, vis-à-vis judges, 
they play the role of alarm bells highlighting points which require from them an enhanced vigilance.  
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
5.2 A BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO THE JUDICIAL MIND: BOUNDS, BIAS & EMOTION 
 
 
The theoretical background detailing the figure of the bounded, biased and sensitive judge which underlies 
the whole chapter is set forth (5.2.1). Empirical evidence is then presented as a way to discuss these 
assumptions (5.2.2). Finally, preliminary conclusions deal with possible criticisms, and ultimately defend 
its relevance when applied to the field of mass litigation (5.2.3). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  5.2.1. The Theoretical Background – The Bounded, Biased and Sensitive Judge 
  
  
 
Subsequent developments bring together three streams of literature in an attempt to propose a unified 
behavioural approach of judges and judicial decision-making. For matters of clarity, the image of a 
triangle is instructive. Its three sides are respectively the figures of the bounded (a), biased (b) and 
sensitive (c) judge. The bounded judge is developed from SIMON’s seminal concept of bounded 
rationality; the biased judge is employed as an allusion to KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY’s research 
agenda which identified some of the key biases affecting the decision-making of human beings; the 
sensitive judge refers to recent developments focusing on the weight of emotions into judicial behaviour. 
Like the three sides of a triangle, these three facets are closely connected and interdependent. For matters 
of clarity, they will be addressed successively.        
  
The decision to tackle these three issues in such order is not taken at random, but is clearly intentional. For 
reasons that are hereafter presented, the path-breaking concept of bounded rationality set forth by the 1978 
Nobel Prize laureate SIMON has been highly influential in the works of behavioural Law & Economics 
scholars, and, consequently, in the behavioural approach of judges. SIMON lies therefore at the base of 
the triangle. His work has paved the way to further research, such as the one conducted by KAHNEMAN 
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- also Nobel Prize laureate in 2002 - and TVERSKY. The issue of judges and emotion is addressed at the 
end since it constitutes a still recent, albeit promising, path of research.      
 
 
a) Judge and Bounded Rationality: The Bounded Judge 
 
 
The seminal concept of bounded rationality coined by SIMON in the nineteen fifties turns out to be 
pivotal for behavioural economists and psychologists. This revolution – in the sense of a paradigm shift - 
deeply influenced the manner judges were perceived. The legalist image of the omniscient judge was 
progressively challenged by the figure of the constrained bounded judge acting as a satisficer.  
  
 The Bounded Rationality Revolution  
 
SIMON was concerned with the weight given to the neoclassical rationality when analysing human 
decision-making. ‘In its actual development, he emphasized during his Nobel Prize Lecture, economics 
has focused on just one aspect of Man’s character, his reason, and particularly on the application of his 
reason to problems of allocation in the face of scarcity’.812 As a reaction to the classical paradigm focusing 
on rational optimizing behaviour which, as GIGERENZER and TODD point out, traditionally assumes 
that individuals have ‘demonic powers of reason, boundless knowledge, and all of eternity with which to 
make decisions’,813 he set forth the concept of bounded rationality which importantly contributed to a 
convergence of economics and psychology as a way to propose a more realistic approach to human 
behaviour.
814
  
In essence, SIMON considered that rationality is bounded ‘when it falls short of omniscience’.815 Two 
justifications explain such a failure. The first is located inside the human mind. Individuals are not 
machines but have finite computational skills and capacities. In simple words, there is a limit to the 
                                                          
812
 H.A. SIMON, Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations, Nobel Memorial Lecture, 8 December 1978 
(hereafter ‘H.SIMON, Nobel Prize Lecture’). 
813
 G. GIGERENZER and P. TODD, ‘Fast and Frugal Heuristics – The Adaptive Toolbox’, in: G. GIGERENZER, P. 
TODD and The Centre for Adaptive Behaviour and Cognition (ABC Research Group), Simple Heuristics That Make 
Us Smart, 1999, Oxford University Press, 415 p. (here at p.5). 
814
 The two seminal articles standing at the core of  SIMON’s theory – ‘A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice’ 
(published in 1955 in (69) The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,n°1, pp.99-118)  and ‘Rational Choice and the 
Structure of the Environment’ (published in 1956, see Models of Man: Social and Rational – Mathematical Essays 
on Rational Human Behaviour on a Social Setting, 1957, John Wiley & Sons, New York, pp. 241-257) were 
respectively published in an economic and in a psychological journal. See also on this issue H. SCHWARTZ, 
‘Herbert Simon & Behavioural Economics’, (31) Journal of Socio-Economics, 2002, pp.181-189. 
815
 H.A.SIMON, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 812. 
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number of options that human brains can effectively handle and assimilate.
816
 This approach departs from 
the neoclassical theory which traditionally assumes that individuals can assess all possible alternatives and 
will choose the one that best fits their preferences and ultimately yields them the highest reward.
817
 The 
second is in turn located outside the human mind. Contexts and environments in which individuals evolve 
and take their decisions are in reality highly uncertain and unpredictable. The amount of information and 
knowledge that is available to individuals when they take their decision remains therefore limited. 
The assumption that individuals display a bounded rationality has two important consequences. First, 
people do not behave as optimizers seeking the best available solution, but rather as satisficers looking for 
a solution that is merely good enough or sufficient, acceptable and reflecting the best outcome that they 
can achieve given the limited amount of knowledge and the unpredictability of the world in which they 
evolve.
818
 Second, the concept of bounded rationality renews the question of search which had been 
neglected under the unbounded rationality paradigm.
819
 SIMON called therefore for ‘a theory of search’ 
and for an enhanced analysis of information-gathering and information-processing.
820
  This turned out to 
have long-lasting implications on the research agenda of cognitive psychologists and behavioural 
economists. 
 
 Bounded Rationality and Bounded Judges Acting as ‘Satisficers’ 
 
 
The concept of satisfying was initially developed in the realm of administrative theory
821
 as a manner to 
describe the behaviour of administrators.
822
 Recently, the notions of bounded rationality and satisficing 
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 K.J.ARROW, ‘Is Bounded Rationality Unboundedly Rational? Some Ruminations’, in: M.AUGIER and 
J.G.MARCH (Eds.), Models of a Man – Essays in Memory of Herbert A. Simon, 2004, MIT Press, Cambridge & 
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 G. GIGERENZER and P. TODD, supra note 813 (observing:‘satisficing is a method for making a choice from a 
set of alternatives encountered sequentially when one does not know much about the possibilities ahead of time’, at 
p.13). 
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 H.A. SIMON, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 812. 
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have been extended to depict judicial behaviour. Mimicking POSNER who considered that judges 
maximize the same thing that everybody else does,
823
 GULATI and BAINBRIDGE go a step further and 
suggest that judges are boundedly rational individuals prone to the same cognitive limitations as the rest of 
us.
824
 Following this view, ZERVOGIANNI and TSAOUSSI consider that judges make decisions within 
real-world constraints. They are therefore more likely to behave as satisficers seeking outcomes that are 
merely good enough.
825
 In addition to the inherent limits of their mental capacities, their environments 
also limit the scope of their knowledge. Like in other administrations, they are subject to budget-
constraints and have limited resources, both human and financial. They may struggle with heavy case-load 
and work under the time-pressure of several deadlines. Studies and experiments conducted on the effect of 
time pressure on decision-making tend to reveal that time-pressure leads to greater filtering during the 
information-gathering process or to a shift to less complex decision strategies.
826
 Moreover, in complex 
matters dealing for instance with scientific issues, judges may lack knowledge and heavily rely on the 
opinions of experts.
827
 As SUNSTEIN has indeed expressed it, ‘if one person has authority or seems 
expert, he is likely to have a big influence on what other people think and do’.828 In situations of 
uncertainty where judges face a lack of evidence, they may not have clear views about all possible 
alternatives, make errors or be short-sighted regarding the concrete consequences and implications of their 
decisions. Importantly, judges may however not be aware of their own limitations. In the field of securities 
class action, GULATI and BAINBRIDGE observe for instance that judges are ‘claiming – at least 
implicitly – a level of expertise about workings of markets and organizations that, in some areas, not even 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
822
 H.A. SIMON, supra note 574, at p.119  (observing: ‘whereas economic man supposedly maximizes – selects the 
best alternative from among all those available to him – his cousin, the administrator, satisfices – looks for a course 
of action that is satisfactory or ‘good enough’); SIMON notably suggested that one of the primary objectives sought 
by organizational structures is thus to remediate to individuals’ bounded rationality by creating conditions which 
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note 812 (highlighting that ‘it is now clear that the elaborate organizations that human beings have constructed in the 
modern world to carry out the work of production and government can only be understood as machinery coping with 
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WICKERSMAN, ‘You Make the Call: Tips for Making Public Decisions’, The Public Manager, 2011. 
823
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824
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Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions’, (51) Emory Law Journal, 2002, pp.51, pp.83-151. 
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Decision-Making’, (27) Journal of Research in Personality, 1993, pp.238-252 (notably reviewing the literature on 
this issue). 
827
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(3) European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2011, pp.376-396. 
828
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the most sophisticated researchers in financial economics and organizational theory have reached’.829 They 
are thus more likely to behave as satisficers, but not as maximizers. In others words, they will seek 
solutions that are not optimal, but rather good enough, and ultimately use heuristics to achieve their aims. 
     
b) Judges, Heuristics and Biases: The Biased Judge 
 
 
 
 
SIMON’s concept of bounded rationality made studies questioning the information-gathering process 
necessary. More specifically, it paved the way to further research investigating the roles of heuristics and 
their associated effects on decision-making. Importantly, these insights have shed new light on judicial 
decision-making and progressively help sketch the figure of the biased judge. Noteworthy, the notion of 
biased judge is here not negatively tainted. As hereafter pointed out, the relationship between judges and 
heuristics is indeed more ambiguous: heuristics facilitate judicial work and help them deal with complex 
matters, but also may lead them to make systematic errors. 
 
 
 The Use of Heuristics in Decision-Making: a Double-Sided Issue 
 
 
The term heuristic is cornerstone in this chapter and thus needs to be clarified.
830
 Deriving from the Greek 
verb Heuriskein, heuristic originally meant serving to find out or to discover. Its signification has 
nonetheless evolved in the successive writings of economists and psychologists.
831
 A simple definition 
proposed by KAHNEMAN posits that heuristics are ‘a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though 
often imperfect, answers to difficult questions’.832 This definition triggers two important precisions which 
have respectively been the red threads of different research agenda. Like Janus, the issue of heuristics is 
indeed double-sided: they represent solutions, but also problems for decision-makers.  
First, heuristics are simple procedures intended to provide solutions to difficult questions. In other words, 
they consist in mental conscious or unconscious simplifications or short-cuts aimed at coping with the 
limited cognitive capacities of the human brain, as well as with the complexity and uncertainty of 
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 G.M. GULATI and S.M. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 824. 
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 G. GIGENREZER and P. TODD, supra note 813, at pp.25-27 (for a useful description of the terms heuristic and 
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 D. KAHNEMAN, Thinking Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011, 500 p. (here at p.98). 
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environments in which individuals evolved.
833
 Heuristics ‘cut down’834 or ignore835 the considerable 
amount of information in order to only focus on a set of key factors that are relevant for decision-
making.
836
 Referring to the words set forth by GIGERENZER and TODD, they constitute ‘fast’, ‘frugal’ 
and ‘adaptive’ ways to solve problems.837 They are fast because they do not require a lengthy period of 
time, they are frugal because they demand only limited knowledge or computational skills, and they are 
adaptive because they evolve according to the specificities of the context and environment in which 
individuals take their decision.
838
 A first line of research notably investigated by GIGERENZER and the 
Adaptive Behaviour and Cognition Group (‘ABC Group’) has focused on the usefulness of heuristics 
viewed as a ‘toolbox’ enabling decision-makers to find solutions to complex situations.839 For example, 
doctors and physicians dealing with considerable amounts of knowledge commonly use heuristics in their 
everyday practice when diagnosing patients.
840
 Their use turns out to be pivotal in cases of emergency and 
can ultimately save lives in situations where decisions must be taken on a short notice and under heavy 
pressure.
841
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Second, heuristics may also lead to imperfect and biased outcomes. In other words, they are a distorting 
lens through which individuals perceive reality. In such circumstances, their use becomes misleading and 
induces systematic judgemental errors.
842
 One of the lines of research pioneered by KAHNEMAN and 
TVERSKY was precisely aimed at identifying biases in decision-making induced by the use of heuristics.  
Their analysis is based on the assumption – generally acknowledged in the literature – that the architecture 
of the cognitive process roughly distinguishes a System 1 and a System 2. The first is mostly intuitive, 
operates quickly, demands less effort, and is ultimately employed for simple decisions. The second is in 
turn slower, less emotional, more neutral, rule-governed and used for effortful mental activities. On the 
top of this dual architecture, every human being has a ‘limited budget of attention’ that he can allocate to 
mental activities.
843
 Both systems are highly interdependent. System 1 leads behaviour when System 2 is 
depleted or becomes busy. System 2 corrects the intuitive decisions made by System 1 and their associated 
potential errors. Importantly, System 2 remains however reluctant to ‘invest more effort than is strictly 
necessary’, and thus often follows ‘the path of least effort [by endorsing] a heuristic answer without much 
scrutiny of whether it is truly appropriate’.844 In other words, both the quick and intuitive System 1 and the 
lazy System 2 are prone to cognitive limitations and erroneous mental shortcuts. Arguably, System 2 
which is rule-governed, neutral and less impulsive is at first sight more likely to guide an intellectual 
exercise such as judicial reasoning. This being said, System 1 is nevertheless not wiped out from judicial 
decision-making. As developed elsewhere, Legal Realists indeed posited that intuition may also play a 
prominent role in judicial decision-making.
845
 Their assumptions received a considerable attention and, as 
discussed below, numerous experiments later conducted with judges sought to substantiate or challenge 
their claims. 
 
 Heuristics and Cognitive Illusions: A Short List 
 
 
 
In an attempt to ‘map the bounded mind’,846 KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY listed some key cognitive 
illusions associated with the use of heuristics that individuals commonly apply when assessing 
probabilities or predicting values. As a matter of fact, this list is not comprehensive and future research 
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will importantly contribute to shed light on the unexplored territories of the bounded mind. A decision is 
taken hereafter to introduce readers to some selected cognitive errors. This selection is justified by the fact 
that the presence of such errors in judges’ decision-making has empirically been tested, and in some cases, 
attested. Other key misleading heuristics which are of relevance and importance in the field of mass 
litigation will timely be set forth in further developments of this chapter.    
First, the availability heuristic refers to the tendency to assess the frequency or likelihood of an event by 
the number of occurrences that easily come to mind and that can be remembered or recalled without great 
effort.
847
Albeit sometimes useful, SUNSTEIN and KURAN have shown that such a bias may be 
opportunistically manipulated by ‘availability entrepreneurs’ using the flows of information addressed to 
the public as a way to influence opinions.
848
 This point is of importance in the framework of mass claims 
and therefore will be further investigated in the coming developments of this chapter. 
Second, the anchoring heuristic refers to the tendency of individuals to rely on external information, value 
or data to anchor - that is, to ground - their own decision. The anchor – which can even be an irrelevant 
information - modifies the standard of reference by setting a starting point which ultimately influences 
decision-making. Situations in which anchors are wrongly assess or intentionally manipulated may lead to 
erratic judgements.  
Third, the hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overstate the predictability of past events in the light of 
new information. Individuals view past events in the light of their recent developments and ignore the 
limited amount of information that was available when the decision was taken. As FISCHHOFF points 
out, people influenced by the hindsight bias ‘not only tend to view what has happened as having been 
inevitable, but also to view it as having appeared “relatively stable” before it happened [and] (…) other 
should have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case’.849  
Fourth, the representativeness heuristic refers to the tendency to neglect relevant background statistical 
information - such as the number of occurrences or the size of the parent population - in order to rely on 
intuitive reaction to the representativeness of the information. A well-known example is the belief in the 
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law of small numbers by which individuals view samples as being highly – and potentially mistakenly - 
representative of the parent population from which they are drawn.
850
  
Fifth, the optimism or egocentric bias refer to the tendency of individuals to view themselves as being 
above the average, immunized against the mistakes usually made by their fellow human beings and 
protected against the difficulties that others commonly face. This illusion is widely shared among 
individuals when, for example, weighing their risks of getting ill or evaluating the success rate of their 
marriage.
851
 This bias ultimately precludes individuals to be fully aware of their own limitations and to 
correctly assess their skills and abilities.   
Sixth, framing effect refers to the tendency to process information differently depending on the manner the 
issue is designed. When confronted to risky situations, individuals tend to be risk-averse when the issue is 
worded in terms of gains, but conversely risk-seeker when the issue is presented as a source of potential 
loss.
852
 
 
 Sketching the Biased Judge 
 
 
As KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY pointed out, ‘the reliance on heuristics and the prevalence of biases are 
not restricted to laymen’.853 Although considered as legal experts, judges are human beings who use 
heuristics and are subject to cognitive illusions. Going a step further, and reflecting thus heuristics’ 
versatility, judges have an ambiguous relationship with heuristics which turns out to be alternatively 
positive and negative.   
From the positive side, judges use heuristics daily as a way to facilitate their work. According to 
TSAOUSSI and ZERVOGIANNI, judicial reasoning based on the analysis of precedents extensively 
relies on heuristics which help alleviating judicial burden.
854
 Their remark echoes CARDOZO who 
already in 1921 observed that ‘the labour of judges would be increased to the breaking point if every past 
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decision could be reopened in every case’.855 Furthermore, procedural rules and doctrinal developments 
can also instructively be regarded from the perspective of heuristics. As WAGNER observes, ‘since the 
aim of a civil trial is not to establish the objective truth, the court is able to apply heuristics as context-
specific parameters to allow decisions to be made on the basis of incomplete information and under 
serious time constraints’.856 Courts with constrained budget and limited abilities have thus progressively 
used simple rules to deal with complex cases. SCHULZ argues more specifically that heuristics in 
evidence law are ‘a means to prepare actions or decisions by enabling individuals to find ideas when 
logical are lacking, to know how to solve problems without knowing why it works, and to justify actions 
or decisions when there is no proof’.857 As an illustration, the standard of proof used by French courts – 
but also employed in many other jurisdictions – requiring a body of sufficiently reliable and consistent 
evidence (un faisceau d’indices suffisamment graves, précis et concordant) is employed to demonstrate 
and substantiate the existence of complex frauds, such as anticompetitive cartel agreement, insider trading 
practices,
858
 but also to deal with highly-debated or uncertain scientific issues, such as for instance the 
controversial link between sclerosis and the vaccine against hepatitis.
859
 For matters of simplicity, consider 
specifically this last issue: in such an area, judges have a restricted access to information and a limited 
knowledge on a highly controversial issue: no scientific consensus has yet been found which clearly 
proves that the vaccine is the cause of the disease. Facing contradictory evidence, judges could simply 
remain paralyzed and infringe their duty of delivering justice.
860
 Since the search of scientific and 
unanimously-approved evidence would require thorough investigation and a waste of time and resources 
for judges and litigants, the use of a set of presumptions enable them to achieve a sufficient solution given 
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the actual uncertainty of research.
861
 Put differently, the use of heuristics enables judges to decide in a 
world of scarce cognitive and informational resources. Similarly, GULATI and BAINBRIDGE have 
pointed out the existence of judicial decision-making heuristics in the field of securities class action. 
Again, their use simplifies the reasoning process and enables judges to dispose cases quickly without 
facing the meanders of complex and potentially equivocal expertise. Relatedly, and as lengthier developed 
in the second part of this chapter, numerous heuristics are also used in the judicial management of mass 
litigation as a manner to help judges monitor complex cases.  
From the negative side, judges may however be misled by heuristics and therefore make systemic errors. 
For instance, judges, like historians, examine past events and are thus likely to be subject to the hindsight 
bias. As FAURE points out, they may wrongly assess risky situations and fix a too high standard of care in 
accident law which would turn out to have detrimental consequences for business activities.
862 
The 
hindsinght bias may also have key economic and legal consequences since it tends to weaken the 
distinction traditionally drawn in tort law between the system of negligence and the system of strict 
liability. As RACHLINKSI observes, ‘the bias causes courts to hold defendants who took reasonable care 
liable, much as they would under a strict liability rule’. 863 Additionally, judges may be influenced by 
availability heuristics making them potentially sensitive to cases highly advertised in the media.
864
 From 
an alternative view, these misleading heuristics are also likely to be used by litigants and their lawyers as a 
way to influence judicial decisions. Anchors may alter judicial decision-making,
865
 concerning for 
instance the assessment of damages award.
866
 Since civil litigation produces ‘a natural frame’ where the 
judge’s decision involves gains for plaintiffs and losses for defendant, judges are prone to framing effects 
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and thus influenced by the manner a settlement offer is formulated by the proposing party.
867
 Recently, 
empirical research investigating the role of cognitive illusions and heuristics in judicial decision-making 
has shed new light on these assumptions. Crucially, these surveys have also suggested that judges tend 
themselves to be sometimes unaware of their heavy reliance on heuristics, but conversely still continue to 
believe that their decisions are ultimately taken without bias.
868
 These empirics are hereafter presented and 
further discussed. 
 
c) Judge and Emotions:  The Sensitive Judge 
 
 
The relationship between judges and emotion is the last point that must be tackled to complete the 
behavioural model of judges. As EPSTEIN emphasizes, ‘often the cognitive and emotional sides of human 
beings work in tandem (…)’.869 For long denied and neglected, this aspect is nowadays a source of 
growing interest among behavioural economists and psychologists working on judicial behaviour. 
 
 
 Rejecting Emotion from Judicial Behaviour 
 
 
In a famous 1871 letter known as ‘la lettre du voyant’, the French poet RIMBAUD wrote ‘I is another’.870 
This assumption transposed to the legal area particularly fits the legalist tradition which distinguishes the 
judge as a lawyer from the judge as a man.  The first is immunized against the emotional or personal 
influences which usually characterize the second.         
 
The term emotion requires some clarifications. Although often taken for granted in common language, 
there is no unique definition of emotion.
871
 Despite its numerous meanings, various causes and different 
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structures,
872
 it is generally assumed that emotion is a mental state ‘highly interpersonal in nature’873 
initiated by stimuli of a particular significance or intensity ‘occurring either in the subject’s environment, 
within the subject’s body or purely mental’.874 When applied to judges –who, according to a traditional 
view, are required to perform a task previously attributed to god(s) - namely judging their human 
fellows
875
- the issue of emotion is unsurprisingly criticized for being erratic and disturbing. Regarded as 
unreliable, biased, inconstant and depending on highly contingent factors,
876
 arbitrary and 
uncontrollable,
877
 emotions impair the correctness and impartiality of judicial decisions.    
 
Throughout centuries, external justifications have therefore been employed to avoid tackling and 
questioning the issue of judges’ personal emotions. During the Middle-Age, ordeals were employed in 
criminal matters as a sign of the intervention of God aimed at revealing the innocence or the guilt of the 
accused. The judgment was not a result of the judge’s personal emotion or inclination, but rather a 
manifestation of a divine choice. After the prohibition of ordeals ordered by the Church during the twelfth 
century, agency-denying procedures developed as a way to enable judges to ‘disclaim meaningful 
personal agency while entering a capital verdict.’878 The climax of this ‘judicial dispassion’ - which still 
influences the way judges are today perceived - is certainly to be found in the Eighteen century 
Enlightenment ideals and their associated Cult of Reason.
879
 Following this logic, the ideal judge does not 
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solely ground his decision on Reason – which, in turn, guides him and dictates him the appropriate course 
of action - but also behaves as the guardian of Reason taming the emotions of parties and society.
880
 
 
 
 
 Including Emotion into Judicial Behaviour 
 
 
 
The vision of emotion as solely disruptive to rationality has however evolved. Psychological works have 
progressively set forth the role of emotions on the way information is processed and pointed out their 
positive and constructive effects which lead individuals to better face and solve problems.
881
 Emotions are 
a fertile ground for heuristics. As ascertained by HANOCH and MURAMATSU, they act as ‘a toolbox of 
specialised cognitive shortcuts [which give] direction to search, stopping and decision rules that produce 
choice behaviour’.882 While supporting an enhanced use of emotion in theoretical models, economists 
have additionally pointed out its relevance and importance to better predict behaviour.
883
 
 
Similarly, the study of emotions has also pervaded the legal sphere.
884
 Cross-disciplinary perspectives on 
the impact of emotion on the law have blossomed and tend to constitute nowadays a ‘field whose time has 
to come’.885 When applied to judicial behaviour, it seems that the initial schizophrenia which disentangled 
the judge as a lawyer from the judge as a man (or a woman) has diminished. As previously said, a turning 
point in the United States was the Legal Realism movement which placed much emphasis on the human 
component potentially altering judicial decision-making.
886
 Meanwhile, judges themselves have 
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progressively acknowledged the role played by emotion in courtrooms.
887
 In a highly controversial speech 
given in the 1970s, the French General Attorney BAUDOT urged his colleagues to ‘not close neither 
[their] hearts nor [their] ears’ to human sufferings and to ‘assess imprisonment not from an annual or 
monthly perspective, but rather by taking into accounts minutes and seconds, as if [they] were 
[themselves] imprisoned.
888
 From the initial theoretical controversy questioning whether judges are indeed 
subject to emotion, discussions have nowadays evolved to more pragmatic issues, such as how emotion 
concretely affects judicial decision-making,
889
 to normative debates, such as how these insights should be 
incorporated into the analysis of judicial behaviour,
890
 or on how emotion should be regulated and used in 
a positive way within courtrooms.
891
 The initial stigmatisation and denial of emotion in the legal area has 
consequently progressively –albeit still slowly-892 been challenged by an enhanced acceptance of its 
importance in judicial practice. Among the still few scholars addressing the link between judges and 
emotions, the work of MARONEY who notably discussed the relationship between judges and anger can 
be mentioned as example.
893
 On the one hand, the author argues that anger helps judges focusing their 
attention, encourages responsive action, and therefore conveys power and authority vis-à-vis parties. On 
the other hand, anger may encourage stereotyped patterns of decision-making, misleading heuristics or 
premature, severe and disproportionate decisions. The author ultimately encourages a judicial 
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management of anger and calls for solutions aimed at ‘regulating judicial anger to maximize [its] benefits 
and minimize [its] dangers.’ 
 
With regards to the current research, considering the role played by emotions on judicial behaviour will 
also turn out to be essential when discussing the impact of the magnitude of mass claims on judges’ 
decision-making.  
 
 
 
 Squaring the Circle: Emotion and Bounded rationality – The Sensitive Judge  
 
 
 
Economists and psychologists have discussed the relationship existing between bounded rationality and 
emotions. Some of them have considered that SIMON, in his analysis of the bounded rationality, 
particularly focused on the cognitive limitations of individuals but failed to further investigate the peculiar 
role played by emotions. As observed by KAUFMAN, ‘the bounded rationality is located in the limited 
processing capabilities of the human brain, but largely ignores the role of passion’.894  Even though this 
viewpoint could be nuanced since emotion appears to be also mentioned in SIMON’s works,895 scholars 
have sought to clarify the link existing between bounded rationality and emotion.   
 
 On a general level, consensus exists on the reality of this link, even if disagreements still remain on its 
nature. The disagreement between KAUFMAN and HANOCH is on this point illustrative. Both of them 
have acknowledged the impact of emotion on decision-making. The first views emotion as an additional 
source of bounded rationality. The second similarly considers that emotions contribute to bounded 
rationality by restricting the range of options envisaged by decision-makers and by leading them to focus 
their attention on specific points or details.
896
 Disagreements subsist however on the impact of emotion on 
decision-making. KAUFMAN suggests that increases in emotional arousal progressively decrease the 
quality of decision-making up to the point where highly emotional situations may ultimately preclude any 
logical or reasoned behaviour.
897
 While criticizing this approach as being too simplistic, HANOCH 
ascertains a nuanced relationship between emotional arousal and decision-making by referring to the 
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complexity of human behaviour. Even though this debate is still open, these insights are instructive. They 
help constructing a better image of the judicial mind which does not appear to be solely subject to a 
cognitive bounded rationality, but also importantly to an emotional bounded rationality.
898
  
 
 
5.2.2. Mapping the Judicial Mind: Empirical Insights 
 
 
 
Previous theoretical developments have posited that judges can be regarded as bounded, biased and 
sensitive decision-makers. Such an approach depicts judicial behaviour from a perspective that seems 
more realistic than the one traditionally spearheaded by the legalist tradition. Empirical studies conducted 
with judges tend to substantiate these assumptions (a), even though their inherent limits invite us to 
remain prudent when interpreting and generalizing these results (b).  
 
 
a) Empirics and Judicial Decision-Making 
 
 
 
Empirical studies have pointed out that judges who are misled by heuristics tend to make systematic 
cognitive errors as human beings usually do. In addition, they have set forth the impact of emotional 
arousal on judicial decision-making. 
 
 
 
 Heuristics, Cognitive Illusions & Effects on Judicial Reasoning 
 
 
 
Following the path paved by TVERSKY and KAHNEMAN, behavioural economists and psychologists 
have investigated whether judges are likely to be prone to the same cognitive limitations and misleading 
heuristics as others human beings.
899
 In an experiment conducted in 1994, RAKOS and LANDSMAN 
already challenged the ideal of judicial self-control and questioned the view of judges acting as ‘masters 
of their biases’, able to control their intuitive reactions and emotions.900 While comparing jurors and 
judges – in other words, decision of specialists v. laymen - and their respective reactions when confronted 
with biasing information in a product liability case, the authors found that judges and jurors may actually 
                                                          
898
 Idem. 
899
 N. VIDMAR, ‘The Psychology of Trial Judging’, (20) Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2011, pp.58-
62, (reviewing the literature). The analysis of cognitive illusion and heuristics has also been extended to the field of 
arbitral decision-making as an attempt to propose an understanding of arbitrators’ behaviour (see also: C.R. 
DRAHOZAL, ‘A Behavioural Analysis of Private Judging’, (67) Law & Contemporary Problems, 2004, pp.105-
132). 
900
 S. LANDSMAN and R. F.RAKOS, ‘A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on 
Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation’, (12) Behavioural Sciences & The Law, 1994, pp.113-126. 
 193 
 
‘not be very different in their reactions to potentially biasing materials’. RACHLINKSI, GUTHRIE and 
WISTRICH similarly analysed whether judges were more able than jurors to dismiss inadmissible 
information when taking their decisions.
901
 In theory, judges should be able to ‘compartmentalize their 
knowledge’ so as to leave aside inadmissible proof. As the authors pointed out, one may naturally think 
that educated judges have ‘superior abilities to perform this difficult cognitive task’. Interestingly, their 
study again casts some doubt on the ability of judges to perform better than laymen. Based on 
questionnaires presenting different civil and criminal scenarios which were distributed to more than 200 
judges attending different judicial workshops and conferences,
902
 they found evidence that judges do not 
systematically dismiss inadmissible information when taking decisions.
903
 In one of the scenarios, they for 
instance notice that most of judges were ultimately influenced by information protected by the attorney-
client privilege, even though such evidence should normally have been considered inadmissible. As jurors 
or other laymen, judges are human and, as SPELLMAN expresses it, ‘it is difficult to envision how a mere 
desire, or an admonition, to stop thinking like a human being could be effective’.904 
 
Going a step further, in an innovative set of studies conducted with American judges, RACHLINSKI, 
GUTHRIE and WISTRICH also tested the presence of cognitive errors in samples generally varying from 
100 to 200 judges.
905
 Their results reveal that judges rely on anchors to estimate damage awards and are 
influenced by framing effects. They may therefore consider differently a settlement offer when 
alternatively assessed from the plaintiff’s or from the defendant’s perspective, even though both offers 
                                                          
901
 C. GUTHRIE, J.J. RACHLINSKI and A.WISTRICH, ‘Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Discarding’, (153) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2005, n°4, pp.1251-1345 
(information can be deemed inadmissible when it violates the principle of due process and fair trial - by for instance 
infringing the principle of loyalty in establishing proof -see on this point in French civil law, Court of cassation, 
Ass.plen., 7 January 2011, pourvoi n°09-14316 , bull. concerning the unnoticed records of private discussions 
between two persons involved in a cartel agreement; B. FARGES, ‘Le principe de loyauté dans l’administration de la 
preuve’, Revue trimestrielle de droit civil, 2011, p.127) - or when the risk of prejudice associated with the evidence 
outweighs its probative force (See notably Rule 403 of the US Federal Rules of Evidence stating: ‘the court may 
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence’). 
902
 The experimental design of the studies conducted by GUTHRIE, RACHLINSKI and WISTRICH follow each 
time a similar pattern. It consists in attending a meeting, a conference or judicial workshops, to distribute a 
questionnaire and to ask judges to read it carefully and to reply individually. Responding generally required 10 to 
fifteen minutes and generally, as the authors generally observes, judge tend to take surveys seriously.  
903
 M. CHORTEK, ‘The Psychology of Unknowing: Inadmissible Evidence in Jury and Bench Trials’, (32) Review 
of Litigation, 2013, pp.117-143 (For a recent comparison between juries and judges on the issue of inadmissible 
information). 
904
 B.A. SPELLMAN, ‘On The Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence’, (157) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 2007. 
905
 C. GUTHRIE, J.J. RACHLINSKI, A.WISTRICH, ‘Inside the Judicial Mind‘, (86) Cornell Law Review, May 
2001, n°4; C. GUTHRIE, J.J. RACHLINSKI and A.WISTRICH, ‘Blinking On the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases’, Vanderbilt Law & Economics Research Paper, 2007, n°07-32. 
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lead economically to identical results. Judges were also potentially subject to the representativeness 
heuristic,
906
 or prone to egocentric bias. Indeed, a vast majority of them (almost 90%) considered that their 
colleagues had higher chances than themselves to see their decisions being reversed on appeal. Finally, 
their reasoning is also influenced by the hindsight bias, even though other experiments have conversely 
nuanced its importance on judicial decision-making.
907
 Importantly, the presence of such biases in judicial 
reasoning is apparently not solely confined to American judges, but seems also concern their European 
counterparts. In a recent and similar experiment conducted with Dutch judges, RACHLINSKI and VAN 
BOOM found evidence that Dutch judges tended to be prone to the same cognitive errors.
908
   
 
Finally, and it is certainly a crucial point, judges may not be aware of the weight of heuristics in their 
decisions. For most of them, they are comparable to MOLIERE’s famous character Monsieur Jourdain in 
his play The Bourgeois Gentleman who, for forty years, has been speaking in prose, and not in verse, 
without knowing it.
909
 Two studies conducted on bail decisions delivered by British judges are on this 
point illustrative. In a first field study, DHAMI found that judges dealing with bail decisions heavily relied 
on previous decisions made by the police, the prosecution or other judges instead of fully investigating all 
the characteristics of the case in front of them.
910
 While noticing that judges were ‘either intentionally or 
unintentionally passing the buck’, the author was ultimately concerned by the fact that judges were 
manifestly behaving ‘contrary to the ideals of due process’. In another study, DHAMI and AYTON also 
found that judges relied on heuristics while deciding about bails.
911
 However, interestingly, the authors 
also pointing out the high degree of confidence of judges who, in their majority, were convinced that they 
had taken a fair and bias-free decision. As one of the judges emphasized, ‘we are trained to question and 
to assess carefully the evidence we are given’.912 
 
 
                                                          
906
 Idem (influence of the representativeness heuristics is not clear-cut. In one of their study, the authors observe for 
instance that more than 40% of them gave the correct answer). 
907
 K. VISCUSI, ‘How Do Judges Think about Risk?’ (1) American Law and Economics Review, 1999, n°1/2, pp.26-
62 (noticing: ‘the influence of hindsight bias on the retrospective assessment of an accident situation is also directly 
pertinent, but most judges were not prone to the hindsight biases). 
908
 J.J. RACHLINSKI and W. VAN BOOM, ‘Inside the Civil Judge’s Mind’, presented during the 6th topics 
workshop of the International Max Planck Research School (IMPRS) on Adapting Behavior in a Fundamentally 
Uncertain World, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 15-19 October 2012. 
909
 MOLIERE, The Bourgeois Gentleman, Act 2, Scene 4. 
910
 M.K. DHAMI, ‘Psychological Models of Professional Decision Making’, (14) Psychological Science, 2003, n°2, 
pp.175-180. 
911
 M.K. DHAMI, ‘Bailing and Jailing the Fast and Frugal Way, (14) Journal of Behavioural Decision-Making, 
2001, pp.141-168. 
912
 Idem, at p.163. 
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 Emotions, Mood & Effects on Judicial Reasoning  
 
 
Although often addressed indifferently and viewed as interchangeable, the concepts of mood and emotion 
are distinguished in the psychological literature. The distinction specifically refers to the degree of 
intensity which differentiates emotion from mood. The first is described as being of high intensity, of 
short or long duration and of high specificity. Conversely, the second remains of lower intensity, limited 
in time and less specific. For an illustration, fear is generally considered as an emotion, but boredom as a 
mood.
913
 Empirical research illustrating the impact of mood and emotion within courtrooms has notably 
been conducted with jurors and mock-jurors. Studies have for instance revealed that sad mood tends to 
enhance the quality of information processing and that sad mood jurors seem to perform better and to be 
more accurate when reporting testimonial inconsistencies.
914
  
 
A few empirical studies have nonetheless attempted to assess the influence of judges’ mood on their 
decisions. Insights on this matter remain nowadays often indirect. In a recent and controversial field study, 
DANZIGER, LEVAV and AVNAIM-PESSO sought to discuss a common caricature associated with the 
Legal Realism movement stating that law is simply ‘what judges have had for breakfast’.915 They 
consequently investigated the effect of food breaks on judges’ decisions to grant or deny prisoners’ 
requests. The survey consisted in the analysis of 1112 rulings delivered by 8 experienced Israeli judges. 
Each judge daily repeatedly dealt with 14 to 35 requests and spent on average about 6 minutes on each 
case. Remarkably, the likelihood of favourable rulings was higher at the beginning of the day or after food 
breaks.
916
 Conversely, the authors found that judges making repeated rulings were progressively favouring 
status quo decisions before a break by choosing the simplest solution, which was here to merely deny 
prisoner’s request and to maintain the previous decision. Since their results highlighting the weight of 
extraneous factors in judges’ decisions were potentially disturbing, the authors were highly cautionary 
when interpreting their findings.
917
 They suggested that judges might over time suffer from cognitive 
fatigue. When mentally depleted, they would thus progressively heavily favour status quo rulings and thus 
behave like other lay individuals who are similarly prone to status quo bias when making repeated 
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 Y.HANOCH, ‘The Effects of Emotions on Bounded Rationality: A Comment on Kaufman’, (49) Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002, n°1, pp.131-135. 
914
 C. SEMMLER and N. BREWER, ‘Effects of Mood and Emotion on Juror Processing and Judgements’, (20) 
Behavioural Sciences and the Law, 2002, pp.423-436. 
915
S. DANZIGER, J. LEVAV and L. AVNAIM-PESSO, ‘Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions’, (108) 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011, pp.6889-6892. 
916
 Idem (observing :‘the percentage of favourable rulings drops gradually from about 65% to nearly zero within each 
decision session and returns abruptly to about 65% after a break’).  
917
 Judges reacted to these findings, and set forth alternative explanations to the ones brought by the experiment. 
 196 
 
decisions.
918
 Experiments have indeed shown that people tend to stick to previous situations in order to 
notably avoid transition costs or costs of search. Breaks would consequently help restore the mental 
capacities of the judicial brain. Importantly, the authors nonetheless refused to draw clear connection 
between their findings and judges’ mood.919 Yet – and even though such extrapolation must obviously be 
taken very carefully -, shorts rests have potentially a potential impact on the positive mood of tired judges 
and might limit their deficit of attention or their potential boredom.  
 
In turn, the influence of emotions on judges’ decision-making has been given higher attention. A stream of 
research has notably investigated the effect of terror management on judicial rulings. Built upon the work 
of BECKER, terror management theory posits that fear of death (the so-called ‘mortality salience’) and 
reminders of personal vulnerability and mortality exert a powerful influence on behaviour and decision-
making.
920
 Scholars studying the effects of terror management have found extensive empirical evidence 
stressing that reminding people of their own mortality motivate them to defend their beliefs, and 
eventually to be harsher vis-à-vis those who do not share or ultimately threaten their cultural 
worldviews.
921
 In an experiment conducted with American municipal court judges, ROSENBLATT, 
GREENBERG, SOLOMON, LYON and PYSZCYNSKI highlighted the effect of terror management on 
judicial reasoning.
922
 Their experimental design required judges to assess the bond for a prostitute. Within 
the group of judges, some of them were previously given a questionnaire in which they were required to 
think about the circumstances of their own death, such as for example imagining what they think will 
occur when they die, or what their emotions and feelings are likely to be on this peculiar occasion. The 
study reveals that judges exposed to terror management tended to be significantly harsher than their 
colleagues who did not previously contemplate their own death. Judges who replied to the questionnaire 
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 W. SAMUELSON and R. ZECKHAUSER, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision-Making’, (1) Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 1988,  pp.7-59 (illustrating the statu quo bias through 2 experiments conducted with university 
employees asked to choose between different health plans and retirement investments). 
919
 S.DANZIGER, J. LEVAV and L. AVNAIM-PESSO, supra note 915 (warning that the study ‘cannot 
unequivocally determine whether simply resting or eating restores the judges’ mental resources because each of the 
breaks was taken for the purpose of eating a meal’, and similarly that they also cannot ‘ascertain whether taking a 
break improved the judges’ mood because mood was not measured in [the] study’). 
 
920
 E. BECKER, The Denial of Death, Free Press, 1973, 336 p. 
921
 J. ARNDT, J.D. LIEBERMAN, A. COOK and S. SOLOMON, ‘Terror Management in the Courtroom: Exploring 
the Effects of Mortality Salience on Legal Decision-Making’, (11) Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 2005, n°3, 
pp.407-438; see also: M.B. JONES and R.L. WIENER, ‘Effects of Mortality Salience on Capital Punishment 
Sentencing Decisions’, (33) Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 2011, pp. 167-181 (noticing that, according to the 
terror management theory, ‘punishing those who violate our own worldviews protects us against the terror of our 
own deaths by bolstering connections to the worldview, which lives beyond our own deaths’). 
922
 A. ROSENBLATT, J. GREENBERG, S. SOLOMON, D. LYON and T. PYSZCZYNSKI, ‘Evidence for Terror 
Management Theory: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural 
Values’, (57) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, n°4, pp.681-690. 
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indeed assigned on average a $455 bond whereas the amount set by judges who were part of the control 
group was only on average of $50. Noteworthy, a subsequent experiment conducted by RACHLINSKI, 
GUTHRIE and WISTRICH aimed at assessing the impact of terror management on bankruptcy judges 
failed to replicate the same findings. The authors found indeed no effect of terror management on judicial 
reasoning.
923
 Remarkably however, their experimental design somehow importantly differed from the one 
previously followed by ROSENBLATT and his team. In this second experiment, references to mortality 
and death were indeed made far more subtle and did not explicitly target judges personally. Judges were in 
reality invited to think about death in general, but not to envisage their own vulnerability. It is thus 
uncertain whether general thoughts about death ultimately led judges to think about their own personal 
death.
924
  
 
As a matter of fact, empirical insights show that traits of judicial behaviour tend to be far more 
complicated than the one traditionally spearheaded in the legal literature.  The identities of the parties, the 
context in which judges take their decision, ways problems are framed and presented have long-lasting 
implication on judicial decision-making.  
 
 
 
b) Methodological Issues and Need for a Precautionary Approach 
 
  
The weight associated with empirics should not be overstated, but be considered carefully. Inherent limits 
regarding notably the use of questionnaires, the external validity of laboratory results and the existence of 
contradictory findings on same topics invite us to prudent interpretations. Obviously, the remarks listed in 
these developments do not solely concern judges, but more generally target any empirical work. Empirics 
provide thus key insights and are appealing, but have still to be regarded as clues, and not as irrefutable 
truths.  
 
 Empirics on Judicial Behaviour and the Use of Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Aside field surveys which ground their findings on datasets of judicial rulings, most empirical works on 
judicial behaviour are built on questionnaires distributed to judges during conference and workshops. The 
                                                          
923
 C. GUTHRIE, J.J. RACHLINSKI, A.WISTRICH, supra note 901. 
924
 However, in an experiment conducted with mock jurors on a capital punishment trial, the authors manipulated 
mortality salience by exposing jurors to the death of plaintiffs, defendants and to their own death. Interestingly, they 
also found no clear evidence supporting the effect of terror management on jurors when they think about their own 
mortality (M.B. JONES and R.L.WIENER, supra note 921). 
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manipulation of questionnaires induces two sets of questions. The first regards their content and the 
manner questions are framed. The second concerns their relevance when compared to real-life situations.  
 
Arguably, experimental economists and psychologists may - consciously or unconsciously - influence 
their respondents by suggesting or highlighting particular responses. Research tends indeed to show that 
only modest alteration or changes in wording are often enough to influence the replies ultimately 
obtained.
925
 Even though experimental scholars may themselves be prone to framing effects when 
behaving as subjects of experiments,
926
 it is believed that they are largely aware of this now well-
documented bias when they behave as authors of studies, and consequently remain prudent when 
constructing their own surveys.  
 
The second issue regards the relevance of questionnaires to understand real-life situations. The question of 
experiments’ external validity - in other words, the question of whether experimental results can safely be 
translated outside laboratories to understand real-life situations - is well-known and remains a source of 
controversies and heated debates, notably between lawyers and economists.
927
 As opposed to real complex 
situations where facts are complex and intertwined, experimental scenarios are constructed on simplified 
issues which allow experimenters isolating and manipulating one or several independent variables. 
Moreover, even though judges may take questionnaires seriously, it may be objected that they will not 
exert the same level of attention and precision in their judgments, or fell ultimately less involved in the 
experimental design than in real-life situations in which real persons and real amounts of money are at 
stake. Finally, as opposed to experiments, deciding on real legal cases – specifically for hard ones – is 
usually a long process and judges may have ample time to discuss issues with colleagues to collect 
different views.         
 
Recent research has nonetheless mitigated this debate and suggested that experiments’ internal and 
external validities are not necessarily irreconcilable. Conversely, a correspondence between them does 
exist. As ANDERSON, LINDSAY and BUSHMAN observed through a meta-analysis comparing the 
results of field and laboratory experiments, ‘the psychological laboratory has generally produced 
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 A. TVERSKY and D. KAHNEMAN, ‘The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice’, (211) Science, 
1981, pp.453-458 (for an extensive overview): W. BRUINE DE BRUIN, ‘Framing Effects in Surveys: How 
Respondents Make Sense of the Questions We Ask’, in: G. KEREN (Ed.), Perspectives on Framing, London, Taylor 
& Francis. 
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 S. GAECHTER, H. ORZEN, E. RENNER and C. STARMER, ‘Are Experimental Economists Prone to Framing 
Effects? A Natural Field Experiment’, (70) Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 2009, pp.443-446 
(observing that junior experimental economists are also influenced by framing effects, while their senior colleagues 
are not). 
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 C. ENGEL, Legal Experiments: Mission Impossible?, Erasmus Law Lecture, Eleven International Publishing 
2013, n.28 (noticing that lawyers may regard legal experiments as being too scientific, individualistic, narrow, 
anxious and small). 
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psychological truths, rather than trivialities’.928 Another recent experiment conducted by MITCHELL also 
substantiates - but nuances – these findings by noticing that the correspondence between external and 
internal validities differs across topics and subfields and is dependent on sample sizes.
929
  
 
 
 
 
  Problems Associated with Equivocal and Contradictory Empirics  
 
 
In a lecture given at Erasmus University Rotterdam in March 2013, Professor RACHLINSKI questioned 
whether empirical legal studies tend to show ‘more heat than light’ by proposing scattered, equivocal and 
sometimes contradictory results on same topics.
930
A similar remark can be formulated concerning some of 
the experiments previously presented. For example, some studies revealed the presence of hindsight bias 
in judicial decision-making, while others did not. Some found evidence of the effect of terror management 
on judicial behaviour, but others ultimately failed to do so. The idiosyncrasies of experimental design, the 
choice of variables and the use of different datasets may explain these divergences. As a matter of facts, it 
may thus not be safe to generalize the results obtained. Further empirical research is currently needed. 
These divergences invite us to remain prudent when dealing with these results.  
 
 Empirical Findings and Need for Prudent Interpretation 
 
 
 
In many aspects, scholars dealing with judicial behaviour are similar to sailors trying to navigate between 
Scylla and Charybdis. Unsatisfied with the traditional legal views on judges, they propose new theoretical 
frameworks to explain judicial behaviour. As soon as theories are formulated, empirical evidence is 
logically urged as a way to substantiate their assumptions. Yet, when empirical insights are found, 
controversies and criticisms then arise regarding their relevance and possible generalization. It is here 
firmly believed that empirical evidence helps renew the vision of judicial behaviour by proposing 
alternatives to the legalist myth. When dealing with empirical findings, one should however keep in mind 
some key principles drawn from the Aristotelian ethics.         
 
First, as Aristotle observed, ‘a swallow does not make the summer’. Empirics may signal and draw 
attention on potential pitfalls or shortcomings of judicial decision-making that should not be neglected by 
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 C.A. ANDERSON, J.J. LINDSAY and B.J. BUSHMAN, ‘Research in the Psychological Laboratory: Truths or 
Triviality?’, (8) Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1999, n°1, pp.3-9. 
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 G.MITCHELL, ’Revisiting Truth or Triviality: The External Validity of Research in the Psychological 
Laboratory’,(7) Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2012, p.109. 
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 J.J.  RACHLINSKI, ‘Does Empirical Legal Studies Shed more Light than Heat’, Lecture at Erasmus University, 
20 March 2013. 
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policymakers. However, these studies remain clues or insights and are not aimed at formulating irrefutable 
assumptions on what is systematically going on within courtrooms or within judges’ minds.931 They rather 
shed light on the likelihood of possible inclinations, biases and misrepresentations that might alter their 
reasoning. Given the considerable human and financial stakes in the realm of mass litigation, even small 
mistakes may have dramatic consequences. It appears therefore preferable to prevent rather than to cure.  
           
Second, even though relying too heavily on empirics conducted with judges may turn out to be 
problematic, discarding them totally is also not a suitable option. Between over-scepticism and over-
reliance, an intermediate approach should be inspired by Aristotle’s Golden Mean. Departing from defect 
and excess,
932
 prudence should thus lead the interpretations of empirical research.  
 
 
 
 
5.2.3. Preliminary Conclusions and Criticisms: What about the Specificities of Legal   
          Reasoning? 
 
 
 
Departing from the legalist edifice largely built on the figure of the cold-blooded judge, this first part was 
aimed at highlighting that judges can be regarded as biased, sensitive and boundedly rational individuals 
taking their decisions in the heat of litigation, influenced by heuristics and prone to emotions. This first 
step was necessary before placing judges into the context of mass litigation.     
 
Most legal scholars might however reject this assumption and conversely defend the view that legal 
practitioners do think differently, or in other words, that it may exist a specific ‘psychology of judging’ 
that judges have progressively acquired throughout their education and practice.
933
 Its specificity would 
rest on the authority of precedents, analogical reasoning or on a ‘second-order’ type of reasoning by which 
judges, unlike lay individuals merely interested in the direct and immediate consequences of their 
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 T. ROSTAIN, ‘Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioural Law & Economics 
Movement’, (34) Law & Society Review, 2000, n°4, pp.973-1006 (noticing: ‘if there is one lesson to be drawn from 
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 F. SCHAUER, ‘Is There a Psychology of Judging’, in: D.KLEIN and G.MITCHELL (ed.), The Psychology of 
Judicial Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.103-120; see also: F.SCHAUER, supra note 609, at p.1 
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schools also maintain that their most important mission is to train student in the arts of legal argument, legal 
decision-making, and legal reasoning – in thinking like a lawyer’). 
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decisions, also take into consideration the consequences of their decisions on later cases.
934
 As SCHAUER 
expresses it, they might ultimately decide that ‘the best legal rule may be one which produces an unjust 
result in the present case, but which will produce better results in a larger number of cases’.935 On the 
contrary, psychologists and behavioural economists often influenced by previous works of Legal 
Realists
936
 have contested the fact that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ was a specific exercise, and rather argued 
that there is not much difference between judicial and non-judicial decision-making.
937
 Other studies 
referring to the MYERS-BRIGGS Type Indicator (MBTI) used to investigate facets of lawyers’ 
personalities have suggested that personality traits of lawyers are different from the ones of laymen.
938
 
Lawyers are more likely to prefer introversion
939
, intuiting
940
, thinking
941
 and judging,
942
 or tend to be 
‘more logical, unemotional, rational and objective in making decisions and perhaps less interpersonally 
oriented than the general population (…)’.943 Such tests have nonetheless not been conducted with judges, 
even though one could expect similarities between both categories. To this day, the issue remains thus an 
open question. The debate can be simplified as a continuum delimitated to each of its two extremes by two 
categories, namely the judge as man and the judge as a lawyer. Deciding where, between these two 
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 S.DAICOFF, supra note 938, at p.1393. 
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extremes, the cursor should fall ultimately depends on scholars’ personal views, the legal tradition of his 
(or her) country, and certainly also, on his (or her) degree of inclination with the claims of Legal Realists. 
Previous chapters have shown that Civil Law countries are less prone to entertain assumptions defended 
by Legal Realists.         
 
Alternatively, there might be another manner to envisage this issue. The key would be to not focus on the 
confrontation, but rather on the complementarity between both decision-making processes. In other words, 
judges do not think like lawyer or like laymen, but think like both because they are lawyer and laymen 
depending on the tasks that they have to perform. For example, concerning tasks that are deeply embedded 
in judges’ education, such as adjudicating or applying law to facts, they are more likely to think like 
lawyers and thus to be less influenced by emotional arousals. Concerning other tasks which differ from 
their traditional practice or education, they may in turn more easily think like other laymen. Regarding 
specifically the field of mass litigation, previous developments have highlighted that the tasks assigned to 
judges in this particular context tend to be peculiar and diverge from the ones that they are usually 
required to perform. They may therefore be more likely to exhibit features of decision-making that are 
comparable to the one of their fellow laymen.  
 
 
 
      * 
 
    
 
5.3. IN THE SHADOW OF NUMBER: THE EFFECTS OF GROUPS, NUMBER AND  
       SCOPE ON DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
The first part of this chapter targeted judges as decision-makers. It is now time to take into account the 
context in which bounded, biased and sensitive judges take their decisions. The second part of this chapter 
is therefore intended to discuss the impact associated with the magnitude of mass claims on the decision-
making process of boundedly rational judges who, as shown previously, are receptive to emotion and 
biases. Behavioural economists and psychologists have stressed the importance of contexts in decision-
making and problem-solving.
944
 Importantly, contexts do also influence the way judges take their 
decisions.
945
 In the realm of mass litigation, cases involve and consolidate in one lawsuit potentially 
                                                          
944
 E. FANTINO and S. STOLARZ-FANTINO, supra note 792; E. FANTINO, ‘Context: A Central Concept’, (54) 
Behavioural Processes, 2001, pp.95-110 
945
 C. GUTHRIE,  J.J. RACHLINSKI and A.WISTRICH, ‘Context Effects in Judicial Decision Making’, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, 2010; K.VISCUSI, ‘How Do Judges 
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hundreds of represented claimants who have suffered a similar harm. The magnitude of the case, that is 
the number of people involved and/or the size of the loss at stake, may consequently be considerable. 
Even though judges discuss and exchange with a limited number of protagonists during hearings - and 
notably among them, with representative bodies such as associations or leading counsels – fiduciary 
judges nonetheless take their decisions in the shadow of numerous represented or absent plaintiffs, that is 
in other words, in the shadow of number.
946
 Furthermore, groups do not only concern plaintiffs but also 
defendants: judges may indeed also deal with several defendants for instance suspected of having 
commercialised a same harmful product. Mass claims have thus an important psychological impact on 
parties and judges: issues at stake are usually highly sensitive societal concerns extensively relayed in the 
media. The fact that numerous individuals, consumers or shareholders are victims of a same misbehaviour 
often induce large emotional arousals, specifically at a period that has been pictured as a ‘victims’ 
time’.947     
 
Two related issues underlie these developments. The first questions whether the magnitude of mass cases 
is likely to act as a stimulus influencing the brain and behaviour of judges potentially sensitive to number 
and scope. Needless to say that such a starting hypothesis is erratic from a traditional legal point of view 
since the identity or the number of parties should theoretically have no effect on judicial decision-making 
focusing only on legal arguments. The second investigates ways by which judges may cope with the 
complexity associated with the magnitude of mass cases. One of the key points here set forth is that 
boundedly rational judges tend to refer to a set of heuristics to deal with complex mass claims involving 
numerous parties, as they often do in individual cases. Yet, it will be shown that, even though helpful in 
some situations, heuristics and their associated cognitive errors may also be exploited by others 
protagonists to influence judge’s decision-making.   
 
How do judges may process information when dealing with groups? What are the plausible cognitive 
errors that they might make when controlling the shape and size of groups? How other actors may exploit 
their errors in their own interest? Do situations involving many participants lead decision-makers to exert 
more effort than in situations involving one participant? Is the number of litigants likely to influence 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Think About Risk?’, (1) American Law and Economics Review,  n°1/2, 1999, pp.26-62 (showing that judges may 
also be sensitive to risky contexts. The author found notably evidence showing that judges tend to be risk-averse. 
They may overestimate small risks but underestimate larger risks. They may therefore consider risky drugs more 
favourably when the risks are higher but known and well-identified, and to be harsher when risks are lower but more 
uncertain).  
946
 On a broader scale, recent research has started to investigate the impact of numerosity on individuals' decision-
making and perception. See for instance: R. ADAVAL, 'Numerosity and Consumer Behavior', (39) Journal of 
Consumer Research, 2013, n°5, pp.11-14. 
947
 C. ELIACHEFF and D. SOULEZ-LARIVIERE, Le Temps des Victimes, Albin Michel, 2006, Paris, 293 p. 
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judgments on liability, causation and damages awards in mass litigation? Responses to these questions 
appear pivotal. They will shed a new light on the roles of neutral watchdog, cattle driver and good 
shepherd assigned to judges in this field. 
  
Built on generic insights drawn from behavioural economics and psychology, this section proposes a 
theoretical framework aimed at discussing the impact of mass claims’ magnitude on decision-making. 
Occasionally, there might not be empirical proof available to support all these claims. Sceptical readers 
may consequently find these assumptions rather speculative. As an attempt to remedy this problem, the 
next chapter will undertake some reality checks.  For the time being, it would be a mistake to discard these 
insights built on a body of informative and well-established literature. As expressed previously, doubts 
also remain on the fact that judges always perform better than lay people. Furthermore, even areas which 
could a priori appear to be highly specialised and require peculiar expertise are nowadays more and more 
prone to take into account insights of generic behavioural economics. The example of medicine is for 
instance instructive. It appears essential to be eclectic in our judgments since ‘the reliance on generic 
psychological research in this highly specialised field manifests a belief that any type of valid 
psychological research ought to be brought to bear to better understand how (…) decisions are made and 
how they can be made better’.948 (…) the prioritization of the usefulness of the research over its 
uniqueness could likewise benefit the study of judicial decision-making’. 949  
 
The rest of this chapter is divided as follows. The first section discusses the idiosyncrasies of information 
processing when decision-makers deal with groups v. when they deal with individuals and ultimately 
attempts to draw some conclusions on the way judges may perceive and handle groups in the realm of 
mass litigation (5.3.1). The second section questions the weight and usefulness of heuristics when 
managing complex mass cases as well as their associated risks of cognitive errors (5.3.2). The third 
section investigates the impact of number and scope on decision-making and draws some conclusions, 
notably concerning the assessment of causality and damages in mass disputes (5.3.3). Preliminary 
conclusions then conclude this second part (5.3.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
948
 D. SIMON, ‘In Praise of Pedantic Eclecticism’, in: D. KLEIN and G. MITCHEL (Eds.), The Psychology of 
Judicial Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.131-148. 
949
 Idem 
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 5.3.1. Perceiving Groups v. Perceiving Single Individuals: Effects on Information- 
                   Processing   
                       
 
Social Psychological literature considers that observers perceive and process information about groups 
and individuals differently (a).  Empirical evidence has also shown that decision-makers tend to decide 
differently when dealing with a group v. a single person (b). These insights shed new light on the 
functioning of mass litigation and on the manner judges may perceive and handle groups of plaintiffs and 
defendants (c). 
 
a) Perceiving Groups as Structured Entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 Perceiving Groups and Perceiving Individuals  
 
 
Facing a group or facing a single individual has an impact on the way information about the target is 
processed and on the manner such information is ultimately used to infer judgements.
950
 On the one hand, 
individual targets are assumed to be coherent and structured entities. Observers expect such unity and try 
to capture this coherence. They will be particularly alert and sensitive to the presence of inconsistencies in 
the behaviour of the individual target.
951
 On the other hand, groups are assumed to be less unified. 
Perceivers do not expect the same degree of coherence among group members as they usually do for 
single individuals. They are also less sensitive to inconsistencies accross group members’ behaviour. 
Consequently, perceivers may be able to better recall, organize and process information when dealing with 
an individual than when dealing with group members.
952
     
 
Extensive research has been conducted to understand the conditions under which an aggregate of 
individuals can per se be considered as a meaningful group. HAMILTON and SHEARMAN have 
suggested that a key factor lies in the degree of entitativity that perceivers seek to associate with the target. 
In other words, the level of entitativity is an important component of the cognitive construction that 
perceivers have about groups.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
950
 D.L. HAMILTON and S.J. SHERMAN, ‘Perceiving Persons & Groups’, (103) Psychological Review, 1996, n°2, 
pp. 336-355; J. SUSSKIND, K. MAURER, J.W. SHERMAN, V. THAKKAR and D.L. HAMILTON, ‘Perceiving 
Individuals and Groups: Expectancies, Dispositional Inferences, and Causal Attributions’, (76) Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, n°2, pp.181-191. 
951
 D.L. HAMILTON and S.J. SHERMAN, supra note 950. 
952
 Idem. 
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 The Concept of Entitativity 
 
 
The term entitativity was initially coined by CAMPBELL in 1958 to define the manner social groups are 
evaluated and assessed.
953
 The key tenet lies in the extent to which groups can be envisaged as being 
entitative, that is as ‘having the nature of an entity’. The concept of entitativity is aimed at capturing the 
degree of coherence and unity that a perceiver may associate with a collection of people. As HAMILTON 
expresses it, ‘entitativity is the glue that holds (or is perceived as holding) a group together’.954 
CAMPBELL suggested that among useful clues for assessing the group’s entitativity stand proximity and 
similarity between group members, or the existence of common goals or a common fate which leads 
participants to ‘move together in the same direction’. He therefore observed that ‘a band of gypsies is 
empirically harder, more solid, more sharply bound than the ladies aid society, and the high-school 
basketball team (…) falls somewhere in-between (…)’.955    
  
Building on this notion, HAMILTON and SHEARMAN have argued that the cognitive process that is 
engaged when perceivers deal with groups is dependent on the degree of the target’s perceived entitativity. 
Information about groups that are highly entitative is more likely to be processed in the same way as 
information about individuals. Perceivers expect the same unity and coherence across the behaviour of 
members of highly entitative groups as they usually do for individuals. Put simply, perceived unity and 
coherence of the group make the group resembles an individual.
956
 Conversely, information about lower-
entitativity group is less likely to be processed in the same way as information about individuals: 
perceivers will therefore expect less unity and coherence in the behaviour of group members.   
 
 
 
b) Empirical Evidence  
 
 
 
In a study, TVERSKY and REDELMEIER investigated whether physicians ‘make different judgements in 
evaluating an individual patient as compared with considering a group of similar patients’.957 Interestingly, 
                                                          
953
 D.T. CAMPBELL, ‘Common Fate, Similarity and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social 
Entitites’, (3) Behavioural Sciences, 1958, pp.14-35. 
954
 D.L. HAMILTON, ‘Understanding the Complexities of Group Perception: Broadening the Domain’, (37) 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 2007, pp.1077-1101 (here at p.1087). 
955
 D.T. CAMPBELL, supra note 953, at p.17. 
956
 S.J. SHERMAN and E.J. PERCY, ‘The Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and Why Collective 
Entities Are Likely to Be Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members’, (137) Journal of Law and 
Policy, 2011, pp. 137-170 (stressing that ‘the difference between perceptions of individuals and groups virtually 
disappears when a group is high in perceived entitativity’, at p.149). 
957
 A. TVERSKY and R.A. REDELMEIER, ‘Discrepancy between Medical Decisions for Individuals Patients and 
for Groups’, (322) The New England Journal of Medicine, 1990, pp.1162-1165. 
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they found that their decisions did indeed diverge. Physicians dealing with one patient were more likely to 
order additional tests, expend time directly assessing a patient, avoid raising some troubling issues, and 
recommend a therapy with a high probability of success but the chance of an adverse outcome.  The 
authors therefore noticed that ‘physicians give more weight to the personal concerns of patients when 
considering them as individuals and more weight to general criteria of effectiveness when considering 
them as a group’. Noteworthy, later similar experiments conducted by DEKAY and his team failed to 
replicate these findings and found no significant differences in treatment advice given to individuals and 
to groups.
958
 
 
A research conducted by TENBRUNSEL, DIEKMANN and NAQUIN similarly seems to show that 
negotiators are more likely to engage in unethical behaviour when dealing with groups than when dealing 
with individuals.
959
 In one of their experiments, NORDGREN and MCDONNELL similarly observed that 
subjects are less prone to make ‘a difficult but ethical decision when more victims were involved’.960 SAH 
and LOEWENSTEIN found evidence that advisors with financial conflict of interest are more likely to 
give biased advice to multiple and unidentified recipients than to single identified individuals.
961
 
Importantly, the authors report that ‘only advisors with single identified recipients demonstrated both 
awareness of the bias in their advice and a motivation to undo it’. 
 
 
 
c) Dealing with Groups, Entitativity and Mass Litigation  
 
 
 Entitativity and Groups of Plaintiffs 
 
 
How much entitative is a group of plaintiffs? Response to this question depends on the nature and 
peculiarities of the case at stake. Do plaintiffs constitute a mere loosely bounded aggregate where 
members share little similarities, or do they form a group that can be perceived as being highly entitative, 
that is which constitutes a single and coherent unit? In a study conducted jointly in the United States and 
in Poland, LICKEL and his team investigated the degree of entitativity that perceivers associate with 
                                                          
958
 M.L. DEKAY, C.A.E. NICKERSON, P.A. UBEL, J.C. HERSHEY, M.D. SPRANCA and D.A. ASCH, ‘Further 
Explorations of Medical Decisions for Individuals and For Groups’, (20) Medical Decision-Making, 2000, pp.39-44. 
959
 A.E. TENBRUNSEL, K.A. DIEKMANN and C.E. NAQUIN, ‘Unethical behaviour directed toward group versus 
individuals: The Role of Target Type In Promoting Misrepresentation’, unpublished manuscript (cited in: T.KOGUT 
and I.RITOV, ‘The Singularity Effect of Identified Victims in Separate and Joint Evaluations’, (97) Organizational 
Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 200, pp.106-116. 
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 L.F. NORDGREN and M.-H. Mc DONNELL, The Scope-Severity Paradox: Why Doing More Harm is Judged to 
Be Less Harmful’, (2) Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2011, pp.97-102 (at p.100). 
961
 S. SAH and G. LOEWENSTEIN, ‘More Affected = More Neglected: Amplification Bias in Advice to the 
Unidentified and Many’, (3) Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2012, pp.365-372. 
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different types of groups.
962
 40 groups were clustered into several categories including notably ‘intimacy 
groups’ (encompassing among others: members of a family, of a rock band…), groups with an explicit 
objective – also named ‘task groups’ - (members of a jury, of a labour union…) or without (people in a 
romantic relationship…) or loose associations (people standing in line at the bank, people in the audience 
at a movie…). The author found that higher entitativity was more likely to be associated with intimacy 
groups, while, by contrast, lower entitativity characterized loose associations. The group’s perceived 
entitativity mainly depended on the perceived interactions between group members, on the existence of 
common goals and common outcomes, and on similarities between group members. Conversely, others 
variables such as the group’s size or its permanence were ultimately perceived as being of less relevance. 
     
Groups of claimants stand in a continuum delimitated at its two extremes by intimacy groups and loose 
associations.
963
 Consider two simple scenarios. For matters of clarity, these two examples are simplified. 
Between these two extremes groups of plaintiffs can obviously vary in their unity and consistency. In the 
first scenario, 1000 consumers have bought a same product which, after a while, turns out to have an 
identical technical problem which makes it of no further use. The group sues the manufacturer and asks 
for reimbursement. In such circumstances, the group of plaintiffs is likely to be viewed as being highly 
entitative from the judge’s point of view: group members share important similarities: they all have 
bought a same product, manufactured by the same manufacturer and the problem is each time identical. 
The situation of one single claimant can therefore safely be extended to the group as a whole. In a second 
scenario, 1000 individuals have over a long period of time been exposed to chemicals and developed 
various chronic diseases. From the judge’s perspective, the entitativity of the group will here be perceived 
as being lower: the length of exposure and the magnitude of the harm may for instance drastically vary 
across group members. The only similarities tend to remain the presence of chemicals that caused the 
harm. As YEAZELL points out, on several occasions, courts have thus ‘[viewed] the class less as an entity 
than as a collection of individuals, (…) not [as] a collectivity but [as] many individuals’.964 The difference 
in groups’ entitativity is also visible in the terminology employed to depict mass litigation. Some authors 
refer to the terminology ‘group litigation’ while others prefer the concept of ‘aggregate litigation’. These 
                                                          
962
 B. LICKEL, D. HAMILTON, A. UHLES, A. NEVILLE, G. WIECZORKOWSKA, A. LEWIS and S. 
SHERMAN, ‘Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity’,(78) Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 2000, pp.223-246. 
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 S.J. SHERMAN and E.J. PERCY, supra note 956 (observing on a broader level that ‘all groups can be 
characterized as having some degree of entitativity, on a continuum from very low -heterogeneous, little connection 
between group members- to very high - strong group level impression, high cohesiveness among group members’). 
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 S.C.YEAZELL, ‘Collective Litigation as Collective Action’, University of Illinois Law Review, 1989, pp.43-68. 
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two notions can nonetheless be distinguished. Group litigation focus on a holistic approach (the group as a 
whole), while aggregate emphasises on the mere collection of single individuals.
965
   
 
Which lessons can ultimately be drawn from the notion of entitativity when applied to the group of 
claimants? Two points are here of interest. First, the psychological aim of the certification process during 
which judges play the role of watchdog filtering claims and supervising the shape and size of the group 
tends to be now clearer. From a legal point of view, it was shown that filtering ensures the group viability 
and helps determining the scope of claimants that are entitled to compensation. Going a step further, 
psychological insights suggest that the certification process also facilitates the way information about the 
group is cognitively processed by the judicial mind. When reviewing the numerosity of plaintiffs or the 
commonality of claims, judges assess the extent to which the group of plaintiffs can be viewed as being of 
lower or higher entitativity, or in others words, its likelihood to constitute a single and coherent unit.
966
 
This procedural step is likely to have long-lasting implications for the judicial management of mass 
claims.  
 
Groups that are likely to be perceived as single and structured units are more likely to trigger emotion, 
feelings of concern and enhance reactions. From an analysis of the influence of entitativity on charity 
donations, SMITH, FARO and BURSON found for instance that higher level of perceived entitativity of 
recipients increases the amount of donations.
967
  The authors theorized hence that ‘presenting a large 
number of victims in a way that makes them seem unified may be another way to increase support’.968 
From the judge’s viewpoint, a high perceived-entitativity may lead them to exert greater concerns and 
attention vis-à-vis the group.  High-entitativity groups will also facilitate higher levels of confidence 
among judges when taking their decisions, as well as greater emotional concerns.
969
 On the contrary, their 
attention tends to lose focus when targeting lower-entitativity groups. Experiments manipulating groups’ 
perceived entitativity reveal that group stereotypes are also more likely to be generalized to all members in 
highly entitative groups.
970
 WILDER found for instance evidence showing that perceivers generalize the 
characteristics of a single group member to the whole group in highly entitative group: subjects expect 
                                                          
965
 Aggregate is defined as a ‘composite’, ‘a collection of items that are gathered together to form a total quantity’. 
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 R.W. SMITH, D. FARO and K.A. BURSON, ‘More for the Many : The Influence of Entitativity on Charitable 
Giving’, (39) Journal of Consumer Research, 2013, pp.961-976. 
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 Idem. 
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 Idem. 
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 M. CRAWFORD, T. MATTHEW, S.J. SHERMAN and D.L. HAMILTON, ‘Perceived Entitativity, Stereotype 
Formation, and the Interchangeability of Group Members’,(83) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  2002, 
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members of a same group to share similar beliefs and behaviour even though, and it is an interesting point, 
they had previously been told that the group had been arbitrarily constituted.
971
  Others studies have 
revealed that greater implicit comparison is engaged between group members of highly entitative group,
972
 
or that membership of highly entitative groups ultimately makes the process of comparison between its 
members easier and faster.
973
 
 
Second, differences in the degree of entitativity associated with the group of plaintiffs (from intimate 
plaintiffs to loose associations) calls for higher flexibility in the use of group procedures. Instead of one 
unique group procedure, one may therefore be more inclined to support a flexible tool so as to take into 
account the different possible degrees of group’s entitativity. In this view, one could for instance mention 
the ‘simplified’ French group action which may be useful to deal with cases where victims are easily 
identified and can without great doubt be perceived as being part of a closed and intimacy group.
974
  In 
others words, this simple procedure would be reserved to highly entitative groups of plaintiffs where the 
situations of all group members can safely be compared to the one of a single individual.  
 
 Entitativity and Groups of Defendants 
 
 
The issue of groups’ perceived entitativity does not only apply to claimants, but also concerns defendants 
who may well be collectively targeted by a group procedure. One example among many is the class action 
lawsuit Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories brought against eleven companies manufacturing and selling 
diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug used to prevent miscarriages which turn out to have detrimental effects on 
health.
975
 Experimental evidence has revealed that the degree of perceived entitativity impacts on the view 
of the group as a causal agent responsible for its action and behaviour.
976
 NEWHEISER, SAWAOKA and 
DOVIDIO found clues showing that groups with higher perceived entitativity are punished more harshly 
than lower-entitativity groups ‘because they are perceived to be more morally accountable for their 
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 C.L. PICKETT and D.A. PERROTT, ‘Shall I Compare Thee? Perceived Entitativity and Ease of Comparison’, 
(40) Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2004, pp.283-289. 
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actions’.977 Lower entitativity groups are in turn more likely to benefit from the existence of mitigating 
circumstances.
978
 Additionally, the work of LICKEL and his team(s) has shown that judgements on 
collective responsibility tend to be highly dependent on the degree of perceived entitativity: the more 
entitative the group is perceived, the more likely its members will bear responsibility collectively.
979
  
Members of highly entitative groups are thus viewed as interchangeable regardless of their personal 
implications into the wrongdoing. They are collectively responsible for the offence perpetrated simply 
because of their shared characteristics with the offender.
980
 
 
Groups of defendants perceived as highly entitative may therefore impact on the assessment of pivotal 
legal issues of mass claims targeting multiple defendants. Let for instance consider the Sindell affair 
previously mentioned. One of the main difficulties that plaintiffs faced consisted in the impossibility to 
distinguish, within the group of defendants, the particular manufacturer that had produced the ingested 
drug. In a landmark decision, the court ruled that every defendant had to contribute to plaintiffs’ damages 
according to the percentage of their shares on the DES market.
981
 This solution, more commonly known as 
market share liability, has been extensively commented and debated in the legal literature.
982
 From a 
psychological and behavioural perspective, does this decision also make sense? Answering this question 
first requires assessing the degree of entitativity associated with the group of defendants. From the point of 
view of the court, the group of defendants was here likely to be perceived as highly entitative. Even 
though defendants objected that ‘there [was] little likelihood that all manufacturers who made DES at the 
time in question [were] still in business or that they [were] subject to the jurisdiction of California courts’, 
Justice MOCK emphasised that ‘all defendants [had] produced a drug from an identical formula’.983  
Moreover, the negative effects of DES on health were at that time known. In 1971, The US Food and 
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Drug Administration (FDA) had already alerted the public opinion and physicians against the toxic effects 
associated with the drug.
984
  A second step consists of connecting the degree of perceived entitativity with 
the view of the group as a causal agent. Empirical evidence previously presented has revealed that 
members of highly entitative groups tend to be seen as interchangeable and collectively responsible for 
wrongdoings committed by one of their peers, regardless of their personal implication. The decision that 
judges took in Sindell seems therefore to be explainable from a psychological perspective. As YEAZELL 
highlighted about this case, courts ‘treated defendants as a group’ by defending ‘group causation’.985 
When facing a highly-entitative group of defendants, judges may be more eager to consider defendants as 
interchangeable, and thus to retain a collective and shared responsibility even in situations where one or 
several defendants did not take – or take at a lesser extent - an active part to the wrongdoing.  
 
To go a step further, consider a recent ruling from the French Court of Cassation - also concerning DES – 
and its successive developments which are also illustrative of the effect of defendants’ entitavity on the 
assignment of liability. Two companies who had manufactured DES in the 1960-1970's were targeted by a 
lawsuit brought by a plaintiff who had ingested the drug. Like in the American case, it was extremely 
difficult for the plaintiff to identify which manufacturer had produced the drug ingested. However, unlike 
the American case, the DES market was at that time strongly unequally divided between two companies 
only: UCB Pharma on the one hand, and Borne (today, Novartis Santé Familiale) on the other.
986
 UCB 
Pharma had the largest market share on the DES market during this period (around 97%) when compared 
to its competitor (around 3%).
987
 From the court’s viewpoint, the defendants were here again perceived as 
being highly entitative: they were only two, had produced a same drug with the same formula, whose 
harmful effects were known, and at the same period of time. In its decision, the Court of cassation held the 
two companies jointly liable.
 988
 In the aftermath of this decision, scholars heavily discussed whether 
companies should be required to pay equal amount of damages, or if these amounts should be 
compounded on the basis of their respective liability or market shares. The market share theory was 
however contested.
989
 Interestingly, in a ruling delivered in October 2012, the Paris Court of Appeal 
decided that the two companies had to pay equal amounts of damages (50/50), even though the position of 
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the two companies on the market was at that time strongly uneven.
990
 This decision may be explained in 
many different ways. One may however not exclude that judges – while perceiving the companies UCB 
Pharma and Novartis as members of a highly entitative group - considered them as being interchangeable 
and thus collectively responsible, regardless of their respective implication which, in this case, was 
significantly asymetric.
991
 
 
5.3.2. Shaping the Group: Versatile Heuristics, Opportunistic Actors and Judicial  
          Management 
  
  
As said previously, judges overview the group and define its shape and size. They must notably fix the 
criteria that plaintiffs must meet to be included into it.
992
 Given the complexity of mass cases, judges 
might rely on a set of heuristics to facilitate their work. Previous developments have nonetheless shown 
that heuristics are versatile: their use helps decision-makers when facing complex matters, but they also 
lead to systematic cognitive errors and misleading mental shortcuts. Such versatility can also be found in 
the realm of mass litigation. Some heuristics may be useful and help judges coping with considerable 
amount of information (a), but others turn out to be misleading and give a biased image of the group or of 
the mass claim (b). They may also be used by opportunistic actors (c). Implications for judicial 
management are finally set forth. 
 
a) Useful Heuristics 
 
 
As continuously pointed out, mass claims are complex: numerous parties are involved, a voluminous body 
of evidence and large quantities of information are required, and a considerable amount of search is 
needed. Mass disputes are thus likely to constitute fertile grounds for procedural heuristics used to 
alleviate their complexity. Put simply, heuristics are aimed at facilitating the work of boundedly rational 
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judges who, like every human being, have limited cognitive capacities. As ULEN and KOROBKIN have 
emphasized, ‘complexity beyond human cognitive capacity is a sufficient condition for an actor to 
substitute a simplified decision strategy for a complete expected utility calculation’.993 Two heuristics are 
further highlighted. Importantly, their use appears strongly contingent on the degree of entitativity 
associated with the group. As research has indeed indicated, the group’s entitativity can affect infra-group 
perceptions.    
 
A first heuristic concerns for instance model or test cases. As discussed elsewhere, this technique is aimed 
at helping judges infer group characteristics from the analysis of a limited number of representative cases, 
and thus circumvent the boundaries of mass claims.
994
 Their use avoids thorough investigation across 
group members and save parties’ and judges’ scarce resources both in terms of times and money. The 
degree of entitativity attached to the group importantly impacts on the process of stereotyping.
995
 The use 
of model cases is particularly well-fitted to higher-entitativity groups where the behaviour of one or 
several group members can more easily be generalized.
996
 As PICKETT points out, ‘the degree to which 
one person is used as a comparison standard for another should depend not only on whether the two 
people belong to the same group, but also on the nature of that group (and specifically its entitativity)’.  
 
The second regards the technique of subgrouping. This tool is aimed at distinguishing within the group 
those who have related claims but different status or interest. The use of subgroups is also a heuristic 
device which helps judges cope with the group complexity by promoting an organizational structure 
within the claimant group. Again, subgrouping may particularly fit higher-entitativity groups. As 
previously suggested, perceivers dealing with a high-entitativity group are sensitive to inconsistencies of a 
group member, and thus more likely to leave aside divergent or idiosyncratic elements. Conversely, 
perceivers dealing with lower-entitative group will be less alert to possible inconsistencies among group 
members. As suggested also by PICKETT, ‘a disconfirming group member may [thus] be less likely to 
take place in lower entitative groups’.   
 
It seems therefore safe to assume that higher-entitative groups encourage judges to concentrate on the 
group as a whole, thus facilitates the use of heuristics and ultimately makes judicial work easier and faster. 
Their use may however induce systematic errors.  
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b) Misleading Heuristics, Biases and Risks of Misperception 
  
 
 
Simplification strategies lead to systemic errors which can have considerable impact on the resolution of 
mass disputes. Four biases, namely the outlier effect, the representativeness heuristics, the halo bias and 
the affect heuristic are further discussed. Some of them might be known among judges, while others have 
still received less consideration. This short list should ultimately be seen as an alarm bell that judges 
should keep in mind when monitoring mass claims.   
 
 
 
 
 
 The Outlier Effect  
 
 
A first error specifically relevant for mass litigation concerns the outlier effect. An outlier is commonly 
defined as ‘an observation in a set of data that is inconsistent with the majority of the data [because] it is 
substantially lower or higher than most of the observations’.997 This effect is well-known in descriptive 
statistics since the presence of outliers is likely to alter the mean and variance of a distribution, and 
ultimately bias results. The main psychological tenets of the outlier effect are first that members of a 
group are not assigned the same weight within the group, and second that decision-makers are often 
blinded by the presence of a stronger claimant. The outlier effect is thus comparable to the previously-
mentioned anchoring effect: the impression of the group as a whole is influenced and sketched from its 
most extreme and most idiosyncratic single members. Among the reasons explaining the existence of the 
outlier effect, one is associated with the complexity of dealing with groups. This complexity increases 
when the number of group members increases. In an experiment conducted with mock jurors, 
HOROWITZ, BROLLY and FORSTER LEE found evidence that jurors facing complex cases and high 
information-load are less and less able to distinguish between plaintiffs.
998
  Information about a group 
member that stands above the average is thus more likely to be easily recalled. Relatedly, ROTHBART 
and his team suggested that availability heuristics make group members who can more easily be retrieved 
to be disproportionately represented when assessing the group.
999
 The presence of outliers may be used for 
the management of mass litigation. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for instance states 
that the court can appoint as lead plaintiff the claimant ‘who has the largest financial interest in the relief 
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sought by the class’.1000 The behavioural impact associated with the outlier seems however to have been 
underestimated.  
 
Outliers can influence the way the group is perceived from different manners. On the one hand, the 
presence of an outlier may lead to the assimilation of all cases – even the weakest ones – to the situation of 
the outlier. On the other hand, the presence of the outlier may reinforce a contrast effect between plaintiffs 
which make weak claimants appear much weaker than they are in reality.
1001
 A study conducted by 
LEON, ODEN and ANDERSON points out a tendency to assess a group from the attributes of its 
extremes components.
1002
 Subjects principally focused on the most serious offenses, but ultimately 
ignored the less serious ones. In an experiment replicating the pattern of mass litigation, HOROWITZ and 
BORDENS similarly found evidence highlighting the influence of outliers in the decisions of simulated 
civil juries dealing with aggregated plaintiffs. As the author expresses it, juries seemed to use the 
judgement of the outlier ‘as a threshold test [:] if they decided that the company was indeed liable for the 
outlier’s injuries than all plaintiffs benefitted. If not, then all suffered.’1003  Following the same logic, 
judges might be receptive to contrast effects where their attention is ultimately distracted when worthless 
or weaker arguments are added to a brief of several arguments. By contrast, weaker arguments make other 
arguments appear stronger. Consequently, there is reason to believe that stronger claims mixed with 
weaker aggregated plaintiffs will also appear stronger than they actually are. Alternatively, weaker 
aggregated plaintiffs will suffer from the presence of outliers since their claims, when compared to the one 
of stronger claimants, will be perceived as being weaker than they actually are. There is thus a chance that 
weaker aggregated plaintiffs receive less than if if their cases were brought individually and separately.
1004
 
The presence of an outlier is therefore likely to have important implications on verdicts on liability or on 
assessments of damages. 
 
 The previously cited asbestos class action lawsuit Cimino v. Raymark Industries Inc. is on this point 
illustrative.
1005
 As previously explained, plaintiffs who had been exposed to asbestos at workplaces were 
divided into five clusters depending on the severity of their disease. These five groups were respectively 
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mesothelioma, lung cancer, asbestosis, pleural disease and other cancer. In his report, the Special Master 
first recommended to exclude from the group mesothelioma plaintiffs because they only represented a 
small percentage of the claims (32 persons suffered from mesothelioma and 1,050 from asbestosis) but 
this disease was far more severe than pleural or asbestosis plaintiffs.
1006
 Interestingly, it was thus feared 
that ‘the jury may be unduly influenced by dramatic illness which make up a small percentage of the 
plaintiffs’ class’.1007 Finally deciding to nuance his point of view, the Special Master finally suggested 
educating jurors as a manner to mitigate the outlier effect. Jurors were thus asked to ‘not judge all cases in 
the class as the same as the most or least serious of the class representative and perhaps by pointing out  
(…) the relatively small percentage of mesothelioma cases in the class as a whole’.1008 In other words, 
information provision was in this case used for debiasing jurors. 
 
 
 Representativeness Heuristics   
 
 
Representativeness heuristics is a pivotal issue in the realm of mass litigation since mass disputes are 
strongly enrooted in the notion of representation:
1009
 claims are brought on behalf of known or unknown 
plaintiffs; cases of representative plaintiffs are generalised and used to circumvent the boundaries of the 
dispute; judges facing limited financial and cognitive resources finally use a set of case management 
techniques (bellwether trials, statistics, sampling)
1010
 which also strongly rely on the notion of 
representativeness.  Regarding the commencement, the monitoring and the denouement of mass disputes, 
this concept remains central.  A key issue is however the extent to which decision-makers - and more 
particularly in this case, judges - should rely on representative tools when monitoring mass cases. They 
should for instance be aware of the common mistake which consists of overestimating common points 
between samples (or model cases) and the parent population from which they are drawn. This error set 
forth by KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY is commonly known as the belief in the law of small number.
1011
 
The authors indeed found that decision-makers tend to exaggerate their confidence in the conclusions 
drawn from the analysis of samples or representative cases. 
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 Halo Bias 
 
 
Decision-makers dealing with mass claims may also be prone to the halo bias when evaluating groups of 
plaintiffs or defendants. This cognitive error can notably occur when general conclusions or assumptions 
are inferred from representative or model cases. Defined as the ‘tendency to make inferences about 
specific traits on the basis of a general impression’,1012 the halo effect was named and investigated in the 
twenties by THORNDIKE through the ratings of soldiers by their superiors.
1013
 The human mind, 
disturbed by risks of cognitive dissonance, seeks to cope with heterogeneity by encouraging a coherent 
and structured framework. As ROSENZWEIG observes, it is ‘difficult for most people to independently 
measure separate features [;] there is [thus] a common tendency to blend them together.’1014 Many 
experiments have substantiated the existence of this bias. Recently, MALOUF, EMMERTON and 
SCHUTTE found for instance evidence revealing halo bias in the decision-making of teachers when 
grading their students.
1015
 In their experimental design, subjects were invited to grade the written work of 
a student who had previously given an oral presentation. The quality of the oral presentation (classified as 
good or bad) was manipulated, whereas the written work remains constant to all graders. The authors 
found that the evaluation of written works was significantly biased by the performance to the oral 
exercise. Another recent experiment conducted by SCHULDT, MULLER and SCHWARZ revealed that 
products presented as fair trade products are more likely to be perceived as containing lower calories that 
non-fair trade ones, and thus warned against the risks that ethical food lead to unwarranted healthy 
inferences.
1016
 Finally, several studies have concluded that ‘what is beautiful is good’: attractive people are 
therefore more likely to be perceived as skilful and talented persons than their less attractive 
counterparts.
1017
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Halo effects also exist within courtrooms in individual litigation. For two cases of equivalent strengths, 
judges are more likely to be seduced by the performance of good lawyers, and conversely bored by bad 
pleadings.
1018
 Since litigating is also the art of convincing, lawyers’ performance acts as a halo tainting 
positively or negatively the perception that judges hold about the case. In an experiment conducted with 
simulated juries, EFRAN found that the decision-making of jurors was also biased by a halo: physically 
attractive defendants were more likely to be punished with less certainty of guilt or with less severity than 
their less attractive counterparts.
1019
 Transplanted into the realm of mass litigation, the main question 
regards the existence of a halo potentially associated with model or representative claimants which may 
ultimately jeopardize the assessment of the whole group.  
 
 
 
 Affect Heuristic and Availability Heuristic 
 
 
SLOVIC and his colleagues have identified the affect heuristic to refer to situations wherein people 
‘consult their affective feelings when making judgements and decisions’.1020 Put differently, feelings and 
affects act as shortcuts channelling decision-making and subsequent judgements on risks and benefits.
1021
 
Mass claims are often emotionally charged and deal with highly debated societal issues such as, for 
example, asbestos, DES, breast implants and other large-scale damage. As stressed in the previous 
chapter, judges dealing with mass disputes and seeking prestige, power, reputation or who are deeply 
concerned with the fate of plaintiffs may be tempted to behave as gurus dictating their own views about 
the case.
1022
 On this occasion, the behaviour of Justice WEINSTEIN when managing the Agent Orange 
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class action litigation was mentioned as an illustration. Judge WEINSTEIN was indeed convinced that the 
United States had a debt towards its Vietnam veterans and thus heavily and actively contributed to an 
active resolution of the case.
1023
 As O’NEILL notices, judge WEINSTEIN ultimately channelled the 
lawsuit through ‘his [own] concept of the best solution’.1024 His behaviour in Agent Orange seems 
therefore symptomatic of a decision influenced by the affect heuristic. His feelings and his own sense of 
what was good and right in this case strongly influenced his views of the case.  
 
Relatedly, the availability heuristic can also trigger the affect heuristic. Research has indeed shown that 
these two cognitive mechanisms may interact.
1025
 As said earlier, the availability heuristics posits that 
decision-making is influenced by the number of occurrences that can easily come to mind. Media very 
often play a key role in this respect.
1026
 The quality of the information provided is thus essential.  
Interestingly, a study conducted by BAILIS and McCOUN has reported that media may provide a 
distorted image of tort litigation by over representing the most controversial cases, exaggerating the 
number of cases decided by a  jury, over representing plaintiffs’ success or providing a distorted picture of 
the award distributed.
1027
 The authors concluded that media reports ‘provide dubious basis for sound 
decision making by potential claimants, manufacturers, health-care providers, lawyers and government 
officials’.1028 Arguably, one could argue that insulated judges are less likely to be influenced by such 
media coverage. Yet, judges, as other human beings, read newspapers too. They may therefore 
consciously or unconsciously be influenced by the magnitude of mass cases extensively relayed in the 
media.  
 
 
c) Judges’ Cognitive Errors Used By Opportunistic Agents  
 
 
Judges can be prone to cognitive errors and some of them seem particularly likely to occur when they 
handle mass claims. A key issue then turns out to be: what happens if these cognitive errors and 
misleading heuristics are opportunistically used against them by others protagonists also involved in the 
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management of mass claims, and who have clearly understood the dynamics and added-value of such 
tools?  KURAN and SUNSTEIN have for instance pointed out the existence of ‘availability entrepreneurs’ 
exploiting ‘availability cascades’.1029 As the authors highlight, ‘located anywhere in the social systems, 
including the government, the media, non-profit organizations, the business sector and even households, 
these entrepreneurs attempt to trigger availability cascades, likely to advance their own agenda. They do so 
by fixing people’s attention on specific problems, interpreting phenomena in particular ways and 
attempting to raise the salience of certain information’.1030 
 
More specifically, consider here the role performed by plaintiffs’ associations in mass litigation (but the 
same reasoning also holds for defendants). As previously explained, these entities play cornerstone 
functions.  In the French group action or the Dutch WCAM, they help filter and organise the claimant 
group. In some proceedings, they may also set forth model cases to help judges circumvent the boundaries 
of mass claims.
 1031
 In line with previous developments, it is strategically judicious and relevant for 
associations to amplify the presence of outliers since they may influence decision-making; associations 
may also use the representativeness heuristics by presenting samples as being representative of the parent 
population; they may choose their model cases in such a way to trigger the halo bias or affect heuristic in 
judicial minds. And the other way around, defendants may similarly be eager to use judges’ behavioural 
flaws in their own interest.  Prior behavioural research has indeed revealed that decision-making could be 
altered by the presentation of evidence.
1032
   
 
 
 5.3.3. On the Ambiguous Effects of Numbers on Decision-Making: Illustrations with the  
                      Issues of Causation and Damages in Mass Claims 
 
 
It was previously suggested that decision-makers process differently information about individual and 
group targets. Adding to this edifice, they also behave differently when facing individual and identified 
targets and when facing numerous and unidentified ones. From a utilitarian perspective, one could 
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theoretically expect that extra attention and extra care will be dedicated to decisions that impact on the 
welfare of a large number of people, no matter if the targets are clearly identified or not.
1033
 This issue is 
essential in the realm of mass litigation. In procedures based on the opt-out system, numerous plaintiffs 
are indeed not identified but nonetheless included into the claimant group. Some authors have then 
pointed out a process of ‘depersonalization’ since plaintiffs are not identified but simply viewed en 
masse.
1034
 Others have further observed that one of the ‘tragic aspect of mass torts is that individual harm 
becomes routinized’.1035 From the viewpoints of judges expected to behave as good shepherds taking care 
of the interests of represented parties who are absent during hearings, this issue appears pivotal.
1036
  
 
Psychological and behavioural literature is on this point scattered. A branch suggests that judges can be 
numbed by number and under-estimate the numerous plaintiffs who are not physically present in the 
courtrooms (a). Another branch suggests a power by numbers leading judges to overestimate the presence 
of multiple plaintiffs when compared to other relevant legal factors (b). The implications of these insights 
are discussed with regards to the issue of causation and damages in mass claims (c). 
 
 
a) Numbed by Numbers  
 
 
Numbing by numbers refers to the inability of the human brain to fully entertain the idea of multiple 
parties and large scope, and to the tendency to rather choose outstanding elements of a group as anchors. 
In this view, the outlief effect previously presented was an example of such a numbing by numbers. 
Similarly, the identifiable victim effect is a second illustration of this behavioural bias.    
 
 The Identified Victim Effect and Vividness Heuristic 
 
 
In a seminal article on the economic analysis of the worth of human lives, SCHELLING claimed that 
people tend to assign different weights to an individual identified life when compared to statistical 
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class actions, from the standpoint of protecting the rights and dignity of an otherwise depersonalized mass of 
plaintiffs/claimants’, at p.521, emphasis added). 
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lives.
1037
  While the first is seen as a ‘unique event’, the second fails to ‘evoke these personal, mysterious, 
superstitious, emotional or religious qualities of life and death’. He therefore theorized that ‘the more we 
know the more we care’. Put simply, people tend to be more sensitive to the condition of identified 
individuals, but feel ultimately less concerned by the one of unidentified victims. This decrease in 
sensitivity vis-à-vis unidentified victims is known as the identifiable victim effect. In a very similar logic, 
NISBETT and ROSS pointed out a so-called ‘vividness heuristic’ which lead people to overestimate 
information that is vivid and imagery-provoking as compared to highly probative but pallid statistics.
1038
   
 
The causes underlying the identifiable victim effects and the vividness heuristic are multiple.
1039
 
Personalized information associated with an identified individual or event notably induces greater 
emotions, empathic response, greater concerns or higher concreteness. They thus lead to a higher level of 
commitment and involvement among decision-makers. On the contrary, larger number, larger scope or 
broad data often fail to do so. As SLOVIC pertinently highlights, ‘the number fails to spark emotion or 
feeling and thus fail to motivate action’.1040 Numbers and scope are, in others words, realities that the 
human mind does not fully entertain. Based on these arguments, commentators have thus pointed out that 
the decision-making process seems primarily to be driven by emotional response and affective evaluation 
rather than by strict rational economic calculation.
1041
  
 
 
 Empirical Evidence  
 
 
Abundant empirical evidence has shown that people are more willing to exert a higher degree of attention 
and effort when their actions or decisions are directed toward identified people, suggesting therefore that 
this bias is actually a well-established pattern of human behaviour. Such insensitivity to scope was for 
instance highlighted in a study conducted by DESVOUSGES and his team in the aftermath of several oil 
                                                          
1037
 T.C.SCHELLING, supra note 878. 
1038
 R. NISBETT and L. ROSS, Human Inferences: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement, Prentice Hall, 
1980, 334 p. (here p.43-620, ‘assigning weights to data: the “vividness criterion”’). 
1039
 K.E. JENNI and G. LOEWENSTEIN, ‘Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect’, (14) Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 1997, pp.235-257. 
1040
 P. SLOVIC, ‘If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act: Psychic Numbing and Genocide’, (2) Judgement and 
Decision-Making, 2007, n°2, pp.79-95 (highlighting that such a tendency explains the lack of sensitivity associated 
with mass murders like genocide). 
1041
 D. KAHNEMAN, I. RITOV and D. SCHKADE, ‘Economic Preferences or Attitudes Expressions? An Analysis 
of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, (1) Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1999, pp.203-235. 
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spills.
1042
  In their experiments, subjects were told that each year some migrating birds drown in uncovered 
oil ponds, and were questioned about their willingness to pay to help covering the ponds with nets which 
could prevent 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning. The experiment was thus principally aimed 
at investigating whether an increase in the number of protected birds triggered a higher willingness to 
contribute. Their study revealed that participants’ willingness to pay to protect birds only slightly varies: 
the mean amounts were $80, $78 and $88 to help saving respectively 2,000, 20,000 and 200,000 birds. 
Adding to the debate, the work of SLOVIC and his colleagues has shown that people are often more 
sensitive to minor changes in their environments (from 0 to 1 death), but conversely less sensitive to 
greater changes (such as, for instance, from 500 to 600 deaths).
1043
 SMALL and LOEWENSTEIN found 
that even a very weak change in the identification of the victim is often enough to increase caring.
1044
  
KOGUT and RITOV found that one individual is more likely to raise the amount of charity donations than 
groups of victims, even though group members are identified.
1045
 Extending the literature, SMALL and 
LOEWENSTEIN have shown that the identifiable victim effect could also be applied to wrongdoers, and 
consequently become an identifiable wrongdoer effect. The authors found indeed evidence that people are 
more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than toward equivalent but non-identified ones.
1046
  
 
Similarly, empirical research has been conducted to test the vividness heuristic. They have shown that 
‘aggregated, statistical, data-summary information is often particularly probative, but it is also likely to 
lack concreteness and emotional interest’.1047 To illustrate this point, experiment conducted by HAMILL, 
                                                          
1042
 W.H. DESVOUSGES, F.R. JOHNSON, R.W. DUNFORD, S.P. HUDSON and K.N. WILSON, ‘Measuring 
Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability’, in: J.A. HAUSMAN, 
Contingent Evaluation: A Critical Assessment, pp.91-164. 
1043
 P. SLOVIC, M. FUNUCANE, E. PETERS and D.Mc GREGOR, ‘Rational Actors or Rational Fools: 
Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioural Economics’, (31) Journal of Socio-Economics, 2002, pp.329-
342 (at p.337). 
1044
 D.A. SMALL and G. LOEWENSTEIN, ‘Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability’, 
(26) Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2003, pp.5-16 (in their experimental design, the main difference between 
identified and unidentified individuals was indeed that in one scenario recipients were already determined when 
subjects were asked to take their decision, whereas in the other scenario recipients had still to be identified. The 
authors finally observed that ‘if such a weak form of identifiability can produce such a dramatic difference in 
altruistic behaviour it seems likely that variations of identifiability will produce even more dramatic effects in 
naturalistic situations in which, for example, one usually does obtain at least some information about identifiable 
victims’ – emphasis added, at p.11). 
1045
 T. KOGUT and I. RITOV, ‘The Identified Victim Effect: An Identified Group or Just a Single Individual?’, (18) 
Journal of Behavioural Decision-Making, 2005, pp.157-167. 
1046
 D.A. SMALL and G. LOEWENSTEIN, ‘The Devil You Know: The Effects of Identifiability on Punishments’, 
(18) Journal of Behavioural Decision-Making, 2005, pp.311-318. 
1047
 R.NISBETT and L.ROSS, supra note 1038, at p.56. 
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WILSON and NISBETT found for example that an individualised and vivid example is more likely to 
influence decision-making than pallid statistical information of greater evidential value.
1048
  
 
  
b) Power in Numbers 
 
The cognitive mechanisms earlier pointed out (the representativeness heuristic, the affect heuristic and the 
availability heuristic) suggest that the number of plaintiffs or the magnitude of large-scale damage may 
also outweigh others relevant parameters in the mind of legal decision-makers. As it will be shown in 
Chapter 6, empirical evidence of a 'power in number' was found through an experiment conducted with 
professional lawyers. 
 
 
c) Applying These Insights - On the Effects of Number on Causation and Damages in Mass 
Claims 
 
The magnitude of mass claim and the number of claimants can impact on the behaviour of legal decision-
makers. As shown previously,
1049
 even professionals that one could imagine to be better immunized than 
laymen behave differently when facing an individual or a group. In order to go a step further, consider 
more specifically the issues of causation and damages in a mass product liability case. This framework is 
retained because widely commercialised defective products are a prototypical example of large-scale 
damage potentially affecting many people. Already challenging in individual litigation, the legal dilemmas 
associated with causation and damages tend to be magnified in mass claims. Behavioural research has 
interestingly shed scattered light on the impact of numbers on such pivotal issues.  
 
 Multiple Plaintiffs and Causation – Legal Dilemmas  
 
Already in individual litigation, establishing causation in a product liability case is a sensitive issue upon 
which the whole success or failure of a claim may ultimately depend.
 1050
 Indeed, ‘for many novel risks it 
is hard to establish affirmatively the link between products and damage where there is scientific dispute. It 
                                                          
1048
 R. HAMILL, T.D. WILSON and R.E. NISBETT, Ignoring Sample Bias: Inferences about collectivities from 
Atypical cases, unpublished manuscript, university of Michigan, 1979 (the content and conclusions of this 
experiment was reported in NISBETT and ROSS, supra note 1038, at p. 57-58). 
1049
 A. TVERSKY and R.A. REDELMEIER, supra note 957. 
1050
 C.J. MILLER and R.S. GOLDBERG, Product Liability, Oxford University Press, 2004, 2
nd
 ed. (highlighting: the 
‘proof of causation will often lead to either a settlement or a successful claim (…). Conversely, a failure to establish 
a causal link between a product, and, for example, the alleged medical conditions of claimants, may lead such claims 
being struck out as an abuse of the process of the court on the basis that each claim has no real prospect of success’, 
at pp.695-696). 
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may be difficult to determine whether an illness was caused by a product or other biological or 
environmental factors’.1051 The assessment of the causal link is thus often ‘inherently difficult, requiring 
time-consuming and detailed examination by the court of complex and often conflicting, scientific 
evidence’.1052  
When transposed to mass contexts, the problem of causation appears magnified. As SILICIANO observes, 
‘the only thing unique about causation issues in mass tort cases is that the sheer number of claims makes 
more visible to the naked eye the common – and commonplace – weakness such cases share with respect 
to the issues of causation’.1053 Noticing the multiplication of large-scale damage, the legal doctrine has 
progressively questioned the role potentially played by the number of involved plaintiffs on the 
assessment of causality.
1054
 GUEGAN-LECUYER has pertinently encapsulated this problem in the 
following terms:  
‘Confronted with a case involving potentially a large pool of plaintiffs, whose debt resulting from civil 
liability might reach considerable amounts, the judge might be willing to exercise a higher degree of 
scrutiny when examining the causal link. Given that the effect of establishing such a link might have a 
bearing on the activity of the one in breach, one should remain vigilant. And the other way around, the 
effect might be also opposite when, in the presence of a big pool of potential victims, the judge might 
show a rather liberal approach to the establishment of the causal link’.1055  
In absence of clear-cut evidence, the mere fact that numerous plaintiffs are involved can easily become 
per se a sufficient proof which would enable courts to ‘escape [the] causation conundrums by easing or 
ignoring wholesale the traditional requirements of proof.’1056 As the old saying states it, ‘where there is 
smoke, there is fire’. Two cases of equal merits may consequently reach two different outcomes on the 
mere basis that they concern a single or numerous claimants. As SILICIANO further observes, ‘weak 
                                                          
1051
 G. HOWELLS, The Law of Product Liability, Butterworth Common Law Series, 2
nd
 ed., at p.382 
1052
 Idem, at p.444 
1053
 J.A. SILICIANO, ‘Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis’, (80) Cornell Law Review, 1995, pp.990-1013. 
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 D. ROSENBERG, ‘The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 
(97) Harvard Law Review, 1984, pp.849-929. 
1055
 A. GUEGAN-LECUYER, ‘Incertitude et Causalité dans la Perspective des Dommages de Masse’, Symposium 
Risque, Assurance, Responsabilité: Le Traitement Juridique et Judiciaire de l’Incertitude, Court of Cassation, 2008, 
(available on : http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/intervention_mme_lecuyer.pdf) (translation from the author. 
In French : ‘saisi d’une affaire dans laquelle le grand nombre potentiel de victimes indique que la dette 
d’indemnisation sera énorme en cas de responsabilité civile établie,  le juge pourrait être enclin à se montrer exigeant 
dans l’appréciation de la causalité. L’impact de sa reconnaissance pouvant remettre en cause l’activité du 
responsable, il convient de se montrer prudent. Mais l’effet du grand nombre potentiel de victimes peut également 
être inverse et conduire le juge à un certain libéralisme dans l’appréciation de la causalité’).  
1056
 J.A.SILICIANO, supra note 1053. 
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evidence on causation is invariably fatal even though we know as a statistical matter that some such 
causation hypotheses must in fact be true. In the mass tort context, the same failure of proof problem can 
occur at the level of individual claims, but at the aggregate level one may observe statistically significant 
proof of generic causation by virtue of the large numbers involved’.1057 In simple words, identical weak 
evidence could lead the individual case to a failure, but the multi-plaintiffs case to a success. 
 
 Multiple Claimants and Damages – Legal Dilemmas  
 
 
 
 
Once liability is established, the compensation amounts awarded to plaintiffs must be calculated following 
the traditional restitutio in integrum rule. These amounts should correspond to claimants’ respective losses 
in order to replace the injured parties to the situation in which they would have been if no injury had 
occurred. The mass context is however specific and might invite to depart from this rule.   
First, amounts awarded to multiple claimants can arguably be reduced to avoid impairing defendants’ 
financial stability. As ROE points out, ‘the tort system normally creates simple financial liability to an 
individual or a class after a single trial or settlement. But under circumstances of massive enterprise 
liability after multiple trials and settlements, that financial clarity and simplicity is quickly obliterated’.1058  
The example of the asbestos litigation in the United States which, at the end of 2002, involved more than 
700 000 individuals is illustrative: 85 liable companies filed for bankruptcy and many insurers became 
financially fragile.
1059
 Such situations led scholars to argue in favour of a limitation of the scope of 
liability and of the amounts of damages awarded in high-profile accidents.
1060
 Second, if as said 
previously, large number of claimants might facilitate the proof of causation, a manner to however express 
the weakness of their claim might be in the amounts of compensation awarded to plaintiffs. In other 
words, a discount effect may lead to a decrease in the amounts awarded to numerous plaintiffs which 
ultimately reflects the weakness of their claim, weakness which, in an individual case, would have been 
fatal for the single plaintiff.  
Regarding the assessments of causality as well as the amount of damages awarded, legal decision-makers 
may face dilemmas. Mass claim’s merit might therefore not be the only parameter taken into account. 
Insights from behavioural research have contributed to this discussion in a scattered way.  
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 Idem (emphasis added). 
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  M.J. ROE, ‘Bankruptcy and Mass Tort’, (84) Columbia Law Review, 1984, pp.846-922. 
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 M.J. WHITE, 'Asbestos and the Future of Mass Tort’, (18) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004, pp.183-204. 
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 S. SHAVELL, ‘An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts’, (9) Journal of Legal 
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 228 
 
 
 
 On the Effect of Number on Causation and Damages – Scattered Behavioural Insights 
 
 
In an experiment conducted with mock jurors, HOROWITZ and BORDENS found that a defendant was 
more likely to be found liable when the number of plaintiff increased.
1061
 Participants saw a trial where the 
unique variable was the number of plaintiffs consolidated for trial (10,6,4,2 or 1 plaintiffs). The strength 
of evidence remained constant for all plaintiffs. The experimenters found that ‘1 or 2 plaintiffs were less 
likely to prevail than when the plaintiffs were aggregated in a 4-, 6- or 10-plaintiffs group’, and ultimately 
concluded that ‘jurors were not judging the evidence pertaining to these plaintiffs on merits alone’. 
Regarding compensatory damages, the authors found that lower awards were given to the 1 and 2 plaintiff 
conditions, that the amounts reached their peak in the 4-plaintiffs conditions before ultimately decreasing 
in the 6- and 10-plaintiffs conditions. In another experiment, the same authors found that the amount of 
punitive damages and compensatory damages (but the second one was not statistically significant) tended 
to increase when mock jurors had been informed that plaintiffs were ‘numbered in the hundreds’.1062  
Alternatively, several laboratory and field studies conducted NORDGREN and Mc DONNELL have 
pointed out a counter-intuitive ‘scope-severity paradox’ where harms affecting a larger number of people 
are ultimately perceived with less severity than harms affecting a smaller number of individuals.
1063
 In one 
experiment, the authors specifically focused on the behaviour of real jurors in toxic tort litigation 
(asbestos, lead poisoning and toxic mold cases). Drawn from the analysis of a dataset of awards granted 
by juries in 136 toxic tort cases between 2000 and 2009, the authors found an interesting negative relation 
between the number of plaintiffs and the amounts of punitive damages and damages per plaintiffs 
awarded. As they expressed it, ‘juries have historically punished defendants less harshly when their 
offense harmed more people’, and furthermore ‘have historically compensated each victim less in tort 
cases when there are more victims’.1064 The authors ultimately explained their findings through ‘the 
diminishing identifiability’ associated with a large pool of claimants.1065 
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  I.A. HOROWITZ and K.S. BORDENS, ‘The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of Plaintiffs on 
Jurors’ Liability Decisions, Damages Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence’, (85) Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 2000, n° 6, pp.909-918. 
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 Idem, at p.101. 
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 Idem. 
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 5.3.4. Preliminary Conclusion 
 
The magnitude of mass claims, the number of involved claimants, the fact of facing groups can alter 
decision-making. Judges may thus for instance neglect differences between members of highly-entitative 
groups; be biased by outlier effects, representativeness heuristic, affect heuristic or identifiable victim 
effect. Put simply, their decisions may be unduly affected by the number of claimants involved. Chapter 6 
will report an experiment conducted with legal professionals as an attempt to contribute to these 
discussions. 
 
 
 
                                                                                  *  
 
 
 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The blindfolded allegory of Justice – named Iusticia in Latin – does neither take into consideration the 
idiosyncrasies of the decision-maker nor the peculiarities of the contexts in which he takes his decision. 
Proposing alternative perspective, this chapter intended to show that these elements may matter in 
practice, and at highlighting how they may impact on decision-making. Interestingly, others 
representations portray Justice under the traits of a mature and open-eyed woman, careful and attentive to 
the world in which she evolved. The specificities of the mass litigation context, the number of individuals 
involved, the financial amount and the societal issues at stake make nowadays necessary a Justice with 
open eyes on the process of its decision-making and on the failures that may plague its deliberations. 
Empirical works are now needed and will be the ‘reality checks’ substantiating or nuancing the claims that 
have been formulated so far.  
 
 
*** 
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Chapter 6 
                                                          
          REALITY CHECKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Preceding chapters have identified different attitudes that judges may be eager to endorse when 
monitoring mass claims. These developments have also highlighted some pitfalls associated with the 
management of mass litigation, and suggested that numerous claimants and extensive damage may impact 
on the way judges resolve mass disputes. In absence of empirical evidence, such claims remain 
nonetheless theoretical. In order to bridge this gap and as an attempt to provide a small part of the answer, 
two reality checks were conducted.
1066
  The first one is an online questionnaire conducted with French 
judges during May-June 2013 aimed at collecting their viewpoints, opinions and comments on the highly-
debated French group action (6.2). The second is an experiment conducted with Dutch professional 
lawyers in January 2014 aimed at investigating the effects of multiple claimants on legal decision-making 
(6.3). A general conclusion on these two reality checks follows (6.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
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 Both studies were conducted with Dr.Pieter Desmet, Associate Professor at Erasmus School of Law. 
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6.2. CHECK N°1: ‘Judges, Floor is yours!’– THE ATTITUDES OF FRENCH JUDGES 
VIS-À-VIS GROUP ACTIONS : AN ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like in other jurisdictions, French policymakers expect a lot and heavily rely on their judges for the 
conduct of mass litigation.
1067
 While witnessing this evolution, French legal scholars recently expressed 
concerns vis-à-vis judges becoming ‘over-powerful’ when dealing with mass proceedings (in French: ‘la 
surpuissance du juge’).1068 During the spring and summer 2013, extensive debates about group actions 
took place in French media,
1069
 as well as in the academic literature.
1070
 We
1071
 used this opportunity to 
conduct an online-questionnaire aimed at collecting viewpoints of French judges regarding the (at that 
time) forthcoming group action. Importantly, by no means the replies that we received shall be considered 
as being representative of the opinion of the French judiciary at large. Given the inherent limitations of 
                                                          
*Speech given at the symposium ‘Pour de véritables actions de groupe : un accés efficace et démocratique  la 
justice’, 10 November 2005, available on  
www.courdecassation.fr/cour_cassation_1/autres_publications_discours_2039/publications_2201/obstacles_juridiq
ues_action_groupe_8449.html, accessed 18 December (translation from the author. In French : ‘pour l’heure, l’on ne 
peut que mesurer combien notre droit est éloigné de ce système (…). C’est sans doute sur ce point que l’imagination 
doit être à l’œuvre, et qu’une réflexion approfondie doit être conduite sur le rôle et les pouvoirs du juge dans une 
configuration procédurale que l’on pourrait envisager comme spécifique à l’action de groupe’). 
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 See for instance, Le Monde, ‘La France s’ouvre à l’action de groupe’, 2 May 2013 (available on 
www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/05/02/la-france-s-ouvre-a-l-action-de-groupe_3169429_3234.html (accessed 
10 December 2013);  Le Point, ‘Les consommateurs pourront bientôt utiliser l’action de groupe’, 12 June 2013 
(available on www.lepoint.fr/societe/les-consommateurs-pourront-bientot-utiliser-l-action-de-groupe-12-06-2013-
1680212_23.php, accessed 10 December 2013). 
1070
 M.J. AZAR-BAUD, ‘L’entrée triomphale (?) de l’action de groupe en droit francais, Recueil Dalloz 2013, 
p.1487 ; O. DUFOUR, ‘L’action de groupe à la française, c’est pour bientôt !’, Petites Affiches, 25 April 2013, n°83, 
p.3 See also  symposium ‘Sur la voie de l’action de groupe’, April 2013, Paris (papers collected in Gazette du Palais, 
May 2013). 
1071
 The survey was conducted in cooperation with Pieter DESMET. 
 
‘At the current time, we can measure the distance between our legal system 
and this mechanism (…). It is, without doubt, on this point that imagination is 
needed, and that intensive reflection must be conducted on the role and the 
powers of the judge in a procedural configuration that one could think as 
being unique to group actions.’ 
Speech of the First President of the Court of Cassation, November 2005 
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this survey which are hereafter highlighted, this data must obviously be handled carefully (6.2.1). This 
study rather presents some clues and anecdotal evidence. The added-value of our approach may however 
be twofold. First, a research devoted to the understanding of judicial behaviour in the realm of mass 
litigation would not have been complete without some views coming from the protagonists themselves. 
The chapter therefore fills in this blank. The questionnaire also sheds new light on earlier developments of 
this thesis: French judges were indeed questioned about the tasks assigned to the judge-watchdog, cattle 
driver and good shepherd, asked about the potential effect associated with number of claimants and about 
their overall perceptions and expectations concerning mass litigation (6.2.2). Second, we hope that this 
survey will attract the attention of policymakers, and be the first step towards future similar studies aimed 
at more closely associating the work of legislators who decide with the viewpoints of judges who enforce. 
Last but not least, the responses collected via the questionnaire are also analysed in the light of earlier 
semi-structured interviews conducted with a first instance judge and Court of Cassation judges which took 
place in May and June 2012 in Paris, as well as with the representative of a consumer association in 
March 2013 in Brussels. These insights further nourish and complete the results that we obtained in the 
survey.
1072
  
 
6.2.1. The Online Survey: Methodology and Limitations   
 
The methodology followed to conduct this survey is first detailed (a).  The limitations associated with this 
questionnaire are then clarified (b). 
 
a) Methodology 
 
 
 Overview of the Survey Administration 
 
 
From May to beginning of July 2013, registries (greffe) and presidents of Courts of First Instance 
(tribunaux d’instance) and High Courts of First Instance (tribunaux de grande instance), of the Courts of 
Appeal and individual judges seating in the Court of Cassation were contacted by emails.
1073
 The Ministry 
of Justice (more specifically, the Direction des Affaires Civiles et du Sceau)
1074
 was also contacted but did 
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 For an overview about the questions asked during the interviews, refer to Appendix 5.  
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 The emails were sent to the courts’ email box services (for instance ca-xxxx@justice.fr, ti-xxxx@justice.fr, tgi-
xxxx@justice.fr...). The list of tribunals was found online on  www.annuaires.justice.gouv.fr. 
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 www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/direction-des-affaires-civiles-et-du-sceau-10023/ 
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not reply to our request. The use of the internet was due to cost-efficiency considerations: it enabled us to 
widen the scope of the research and to facilitate contacts with courts at lower expenses. In the email, 
judges were proposed to participate to a survey entitled ‘French Judges and the Group Action: Roles, 
Expectations and Attitudes’ (in French: Les juges français et l’action de groupe: rôles, attentes et 
attitudes). An explicative letter was attached where we detailed the objectives of the research and 
emphasized the importance of their cooperation. Judges were told that their individual answers were kept 
anonymous.  Three weeks after our initial email - that is, around mid-June - follow-ups were sent as 
reminders.
1075
   
Once contacted, presidents and/or registries could decide to forward our request to the judges sitting in 
their respective courts. In other words, our survey had to face one or two consecutive screenings. In the 
first case, presidents of tribunals were the unique filter. They could decide to forward - and as it has been 
the case on several occasions – to actively support our questionnaire vis-à-vis their colleagues, or, 
alternatively, to ignore or reject our request. In the second case, our survey first needed the approval of 
registries to proceed. If accepted, the questionnaire was then forwarded to the president of the tribunal for 
a second approval.  Similarly, presidents could accept or deny our request.
1076
  
 
 The Questionnaire: Content and Structure 
 
 
Accessing the online questionnaire was possible via a link indicated in the explicative letter. Once judges 
had clicked on the link, they were redirected to a secured website.
1077
 The welcome page thanked 
respondents for their participation, briefly recapitulated the objectives of the survey and provided a 
general overview of the questionnaire. Respondents were informed that the survey was divided into two 
parts. In the first part, judges were questioned about a hypothetical scenario aimed at highlighting the 
impact associated with the number of claimants on judicial decision-making. Unfortunately, the lack of 
replies to this first part did not allow us to draw any significant or meaningful conclusion. It was therefore 
decided to keep this part aside for a future experiment (see check n°2). This first check exclusively deals 
with the replies that we received to the second part of the questionnaire which focused more specifically 
on group actions.  
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 Sent only one time to avoid irritating respondents or being assimilated to spams (see: E. DEUTSKENS, K.D. 
RUYTER, M. WETZELS and P. OOSTERVELD, ‘Response Rate and Response Quality of Internet-Based Surveys: 
An Experimental Study’, (15) Marketing Letters, 2004, n°1, pp.21-36). 
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 We sincerely thank registries and judges who accepted to collaborate and crucially helped this research proceed. 
 
1077
 We used the software qualtrics to run the survey (www.qualtrics.com). 
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In this second part, judges were asked 14 questions concerning group actions and the scope of judicial 
intervention. The format of these questions varied. It included open-ended questions, closed multiple-
choice questions and matrix questions condensing several issues into one unique list. The questionnaire 
required respondents to scroll down to answer all the 14 questions. By doing so, we wanted to avoid 
discouraging or disturbing respondents with too much clicking. Appendix 1 shows how the questionnaire 
looked like on the screen of respondents.  
 
 Profile of the Judges-Respondents 
 
 
40 judges return the questionnaire (20 men, 20 women). The average age of the respondents was 46,18 
years old. In its large majority, the sample consisted of first instance judges (number=33), followed by 
judges of courts of appeal (n=5), and finally by judges of the Court of cassation (n=2). Targeting first 
instance judges was for us a priority since this is the category of judges which will be in charge of group 
actions. Their fields of specialisation included civil law, civil litigation, civil procedure, consumer law and 
consumer credits, tort law, contract law, labour law, criminal law, criminal economic law, insurance law, 
environmental law, financial law and commercial law. 
 
b) Limitations  
 
 Designing a  Questionnaire: An Obstacle Course 
 
The ‘art of asking questions’ is a tricky exercise and problems encountered by researchers are plethora.1078  
Such challenges tend to be comparable in paper-based and internet-based questionnaires, even though this 
second category has its own specificities, notably in terms of design or mode of responding.
1079
 Although 
well-known among social scientists, some methodological issues are here worth briefly recapitulating. 
First, the order of questions matters since the responses given to early questions can influence the 
responses brought to later ones. Second, the format of the questions can also influence answers. As 
FODDY points out, ‘respondents are more likely to endorse a particular option if it has been explicitly 
                                                          
1078
 S.L. PAYNE, The Art of Asking Questions, Princeton University Press, 1951, 250 p. 
1079
 E. DEUTSKENS, K.D. RUYTER, M. WETZELS and P. OOSTERVELD, supra note 1075; see also L.A. 
RITTER and V.M. SUE, ‘The Survey Questionnaire’, New Directions for Evaluation – Special Issue: Using Online 
Surveys in Evaluation, Autumn 2007, issue n115, pp.37-45, (observing on a broader level that ‘with respect to 
questions and how they are presented in an online questionnaire, we can rely on generally accepted standards for 
paper-based questionnaire’). 
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listed than they are if they have to spontaneously think of it for themselves’.1080 Third, the framing of 
questions may have an impact on answers.
1081
 The framing effect is indeed a well-documented bias 
notably uncovered in numerous consumer surveys, business or social psychological studies.
1082
 Fourth and 
relatedly, the wording may also be problematic: general or ambiguous formulations can indeed induce 
misunderstandings among respondents.
1083
 Fifth and finally, respondents may be tempted to answer 
questions even when it appears that they have no particular - or very little - knowledge about the topic.
1084
 
Aware of these issues, we tried to mitigate these problems by constructing precise, clear and simple 
questions in the most unbiased way possible. We however admit that attempts to eradicate all forms of 
subjectivity might be a vain exercise. An unavoidable degree of subjectivity in the construction of the 
questionnaire, albeit reduced to its minimum, may thus remain.  
We assumed that neither all respondents were necessary frequent internet users, nor that they had all high-
speed internet access.
1085
 Importantly, we also assumed that judges facing heavy caseload had only a 
limited amount of time to devote to our questionnaire. Therefore, we chose to limit its length following the 
general idea that ‘a shorter questionnaire elicits greater response and results in less abandonment than a 
longer one’.1086 Furthermore, we decided to use both closed and open-ended questions in order to leave 
respondents leeway to express their personal views.  We started the questionnaire with broader general 
questions dealing with the goals and the scope of group actions, and progressively incorporating more 
sensitive issues in the middle of the survey, such as judicial attitudes vis-a-vis associations or potential 
effects of numerous plaintiffs on decision-making. 
 
 
                                                          
1080
 W. FODDY, Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires – Theory and Practice in Social 
Research, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 228 p. (at p.8). 
1081
 D. KAHNEMAN and A.TVERSKY, ‘Framing Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, (211) Science, 1981, 
n°4481,pp.453- 458 (highlighting that individuals tend to decide differently in risky situations when the object of 
their choice is presented as a gain or as a loss). 
1082
 I.P. LEVIN, S.L. SCHNEIDER and G.J. GAETH, ‘All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical 
Analysis of Framing Effects’, (76) Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes,1998, n°2, pp.149-
188; W.BRUINE DE BRUIN, ‘Framing Effects in Surveys: How Respondents Make Sense of the Questions We 
Ask’, in: G.KEREN (Ed.), Perspectives on Framing, London, Taylor & Francis. 
1083
S.L .PAYNE, supra note 1060 (specifically Chapter 10 ‘What’s wrong with ‘you’; pp.158-176 (showing that the 
use of generic and everyday words such as ‘usually’, ‘you’, ‘anyone’, ‘generally’ are likely to be understood in 
different ways by different respondents). 
1084
 W. FODDY, supra note 1080, at p.9. 
1085
 M.C. MONROE and D.C. ADAMS, ‘Increasing Responses Rate to Web-Based Surveys’, (50) Journal of 
Extension, 2012, n°6 
1086
 L.A. RITTER and V.M. SUE, supra note 1079. 
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 Trusting People for What They Do and Not for What They Say? 
 
This objection commonly highlighted about survey questionnaires is well-known among social scientists. 
As SCHELLING points out, ‘it is sometimes argued that asking people is a poor way to find out, because 
they have no incentive to tell the truth (…). It is also argued, and validly, that people are poor at answering 
hypothetical questions, especially about important events – that the mood and motive of actual choice are 
hard to stimulate’.1087  Based on this observation, individuals should preferably be trusted on their actions, 
rather than on their personal statements. When applied to judges, this statement appears indeed relevant. 
Judges may be particularly prone to dissimulate their personal concerns or opinions behind a legalistic 
discourse, earlier described as the ‘mythology of judicial decision-making’.1088 In addition, previous 
developments have suggested the existence of optimistic and other self-serving biases which lead 
individuals to have distorting views and opinions about their own skills and competences.
1089
 
Undoubtedly, the legalistic speech and other optimistic biases may have tainted some answers that we 
collected.  
 
 Problematic Participation Rates 
 
 
 
Online surveys usually face problematic low-response rates, which sometimes can turn out to be even 
lower than the participation to paper-based surveys.
1090
 Each of us is indeed daily bombarded with 
requests to complete questionnaires or satisfaction surveys to which we often do not grant much 
attention.
1091
 We knew from the beginning that the response-rate could be an issue. As an attempt to cope 
with this difficulty, we decided to send the questionnaire during the interval May-July 2013 which is the 
period during which the bill proposal containing the group action was presented to Parliament. The issue 
was therefore highly mediatised and experienced a renewed energy and consideration among legal 
practitioners and within the doctrine. We thought that interviewing judges on such a burning topic was a 
possible solution to facilitate and encourage their participation. In spite of our efforts, we admit that our 
                                                          
1087
 T.C. SCHELLING, supra note 878, at p.143 
1088
 See Chapter 5. 
1089
 Idem 
1090
 K. SHEEHAN and S.MC MILLAN, ‘Response Variation in E-mail Surveys: An Exploration’, (39) Journal of 
Advertising Research, 1999, pp.45-54; C. COOK, F. HEATH and R.L. THOMPSON, ‘A Meta-Analysis of 
Responses Rates in Web- or Internet-Based Surveys’, (60) Educational and Psychological Measurement, 2000, 
pp.821-836. 
1091
 J. PETCHENIK and D.J. WATERMOLEN, ‘A Cautionary Note on Using the Internet to Survey Recent Hunter 
Education Graduates’, (16) Human Dimensions of Wildlife: An International Journal, 2011, n3, pp.216-218 
(reporting the example of an online survey conducted with students in Wisconsin, United States, where, out of the 
16,560 students who were contacted to fill in the survey, only 348 – that is roughly 2% - return the questionnaire). 
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sample is small. One more time, the responses that we collected cannot be regarded as representative of 
the French judiciary.
1092
 
 
 French Judges’ Lack of Experience with Group Actions  
 
This limitation is important and must be highlighted: at the time when the survey was administrated, no 
French judges had in practice dealt with group actions yet. If this obstacle is undeniable, it is nevertheless 
not unsurmountable. First, and as evidenced by other surveys,
1093
 judges who took time to respond were 
those who were interested in the topic. Their viewpoints are thus worth considering. Second, the 
questionnaire was aimed at pointing out the expectations, views and possible concerns of French judges 
regarding the implementation of group actions, not at investigating how the proceeding is enforced in 
practice. Third, on several occasions, we inserted a category without opinion which enabled judges to 
avoid responding whenever they considered that the visibility on the issue was not sufficient. Fourth, and 
crucially, this questionnaire must not be regarded as an assessment of judicial intervention, but rather as a 
document highlighting possible judicial concerns and preferences that policymakers might have neglected. 
As a complement to this research, it will therefore be interesting to conduct a similar survey in several 
years from now in order to observe whether concerns that judges have expressed in this 2013 
questionnaire ultimately materialised, or whether they have faced unexpected challenges further arising 
from their practice. In others words, this questionnaire should be seen as a modest first step investigating 
the relationship between judges and mass litigation in France. We make the wish that other similar studies 
will be conducted in the future to determine in greater details the practical pitfalls faced by French judges 
when resolving mass disputes.  
 
   
    
                                                          
1092
 It is difficult to assess with precision the response-rate that we ultimately obtained. Indeed, we do not have clear 
views on the number of judges who effectively received our questionnaire and subsequently decided to not reply. As 
highlighted, the surveys were first sent to registries and presidents of tribunals. They were afterwards free to forward 
the questionnaire to their colleagues seating in their tribunals. The number of judges per courts may however 
drastically vary. 
1093
 E.A. SUCHMAN and B.MC CANDLESS, ‘Who Answers Questionnaires?’, (24) Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 1940, issue 6, pp.758-769 (observing that among the main factors affecting the returns of mail 
questionnaires was notably ‘the interest or familiarity with the topic under investigation – the more interest, the 
greater the returns’). 
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6.2.2.  Results 
 
Results are hereafter grouped into five categories. They are respectively: judicial perceptions on the 
objectives and the scope of application of group actions (a), judicial perceptions on the extent and 
particularities of their intervention (b), judicial apprehensions, feelings and potential concerns regarding 
group actions (c), judicial perceptions on another protagonist, namely the claimants’ association (d), and 
finally, judicial perceptions on possible solutions aimed at regulating and improving judicial work  in the 
framework of mass litigation (e).   
Four clarifications must preliminary be addressed concerning the way responses are hereafter presented. 
First, the questions contained in this survey targeted a French speaking-audience, and were thus initially 
worded in French. They are herein translated into English. Readers wanting to compare the wording in 
French and in English may refer to Appendix 2. Second, the present report does not follow the order of 
questions as initially presented in the online questionnaire. For matters of clarity, questions tackling 
similar or related topics are grouped. Readers may nonetheless also refer to Appendix 3 for further details 
regarding the initial order of questions. Third, on several occasions, matrix questions required judges 
nuancing their choice by selecting on a five-point scale the answer(s) that best fitted their opinion. To 
simplify the presentation of the data and to avoid a proliferation of numbers, graphs summarise the replies 
that we obtained. They are constructed from the mean (m) of the responses, going from 1 to 5. For matters 
of clarity, the scale is constructed as follows: 
 
5. Very important (or strongly agree) 
4. Rather important (or rather agree) 
3. Without opinion (neutral) 
2. Rather not important (or rather disagree) 
1. Not important at all (or strongly disagree) 
 
 
 
Standard deviation (sd) is directly reported onto the graphs. Occasionally, information is provided 
regarding the exact number of judges (i.e. frequencies, hereafter ‘f’) who – out of the 40 respondents – 
selected a specific answer. Readers can refer to Appendix 3 to have a detailed overview of frequencies per 
question. Fourth, a brief account regarding the contextual background in which questions are embedded is 
each time provided. Finally and as earlier pointed out, viewpoints expressed by French judges and by the 
representative of a consumer association collected during semi-structured interviews conducted during the 
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Spring 2012 and Winter 2013 are used as complements to illustrate these results. An overview of the 
questions asked during these interviews can be found in Appendix 5. 
 
a) Objectives Pursued by Group Actions 
  
In this first question, judges were asked about the goals that, in their views, mass proceedings should be 
aimed to achieve. the question was worded as follows: many objectives have been associated with group 
proceedings. To what extent do you consider that  group proceedings should indeed be aimed at…. Five 
objectives were proposed (from the left to the right on the graph below): enhancing compensation of small 
claims (i); enhancing and increasing deterrence of corporate misbehaviour (ii); helping the judicial 
management of mass litigation (saving judges’ time and resources) (iii); facilitating a better coherence of 
judicial decisions (iv); enhancing claimants’ compensation (v). 
 
 
        
Respondents tended to agree that these five objectives were indeed closely associated with group actions. 
Closer examination however revealed that judges viewed the deterrence of corporate misbehaviour as 
     To what extent do you consider that a group proceeding should indeed be aimed at... 
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being the main objective pursued.
1094
 In comparison, compensation of small claim plaintiffs tended to be 
regarded as being of  lower importance.
1095
  
During an interview, a judge of first instance Court also pointed out the need for an increased coherence of 
judicial rulings when rendered on similar or related topics.
1096
 In our questionnaire, this objective was 
however not significant when compared to others goals. Suggesting an alternative perspective, the 
representative of the consumer association conversely pointed out - also during an interview - that 
compensation should obviously be the first objective that group proceeding should seek to achieve.    
As an attempt to understand the reason why judges tended to view deterrence of corporate misbehaviour 
as main objective, it is insightful to remember that this survey was conducted in the aftermath of the PIP 
breast implants and Mediator scandals which might have triggered availability heuristics among 
respondents. Furthermore, another survey conducted in December 2012 with French judges by two 
economists also adressed the relationship between judges, markets and economics.
1097
 It showed that 
French judges were remarkably strongly sceptical vis-à-vis market structures. This mistrust, the authors 
argued, could be explained by many factors such as judges’ education or the Civil Law tradition. 
Importantly, the study also argued that this mistrust had influenced the development of case law on 
economic matters such as redundancy. Interestingly, the authors however observed that judges who 
received education or trainings in economics had however softer views and perceptions about markets and 
companies. As a possible – albeit very speculative – conclusion, one may question whether this preference 
for the deterrent function of the group action is not somehow connected with the reported judicial mistrust 
vis-a-vis market functioning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1094
 28 judges chose ‘very important‘, 11 judges selected ‘rather important’. No judges chose the boxes ‘rather 
secondary’ or ‘very secondary’. 
1095
 10 respondents chose the box ‘rather secondary’. 
1096
 See on this point Chapter 2 and case law on vaccine against hepatitis and sclerosis which has recently led to 
many divergent rulings. 
1097
 P. CAHUC ans S. CARCILLO, Les juges et l’économie: une défiance française, Institut Montaigne, December 
2012, available on www.institutmontaigne.org/fr/publications/les-juges-et-leconomie-une-defiance-francaise 
(accessed 16 December 2013). 
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b) The Scope of Application of Group Actions  
 
 
Like in other European jurisdictions, a burning policy issue regards the scope of application of group 
actions.
1098
 Should the proceeding be limited to a unique area? Should its use be extended to all fields of 
substantive law where disputes are likely to involve many individuals? Between these two extremes, 
should the proceeding be restricted to several but specific and limited domains? In 2010, Senators 
BETEILLE and YUNG already pointed out that ‘there is no consensus regarding the scope that should be 
given to group actions’.1099 In their proposal, they suggested to restrict the action to consumer, competition 
and securities/financial law. Remarkably, this topic has been a source of intense lobbying from the 
industry and private sector represented by the French business confederation MEDEF (Mouvement des 
Entreprises de France)
1100
 and from claimants’representatives. 
As an attempt to contribute to these discussions, respondents were invited to reply to the following 
question: According to you, should the scope of application of group proceedings be restricted to specific 
fields (only competition law), or should it be applicable more widely? Four possible answers were then 
proposed (from the left to the right on the graph below) ‘only competition law’ (i); ‘all fields without 
distinction’ (ii); ‘some specifics areas’ (iii), ‘without opinion’ (iv). Judges who selected the box ‘some 
specific areas’ were further asked to detail their answers by indicating which fields.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1098
 M. VALIMAKI, ‘Introducing Class Actions in Finland: An Example of Law-Making Without Economic 
Analysis’, in: J.  BACKHAUS, A. CASSONE and G. RAMELLO (Eds.), supra note 23, pp. 327-341 (highlighting 
that the law on class action which came into force in 2007 finally restricted the use of the procedure to consumer 
law, even though earlier drafts of the proposal had much broader scope of application). 
1099
 2010 French Report on Group action, supra note 199, p.15 (in French : ‘il n’existe pas de consensus sur le 
périmètre qui doit être donné à l’action de groupe’).  
1100
 MEDEF (Commission Droit de l’entreprise), Positions du MEDEF sur le Projet de loi visant à introduire 
l’action de groupe en droit français, November 2012 
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                            According to you, the scope of application of the group proceeding should be…. 
 
Following the findings of Senators BETEILLE and YUNG who, already in 2010, pointed out a preference 
of the French Council for the Judiciary (Conseil supérieur de la magistrature) and of the National 
Association of First Instance Judges (Association nationale des juges d’instance) for broadly applicable 
group actions, in their vast majority respondents were also reluctant to a too-narrow application of group 
actions. Only 10% considered that the proceeding should be limited to competition law. A majority 
supported its use in all fields of law, or to several but restricted domains. Judges who ultimately selected 
the box ‘some specific areas’ further indicated the following combinations: ‘economic and industrial 
activities-public health’; ‘public health-ecology-competition law’; ‘consumer law-property law’; 
‘employment cases’, ’public health’; ’competition law-consumer protection’; health-environment-
adhesion contracts’ and ‘health-environment’. These results were also substantiated by other comments 
collected during interviews where judges similarly were reluctant to a too-restricted application of group 
actions. As one of them expressed it, once the group action is introduced, it will be in practice very 
difficult to limit its scope of application.  
 
c) Judicial Perceptions on the Scope of Judicial Intervention   
 
 
During an interview, the representative of a consumer association suggested that the work of judges in the 
mass litigation framework is ultimately not very different from the tasks that they are already used to 
perform in their everyday practice. We actually wanted to test this claim. The question was therefore 
worded as follows: According to you, how should the judge behave when he is in charge of group actions? 
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Three possible answers were proposed (from the left to the right on the graph below): ‘be very active 
(more than what is today required for the monitoring of individual lawsuits)’ (i); ‘be active (but not more 
than what is today required for the monitoring of individual lawsuits)’ (ii); ‘be passive (leaving the 
monitoring of the proceeding primarily to associations and/or lawyers, and performing an ex post control)’ 
(iii).  
                       
 
 
Noteworthy, a majority of respondents considered that the monitoring of group proceedings does not 
require a more active role than the one that they are nowadays already expected to perform.
1101
 Put 
differently, respondents did not seem to believe that managing group proceedings will revolutionize their 
practice. However, these responses must be handled carefully since French judges have not been 
confronted to the proceeding in practice yet.  
 
d) Judicial Perceptions on Specific Tasks 
 
 
Monitoring group proceedings gives judges extensive powers to perform tasks which potentially may 
differ from their daily practice. In these two matrix questions, judges were asked about the duties that 
judges should indeed be required to do. Specifically, our interest was here to understand whether judges 
                                                          
1101
 25 respondents chose the box ‘rather agree’, 6 chose the box ‘strongly agree’. 
    According to you, how should the judge behave when he is in charge of group actions? 
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seem willing - and ready - to execute some tasks which, for some of them, can potentially differ from their 
everyday practice. The tasks herein listed correspond to the ones usually required from judges when 
monitoring mass litigation: some of them refer to the work of the judge-watchdog and the judge-cattle 
driver (for example, filtering weaker or frivolous claimants; publicizing the case in the media; assuring the 
adequate communication between lawyers/associations and plaintiffs…), others are associated with the 
work of the judge-good shepherd (taking care of the interests of absentees; reviewing the settlement 
agreement; reviewing lawyers’ fees et cetera).  
The first question was worded as follows: to what extent do you consider that the following tasks should 
be endorsed by the judge(s) in charge of monitoring a group action? Seven tasks were listed (from the left 
to the right on the graph below): determining the criteria to be met to be part of the group and ensuring the 
homogeneity of plaintiffs within the group’(i); ‘distinguishing, and if necessary, punishing frivolous 
claimants (ii); taking care of the interest of absent or represented parties (iv); ensuring the publicity of the 
proceeding in the media (v); supervising and reviewing the terms of a final settlement concluded between 
the parties (both from a procedural and a substantial perspectives) (vi); controlling the adequate 
representativeness of consumer associations and/or lawyers, as well as their adequate communications 
with their members/clients (vii); and finally, reviewing lawyers’ fees (viii). Judges were required to 
nuance their opinion on a five-point scale going from strongly disagree, rather disagree, without opinion, 
rather agree, and strongly agree.       
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A majority of respondents considered that distinguishing and punishing frivolous claimants (task 2 on the 
graph) was a role that judges should endorse. This result is significant when compared to all other tasks 
listed, except task 1 which is ‘determining the criteria to be met to be part of the group’. Strikingly, on the 
contrary, judges did not regard the adequate advertising of the case in the media (task 4) as being a duty 
that should fall upon them.  This result is significant when compared to all others tasks presented. This 
insight is noteworthy given that the actual group action gives judges the mission to ensure and supervise 
the right mediatisation of mass claims,
1102
 or when a settlement agreement is reached by parties.
1103
  
In another question judges were asked to evaluate on the same five-point scale the degree of difficulty that 
they would assign to each of these tasks. The question was worded as follows: Do you think that the 
following tasks will be difficult to fulfill for the judge in a charge of the group action? The list of tasks 
remained unchanged. We deliberately chose the term ‘difficult’ in our question to investigate a possible 
judicial optimism in this domain. Finally, since these two questions were quite similar in their wordings - 
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 New article L.423-3 al.3 Consumer Code (in French : ‘le juge ordonne, aux frais du professionnel, les mesures 
nécessaires pour informer, par tous moyens appropriés, les consommateurs susceptibles d'appartenir au groupe, de la 
décision rendue’). 
1103
 New article L.423-9 al.2 Consumer Code (in French : ‘le juge peut prévoir les mesures de publicité nécessaires 
pour informer les consommateurs de l'existence de l'accord ainsi homologué’). 
To what extent do you consider that the following tasks should indeed be endorsed by the judge(s) in charge of monitoring the group action? 
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and may have led respondents to mechanically repeat the replies that they had given to the question 
coming first - we decided to avoid presenting these two questions successively. These questions were 
therefore respectively presented as question n°4 and question n°6. This strategy enabled us to compare the 
responses obtained with greater confidence. 
 
 
 
Results are consistent with the responses obtained to the preceding question. Supervising the adequate 
mediatisation of the case is perceived as the most difficult task to peform. This result is significant when 
compared to task n°2 (distinguishing and punishing frivolous claimant) and task n°7 (reviewing the 
amount of lawyers’ fees). Going into the details, responses that judges have given regarding the degree of 
difficulty associated with case mediatisation are strongly polarized: 16 respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that 
this task will be difficult to achieve, while 18 of them were neutral on this issue. It seems therefore that 
case mediatisation is a task which casts doubts in the minds of respondents. Unsurprisingly, judges tend to 
be more at their ease with tasks which best corresponds to their judicial practice, such as punishing 
frivolous claimants or reviewing lawyers’ fees.   
 
 
Do you think that the following tasks will be difficult to fulfill for the judge in charge of the group action? 
 247 
 
e) Judicial Apprehensions 
 
 
The goal pursued in this question was to understand whether judges have positive or negative 
apprehension concerning group actions. Previous development of this research suggested that monitoring 
mass litigation could be seen as a misfortune from the perspective of judges seeking to maximize their 
leisure time or to avoid public attention, or alternatively, as an opportunity for those seeking prestige, 
good reputation, recognition or increased powers.
1104
    
The question was worded as follows: would you personally enjoy monitoring group actions? Judges were 
asked to nuance their answer on a five-point scale from yes really; yes, why not; without opinion; rather 
no; and really no.  
 
 
A few respondents expressed enthusiasm vis-à-vis the possibility of being personally involved in the 
conduct of group proceedings.
1105
 However, a vast majority of judges (70%) would ‘rather enjoy’ being 
personally involved in group actions. As one judges further expressed it during an interview, group 
proceeding tend to ‘upgrade’ the roles of judges considerably.   
 
                                                          
1104
 See Chapter 4. 
1105
 f=6 for ‘yes, really’, see Appendix 3. 
               Would you personally enjoy monitoring group actions? 
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f) Judicial Feelings 
 
The research has shown that the conduct of mass litigation importantly depends on judicial attitudes. In 
this view, previous developments have pointed out the impact of emotions and feelings on judicial 
behaviour.
1106
 The following question was specifically intended to understand feelings that judges may 
potentially have when managing mass disputes.        
The question was worded as follow: would consider the perspective of monitoring group actions as being 
an experience…. Four possible answers were proposed (from the left to the right on the graph below): 
‘potentially intimidating’ (i); ‘potentially motivating’ (ii); ‘potentially worrying’ (iii). In order to take into 
account the fact that judges might not have clear views on this issue, we added a last category entitled 
‘may constitute a real challenge for judges’ (iv). This category was aimed at letting judges a leeway to 
signal that group proceedings might have an emotional impact on judges, without having to clearly 
translate it in terms of negative or positive feelings. Respondents were required to nuance their answers on 
a five-point scale: from strongly agree; rather agree; without opinion; rather disagree; strongly disagree.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1106
 See Chapter 5. 
               Would you consider the perspective of monitoring group actions as being an experience… 
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Respondents did not seem to have clear negative feelings or negative anticipations concerning group 
actions. A closer attention reveals that responses in the categories ‘potentially intimidating’ and 
‘potentially worrying’ are polarized between ‘rather agree’ and ‘rather disagree’.1107  On the contrary, a 
large part viewed this experience as being positive and potentially motivating. Apparent fluctuations and 
differences in these responses tend to support the idea that the monitoring of group actions is likely to 
arouse emotions, even though it is nowadays still too early to further expand on this point.   
 
g) Judicial Concerns 
 
We asked judges two questions in order to investigate possible judicial concerns. The first required them 
to assess whether some listed obstacles were likely to be perceived as potentially problematic. These 
obstacles - judge’s increased public exposure, time pressure, asymmetric information et cetera - have been 
further discussed in previous developments of this research.
1108
     
The first question was worded as follows: to what extent do you consider that the following issues are 
likely to be problematic from the perspective of the judge in charge of group proceedings? Ten different 
obstacles were listed (from the left to the right on the graph): ‘media or political pressure’(i); ‘pressure 
from public opinion’ (ii); ‘tasks highly time-consuming or burdensome from the judges’ point of 
view’(iii); ‘perspective of facing numerous litigants’ (iv); ‘judicial overexposure (in the media and within 
the legal profession)’ (v); ‘difficult communication between the judge and parties’(vi); ‘defining the 
adequate level of mediatisation of the proceeding (vii); ‘lack of information about the interest of absent or 
represented parties’ (viii); ‘taking into account the interest of companies (notably in terms of reputation)’ 
(ix); ‘lack of financial or human resources to deal with mass cases’ (x). Respondents were asked to nuance 
their replies on a five-point scale going from strongly agree; rather agree; without opinion; rather 
disagree; to strongly disagree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1107
 Regarding the category rather intimidating, f=12 for ‘rather agree’ & f=14 for ‘rather disagree’. Regarding the 
category rather worrying, f= 13 for ‘rather agree’ & f=15 for ‘rather disagree’. 
1108
 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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A vast majority of respondents did not consider the difficult communication between the judge and parties 
to be a problematic issue when monitoring group lawsuits. This result is significant with all others listed 
issues, except n°9 (‘taking into account the interest of companies’).  On the other extreme, judges almost 
unanimously agreed that the lack of financial and human resources to deal with mass cases is problematic. 
Importantly, respondents also considered that monitoring group actions may drastically increase judicial 
workload. Noteworthy, external pressures coming notably from either media or public opinion also 
obtained high scores.  
To complete our investigation on this point, we also asked an open-ended question and gave respondents 
freedom to express their personal opinions. The question was worded as follows: do you have any other 
concerns that you would like to share? To avoid respondents skipping too quickly this question, we asked 
them to explicitly write no in the box if they had no particular concern to express. Many respondents 
highlighted an actual lack visibility about the group action. Remaining viewpoints can be grouped into the 
three following categories.   
The first category concerns the lack of human and financial resources to deal with mass disputes. Even 
though this issue was already stressed in the preceding question, many respondents decided to mention 
To what extent do you consider that the following matters are likely to be an issue from the perspective of the judge in charge of group proceedings? 
 251 
 
this concern a second time. One respondent claimed for example that ‘judicial personnel and logistics are 
still insufficient to deal with this kind of cases’, another stressed that resources given to the judge (or to 
the panel) in charge of the proceeding may not be sufficient when compared to the stakes of the lawsuit; a 
third one argued that ‘there are not enough judges’, and another finally pointed out a need for ‘more 
assistants to deal with the administrative aspects of mass cases’.    
The second category of comments targeted the procedural pitfalls and the risks of lengthy and burdensome 
proceedings. A respondent for example highlighted the ‘risks of lengthy and complex proceedings from 
the viewpoints of both litigants and judges’. Others warned against ‘the complexity of the proceeding’, 
‘lengthier proceedings’ or a ‘multiplication of lawsuits’. Another judge rang the alarm bell against an 
increase in the burden and workload of registries (greffe) which already today must deal with heavy 
caseload. The same respondent further pointed out that this situation may ultimately lead to higher risks of 
errors.     
Finally, a third category of comments had a broader scope. A judge for instance mentioned the dilemmas 
of mass justice and stressed the difficulties of evaluating the amounts of damages individually awarded to 
claimants. Another respondent pointed out the risk associated with an increase in low-merits disputes and 
a risk of seeing claimants eventually becoming ‘consumers of justice’ (in French: ‘une 
déresponsabilisation du consommateur qui devient aussi consommateur de justice’). Finally, another 
judge highlighted that the status of judges in France prohibits them to endorse any judicial or political 
responsibilities to a greater extent. The risks of disciplinary measures, he adds, are such that ‘only simple 
individual cases can today truly be managed by judges’.   
 
h) Judicial Perceptions on Another Key Protagonist: The Claimants’ Association  
 
 
Under the current design of group actions, associations have a monopoly for legal standing.
1109
 These two 
questions investigated the overall perception of judges about associations, their a priori positive or 
negative opinions about the role of this actor, and the quality/trustworthiness of their work.   
     
The first question was worded as follows: do you think that the work performed by plaintiffs’ associations 
is generally trustworthy? The second further asked judges: do you think that their work should be kept 
under close judicial supervision? Respondents could nuance their answer on a five-point scale going from 
strongly agree; rather agree; without opinion; rather disagree; to strongly disagree. 
                                                          
1109
 See Chapter 3. 
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In their majority, respondents had positive views on associations. Only two judges out of forty rather 
disagree that their work is usually trustworthy, and none indicated ‘strongly disagree’. This being said, 
interestingly, a majority considered that the work of associations should be kept under close judicial 
scrutiny. Noteworthy, ten judges out of forty ‘strongly agreed’ and twenty-one ‘rather agreed’ with the 
need for judicial supervision. These results are also interested when analysed in the light of the EU 2013 
Consumer condition scoreboard which showed that consumers' perceptions and trust vis-à-vis associations 
tend to significantly vary across Member-States. Trust in independent associations to protect their rights 
was particularly higher in the Netherlands (90%), France (88%) and the United Kingdom (86%), than in 
Bulgaria (54%) or Greece (57%).
1110
 
 
i)  Improving Judicial Intervention:  Single Judge or Panels? 
 
 
In France, civil judges sit alone in courts of first instance (tribunaux d’instance) when dealing with minor 
offences or when the amounts at stake do not exceed 10,000 Euros.
1111
  In High Courts of First Instance 
(tribunaux de grande instance), judges usually sit in panels.
1112
. In a context of scarce judicial resources 
                                                          
1110
 European Commission, Consumers Conditions Scoreboard, 9th ed., July 2013, p.50-51. 
1111
 Article L.222-1 Code de l’organisation judiciaire. 
1112
 Some specialised functions may however also be endorsed by a single judge, such as for example family-law 
judges (juge aux affaires familiales), judge in charge of enforcing (juge de l’exécution), or judge empowered to issue 
temporary orders in case of urgency (juge des référés). Under certain conditions and whenever the president of the 
tribunal deems it necessary and if parties agree, it can be decided that a single judge will preside over a case usualy 
assigned to a panel (Loi n.70-13 du 10 juillet 1970 modifiant et complétant l’ordonnance n.58-1273 du 22 décembre 
1958 relative à l’organisation judiciaire (enshrined in Article R.212-9 Code de l’organisation judiciaire), regarding 
the conditions regulating the decisions of the President of the tribunal, refer to articles L.212-2 and R.213-7 Code de 
Left:   Do you think that the work performed by plaintiffs’ association is generally trustworthy? 
 
Right: Do you think that their work should be kept under close judicial supervision?  
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and of a lack of court personnel, single judges are regarded as eliciting quicker and more flexible judicial 
response.
1113
  In the framework of mass litigation, some mass proceedings leave the monitoring of the 
proceeding to single judges, whereas others rely on panels. The following question was aimed at 
collecting judicial views on this issue. It was worded as follow: Do you think that group proceedings 
should be monitored by…’.Respondents could select three possible responses (from the left to the right on 
the graph below): ‘by a single judge’ (i); by several judges (ii), ‘without opinion’ (iii). 
 
 
 
A vast majority of respondents considered that the monitoring of group actions should be assigned to 
panels. Possible explanations to this result may be multiple:  judges may view the panel as a way to reduce 
their individual workload through a division of labour. Judges may also be reluctant to remain isolated 
when monitoring group actions, or may not be prone to endorse and assume alone decisions which have 
long-lasting social implications. Additional clarifications on the pro and cons of panels v. single judges in 
the mass litigation context will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
l’organisation judiciaire. See also on this point N. CAYROL, ‘Procédure devant le tribunal de grande instance’, in : 
Répertoire de procédure civile, updates 2010, at ‘attributions du juge unique’. 
1113
 R. PERROT, ‘Le juge unique en droit francais’, (29) Revue internationale de droit comparé, 1977, n°4, pp.659-
674 ;  J.P. LACROIX-ANDRIVET, ‘Procédure devant le tribunal de grande instance’, in: S.GUINCHARD (Ed.), 
Dalloz action droit et pratique de la procédure civile, 2012, chap.331, at 331.311; L. CADIET, ‘Efficience v. 
Equité’, in Mélanges Jacques van Compernolle, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2004, pp.25. 
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j) Regulating Judicial Attitudes: Rules or Guidelines? 
 
Earlier developments have discussed the cost and benefits associated with the use of rules vs. standards 
and their effects on judicial attitutdes. In order to contribute to this debate, the question was aimed at 
questioning the degree of flexibility and assistance that judges deem necessary when handling mass 
litigation. The question was worded as follow: according to you, the judicial monitoring of a group action 
should be…’. Respondents could then choose between four alternatives answers (from the left to the right 
on the graph below): ‘limited and regulated by strict rules’ (i), ‘limited but guided by broad guidelines’ 
(ii),  ‘wide but regulated by strict rules’ (iii) and ‘wide and guided by broad guidelines’ (iv) 
 
 
        
 
A majority of respondents considered that judicial intervention should preferably be wide, but also 
regulated by strict rules. In others words, judges asked for extensive powers for the treatment of mass 
disputes, but also wanted clear indications on the scope and extent of their work. They seemed to be more 
attracted by the need for certainty brought by strict rules, than by the need for flexibility permitted by 
broad standards.  
 
 
 
 
 
According to you, the judicial monitoring of a group action should be… 
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k) Facilitating Judicial Intervention: Specialisation, External Assitance, Education 
 
This last question investigated possible venues for facilitating and improving judicial intervention in the 
context of mass litigation. The question was worded as follow: According to you, what are the tools that 
could be used to facilitate the judicial monitoring of group actions? Respondents were then asked about 
four successive options (from the left to the right on the graph below): a specialised court (i), specialised 
judicial education/training (ii), implementation of guidelines or best practices (iii), external assistance 
(experts, specialised agencies…). These options corresponded to different alternatives intended to help 
judges when dealing with mass litigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Most of judges did not consider the creation of specialised courts as a suitable solution. These results are 
coherent with the work conducted by other scholars which already pointed out a judges’ overall reluctance 
for over-specialisation.
1114
Most of them however considered that special education/training were 
                                                          
1114
 L. BAUM, Specializing the Courts, University of Chicago Press, 2011, 282 p. 
According to you, what are the tools that could be used to facilitate judicial monitoring of group actions? 
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necessary. In addition, they stressed the importance of external help and tend to welcome assistance from 
experts and/or specialised agencies.  
 
6.2.3. Discussion 
 
One more time, the results that were collected should be handled carefully given the inherent limitations 
of this survey. This being said, the questionnaire provides interesting clues on the views of (French) 
judges about mass litigation and the monitoring of mass procedures. First, respondents seemed quite 
optimistic regarding group actions, but feared drastic increases in their workload. Even though they did 
not expect important changes in their judicial practice (this, we believe, is principally due to the fact that 
no judge has been confronted to group actions yet), they pointed out the current lack of adaptation of the 
whole judicial system in terms of human and financial resources to deal with this new types of lawsuits. 
Meanwhile, they also expressed concerns vis-à-vis new tasks such as ensuring the publicity and 
mediatisation of mass claims. As discussed in Chapter 3, this mission is nonetheless cornerstone in mass 
litigation. Judges asked for increased powers, but also claimed for more clarity and indications on the 
scope of their work. In addition, judges regarded group actions principally as deterrence-enhancing 
mechanisms. One may therefore wonder whether such a view will now influence their practice: they may 
for instance retain extensive group membership in order to maximize the number of claimants, and thus 
increase the deterrent effect of group actions. Again, judicial practice in the coming months will turn out 
to be highly instructive.            
This survey was conducted in May-July 2013. At almost the same time, a report for the Ministry of Justice 
(Garde des sceaux) entitled ‘l’office du juge au 21e siècle’ pointed out a need for renewed views on the 
roles and functions of French judges. The authors notably pointed out that even though French judges 
have usually high ideas about their roles in society, confusion still tend to remain regarding the content, 
meaning and scope of judicial tasks.
1115
 This online survey tends to confirm this observation.  
 
 
*  
                                                          
1115
Institut des Hautes Etudes sur la Justice  (IHEJ), La prudence et l’autorité – l’office du juge au XXIe siècle, 
Rapport de la mission de réflexion confiée par la Garde des Sceaux C.TAUBIRA, May 2013  (observing, in French, 
‘ce qu’enseigne l’observation des juges, c’est qu’ils ont à la fois une grande conscience de leur office mais que règne 
une confusion quant à son contenu et à son périmètre’, at p. 17) 
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6.3. CHECK N°2: Does the Number Matter? INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF 
MULTIPLE CLAIMANTS ON LEGAL DECISION-MAKING: AN 
EXPERIMENT 
 
 
 
As stressed in preceding chapters, legal scholars consider that the number of claimants involved in a 
dispute might have an effect on the assignment of liability and on the amounts of damages awarded. 
Behavioural researchers have also highlighted that the number may influence decision-makers. Empirical 
evidence on this issue remains nonetheless scarce and inconclusive: the few studies that did address the 
effect of number on decision-making have revealed scattered results. Moreover, these studies all used 
laymen as participants and did not consider whether - and to what extent - legal professionals (lawyers or 
judges) are affected by this potential bias. In response to this call, we
1116
 conducted an experiment with 
professional lawyers to see whether the number of claimants can have an influence on their assessment of 
liability assignment and compensation size.
1117
 In addition, we manipulated the case’s strength in order to 
assess the generalizability of any potential effect of number of claimants to both weaker and stronger 
cases.
1118
  
We designed an experiment based on a product liability case. We chose this framework because widely 
commercialised defective products are a prototypical source of large-scale damage potentially affecting 
many people. In this setting, we looked at the influence of two factors, namely the number of filing 
claimants (one v. multiple claimants) and the case’s strength (weaker v. stronger claim). The design of the 
experiment and its results are hereafter presented (6.3.1). Its implications and limitations are then clarified 
(6.3.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1116
 This experiment was conducted in cooperation with P.DESMET. 
1117
 We are sincerely grateful to Professors M.FAURE, W.VAN BOOM and L.VISSCHER for their precious help 
and advice. We also thank the professors at Erasmus School of Law (and elsewhere) who gave us comments on this 
experiment and helped us improve its design. 
1118
 Despite our efforts to conduct a similar experiment with judges, our request has to this day (October 2014) not be 
accepted. 
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6.3.1. The Experiment – Methodology and Results 
  
 
a) Methodology 
 
 
 Participants and Design 
 
139 Dutch personal injury lawyers (50.4% male; average age 46.18 years, SD = 11.68) were recruited at 
the annual conference for Dutch Personal Injury Lawyers. Respondents had worked on average 16.9 years 
as personal injury lawyer, expert, or insurers (SD = 9.09) and were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions of our 2 (Case Strength: Strong vs. Weak) x 2 (Number of plaintiffs: Single vs. Multiple) 
between-subjects design.  
 
 Materials and Procedure 
 
Respondents were approached during the conference and given a questionnaire. At later time during the 
conference responses were collected. All respondents were provided with a scenario consisting of a 
hypothetical court case. The background of the case was based on real-life cases concerning vaccination. 
For a long time, vaccines and their possible side effects have been a source of extensive controversies.
1119
 
Given that for some of these vaccines more negative side effects have been reported than for others, 
constructing the case around a hypothetical vaccination campaign provided us with a suitable context for 
our study. We placed a short text at the beginning of each scenario informing respondents that we were 
well-aware of the case’s simplification, and requiring them to solely respond on the basis of the 
information provided. 
In our scenario, participants were told that a (unspecified) vaccination campaign had taken place in the 
Netherlands. After a period of time, X individuals started to suffer from illnesses potentially due to the 
vaccine. The plaintiff(s) had decided to sue the manufacturer for damages and asked for 30,000 Euros as 
pain and sufferings damages (per person). Participants were also told that in comparable cases awards had 
reached between 17,000 and 43,000 Euros. We decided to focus on pain and suffering damages because in 
contrast to other losses, which may be set upon objective criteria such as for instance hospital and doctors’ 
                                                          
1119
 See for instance: the vaccine against hepatitis suspected (without clear established evidence) of causing sclerosis. 
For more than a decade, this product has been a source of controversies and contradictory rulings in France (L. 
NEYRET, ‘L’imputabilité de la sclérose en plaques au vaccin contre l’hépatite B’, Recueil Dalloz, 2007, p.2204 ;  B. 
DEFOORT,’Incertitude Scientifique et causalité : la preuve par présomption’, Revue Française de Droit 
Administratif, 2008, p.549). 
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bills or lost wages, pain and suffering damages gives decision-makers more leeway and discretion to 
decide on the amounts awarded.
1120
 
The two manipulated variables in the scenario were the strength of the claim (weaker v. stronger) and the 
number of claimants (single v. multiple). As a result, the following four unique versions of the scenario 
were constructed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number: Single v. Multiple Claimants 
 
 
 
In order to manipulate the number of claimants while at the same time preventing this number to become 
indicative of the case’s strength, we did not just manipulate the number of claimants but also varied along 
the total number of vaccinees in the population. This allowed us to manipulate the number, while keeping 
constant the percentage of vaccinees who became ill. This percentage was fixed at 0,059%, which is 
around the usual rate of people with serious complications due to vaccines (0.07%).
1121
 The single- and 
multiple plaintiffs- versions were worded as follows:
1122
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1120
 W.K.VISCUSI, ‘Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious 
Awards?’ (8) International Review of Law and Economics, 1988, pp.203-220 (observing that in product liability 
cases, ‘the subsequent calculation of medical costs and lost wages losses is straightforward, as the losses are directly 
measurable and readily quantifiable. Although future growth rates of wages and medical costs are uncertain, there is 
a substantial body of empirical evidence and economic theory to assist in making such judgements. Thus the criteria 
for compensation and calculation of the appropriate level of compensation are reasonably well-defined.  Matters are 
quite different in the case of pain and suffering awards (…). There is no scale by which the detriment caused by 
suffering can be measured and hence there can be only a rough correspondence between the amount awarded as 
damages and the extent of the compensation’). Law & Economics scholars have proposed framework to better assess 
the amounts of pain and suffering damages awarded (see V.KARAPANOU and L.VISSCHER, ‘Towards a Better 
Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages’, (1) Journal of European Tort Law, 2010, pp.48-74.  
1121
 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vaccinatieprogramma (visited: January 2014). 
1122
 The text was initially worded in Dutch (see appendix). 
Version 1 – Single Claimant      
/ Weaker Claim 
 
Version 2 – Multiple 
Claimants / Weaker Claim 
 Version 4 – Multiple 
Claimants / Stronger Claim 
 
Version 3 – Single Claimant      
/ Stronger Claim 
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                      Single 
 
    Number of claimant: 1 
 
   Vaccinated Population: 1700 
 
 
In the text:  
 
“1700 individuals were vaccinated to 
prevent disease X. The vaccine is 
produced by company Alpha.  
Among the individuals whom the 
vaccine was administered to is 
Jansen.  
                     Multiple  
 
     Number of claimants: 68 
 
     Vaccinated population: 115 600 
 
 
In the text:  
 
“115 600 individuals were vaccinated to 
prevent disease X. The vaccine is produced 
by company Alpha. Among the individuals 
whom the vaccine was administered to are 
Jansen, Vervink, Pasternaak, Van de Werf, 
Te Haar, Habili, Emeraldo, Eijkestein and 60 
other individuals.” 
 
 
 Case Strength: Weaker v. Stronger Claim 
 
 
 
In addition, we manipulated the case’s strength in order to assess the generalizability of any potential 
effect of number of claimants to both weaker and stronger cases. Therefore, we created scenarios in which 
scientific evidence for a causal link between the symptoms and vaccination was more (or less) ambiguous. 
Depending on the condition, the case read as follows: 
                          Weaker Claim 
 
                         Stronger Claim 
“There is no clear-cut evidence regarding 
the causal link between the vaccine and 
the reported symptoms.  The latest 
developments of epidemiological research 
cannot establish a causal link with 
certainty. 
 
The lawyer of Jansen (or of the 68 
claimants) investigated similar court cases 
in which exactly the same product and the 
same health symptoms were involved. 
 
In these cases, experts were called to 
testify and on the basis of their 
conclusions, in 
46% of the cases the claim of the litigants 
was denied and in 54% of the cases the 
claim prevailed.  
 
The lawyer of the other party, company 
Alpha, argues that the symptoms should 
have developed sooner to be caused by 
“There is no clear-cut evidence regarding 
the causal link between the vaccine and 
the reported symptoms.  The latest 
developments of epidemiological research 
cannot establish a causal link with 
certainty. 
 
The lawyer of Jansen (or of the 68 
claimants) investigated similar court 
cases in which exactly the same product 
and the same health symptoms were 
involved. 
 
In these cases, experts were called to 
testify and on the basis of their 
conclusions, in 
36% of the cases the claim of the litigants 
was denied and in 64% of the cases the 
claim prevailed.  
 
The lawyer of the other party, company 
Alpha, argues that the symptoms should 
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the product. In this case, the symptoms 
presented themselves only after a year. It 
is also argued that the symptoms were due 
to predispositions of the claimant(s) and 
that a lot of other individuals who 
received the vaccination did not develop 
symptoms.” 
have developed sooner to be caused by 
the product. In this case, the symptoms 
presented themselves only after a year. It 
is also argued that the symptoms were 
due to predispositions of the claimant(s) 
and that a lot of other individuals who 
received the vaccination did not develop 
symptoms.” 
 
 
 
 Measures 
 
 
o Manipulation Check. 
 
 To test the eﬀectiveness of the merit manipulation, we asked participants to report the extent to which 
they considered the evidence as strong on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not strong at all, 5 = very strong). 
o Liability Assessment.  
 
 
The assessment of liability was measured by a dichotomous item, asking the participants to what extent 
they would rule the vaccine manufacturer to be liable (1 = liable, 2 = not liable). 
 
o Assessment of damages for pain and suffering  
 
 
If respondents assigned liability, they were subsequently asked what compensation they would award to 
the individual plaintiff for pain and suffering and could indicate any amount in euros. 
 
b) Results 
 
 
 Manipulation check 
 
  
A 2 (Number) x 2 (Case Strength) ANOVA on the competition manipulation check for case strength only 
revealed a marginally significant main effect of Case Strength, F(1,135) = 2.25, p = .07, η2 = .02 (one-
sided). Respondents in the strong case considered the strong case to be stronger (M = 2.65, SD = 0.94) 
than respondents who received the weak case (M = 2.44, SD = 0.85). We further elaborate on this issue in 
the discussion. 
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 Liability 
 
 
A binary logistic regression analysis with Number, Case Strength and their interaction as the predictor 
variables and the liability question as the dependent variable yielded no significant main or interaction 
effects (see Figure 1 below). Number, nor Case Strength or their interaction affected respondents’ 
judgment of liability. Participants assigned liability in 40,82 % of the cases.  
Figure 1               
 
 
 Damages awarded 
 
A 2 (Number) x 2 (Case Strength) ANOVA on the amount of damages awarded for pain and suffering 
revealed a main effect of Number, F(1,65) = 5.06, p < .05, η2 = .08. Lawyers awarded significantly more 
damages to individual claimants in the multiple case (M = 31730.78, SD = 12529.35) than to claimants in 
the single case (M = 25250, SD = 9291.78). No other effects were significant. The mean damages awarded 
in each condition are displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
       
    
 Effect of respondents’ age on the amounts of damages awarded 
 
 
 
We proceeded with exploring whether this effect of number was more pronounced for particular groups of 
legal professionals and therefore explored potential interactions with our demographical variables. These 
analyses revealed that age in fact moderated the effect of Number on compensation awarded: particularly 
older lawyers were more influenced by the number of plaintiffs involved, as can be seen in Figure 3.  
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                                                                               Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
6.3.2. Discussion  and Limitations  
 
a) Discussion: Contribution to the Existing Literature 
 
  
Taken together, our findings provide support for the idea that the number of plaintiffs can have an 
influence on how legal professionals evaluate a court case. We indeed found that whereas the number of 
claimants had no influence on lawyers’ judgment about whether or not liability should be assigned, the 
number of claimants did have an effect on the amount of compensation they judged to be appropriate for 
pain and suffering damages. Moreover, the direction of this effect provides corroborating evidence for a 
‘power in numbers’ effect, where multiple claimants are awarded more compensation individually than a 
sole individual. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that this effect of larger numbers exists 
independent of the strength of the case: for both strong and weak cases, multiple litigants were awarded 
more damages than single individuals. These findings contribute to the literature in several ways. 
A first contribution is that we studied the effects of numbers on decision-making by focusing on legal 
professionals judging a prototypical court case. Prior research into the effects of number in legal decision 
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making has only looked at its influence on laymen’s judgments (i.e. potential or actual jurors) and these 
studies provided contradictory evidence.
1123
 Using professional lawyers, specialised in personal injury 
litigation, we observed that the number of litigants does have an influence on the amount of damages that 
is considered appropriate in a personal injury case.  
A second contribution is that we did not only look at the effects of number on the assignment of liability, 
but also at its effect on the amount of damages awarded for pain and suffering. In contrast with the 
calculation of other losses which are more contingent on objective criteria,
1124
 the assessment of pain and 
suffering damages is a judicial appraisal that leaves more leeway and discretion to the decision maker. 
Whereas the number of litigants may therefore not have a direct influence on the assignment of liability or 
material damages, it may exert its influence in decisions that lack these objective criteria. Our findings 
indeed seem to confirm this: whereas legal professionals were not affected by the number of litigants in 
their assignment of liability, they were influenced by this number when they decided on the amount of 
pain and suffering damages.  
Finally, a third contribution is that we also investigated whether the effect of number occurs when 
controlling for the strength of the case. First, by keeping the percentage of injured constant across 
conditions, we provide a more accurate picture of the isolated effect of number of litigants. This departs 
from previous experimental or field studies where only absolute numbers were manipulated or measured, 
leaving the possibility open that the number of litigants also becomes part of the evidence.
 
 When 
following this approach, we observed that whereas the number itself did not affect the case’s perceived 
strength or the assignment of liability, it did affect the amount awarded as pain and suffering damages, 
suggesting that the effect of number does not occur for decisions that rely more on hard evidence, but 
rather surfaces in decisions for which less objective criteria are available. Furthermore, we manipulated 
case strength directly in the scenario as well, allowing us to see whether an effect of number can be 
observed for both weak and strong cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1123
 I.A. HOROWITZ and K.S. BORDENS, supra note 1061; L.F. NORDGREN and M.-H Mc DONNELL, supra 
note 960. 
1124
 See W. K. VISCUSI, supra note 1120. 
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b) Limitations 
 
 
Our findings have nevertheless important limitations. First of all, even though we specifically manipulated 
case strength in order to assess the generalizability of our findings to both weak and strong cases, one 
could argue that both our weak and strong case were in fact relatively weak (around 41% assigned liability 
in the weak case compared to 46% in the strong case). Moreover, both strong and weak cases were very 
much similar in their level of perceived case strength as well, as witnessed by the only marginally 
significant effect of case strength on our manipulation check and the absence of any main effect of case 
strength on the assignment of liability. While we deliberately opted for this approach to make our case not 
too strong nor too weak in order to observe enough variation on the liability measure, this strategy also 
poses a limitation to our findings in the sense that the observed effect of number of plaintiffs on 
compensation size may be limited to ambiguous cases and therefore cannot be generalized to cases that 
are extremely strong or weak. Further research may therefore shed light on this issue by looking at the 
effects of number on assigned liability and awarded compensation in cases that are truly weak and strong.  
Second, our participants only represent one of the parties involved in mass litigation cases (lawyers) and 
not other influential actors like victims or judges. Indeed, whereas judges are the primary decision makers 
that ultimately decide on the question of liability and compensation size, plaintiffs too may behave 
differently when they know that they are not the only victim involved in litigation. They too may, for 
example, become overconfident and inflate their perceived chances of liability assignment and estimates 
of compensation. Future research would therefore find an interesting challenge in investigating how these 
and other parties involved are affected by the number of litigants in terms of their expectations (plaintiffs) 
and judgment (judges). 
Finally, we cannot fully exclude the fact that external elements in link with the conference (for instance 
interventions of speakers, the time dedicated to respond to the survey et cetera…) might also have 
somehow influence the results. Despite these limitations, we hope that our findings will spark further 
research into how specific characteristics of the mass litigation context can influence the different actors 
involved in actual court cases. 
 
* 
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6.4. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The goal of these two distinctive reality checks was to shed empirical light on the theoretical 
developments discussed throughout this research. The online questionnaire investigated judges’ attitudes, 
concerns and expectations vis-à-vis mass litigation in France. The experiment more specifically 
questioned the effect of multiple claimants on judgments of liability and compensation. As explained, 
these two studies only provide a first and imperfect step towards a better understanding of the impact of 
mass litigation on decision-making. Much more research is now needed to draw definite conclusions. 
Mass litigation is however, a judicial tool that has experienced expanding prevalence over the last few 
years, particularly in Europe.  Any future research that furthers these two studies will therefore be - 
without doubt - a valuable undertaking.    
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
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Chapter 7 
                                                                               
INVESTIGATING SOLUTIONS FOR ENHANCING JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION IN MASS LITIGATION:  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
                   
 
 
 
 
7. 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In Law and the Modern Mind FRANK argued that ‘the honest, well-trained judge with the completest 
possible knowledge of the character of his powers and of his own prejudices and weaknesses is the best 
guaranty of justice’. He also believed that ‘efforts to eliminate the personality of the judge are doomed to 
failure [,] the correct course is to recognize the necessary existence of this personal element and to act 
accordingly.’1125 Even though eradicating judges’ personality indeed turn out to be impossible, solutions 
however may exist for debiasing and assisting judges when managing mass claims. 
 
 
7.1.1. Where Are We? 
 
 
The research started with two straightforward questions: what do policymakers expect from judges when 
managing and resolving mass disputes, and are these expectations ultimately realistic? Throughout 
preceding chapters, the role of judges in mass claims was analysed through the perspectives of social 
sciences. These insights have shed new light on the judicial cathedral and pointed out judges’ strengths 
and weaknesses.
1126
 They importantly show that the relationship between judges and mass litigation 
should not be viewed as one-sided, but as clearly double-sided: judges not only have essential roles to play 
in mass claims, but mass claims also have a great impact on judicial attitudes and decision-making. The 
personality of judges therefore significantly contributes to shaping the outcomes of mass disputes. 
Furthermore, these insights have highlighted a Herculean judge syndrome currently biasing the vision of 
policymakers: legislatures tend to rely a lot on judge’s expertise and discretion, and therefore may ask 
more than what judges might actually be able to do. Given the high stakes in play in mass claims, it seems 
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to be hazardous to put too much emphasis on judge’s performance and attitudes. Policy measures can 
however be undertaken to support and facilitate judicial intervention.  
 
7.1.2. Methodology and Objectives 
 
Identifying judicial weaknesses and debunking the Herculean judge myth was a first important step. Yet, 
as a French old saying expresses it, la critique est aisée et l’art est difficile.1127 Since European 
policymakers are nowadays prone to let judges play an active role in the conduct of mass claims, a second 
step must be made and policy recommendations should be formulated in order to address the issues raised 
in previous chapters.  
 
Yet, some apparent remedies tend to be restrictive and do not solve - or solve only partially - the problems 
identified throughout this research (7.2). Conversely, other solutions are more innovative and forward-
looking (7.3).  Based on these findings, policy recommendations can be proposed (7.4). This chapter does 
not intend to discuss each option exhaustively. The goal is here to look at the future in order to pave the 
way for future research in this field. These suggestions may importantly become food for thought for 
policymakers in the coming years. 
 
 7.1.3. The Chapter in a Nutshell 
 
The chapter sheds some light on possible mechanisms for debiasing judges and facilitating the judicial 
management of mass claims. It highlights the limits of some apparent remedies which fail to be fully 
satisfactory in practice. It is ultimately argued that enhancing judicial intervention in mass claims 
importantly needs a broader approach where a strategy is first clarified and tactics are then defined. 
 
 
    
*  
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7.2. RESTRICTIVE SOLUTIONS: A NEED FOR NUANCED APPROACHES 
 
 
Discarding judges (7.2.1), limiting the scope of application of mass proceedings (7.2.2) or relying on 
judicial panels (7.2.3) are possible remedies which nevertheless do not solve the previously-identified 
problems. They indeed require nuanced approaches. Their remedies will invite us to investigate possible 
alternatives.   
 
 7.2.1. Discarding Judges? 
 
 
Discarding judges is a radical solution which, understandably, could arise in the minds of readers while 
noticing the vagaries of judges’ attitudes and decision-making throughout preceding chapters. As 
highlighted in Chapter 2, the monitoring of mass claims requires the intervention of a third-party. One 
may argue that such tasks could alternatively be endorsed by regulators. Let consider briefly consider this 
argument (a), before highlighting the reasons why it ultimately fails to be a convincing and satisfactory 
solution (b). A compromise may rather lie in a shared intervention between judges and regulators (c). 
 
 
a) Replacing Judges by Regulators 
 
 
The limits of judicial intervention have conducted some Law & Economics scholars to urge for more 
regulation and for a replacement of judges by regulators. As SCHLEIFER writes, ‘regulators rise when 
judges fail’.1128 Such arguments which principally focus on the failures of the judicial process and the 
inabilities of judges to correctly perform their roles are by no means recent.
1129
 They generally consider 
that regulators are experts who can more easily be provided with incentives to work harder
1130
; that in 
situations‘where the costs of verifying the circumstances of specific cases and interpreting statutes are 
high, judges may not be sufficiently motivated to enforce legal rules’1131; that ‘regulation would also be 
more common in situations where facts are complex and fact finding requires expertise and incentive’;1132 
or that ‘the rise of regulation might be intimately tied to a specialisation and the rise of large corporations 
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as organisational forms’.1133 At first sight, these situations seem to correspond to the mass litigation 
framework where judges must deal with extensive fact-finding issues, face well-structured corporations 
but may lack the incentives to work hard.   
 
b) Limits 
 
 
Despite such benefits, one may however object that regulators may fail too. They may lack transparency, 
be subject to capture and prone to biases. Substituting regulators to judges may therefore merely consist of 
passing the buck from one protagonist to another without providing suitable long-term solutions. 
Furthermore, discarding judges will importantly fail to adapt the judiciary to the new challenges of the 21
st
 
century. In the nineties, CAPPELLETTI already highlighted what can be described as an ‘adapt or perish’ 
dilemma. He wrote in this respect: 
 
‘Judges may adopt an attitude of a simple rejection and refuse to get involved in the area of class and 
group conflicts. By doing so and despite the fact that these have become crucial to modern societies, they 
will give up influence and control over these types of conflict. If this is the case and the judicial system 
sticks to its image of the 19th century, it will end up as a respected but outdated relict, stripped out of its 
importance. Since it won’t be able to adapt to the demand of today’s world that has radically transformed, 
it will remain more or less distanced from other „quasi-judicial“ institutions and procedures which will 
end up being instituted or gradually revisited in order to meet the new and urgent societal needs ‘.1134  
 
 
Adapting to the challenges of mass litigation is therefore cornerstone for judges. As also stressed by 
HENSLER, ‘'by confronting the realities of mass litigation and thinking creatively about how to balance 
efficiency and fairness in aggregate litigation, the judiciary can help maintain the relevance and legitimacy 
of courts in the twenty-first  century.
 1135
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mêmes les protecteurs, en dehors des droits individuels traditionnels, des droits nouveaux de caractères diffus, 
collectif, fragmentes qui sont de grande importante et caractéristique dans une civilisation de masse’, translation 
from the author, at p.60). 
 
1135
  D. HENSLER, supra note 8; see also: A. GARAPON, J. ALLARD and F. GROS, supra note 17 (highlighting 
that in advanced democracies, legitimacy is ultimately collectively viewed and assessed by the quality of the service 
provided). 
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c) Judges and Regulators as Complementary Actors 
 
 
Between relying too much on judges and discarding judges, a compromise seems possible. Judges and 
regulators should not be perceived as substitutes but as complementary agents in charge of monitoring 
mass claims. Although it goes beyond the scope of this research to extensively discuss such a division of 
labour between judges and regulators, one may however notably pinpoint the review of mass settlement 
agreements as an issue where such cooperation appears particularly relevant. As an illustration, rule 19(b) 
of the 2006 Israeli class action Law provides that judges cannot clear a settlement agreement without a 
prior opinion from an external settlement examiner. As MAGEN and SEGAL have explained, the 
examiner must be ‘a disinterested person who possesses expertise in the field pertaining to the 
representative action in question (such as consumer rights, securities, environmental damages etc.)’.1136 In 
his report, the examiner will notably conduct a cost and benefits analysis of the proposed settlement and 
shares his conclusions with the court and parties. Similarly, the creation of an external ‘guardian’ in 
charge of taking care of the interests of group members and of assisting judges when reviewing settlement 
agreements has also been advocated in others countries, such as notably in Australia.
1137
 In fields such as 
competition law or financial markets, national authorities and agencies should therefore be required to 
review the terms and conditions of proposed settlements agreements before judicial approval. The trade-
off therefore consists of  higher system costs versus higher quality. 
 
 
 7.2.2. Limiting the Scope of Application of Mass Devices?  
 
 
 
Limiting mass procedures to situations where claims are likely to be identical and easily quantifiable is an 
argument nowadays defended in some European countries. This tends to be justified in the light of 
previous developments of this research (a). Albeit appealing, this solution is however not a suitable long-
term solution (b). 
 
a) Restricting the use of Mass Proceedings to the Treatment of Identical Claimants 
 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted that homogeneity within the claimant group is a prerequisite for the use of 
innovative case management techniques such as bellwethers trials, samples or models cases. It was 
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notably said that generalization and extrapolation techniques from test cases or representative claimants 
can only hold in cases where the claimant group is homogeneous enough. Chapter 5 further suggested that 
the group’s entitativity can impact on the way perceivers will process information about group members. 
Higher-entitativity group notably trigger greater attention and confidence in the mind of decision-makers. 
A way to ensure a high level of homogeneity within the claimant group (and therefore a high perceived 
entitativity) is to contain the use of mass proceedings to situations where claimants are identical. 
Following a logic that is comparable to the one of factory’s employees working on the assembly line and 
performing the same tasks with identical items, judges’ decisions would be justified insofar as they can 
mechanically be repeated to identical plaintiffs sharing comparable and easily quantifiable harms. If 
substantial differences between plaintiffs exists regarding relevant factors (for instance concerning 
negligence, causation, damage et cetera), mass litigation would become less suitable because no true 
economies of scale could be achieved. In such situations, plaintiffs would be so unalike that in essence 
every case would have to be handled individually. As shown earlier, this was an argument spearheaded by 
French policymakers when deciding to limit group actions to the treatment of material damage resulting 
from consumer and competition law.
1138
  
 
b)  Limits 
 
There is however here a discrepancy between theory and practice. Even though French policymakers have 
restricted the group action to specific fields and excluded compensation for immaterial damage, recent 
health-related scandals - such as the Mediator or the PIP breast implants- have considerably supported 
claims for a broader application of group actions. In addition, the line between consumer issues and, for 
instance, health matters may sometimes be blurry. One could for instance argue that individuals who 
bought defective breast implants can be viewed as consumers, and are thus entitled to claim compensation 
through the French group action. Moreover, and as the questionnaire and interviews with French judges 
have revealed, judges themselves tend to consider that once group devices have been implemented, it 
ultimately turns out to be highly difficult to limit its scope of application to specific areas.
1139
 Other 
national examples with mass litigation are also illustrative. In the United States, despite the early warnings 
of the 1966 US advisory Committee which initially claimed that class actions were not suitable to handle 
large-scale accidents, the proceeding has been progressively extended to other domains such as notably 
toxic torts. In the Netherlands, the WCAM was initially implemented to deal with personal injury matters 
in the DES case, but has also successively been used in the fields of securities, financial products or 
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insolvency.
1140
 Attempts to restrict the scope of mass proceeding appear to be doomed to failure, and 
therefore do not constitute a suitable long-term solution. They may only postpone problems to future 
stages and fail to fully prepare judges to their new duties. Moreover, even in situations where plaintiffs are 
likely to be heterogeneous, in as far as there are similarities between cases - for example regarding the 
question whether the defendant acted wrongfully against the victims - such issues could be dealt with in a 
collective procedure.
1141
 
 
 
7.2.3. Relying Strongly on Panels? 
 
 
In several mass proceedings, judges sit en banc. For instance, WCAM judges sit in panel of three. French 
High Court of First Instance judges will also take a collective decision when issuing their declaratory 
ruling on liability. This however does not hold for all mass proceedings: English GLO judges for example 
preside over cases alone. A possible remark consists of arguing that judicial interested attitudes and biases 
will ultimately be mitigated by the simple fact that judges can discuss and exchange their viewpoints and 
doubts with their colleagues. The idea is consequently straightforward and indeed appealing: several 
judges may do it better (a). The effect of panels on judicial behaviour remains however ambiguous and it 
is far from certain that panels can alone contribute to fully alleviate the problems previously identified (b).  
 
 
a) Several Judges May Do It Better  
 
 
Panels can affect the way judges think and behave. In this respect, the judge-guru sitting en banc would be 
more prone to discussions, while the judge-follower facing the watchful eyes of his peers would be 
incentivized to be more active. Similarly, judicial biases may also be mitigated by the mere confrontation 
of point of views and the sharing of experience and knowledge.
1142
 Following this logic, WCAM judges 
and French Group Action judges sitting in panels would thus be more protected against their own biases as 
compared to their English and American counterparts sitting alone.  
 
To some extent these assertions tend to be supported in the economic and behavioural literature which 
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indeed suggests that group membership can alter individual attitudes and decision-making.
1143
 
Experimental games have for instance revealed that groups are more rational than single individuals, and 
that they can better perceive strategic relationships with other participants.
1144
 Other studies have 
highlighted that groups tend to perform better than the best individuals to complex intellective 
problems,
1145
 and that groups ultimately appeared ‘less behavioural’ than single decision-makers, and thus 
more rarely prone to cognitive errors.
1146
  In other words,  by referring to the architecture of the cognitive 
process described in Chapter 5, panels would enable decision-makers to switch more easily from their 
intuitive System 1 to their more neutral and rule-governed System 2. Research has also shown that groups 
lead individuals to take more risky decisions than they would have taken when acting alone. A field 
survey conducted with American district judges for instance revealed than judges sitting en banc used the 
panel as a shield: benefitting from the support of their colleagues, judges were more prone to take 
unpopular or controversial decisions.
1147
  Put simply, these insights suggest that panels can indeed be a 
tool to enhance judicial intervention in mass claims. The key issue is however whether this tool is per se a 
sufficient one.  
 
 
b)  Limits 
 
 
A closer look reveals that the effects of group on decision-making and the capacity of groups to mitigate 
biases are in reality more ambiguous.
1148
 Such ambiguity also applies to judicial panels.
1149
 Judges’ 
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personal objectives and interests do not fully disappear when sitting en banc. The secret nature of panels 
may for instance allow low-effort judges to free ride on the work of their colleagues. Their concerns for 
reputation vis-à-vis their peers can push them to simply agree with the opinion of the most charismatic or 
powerful judges. Relatedly, deference vis-à-vis senior judges may refrain some of them from dissenting. 
An empirical study conducted by EISENBERG and his colleagues have notably shown that Israel 
Supreme Court judges' voting patterns tended to differ significantly when presiding or non presiding over 
cases, and found that judges were more likely to vote in their preferred direction when presiding the case 
than when acting as a mere panel members. 
1150
 As other commentators have finally observed, ‘the group 
decision may actually reflect the judgment of the most powerful group member rather than the integration 
of all group members’ judgments’.1151 Therefore, it appears far from certain that the incentives of a 
charismatic judge willing to endorse the role of judge-guru (or alternatively the one of a judge-follower) 
will ultimately be tamed by panels. Based on psychological literature, it is likely that the entire panel will 
ultimately endorse the same attitude.  Panel is therefore a starting point to mitigate the problems identified 
in this research, but it is not per se a sufficient one. 
 
7.2.4. Preliminary Conclusion  
  
This section has pointed out the limits of the commonplace arguments that are often set forth to mitigate 
the vagaries of judicial decision-making and attitudes. Discarding judges is a radical solution that fails to 
adapt the judiciary to new challenges in ever-growing mass consumption and mass production societies. 
Restricting the scope of application of mass proceedings also fails to actively embrace the challenges that 
judges will sooner or later encounter. Panels in turn cannot alone be a panacea. 
 
In turn, this section has also shown that regulators can assist judges in the monitoring of mass claims and 
that panels are potential tools for mitigating judicial errors. Arguably, requiring the assistance of 
regulators and the intervention of several judges for the monitoring of mass claims is costly: it decreases 
flexibility in case management and increase delays. However, the likelihood of cognitive errors and 
interested attitudes may also be reduced. Furthermore, and specifically in Civil Law countries where, as 
said previously, judges may not be used to take decisions impacting on large pool of individuals,
1152
 these 
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measures may be used as shields, since they avoid a clear identifiability of a single judge. Other remedies 
have now to be investigated.  
 
 
       
* 
 
 
 
 
7.3. FORWARD-LOOKING SOLUTIONS: CLARIFYING A STRATEGY AND  
DEFINING  TACTICS 
 
 
Although often used indistinctly, differences do exist between the terms strategy and tactic. The first 
refers to the goals that policymakers seek to achieve. It appears essential that policymakers provide judges 
with a clear prioritization and hieararchy of objectives that mass litigation is aimed at achieving (7.3.1). 
As indeed SENECA pointed out, ‘if one does not know to which port one is sailing, no wind is 
favorable’.1153 Indeed, it cannot be expected from the captain of a vessel to navigate safely and promptly 
toward his final destination without clear maps and sufficient resources. Hence, enhanced consideration 
must be given to the tactics, i.e. the means which are necessary to achieve those goals. Among possible 
tactics, particular attention will be given to the need for preparing (7.3.2) and guiding (7.3.3) courts in the 
administration of mass claims. A discussion on possible solutions for debiasing judges will follow (7.3.4). 
Finally, the need for judicial specialization in mass claims will be discussed (7.3.5). 
 
 
 7.3.1. Clarifying a Strategy: Prioritizing the Goals of Mass Litigation  
 
 
a) The Actual Absence of  a Clear Prioritization of Objectives 
 
 
As shown in the early developments of this research, mass proceedings can be considered as management 
tools in judicial hands enabling judges to reach economies of scale; as compensation-enhancing 
mechanisms facilitating access to justice; and as dissuasive mechanisms discouraging misbehaviour. Very 
often, those goals are addressed indistinctly. As an illustration, consider Article 1 of the 2006 Israeli Class 
Action Law which provides that: 
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 ‘The goal of this law is to set uniform rules in the matter of the submitting and managing class actions, in 
order to improve the defence of privileges, and in doing so particularly promote these: actualizing the 
privileges of access to the court house, including the types of the population that find it difficult 
addressing the court as individuals; enforcing the law and deterring its breaking; giving proper assistance 
to those harmed by the violation of the law; efficient, fair and exhaustive management of suits’.1154  
 
Noteworthy, goals are here listed in a single and unique sentence. This article is a piecemeal of objectives 
which fails to provide a clear hierarchy. A report commissioned by DG SANCO of the European 
Commission on the Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Existing collective Redress 
Proceedings in Europe also pointed out the absence of clear goals and argued that some mass devices have 
appeared to be more ‘case-management tools rather than collective redress mechanisms’.1155  In Australia 
for instance, MULHERON has observed that the objective of behavioural modifications has not ultimately 
be ‘viewed as a valid objective in Australian class action jurisprudence’.1156 A similar view was until 
recently also retained in several European countries where scholars traditionally regarded the deterrent 
function of private law as being of limited significance, deterrence remaining mostly a matter of criminal 
law.
1157
 Debates taking place within the EU Commission between different Directorates General are also 
illustrative of a lack of consensus about the goals of mass litigation.
1158
  On the one hand, the Directorate 
General for Competition (DG COMP), followed by a vast majority of European competition authorities, 
strongly emphasises the deterrent function of mass proceedings.
1159
 On the other hand, other Directorates 
General (such as DG SANCO or DG JUSTICE) mostly focus on compensation and access to justice.
1160
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b) Why Does a Prioritization of Goals Matter for Judges?  
 
 
Prioritizing goals can help and guide judges when monitoring mass claims. To substantiate this argument, 
consider the judicial control over the shape and the size of the claimant group. Chapter 3 highlighted some 
of the key dilemmas that judges face in such circumstances: while retaining broad criteria to be met to be 
included into the group, judges can facilitate deterrence by maximizing the group’s size. Yet, as 
previously shown, doing so may also impair claimants’ interests.1161  Furthermore, increasing the size of 
the group is likely to increase the complexity of judicial management since judges will have to identify 
several subgroups to take into consideration claimants’ different interests and status. Alternatively, those 
judges who perceive mass proceedings as mainly management tools may be more inclined to deny 
certification or to fix stricter criteria in order to ensure high homogeneity within the group, and thus easier 
case management. Judges who want to decrease their workload or to facilitate judicial economies may be 
prone to reject group lawsuits. As an observer pertinently suggested regarding the American context, ‘a 
decision based on overall judicial economy may place the court’s interests in decreasing litigation above 
the rights of plaintiffs to have their day in court’.1162 As a consequence, he adds, ‘while prohibiting a class 
action may preserve the court’s goal of judicial economy; it might not ultimately enhance the goals for 
justice’.1163 In others words, some judges may prioritize deterrence while others may rather focus on case 
management or access to justice. As shown in Chapter 4, heterogeneity in judicial attitudes vis-à-vis mass 
devices may exist. 
 
Elected policymakers should thus prioritize objectives as a way to reduce judicial discretion in this 
domain. Prioritizing the goals is essential to guide judicial behaviour and its absence creates an area of 
uncertainty for judges and parties. It may not the role of judges to decide whether mass devices should 
primarily be compensation-enhancing mechanisms, case management devices or deterrent tools. These 
political trade-offs have to be decided by policymakers. Extensive discussions have taken place about the 
procedural design of mass proceedings, but a consensus is still lacking on the goals to be achieved at both 
the European and Member-States levels.
1164
 As stressed along these lines, within a same country, different 
                                                          
1161
 B. ALLEMEERSCH, supra note 528 (highlighting: ‘the larger the class and the more dispersed it is, the higher 
the chances that interests of minority groups will not be sufficiently preserved’). 
 
1162
 M.C. HAHN, ‘Smokers’Chances of a Fair Fight against the Tobacco Companies Go Up In Flames: A Study of 
Philip Morris Inc. V. Angeletti and its Effects on the Viability of Class Actions Lawsuits in Maryland Tobacco 
Litigation’, (31) University of Baltimore Law Review, 2001, p.103 
1163
 Idem 
1164
 C. PRIETO, supra note 1158;  Y. HESS, 'Proposed Collective Redress in Europe in the Perspective of 
Deterrence of Corporate Wrongdoing', (10) European Company Law, 2013, n°3, pp.123-128 (highlighting: 'before 
collective redress is introduced into the European legal system, it is important to establish the goals one wants this 
 280 
 
actors (regulatory bodies, judges, associations, companies) may still consider the proceeding from 
different perspectives. Without clear hiearchy of goals, uncertainty on the scope of the adequate 
monitoring behaviour will subsist. One may therefore be doubtful and sceptical vis-à-vis tools maintaining 
such uncertainty which ultimately allow policy-makers to simply pass the buck to judges. An illustration 
is for instance the English Draft for Court Rules on Collective Proceeding which leaves to judges the 
decision to prefer the opt-in or the opt-out systems according to the needs of the mass claim at stake. 
While favouring the opt-in approach, the 2013 recommendations of the EU Commission also maintains a 
possibility to refer to the opt-out system whenever the court deems it necessary, or when it is justified by 
'a sound administration of justice'.
1165
 As previously discussed, selecting the opt-in or the opt-out system is 
principally a political trade-off which consists of determining which interests- between the one of 
claimants and the one of companies – will by default be protected. Furthermore, opt-in and opt-out 
schemes have great implications, notably in terms of deterrence and access to justice. Such decisions 
should thus prior be agreed by policymakers, and not left to judges. 
 
 
  7.3.2. Defining Tactics (i): Preparing Courts to the Monitoring of Mass Claims 
  
 
Once a strategy has been clarified, it is possible to propose tactics to achieve those goals. In this view, 
preparing courts to the monitoring of mass claims demands an adaptation of Civil Law jurisdictions (a). 
This also requires enhanced consideration for courts’ resources (b), and a faster evolution towards 
digitalized and connected courts (c). 
 
 
a) Adapting Civil Law Jurisdictions to the Administration of Mass Claims 
 
 
Policymakers should keep in mind that mass devices represent an important evolution for judicial 
practices, and, like all institutions, judiciairies may remain ‘a step behind the tasks that they must 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
legal instrument to serve. Does Europe really want collective redressonly as a means of providing compensation to 
the victims of thewrongdoing in some specific cases? Or is Europe interested in thisinstrument as a valuable means 
of deterring the misconduct andunlawful and unfair business practices? Without goal preference, it is impossible to 
adequatelydetermine the optimal policy preferences and features that theEuropean model of collective redress should 
possess'). 
1165
 Communication (EC), 'Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress', COM (2013) 401 
Final, 11 June 2013 (pointing out:  'under the European horizontal framework on collective redress the claimant party 
should be formed on the basis of the ‘opt-in’ method and that any exception to this principle, by law or by court 
order, should be duly justified by reasons of sound administration of justice'). 
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perform’.1166 This observeration is particularly relevant when applied to Civil Law judges, since mass 
litigation renews judicial roles in the traditional civil justice scheme. As earlier highlighted, Civil Law 
judges may indeed be less inclined than their Common Law counterparts to take decisions impacting large 
pools of individuals. The initial reaction of the Dutch judiciary regarding the implementation of the 
WCAM in 2006 is here illustrative. As an observer recalls, judges’ reactions were at that time contrasted 
and often ‘resistant’ as many initially considered that dealing with large-scale damage involving many 
claimants was a task falling primarily on the legislature.
1167
 In the same vein, a French judge claimed in 
the questionnaire that, in his view, the current status of French judges prohibits them to endorse any 
judicial or political responsibilities to a greater extent.
1168
 Suspicions vis-à-vis judges going beyond the 
scope of their mandates and exceeding their powers (the so-called fears of a gouvernement des juges) are 
still pregnant in countries such as France or Poland where perceptions about the judiciary may still be 
contrasted.
1169
 In countries where mass proceedings have been recently implemented, increased 
consideration must therefore be given to the respective roles of the different stakeholders involved into the 
proceeding.
1170
  
 
 
b) Enhanced Considerations for Courts’ Resources 
 
 
  
For decades, the lack of resources has been denounced by judges and policymakers as a key factor 
negatively impacting on the work of the judiciary.
1171
 A recent survey conducted in March 2014 also 
showed that insufficient resources could partly explain the actual negative perceptions shared by a 
majority of French citizens about the judiciary and its functioning.
1172
 The new responsibilities and duties 
                                                          
1166
 D.L. HOROWITZ, The Courts and Social Policy, The Brookings Institution, 1977, 309 p.(stressing that this 
situation is ‘very much the situation of courts. Their policymaking functions have gradually been superimposed on a 
structure that evolved primarily to decide individual cases’, at p.23). 
1167
 I. TZANKOVA, supra note 60. 
 
1168
 See Chapter 6. 
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 As pointed out in Chapter 3, in Poland, suspicion is associated with the communist period and the links that at 
time existed between the Judiciary and the Executive. In France, suspicion is enrooted in French history since the 
1789 Revolution. It often revivifies in discussions about examining judges intervening in criminal cases (juge 
d’instruction). See on this point: J.D. BREDIN, ‘Un gouvernement des Juges’, (68) Pouvoirs, 1994. 
 
1170
 S. AMRANI-MEKKI, supra note 1068, see also: S. BRUNENGO-BASSO, L’émergence de l’action de groupe : 
processus de fertilisation croisée, Presse Universitaire d’Aix-Marseille, 2011, 343 p. (observing: ‘l’inadaptation de la 
réflexion actuelle des pouvoirs publics sur l’introduction en droit français de l’action de groupe’, at p.291). 
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JOLIBOIS and P. FAUCHON, Quels Moyens pour quelle Justice ?, Mission d’information de la Commission des 
Lois chargée d’évaluer les moyens de la justice, rapport n°49, 1996/1997 (available on www.senat.fr, accessed 17 
December 2013). 
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assigned to judges for the administration of mass claims importantly would thus call for an increase in 
judicial resources. This notably implies an increase in court’s logistics (regarding court’s personnel and 
assistants) in order to facilitate the receiving of objections from claimants, the preparation of hearings or 
the maintenance of updated group’s registers. Dividing tasks is essential to avoid overburdening judges 
with the administrative aspects of mass claims. Arguably, one may object that increasing court’s resources 
is a costly measure for society. Such costs may however be lower than the costs of errors which would 
have dramatic consequences due to the financial interests at stake, the number of individuals involved, and 
the costs of individual successive litigation.  
 
c) A Faster Evolution toward Digitalized and Connected Courts? 
 
Since the 2000s, extensive consideration has been given in Europe to the rise of internet and information 
technologies applied to case management and judicial administration. Dematerialization of procedures are 
said to make justice more accessible to more people and at lower costs. The benefits associated with this 
e-justice remain nowadays controversial and highly debated among legal scholars. Even though it goes 
beyond the scope of this research to extensively discuss the pros and cons of the use of ICTs within 
courtrooms, this issue is however worth briefly adressing since ICTs may become cornerstone tools for 
both judges and parties involved in mass disputes.   
 
First, ICT tools facilitate a better circulation of information between courts and claimants. As an 
illustration, a system of video conferencing has been implemented in several French cities which enables 
individuals living far from the tribunals to receive information about their procedure and to request the 
communication of additional documents.
1173
 Similar tools can be of interest for the administration of mass 
claims which may concern plaintiffs located in several cities. As a manner to centralize the dispute, 
mechanisms, such as for instance videoconferences, can become tools facilitating contacts and enabling 
claimants to present objections during hearings. 
 
Second, ICT tools facilitate information and knowledge-sharing between courts. An intrinsic characteristic 
of large-scale damage – for instance caused by defective products or corporate misbehaviour - is that they 
often occur in several jurisdictions, sometimes at a same period of time, sometimes with time lags. 
Interestingly, dialogues between judges who deal, or have dealt, with mass claims have progressively 
multiplied. This may first concern dialogues between judges within a same country. As an illustration, 
Judge HAPPAS, when appointed as new mass-tort judge in charge of a pharmaceutical litigation, 
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highlighted that she first ‘sought out advice from judges handling similar matters in federal and state 
courts’.1174 Judicial dialogues may also concern judges from different countries. For example, Dutch 
judges involved in the Converium WCAM extensively took into consideration the reasoning of American 
judges who dealt with the Converium class action lawsuits. Therefore, a comparable sharing of 
information could interestingly be implemented and institutionalized at the EU level via an internet 
platform where judges could be provided with information such as the scope of a mass damage in other 
countries, the number of people involved in the dispute, the number of objections received, the number of 
people who opt-in/opt-out, et cetera. Importantly, information exchanged should be subject to 
confidentiality in order to notably ensure that the reputation of companies is not unfairly harmed. Such 
initiative would also be in line with other current initiatives conducted at the EU level in other fields 
which nowadays aim at disseminating and coordinating information between public authorities.
1175
 One 
more time, efficient resolution of mass disputes requires cooperation within and between jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
7.3.3. Defining Tactics (ii): Guiding Court throughout the Administration of Mass claims 
 
 
 
The scope of judicial intervention should be clarified with guidelines aimed at listing the different issues 
requiring enhanced supervision and vigilance. This is the path that has been followed by the United States 
for decades, and this approach is also of relevance for Civil Law judges (a). Since this research mainly 
focused on Law and Economics and behavioural perspectives, insights from these disciplines should be 
incorporated into such guidelines as a possible solution for debiasing judges (b).  
 
 
 
a) The US Experience with Guidelines in Mass Litigation and Its Relevance for Civil Law 
Judges 
 
 
 
In the 1960’s the US Federal Judicial Centre started to elaborate a manual perceived as ‘a great reservoir 
of experience in the conduct of protracted litigation accumulated over the years and lying dormant within 
the legal profession’. Even though the first edition of the manual – entitled Manual for Complex and 
Multi-District Litigation –initially briefly tackled the issue of mass litigation, its importance increased and 
                                                          
1174
 C. TOUTANT, ‘Happas, Newest Mass-Tort Judge, Is Assigned Pharmaceutical Litigation’, New Jersey Law 
Journal, 21 September 2007 (Justice J.HAPPAS appointed as mass-tort judge to deal with pharmaceutical litigation 
who said that to get up to speed on mass torts, she ‘[had] not only pored over the voluminous case records but also 
sought out advice from judges handling similar matters in federal and state courts’). 
 
1175
 See notably: Regulation (EC) n.2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Cooperation 
between National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Law (the Regulation on 
Consumer Protection Regulation), 27 October 2004. 
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became significant in the 3
rd
 and successive editions released from 1995.
1176
 In parallel, a pocket guide for 
judges collecting best practices was also published.
1177
 The objective was to clarify the roles of the 
different stakeholders intervening in complex cases. 
 
Progressively, an interrogation arose regarding the binding authority that had to be associated with such 
guidelines.
1178
 As a prominent American author highlighted, some American lawyers and judges referred 
to the Manual ‘like a treatise’,1179 a sort of oracle likely to provide solutions to all kind of problems. Yet, 
as the authors of the fourth edition clarified, ‘practices and principles that served in the past may not be 
adequate, their adaptation may be difficult and controversial, and novel and innovative ways may to be 
found’.1180 Put differently, criticisms principally feared a 'freezing' of case management techniques at a 
certain period of time, which would turn out to be of no further use for the handling of future cases. A 
second danger was that judges without experience might be tempted to strictly follow the rules catalogued 
in the guidelines because of their ‘moral authority’.1181 As SCHELLING indeed observed on a broader 
scale, ‘one of the reasons for having a book of rules about when to run the risk and when not to (…) is to 
relieve the man who gives the order, the man in the control tower, of personal guilt for the instruction he 
gives’.1182  
 
Guidelines may be well-suited to facilitate the work of Civil Law judges. The roles of guidelines can here 
be twofold. First, they give to Civil Law judges who are often portrayed as being more legalists than their 
Common Law counterparts a textual basis upon which they can ground their decisions. They also provide 
them with visibility on tasks that differ from their traditional adjudicative attributes. Results from the 
survey conducted with French judges also showed judges’ interest for this tool. Furthermoe, guidelines 
will be useful when clarifying judicial intervention vis-à-vis society: they may notably provide judges with 
enhanced legitimacy and are likely to decrese criticisms about judges exceeding the scope of their powers. 
In other words, guidelines have an important pedagogic role vis-à-vis society as a whole: they can better 
legitimize the active judging required for the monitoring of mass disputes. 
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 T.E. WILLGING, supra note 801. 
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 Ed, at p.3. 
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 T.E. WILLGING, supra note 801, at p.2225. 
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 T. SCHELLING, supra note 878, at p.130. 
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b) Incorporating Law & Economics and Behavioural Insights into the Guidelines 
 
 
Guidelines may also help decrease heterogeneity in judicial attitudes. As however below explained, 
guidelines are not per se sufficient and should be accompanied with judicial specialization. Guidelines and 
judicial specialisation are the two sides of the same coin: well-trained and specialised judges may better 
know how correctly handling the guidelines. Arguably, one may however say that guidelines can only 
result from experience, and since mass proceedings are still relatively new in Europe, critics may argue 
that it is nowadays too early to implement guidelines. This argument can however be contested: as 
stressed throughout this research, judicial intervention in mass claims tends to converge regardless of the 
idiosyncrasies of national mass devices. Experiences drawn from other jurisdictions may therefore be used 
as a preliminary substance for establishing guidelines, and, arguably, the European Commission could 
provide a first working draft of Best Practices and/or recommendations addressed to judges for the 
treatment and resolution of mass claims. As discussed below, guidelines should also include solutions for 
correcting judges’ behavioural biases. 
 
 7.3.4. Defining Tactics (iii): Debiasing Judges? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, individuals may behave as boundedly rational decision-makers. The 
behavioural literature has however progressively set forth methods for correcting individuals’ biases and 
errors (a). These insights can be used to suggest possible remedies for debiasing the outlier effect (b), the 
vividness heuristics and the identifiable victim effects (c), as well for preventing against heuristics 
entrepreneurs (d). 
 
a) Preliminary Remarks -Mitigating Behavioural Biases: Remedies and Controversies 
 
 
The behavioural literature notably identifies two solutions for correcting individuals’ biases. The first one 
consists of insulating legal outcomes from the influence of decision-makers’ biases. In simple terms, this 
approach aims at restricting the scope of individual decision. The second is known as ‘debiasing through 
law’ and refers to the framing of legal policies in a way that does not insulate individuals, but rather that 
‘[operates] directly on the boundedly rational behaviour and [attempts] to help people either to reduce or 
to eliminate it’.1183 This approach, SUNSTEIN and JOLLS argue, is ‘less intrusive, more direct and [is a] 
                                                          
1183
C. JOLLS, C.R. SUNSTEIN and R. THALER, supra note 791, at p.200.  
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more democratic response to the problem of bounded rationality’.1184 In contrast to the insulation 
technique, debiasing through law does not exclude individual’s choices but leads people to take their 
decision in a more rational way by, for instance, providing them with enhanced information through 
warnings and disclosure. These behavioural remedies have often been portrayed as ‘paternalistic’ in the 
sense that they modify choice infrastructure by ‘nudging’ individuals towards decisions that better match 
their interests.
1185
  
This literature has however been the target of numerous criticisms. First, remedies aimed at correcting 
behavioural biases have been contested for constraining individual’s autonomy and freedom of choice. 
Second, governments or agencies who decide to act paternalistically to protect their agents should not 
themselves fall prey to behavioural biases. Third and as stressed in Chapter 5, mapping the human brain 
and its cognitive errors is nowadays still an ongoing process. Attempts to correct behavioural biases 
should thus be built on a clear and well-established body of evidence. Yet, as Chapter 5 and 6 have shown 
behavioural evidence on – for instance - the impact associated with the number of claimants on decision-
making still remains inconclusive. Additional work should therefore be conducted in this area. As an 
attempt to however pave the way in that direction, solutions to mitigate some of the behavioural biases 
which judges may be subject to in mass litigation are investigated.  
 
b) Example n°1: Debiasing the Outlier Effect  
 
 
Chapter 5 pointed out the likelihood of outlier effects in mass litigation where stronger and identified 
individuals tend to influence the perception of the claimant group as a whole. Based on this argument, one 
may question the relevance of group procedures in which claimant(s) with the largest financial interest in 
the lawsuit are ultimately appointed as lead plaintiff(s).
1186
 In such situations, judges may indeed be 
particularly prone to the outlier effect. A possible remedy to the outlier effect is to disclose information. 
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This was the solution proposed by the Special Master appointed in the asbestos-related Cimino class 
action. ‘The Court’, he reported, ‘can take care of the possibility of prejudice by instructing the jury (…) 
that it must not judge all cases in the class as the most or least serious of the class representatives and 
perhaps by pointing out to the Jury the relatively small percentage of mesothelioma plaintiff [i.e. plaintiffs 
with the most severe injury] in the class as a whole’.1187 Information provision reminding judges about the 
rest of the group may consequently help mitigating the outlier effect. 
 
c) Example n°2: Debiaising the Vividness Heuristic and the Identifiable Victim Effect 
 
 
Chapter 5 also highlighted the existence of vividness heuristics which lead decision-maker to be sensitive 
to vivid and image-provoking information and to neglect pallid data summary or statistical information. 
Relatedly, individuals tend to be more sensitive to the personalized situation of a single victim as 
compared to a group of similar plaintiffs viewed en masse. Interestingly, Chapter 3 has however shown 
that cost efficiency considerations have supported the use of statistical evidence in mass litigation. In a 
similar logic, FORD points out that ‘a focus on collective justice requires us to resist the natural impulse 
to prefer dramatic narratives to hard evidence and to respond to identifiable victims with a face than to 
systemic social problems’.1188 The key issue is therefore to ensure that judges handling statistical data and 
information about the group will not overlook the interests of absent claimants. A possible solution is here 
again to educate judges about their possible biases. This idea was tested by SLOVIC, LOEWENSTEIN 
and SMALL through an experiment conducted with lay persons that aimed at clarifying the reactions and 
decisions of participants who had previously been informed about the identifiable victim effect and its 
consequences.
1189
 Interestingly, the authors found that informed decision-makers gave less to identified 
victims, while not giving more to statistical victims. They ultimately observed that ‘people discount 
sympathy towards identifiable victims but fail to generate sympathy toward statistical victims’.  Debiasing 
the identifiable victim effect through disclosure of information might therefore not be a sufficient solution. 
As discussed in the preliminary remarks, solutions to cope with the identifiable victim effect appear to be 
a field where more empirical research is needed before drawing policy recommendations.  
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d) Example n°3: Warning against Heuristics Entrepreneurs 
 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 suggested that judges’ behavioural biases can be manipulated by parties willing to 
pursue their own agenda. Claimants’ associations may for instance amplify the existence of outliers in the 
claimant group. Based on the results of the experiment presented in Chapter 6, they may also be tempted 
to overstate the presence of numerous claimants to obtain more damages. There are two possible filters 
against possible manipulations from heuristics entrepreneurs. The first one is the role played by the 
opposite party (defendant). A defendant will for instance put lots of effort and energy to prove the 
insufficient representativeness of samples or test cases, or to highlight the effects associated with outliers. 
In simple terms, the opposite party will act as a counter-voice and points out the possible manipulations 
from heuristics entrepreneurs. The second filter must be judges themselves. In this view, it appears 
necessary to teach judges - through special training, guidelines and as discussed below specialization - so 
as to maintain them vigilant against such biases.  
 
7.3.5. Defining Tactics (iv): Specialising Judges? 
 
 
A final remedy can consist of promoting judicial specialisation for the treatment of mass disputes (a). 
Questions however remain regarding the forms of such specialisation (b).  
 
 
a) Benefits and Limits of Judicial Specialisation  
 
 
 Benefits 
 
 
 
Literature has highlighted that specialisation leads judges to act as repeated players. As a consequence, 
they can develop a particular expertise which increases their skills, efficiency and performance when 
dealing with complex cases.
1190
 During the past decades, ever-increasing technical sophistication of the 
law has indeed encouraged an ever-specialization of courts.
1191
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 C. GUTHRIE J.J RACHLINSKI, and A.WISTRICH, ‘Inside the Judicial Mind’, (86) Cornell Law Review, 2000, 
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du droit’). As an illustration, in 2005 the number of French tribunals in charge of competition matters, intellectual 
property and bankruptcy law was restricted  (see : décret n° 2005-1756 du 30 décembre 2005 fixant la liste et le 
ressort des juridictions spécialisées en matière de concurrence, de propriété industrielle et de difficultés des 
entreprises). 
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In a similar logic, some European countries have given exclusive jurisdiction to a restricted number of 
courts for the treatment of mass claims. The example of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal which has 
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with collective settlements is illustrative.
1192
 In France, exclusive jurisdiction 
for the treatment of group actions was explicitly mentioned in the 2010 report, but has finally been 
abandoned in the latest version of the 2014 bill on Consumer Law. This being said, there is however an 
important exception to this rule which regards situations where defendants are located outside France. In 
such circumstances, the Paris High Court of First Instance will have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the 
group action.
1193
 This decision has first and been foremost motivated by a desire to centralize the dispute 
in situations where defendants are located outside France, but does not seem to have per se been adopted 
to encourage a judicial specialization. Finally, in England, judges handling GLOs are few and have over 
time developed their own savoir-faire.  
From a Law & Economics perspective, judicial specialization can be viewed as a possible technique to 
modify judicial incentives. As extensively explained in Chapter 4, unlike usual workers, behaviour of 
insulated judges cannot be influenced through the use of sticks and carrots. This insulation is beneficial for 
society: it minimizes risks of corruption and preserves judges’ independence. Preceding developments 
have however pointed out that judges also respond to incentives that are mostly non-pecuniary, such as 
prestige, reputation, career concerns or taste for public service. Interestingly, BAUM observes that ‘more 
subtly, judges’ awareness of their importance in a field can shape their perceptions of their role and 
ultimately their choices’. The author further stresses that ‘judges may find it satisfying to specialise [,] 
might enjoy judging in a high-prestige field such as corporate law or tax law’, or that they can ‘gain 
acclaim by serving in a court that people perceive as innovative’.1194 Specialised courts may give judges 
greater visibility and public exposure vis-à-vis society and the legal profession. Attracting public attention 
and seeking prestige are arguments that judges-guru may seek to maximize when monitoring mass claims. 
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 Limits  
 
 
The benefits of specialisation on judicial outputs are however neither straightforward nor automatic. They 
tend to remain highly contingent on the conditions under which specialised courts operate.
1195
 Moreover, 
evidence on the benefits of judicial specialization is nowadays still scarce and inconclusive.
1196
 
Specialisation may for instance fail to eradicate judicial biases. RACHLINSKI, GUTHRIE and 
WISTRICH found for instance evidence that specialised judges tend to make the same cognitive errors as 
generalist judges with regards notably to the anchoring or framing effects.
1197
 
Furthermore, even though judicial specialization has drastically increased during last decades, judges 
often still remain hostile to specialization. As evidenced in the questionnaire conducted with French 
judges, a majority of respondents did not consider specialised courts as a suitable solution for the 
monitoring of mass disputes. In other jurisdictions, similar judicial reluctance toward specialisation is also 
palpable. As a US Federal judge has explained, ‘I like the fact that federal judges are generalists. I often 
say that judges may be the last generalist in professional life, and I have resisted mightily any suggestion 
that the federal courts become specialised in any particular area’.1198 In spite of this argument, there is 
already a great deal of specialisation within judiciaries and, as explained below, judges may importantly 
benefit from the creation of a specialised court for enhancing their reputation and prestige in the legal 
profession.  
 
  
b) Forms of Judicial Specialization: an Open Question for the Future 
 
 
Doubts remain vis-à-vis the forms of court specialization in mass litigation. Should policymakers establish 
‘disaster courts’ with specific rules, support personnel and expert judges specifically trained to deal with 
mass litigation?
1199
 It is however rather doubtful that the number of claimants can per se constitute a 
sufficient criterion for judicial specialisation. An alternative is to reserve the treatment of mass litigation 
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to a specific chamber of a specialised tribunal. For example, one may decide that a specific chamber of the 
environmental court will be in charge of large-scale environmental damage.
1200
 In doing so, problems may 
however potentially arise in cross-cutting disputes which could for example mix environmental and health 
issues. A possible solution to cope with this difficulty could be to appoint ad hoc courts which would be 
composed of judges sitting in specialised chamber of environment and health courts.   
 
 
7.3.6. Preliminary Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter has shown that the roles of judges should be guided by a strategy (clarifying the goals 
pursued by mass devices) followed by different tactics. Giving courts sufficient resources, providing 
judges with guidelines, facilitating judicial dialogues, enhancing e-justice, debiasing and specializing 
judges are solutions which can be investigated and should nowadays accompany debates on the roles of 
judges in mass disputes. Importantly, other solutions – such as notably the use of judicial liability as a way 
to influence judicial attitudes –1201  should also be given enhanced attention in future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      *** 
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7.4. CONCLUSION  
 
 
To recapitulate, a set of policy recommendations can be proposed to help policymakers and judges for the 
management and resolution of mass claims. Based on previous developments, they may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
1. Policymakers should change their current views on judges when acting in the mass litigation area. 
When evaluating and adapting existing forms of mass litigation, as well as in designing new forms, it is 
essential to bear in mind the idiosyncrasies of decision-making. The effects associated with the 'mass' 
context should also further be taken into consideration. In addition, increased attention should be given to 
the judicial incentives structure, and to cognitive biases which may importantly shape the outcomes of 
mass disputes. Judge sitting in panels may be less inclined to such biases and self-interested attitudes. 
However, and as stressed throughout this Chapter, the absence of clear-cut evidence on the corrective 
effect of panels on judicial decision-making and atttitudes calls today for a precautionary approach; 
  
2. Policymakers should guide the intervention of judges. Importantly, a clear prioritization of goals to be 
achieved through mass proceedings is needed to reduce uncertainty in the scope of appropriate judicial 
monitoring;  
 
3. Policymakers should assist and facilitate the intervention of judges in mass litigation. Guidelines may 
be released to help judges when monitoring mass claims. These guidelines can facilitate and legitimate the 
roles of (Civil Law) judges whose intervention may depart from their traditional practice. They have also 
pedagogic roles for judges, parties and society. They may help debias juddges and should therefore 
include behavioural insights, such as the identified victim effect or the outlier effect. External assistance 
should also be provided for the treatment and resolution of technical issues. External examiners may for 
instance be required to intervene for the reviewing of mass settlement agreements. Finally, coordination 
tools, such as an online platform, may also be developed – potentially at the EU level – to help judges 
exchange information about the treatment of mass claims (on the number of claimants, number of opt-
in/opt-out, scope of mass harm situations et cetera); 
 
4. Policymakers should (re)organise their judiciairies for the treatment of mass claims. Enhanced 
consideration should be given to courts’ logistics, human and financial resources. The issue of 
specialisation and the design of such specialised courts should further be discussed. Mass litigation may 
also encourage a faster transition to ITCs within courtrooms, since new technologies -such as video-
conferencing- are likely to facilitate communication between judges and claimants. 
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Therefore, based on these developments, the text of the 2013 recommendations of the European 
Commission on common principles for injunctinve and compensatory collective redress mechanisms
1202
 
could be completed as follows: ‘a key role should be given to courts in protecting the rights and interests 
of all the parties involved in collective redress actions, as well as in managing the collective redress 
actions effectively. However, in doing so, Member States should not too heavily rely on their judges, but 
importantly adapt their courts to the treatment and resolution of collective redress actions. They should 
notably ensure that judges are given clear guidances, are supported with sufficient resources (human, 
financial and logistics) and provided with external assistance. Finally, Member States may help identify 
Best Practices for facilitating the judicial management of mass claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1202
 (EC) 2013 Recommendations, supra note 5. 
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Chapter 8 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION  
& 
PATHS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
    
In a recent novel, VARGAS LLOSA concludes about his main character that ‘it is impossible to know 
definitely a human being, totality that always slips through the theoretical and rational nets that try to 
capture it’.1203 Indeed, human beings can neither be entirely simplified, nor fully understood. The legal 
myths relating to judging can however today be unravelled, and that was one of the objectives pursued in 
this research. Although controversial, the added value of rational choice theory and behavioural 
economics proposes alternative methodologies to investigate judicial attitudes, which are different from 
the traditional legal views on judges. These approaches question what the legal literature has often held as 
unquestionable: the personality, preferences and biases of judges.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to propose different perspectives on judges and judicial attitudes as a an attempt 
to discuss a burning policy issue – the implementation and development of mass litigation procedures - 
which presently stands at the forefront of many policy agendas in Europe and beyond. The research 
identified the different roles that policymakers have assigned to judges in the treatment and monitoring of 
mass disputes.These roles were then assessed from a rational choice perspective and from a behavioural 
Law & Economics angle. Importantly, the outcomes of mass disputes tend to be nowadays highly 
dependent on judges’ behaviour and preferences. Two reality checks were then conducted, and possible 
solutions to remedy judges’ vulnerabilities were finally discussed. 
 
Remarkably, the contrast between the manner policymakers and the law address the work of judges with 
respect to mass claims on the one hand, and insights from social sciences on the other, is striking. This gap 
represents clear opportunities for future research for lawyers (i), economists (ii), behavioural researchers 
and psychologists (iii), sociologists and political scientists (iv).   
                                                          
1203
 M. VARGAS LLOSA, The Dream of the Celt, Faber & Faber, 2012 (translated from Spanish by Edith 
Grossman), at p.493 
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(i) Vis-à-vis lawyers, mass litigation represents a constantly evolving topic in Europe. As an 
illustration, when I started this research, group actions were still in limbos in France and many 
thought at that time that their chance of eventually being implemented into the French legal 
system was low. Yet, after several decades of discussion, group actions have been adopted. 
Instead of remaining blocked with endless debates about American-style class action lawsuits, 
legal scholars should instead view experiences in other European countries with mass 
litigation as opportunities for cross-fertilization. Moreover, legal scholars should give 
particular attention to the use of case management techniques in mass claims. As discussed in 
this research, a key issue - which is currently already pivotal but which will have also growing 
importance in the coming years - regards solutions for delivering and ensuring a high-quality 
justice to many and at lower costs. Developments of mass litigation will sooner or later 
require judiciary to adopt new case management techniques. As a suggestion following up the 
2013 recommendations on collective redress of the European Commission, it will also turn 
out to be useful to prepare a set of best practices or guidelines addressed to European judges 
when dealing with mass claims. Finally, greater attention should be given to judicial attitudes 
in mass litigation dealing with specific fields of substantive law such as environment, toxic 
tort or health law. Judicial attitudes might possibly diverge depending on the areas at stake; 
 
(ii) Vis-à-vis economists, greater attention should be given to the dynamics of mass litigation, and 
more specifically to the relationship between different protagonists involved in mass claims. 
In this view, a particular emphasis should be placed on the work performed by associations 
(and on their incentives) in mass claims. Since voices tend nowadays to support more and 
more active judging, studies should also investigate solutions for incentivizing judges to work 
efficiently. Although system of bonuses and premium are currently considered to be 
controversial, other solutions need to be explored. On a broader level, efforts should be made 
to multiply studies with and on Civil Law judges, taking into account the idiosyncrasies of 
Continental judiciaries and subsequent sub-branches of the judiciary (commercial judges, 
labour judges, et cetera); 
 
(iii) Vis-à-vis behavioural economists and psychologists, the mass litigation context is an object of 
investigation for many possible studies. Following the experiment conducted in this research, 
one should further question the impact of multiple claimants and large-scale damage on legal 
decision-making. As observed above, evidence is currently scarce and contrasted. 
 296 
 
Experiments should be conducted with legal professionals on this important issue to know if 
and how extra-legal factors such as the number of parties involved impact on the outcomes of 
mass disputes; 
 
(iv) Vis-à-vis sociologists and political scientists, mass litigation is also a promising field of 
research since it changes the roles of judges in society and the perceptions that citizens may 
have of their judiciary. One could notably run a questionnaire in a couple of years from now 
to collect viewpoints of European judges on the treatment of mass claims. Furthemore, as a 
way to expand the work done in this thesis, a questionnaire could also be conducted with 
French judges to compare the viewpoints expressed in 2013 and the viewpoints after several 
years of practice with group actions. More precisely, this exercise could interestingly be 
conducted in early 2016 since the law reforming Consumer Law passed in March 2014 clearly 
stated that the government will have to report to the Parliament on the successes and failures 
of the group action, and ultimately propose recommendations for improving its 
functioning.
1204
 This may turn out to be key occasion for collecting judicial viewpoints on 
mass litigation. 
  
As a matter of fact, mass litigation and judges will be a promising field of research for scholars with 
various backgrounds. However, the most important challenge will be to ensure that all these studies 
manage to cross-fertilize and exchange their findings, so that scholars can maintain cross-disciplinary 
approaches. In this field, like in many others, researchers should finally keep in mind that ‘every scientific 
matter of inquiry that places Man at the center of their study is similarly structured. We must order and 
classify the areas of convergence between these sciences, so that they can ultimately be fused into a 
harmonious and consistent collective of knowledge’.1205 
 
 
 
                                                          
1204
 Loi 2014-344 of 17 March 2014, Article 2 (IV) (in French: ‘trente mois au plus tard après la promulgation de la 
présente loi, le Gouvernment remet au Parlement un rapport évaluant les conditions de mises en œuvre de la 
procédure d’action de groupe et propose les adaptations qu’il juge nécessaire’). 
1205
 F. GARDE, Ce qu’il advint du sauvage blanc, Gallimard, 2013, at p.332 (translation from the author. In French: 
‘j’esquisse aujourd’hui le théorème suivant: toutes les sciences ayant l’homme pour objet d’études obéissent aux 
mêmes principes et sont structurés d’identique façon. Il faut constater et cultiver ces convergences, afin qu’elles 
fusionnent en un ensemble harmonieux’). 
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         Appendix 1 
Experiment (Dutch Version) 
 
 
 
                      Single 
 
 
1700 personen zijn ingeënt met een 
vaccin (geneesmiddel) om de ziekte 
X te voorkomen. Het middel is 
geproduceerd door het bedrijf Alpha. 
De heer Jansen is een van de 
personen die ingeënt is met het 
middel. 
                     Multiple  
 
      
115 600 personen zijn ingeënt met een 
vaccin (geneesmiddel) om de ziekte X te 
voorkomen. Het middel is geproduceerd door 
het bedrijf Alpha. Onder de ingeënte 
personen zijn Jansen, Vervink, Pasternaak, 
Van de Werf, TeHaar, Habili, Emeraldo en 
Eijkestein en nog 60 andere personen. 
 
 
                          Weaker Claim 
 
                         Stronger Claim 
“Er is geen onomstotelijk bewijs over het 
verband tussen inenting met het middel  
en de ontwikkelde klachten. De laatste 
epidemiologische studies kunnen het 
causaal verband niet buiten twijfel 
vaststellen. 
 
De advocaat van de heer Jansen (OR van 
de 68 personen) heeft vergelijkbare 
rechtszaken onderzocht, waarbij precies 
hetzelfde middel en dezelfde 
gezondheidsklachten centraal stonden. 
 
In deze zaken werden experts opgeroepen 
en op basis van hun conclusies werd in 
46% van de gevallen de eis van 
benadeelden afgewezen en in 54% van de 
gevallen werd de eis toegewezen.  
 
De advocaat van de tegenpartij, het bedrijf 
Alpha, stelt dat de klachten zich eerder 
hadden moeten voordoen als zij echt door 
het middel zouden zijn veroorzaakt. In dit 
geval deden de klachten zich pas na een 
jaar voor. En ook wordt betoogd dat de 
klachten van de eiser aan predispositie te 
wijten zijn en dat veel personen die zijn 
ingeënt geen klachten hebben.” 
“Er is geen onomstotelijk bewijs over het 
verband tussen inenting met het middel 
en de ontwikkelde klachten. De laatste 
epidemiologische studies kunnen het 
causaal verband niet buiten twijfel 
vaststellen. 
 
De advocaat van de heer Jansen (OR van 
de 68 personen) heeft vergelijkbare 
rechtszaken onderzocht, waarbij precies 
hetzelfde middel en dezelfde 
gezondheidsklachten centraal stonden. 
 
In deze zaken werden experts opgeroepen 
en op basis van hun conclusies werd in 
36% van de gevallen de eis van 
benadeelden afgewezen en in 64% van de 
gevallen werd de eis toegewezen. 
 
De advocaat van de tegenpartij, het 
bedrijf Alpha, stelt dat de klachten zich 
eerder hadden moeten voordoen als zij 
echt door het middel zouden zijn 
veroorzaakt. In dit geval deden de 
klachten zich pas na een jaar voor. En ook 
wordt betoogd dat de klachten van de 
eiser aan predispositie te wijten zijn en 
dat veel personen die zijn ingeënt geen 
klachten hebben.” 
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     Appendix 2 
      The Questionnaire as Displayed on the Screen of Respondents 
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire (Translation French/ English) 
 
 Question 1  
 
FRENCH : De nombreux objectifs ont été associés aux actions de groupe. Dans quelle mesure estimez-
vous qu’un mécanisme d’action de groupe doit en effet permettre… 
ENGLISH: Many objectives have been associated with group proceedings. To what extent do you consider 
that a group proceeding should indeed be aimed at… 
 
- D’encourager les actions en justice de demande en réparation d’un faible montant   
Enhancing compensation of small claims 
- D’encourager et d’accroitre la dissuasion des comportements d’entreprises frauduleux ou 
illicites 
Enhancing and increasing deterrence of corporate misbehavior 
- De faciliter le travail des juges (rationalisation des ressources judiciaires, économies 
procédurales, gain de temps…) 
Helping judicial management of mass litigation (saving judge’s time and resources) 
- De faciliter la cohérence sur le fond des décisions de justice 
Facilitating a better substantial coherence of judicial decisions 
- D’améliorer l’indemnisation des victimes 
Enhancing plaintiffs’ compensation  
 
 
 Question 2 
 
Estimez-vous que les procédures d’action de groupe doivent demeurer restreintes à un champ 
d’application étroit (uniquement le droit de la concurrence) ou doivent-elles pouvoir être appliquées de 
manière plus générale, potentiellement à tous les domaines du droit ?  
According to you, the scope of application of group proceedings must be restricted to specific fields (only 
competition law), or should be potentially applicable more widely? 
 
 
- Seulement le droit de la concurrence 
Only competition law 
- Tous les domaines du droit sans distinction 
All fields without distinction 
- Certains domaines en particulier (veuillez indiquer ces domaines) 
Some specific fields (if so, please indicate these fields) 
- Sans opinion 
Without opinion 
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 Question 3  
 
Selon vous, comment doit se comporter le juge lorsqu’il est en charge d’une action de groupe: 
According to you, how the judge should behave when he is in charge of a group action?  
 
- Etre très actif. (d’avantage que ce qui est requis aujourd’hui dans la conduite des actions 
civiles individuelles) 
Be very active (more than what is today required for the monitoring of individual lawsuits) 
- Etre actif (sans pour autant qu’il soit nécessaire d’être plus actif que ce qui est aujourd’hui 
requis dans la conduite des actions civiles individuelles) 
Be active (but not more than what is today required for the monitoring of individual lawsuits) 
- Etre passif (Laisser principalement la conduite de la procédure aux associations de 
consommateurs et/ou avocats et ne jouer qu’un rôle de contrôle ex post) 
Be passive (leaving the monitoring of the proceeding primarily to associations and/or 
lawyers, and performing an ex post control). 
 
 
 Question 4  
 
Dans quelle mesure estimez-vous que les missions suivantes devraient être confiées au juge en charge de 
la conduite d’une action de groupe : 
To what extent do you think that the following tasks should be endorsed by the judge in charge of 
monitoring a group action? 
 
- Fixer les critères de rattachement des demandeurs individuels au groupe et s’assurer de 
l’homogénéité des demandeurs au sein du groupe 
Determining the criteria to be met to be part of the group and ensuring homogeneity of 
plaintiffs within the claimant group 
- Distinguer et sanctionner les demandes individuelles jugées non-fondées ou dilatoires 
Distinguishing and punishing frivoulous claimants 
- Veiller sur les intérêts des demandeurs absents ou représentés 
Taking care of the interests of absent or represented parties 
- S’assurer d'une bonne médiatisation de la procédure dans la presse 
Ensuring the advertising of the proceeding in the media 
- Revoir les conditions de la transaction (d’un point de vue tant procédural que substantiel) 
éventuellement in fine conclue entre les parties 
Supervising and reviewing the terms of the final settlement potentially concluded between 
parties (from both a procedural and substantial perspectives) 
- Contrôler la bonne représentativité des associations de consommateurs et/ou avocats, ainsi 
que la qualité de leur communication/relations avec les demandeurs 
Controlling the adequate representativeness of consumer associations and/or lawyers , as 
well as their adequate communication with their members/clients 
- Se prononcer sur le montant des frais d’avocats 
Reviewing the amounts of lawyers’ fees  
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 Question 5  
 
Estimez-vous que la conduite d’une action de groupe doit-être placée sous l’autorité : 
Do you think that a group action should be monitored by… 
 
- D’un juge unique 
A single judge 
- De plusieurs juges 
Several judges (a panel) 
- Sans opinion 
Without opinion 
 
 
 Question 6  
 
 
Considérez-vous que les tâches suivantes sont susceptibles d'être difficiles à accomplir pour le juge en 
charge de la conduite de l’action de groupe ? 
To what extent do you consider that the following tasks are likely to be difficult to fulfill for the judge in 
charge of a group action? 
 
(regarding the lists of the tasks here listed, refer to Question 4) 
 
 
 Question 7  
 
Selon vous, l’intervention du juge en matière d’action de groupe devrait être: 
According to you, the judicial monitoring in a group action should be… 
 
- Limitée et sujette à des règles strictes 
Limited and regulated by strict rules 
- Limitée mais guidée par de simples lignes directrices 
Limited but guided by broad guidelines 
- Etendues mais sujette à des règles strictes 
Wide but regulated by strict rules 
- Etendues et guidées par de simples lignes directrices 
Wide and regulated by broad guidelines 
- Sans opinion 
Without opinion 
 
 
 Question 8  
 
Dans quelle mesure considérez-vous que les points suivants sont susceptibles d’être une source de 
difficulté susceptible d’affecter le travail du juge en charge d’une action de groupe: 
To what extent do you consider that the following issues are likely to be problematic from the perspective 
of the judge in charge of a group action ? 
 
-       Pression médiatique ou politique 
        Media or political pressure 
- Pression de l’opinion publique 
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Pressure from public opinion 
- Accroissement important de la charge de travail du juge 
Tasks highly time consuming or burdensome from the judges’ point of view 
- Perspective d’être potentiellement confronté à de très nombreuses victimes 
Perspective of potentially facing numerous victims 
- Surexposition du juge en charge de l’action de groupe (dans les médias ou au sein de la 
profession) 
Judicial overexposure (in the media or within the legal profession) 
- Difficile communication entre le juge et les parties 
Difficult communication between the judges and the parties 
- Définir le niveau adéquat de médiatisation de la procédure dans les médias 
Defining the adequate level of advertising of the proceeding in the media 
- Potentiel Manque de visibilité sur les intérêts des demandeurs absents ou représentés 
Potential lack of visibility on the interests of absent or represented claimants 
- Prise en compte des intérêts des entreprises défenderesses (protéger notamment leur 
réputation) 
Taking into account the interest of companies (notably in terms of reputation costs) 
- Manque de ressources financières et/ou humaines du monde judiciaire 
Lack of financial and/or human judicial resources to deal with mass cases 
 
 
 Question 9  
 
Avez-vous d’autres sujets d’inquiétudes (si non, veuillez s’il vous plait indiquer ‘non’ dans la case ci-
dessous) 
Do you have any other concerns? (if not, indicate ‘no’ in the box below) 
 
 
 Question 10 and 10 bis 
 
Dans quelle mesure estimez-vous que le travail opéré par les associations de consommateurs (ou par tout 
autre association susceptible d’engager une action de groupe) est généralement digne de confiance 
To what extent do you consider that the work performed by consumers’ association (or any plaintiffs’ 
associations entitled to file a group lawsuit) is generally trustworthy? 
 
Dans quelle mesure estimez-vous que le travail opéré par les associations de consommateurs (ou par tout 
autre association susceptible d’engager une action de groupe) doit être maintenue sous un strict contrôle 
du juge 
To what extent do you consider that the work performed by consumers’ association (or any plaintiffs’ 
associations entitled to file a group lawsuit) should be kept under close judicial supervision? 
 
 
 Question 11  
 
 
Considérez-vous la perspective d’être en charge d’une action de groupe comme étant une expérience :  
Do you view the fact of being in charge of a group action as being an experience… 
 
-      Potentiellement intimidante 
       Potentially intimidating  
- Potentiellement motivante 
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Potentially motivating 
- Potentiellement inquiétante 
Potentially worrying 
- Est susceptible de représenter un véritable défi pour le juge 
Likely to constitute a real challenge for the judge 
 
 
 Question 12  
 
 
 Souhaiteriez-vous, à titre personnel, être en charge de la conduite d’une action de groupe dans le futur : 
Would you personally enjoy monitoring  a group action ? 
 
- Oui, clairement 
Yes, really 
- Oui pourquoi pas 
Yes, why not  
- Non pas nécessairement 
No, not necessarily 
- Non, vraiment pas 
No, really not 
- Sans opinion 
Without opinion 
 
 
 Question 13  
 
 
Quels sont selon vous les outils susceptibles de faciliter le travail du juge qui serait demain en charge de la 
conduite d’une action de groupe ?  
According to you, what are the tools to be used for facilitating the judicial monitoring of a group action ? 
 
- Mise en place d’une juridiction spécialisée 
A specialised court 
- Mise en place d’une formation spécialisée pour les juges 
Judicial education and training 
- Ediction de lignes directrices ou d’un code de bonnes conduites 
Guidelines or best practices  
- Assistance extérieurs (experts, autorités specialisées…) 
                        External assistance (experts, specialised agencies…) 
 
 
 Question 14  
  
 
En conclusion, avez-vous tout autre point, inquiétude ou suggestion que vous souhaiteriez partagé au sujet 
des mécanismes d’action de groupe ? 
Finally, do you have any other concerns or point of views that you would like to share regarding group 
actions?  
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Appendix (4) 
 
              Frequencies per Question: Complete Overview 
 
f= frequency (or number of respondents per question) 
NB: The responses to open-ended questions are hereafter not reported. 
 Many objectives have been associated with group proceedings. To what extent do you consider 
that these mechanisms should indeed be aimed at... 
 
  
Very 
important 
 
rather 
important 
 
 
without 
opinion 
 
Rather 
secondary 
 
 
Very 
secondary 
 
Total 
 
Facilitating the 
compensation of 
low-claim plaintiffs  
 
 
F=13 
 
12 
 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
 
3 
 
 
40 
 
Promoting and 
increasing 
deterrence against 
unlawful corporate 
behaviours 
 
 
28 
 
 
11 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Facilitating the 
judges’ work 
(saving in terms of 
resources, times..) 
 
 
12 
 
 
16 
 
 
3 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Facilitating the 
coherence of 
rulings on a same 
topic/same legal 
issue 
 
 
17 
 
 
20 
 
 
0 
 
 
3 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
 
Facilitating 
compensation of 
plaintiffs 
 
 
17 
 
 
19 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
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 Do you consider that group proceedings should be restricted to (a) specialized area(s) or applied 
to all fields of law? 
 
Competition Law only 
 
All fields of Law 
without distinction 
 
      Only some 
fields in particular 
 
No opinion 
 
 
         total 
 
4 
 
           17 
 
 
13 
 
6 
 
   
40 
 
 According to you, how should a judge behave when he is in charge of monitoring a collective 
proceeding? 
 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Rather 
agree 
 
Without 
opinion 
 
Rather 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
total 
 
Being very active (more than 
what is currently required for the 
conduct of individual lawsuit) 
 
  
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
7 
 
 
26 
 
 
2 
 
 
40 
 
 
Being active (but not more than 
what is currently required for the 
conduct of individual lawsuit) 
 
 
6 
 
 
25 
 
 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
 
Being Passive (Leaving the 
conduct of the proceeding 
primarily to plaintiffs 
organization/consumer 
organization/ lawyers( and 
maintaining only an ex post 
intervention) 
  
 
3 
 
 
7 
 
 
3 
 
 
18 
 
 
9 
 
 
40 
 
 To what extent do you consider that the following tasks should be endorsed by the judge(s) in 
charge of monitoring a collective proceeding? 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Rather 
agree 
Without 
opinion 
Rather 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
 
Determining the criteria that are 
required to be member of the 
group and ensuring the 
homogeneity of plaintiffs within 
the group 
 
 
11 
 
 
20 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
Distinguishing and if necessary 
punishing frivolous or 
unmeritorious individual claims  
 
10 
 
 
28 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
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Taking care of the interest of 
absent or represented plaintiffs 
 
 
8 
 
 
17 
 
 
3 
 
 
9 
 
 
3 
 
 
40 
 
Ensuring the publicity of the 
proceeding in the media 
 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
 
5 
 
 
11 
 
 
22 
 
 
40 
 
Supervising and reviewing the 
settlement potentially concluded 
between litigants (from both a 
substantial and procedural 
perspectives) 
 
 
5 
 
 
20 
 
 
3 
 
 
11 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
Controlling the adequate 
representativeness of consumer 
organization or lawyers, as well 
as their communication with their 
member/clients. 
 
 
10 
 
16 
 
9 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
40 
 
Reviewing the fees of lawyers 
 
 
7 
 
 
15 
 
12 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
 
40 
 
 Do you think that a collective proceeding should be managed by: 
 
 
A single judge 
 
A panel (several judges) 
 
No opinion 
 
 
total 
 
8 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
7 
 
40 
 
 Do you think that the following tasks might be difficult to fulfill by the judge in charge of a 
collective proceeding? 
 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Rather 
agree 
 
Without 
opinion 
 
Rather 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Total 
 
Determining the criteria 
that are required to be 
member of the group and 
ensuring the homogeneity 
of plaintiffs within the 
group 
 
 
7 
 
 
16 
 
2 
 
 
14 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
Distinguishing and if 
necessary punishing 
frivolous or unmeritorious 
individual claims 
 
 
2 
 
 
15 
 
 
2 
 
 
21 
 
0 
 
 
40 
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Taking care of the interest 
of absent or represented 
plaintiffs 
 
 
6 
 
 
17 
 
3 
 
 
14 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Ensuring the publicity of 
the proceeding in the media 
 
 
16 
 
 
2 
 
 
18 
 
 
3 
 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
Supervising and reviewing 
the settlement potentially 
concluded between litigants 
(from both a substantial and 
procedural perspectives) 
 
 
4 
 
 
21 
 
 
3 
 
 
11 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
 
Controlling the adequate 
representativeness of 
consumer organization or 
lawyers, as well as their 
communication with their 
member/clients 
 
 
4 
 
20 
 
3 
 
 
12 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
Reviewing lawyers’ fees 
 
 
4 
 
9 
 
 
9 
 
12 
 
 
6 
 
 
40 
 
 According to you, the intervention of the judge should be: 
 
 
Limited and 
subject to strict 
rules 
 
Limited but solely 
regulated by broad 
guidelines 
 
Wide but 
subject to 
strict rules 
 
Wide and solely 
regulated to broad 
guidelines 
 
Without 
opinion 
 
 
 
Total 
 
9 
 
 
5 
 
 
18 
 
 
8 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
 To what extent do you consider that the following points are likely to be an obstacle from the 
perspective of the judge in charge of monitoring of a group proceeding? 
 
  
Strongly agree 
 
 
Rather agree 
 
Without 
opinion 
 
 
Rather 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Total 
 
Media or political 
pressure 
 
 
16 
 
 
19 
 
0 
 
 
5 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Pressure from 
public opinion 
 
 
12 
 
 
22 
 
0 
 
 
6 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Tasks highly 
time-consuming 
 
14 
 
 
23 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
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or drastically 
burdensome from 
judge’s point of 
view 
 
 
Perspective of 
facing potentially 
numerous 
litigants 
 
 
4 
 
20 
 
5 
 
 
11 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Judicial 
overexposure (in 
the media or 
within the legal 
profession) 
 
 
9 
 
 
19 
 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Difficult 
communication 
between the 
judges and the 
litigants 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
6 
 
 
22 
 
2 
 
 
40 
 
Defining 
correctly the level 
of mediatization 
of the proceeding 
in the media 
 
 
10 
 
12 
 
14 
 
 
3 
 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
Lacking 
information about 
the interest of 
absent and 
represented 
parties 
 
 
2 
 
 
23 
 
8 
 
 
6 
 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
Taking into 
account the 
interest of 
companies 
(notably in terms 
of reputation) 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
7 
 
 
11 
 
 
2 
 
 
40 
 
Lack of financial 
or human 
resources to deal 
with mass cases 
 
 
33 
 
6 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
40 
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 Do you consider that the work performed by consumer organization/association of plaintiffs… 
 
  
Strongly agree 
 
 
Rather 
agree 
 
 
Without 
opinion 
 
Rather 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Total 
 
Is usually 
trustworthy 
 
 
2 
 
 
31 
 
5 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Should be kept 
under close 
judicial scrutiny 
 
 
10 
 
 
21 
 
2 
 
 
6 
 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
 Do you consider the perspective of managing a collective proceeding as being an experience… 
 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Rather agree 
 
Without 
opinion 
 
Rather 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Total 
 
Potentially 
intimidating 
 
 
5 
 
 
12 
 
7 
 
 
14 
 
2 
 
 
40 
 
Potentially 
motivating 
 
 
6 
 
 
31 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Potentially 
worrying 
 
 
2 
 
 
13 
 
 
8 
 
15 
 
2 
 
 
40 
 
may constitute a 
real challenge for 
the judge 
 
 
10 
 
 
22 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
 Would you personally enjoy monitoring a collective proceeding? 
 
Yes really 
 
Rather yes 
 
Without 
opinion  
 
Rather 
Not  
 
Really not 
 
 
 
Total 
 
6 
 
 
28 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
40 
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 What are the tools that may help the judge in the fulfillment of his tasks? 
 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Rather 
agree 
 
Without 
opinion 
 
Rather 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Total 
 
Creation of a 
specialized 
jurisdiction 
 
 
8 
 
 
12 
 
 
8 
 
11 
 
1 
 
 
40 
 
Specialized judicial 
education  
 
 
26 
 
13 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
Guidelines 
 
 
13 
 
 
23 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
40 
 
External assistance 
(experts, regulatory 
agencies…) 
 
 
23 
 
 
14 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
40 
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Appendix (5) 
     Questions asked during the Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
(The persons were contacted by emails in which I presented the aim of the research.  On average, these 
interviews last between 30 and 45 min. They took place in Paris (with judges) and in Brussels (with the 
consumer association). 
   
 Interviews with Judges 
 
- What is your overall opinion about the implementation of a group action in France? 
- Do you think that the action should be restricted to specific fields? 
- Do you think the group action will change the role of judges 
- What are, according to you, the objectives pursued by the group action? 
- Do think that the group action should be handled by specialized agencies rather than by 
judges?   
- What should be the roles of consumer associations? 
 
 
 Interview With the representative of a consumer association 
 
- Are you optimistic vis-à-vis the work expected from judges for the monitoring of group 
proceedings? 
- What is the role of consumer association vis-à-vis mass proceedings?  
- Do you think that the personality of the judge will affect the way the case is monitored? 
- Do you think that judges take peculiar decisions when their decisions are likely to affect a 
large group of claimants? 
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Executive Summaries  
 
 
 English summary:  Judges and Mass Litigation – a (Behavioural) Law & Economics 
Perspective 
 
 
Judicial duties have for decades extended far beyond the scope of traditional adjudication, judges being 
progressively called upon to occupy the role of social engineers. Meanwhile, contexts in which judges 
evolve have transformed: mass damage nowadays tends to multiply and create new challenges not only for 
legal actors, but also for society at large. In spring 2011, the replies received by the European Commission 
to its public consultation on collective redress indicated European stakeholders’ strong interest in seeing 
judiciaries play prominent and leading roles in the supervision and monitoring of procedures which enable 
groups of claimants to seek together compensation for damage caused by mass events. In its 2013 
Recommendations, the EU Commission further highlighted that ‘a key role should be given to courts in 
protecting the rights and interests of all the parties involved in a collective redress actions as well as in 
managing the collective redress actions effectively’. Judges are thus expected to be neutral and robust 
agents while assuming heavy responsibilities under a considerable burden.  
After having briefly introduced the topic (Chapter 1) and explained why the rationale of mass litigation 
indeed may require the intervention of judges as safeguards (Chapter 2), this thesis explores the new 
responsibilities falling upon judges and the novelties that mass litigation may bring to their practice. The 
comparative analysis of five different mass litigation procedures highlights convergences in judicial 
intervention, and helps clarify the type of judges that policymakers nowadays tend to expect to monitor 
and resolve mass disputes (Chapter 3). Interestingly, the study of judicial behaviour and judicial decision-
making has recently pervaded social sciences and subsequently been embraced by lawyers, economists 
and psychologists. These different branches of study have shed light on the way judges manage and decide 
cases beyond the traditional assumption positing that they are mere neutral decision-makers simply 
applying law to facts. Such insights from social sciences offer complementary views that are worth 
considering in times where judges have been assigned increased responsibilities in our society: expecting 
too much from judges who might not be able to live up to these expectations could be detrimental for the 
judiciary’s functioning and reputation, and ultimately for the whole treatment of mass litigation. Referring 
to rational choice theory, this research tends thus to propose a view ‘from the inside’ of judges dealing 
with mass litigation. It discusses the issue of judicial incentives and points out the influence of judicial 
attitudes on the resolution of mass claims (Chapter 4). Going then a step further and assuming that 
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individuals do not behave as rational utility maximizing agents but have a bounded rationality and may be 
prone to bias, insights from behavioural law & economics show how contexts – here, the ‘mass’ context – 
can influence judicial decision-making. It notably questions whether decision-makers tend to behave 
differently when facing groups or numerous individuals, and highlights the associated consequences for 
the treatment of mass claims (Chapter 5). Since the analysis would not be complete without empirical 
testing, the research proposes two reality checks in order to verify whether the theoretical developments 
previously set forth can be substantiated in practice. The first check consists of an online questionnaire 
conducted with French judges, aimed at collecting judicial viewpoints on the French group action. The 
second is an experiment intended to discuss the impact of multiple claimants on legal decision-making 
(Chapter 6). The analysis finally discusses alternative solutions to remedy judges’ vulnerabilities 
(Chapter 7) and proposes paths for future research in this field (Chapter 8). 
This research ultimately shows that policymakers have a view of the relationship between judges and mass 
claims that is mostly one-sided: judges have a key role to play for the management and resolution of mass 
disputes. Yet, insights from social sciences tend to suggest that this relationship is actually double-sided: 
judges do not only have an important role in mass litigation, but mass claims also can have a great impact 
on judicial attitudes and decision-making. Therefore, the first audience that this research seeks to target is 
policymakers at both EU and Member States levels who have recently implemented - or are currently 
discussing - the implementation of mass devices. Viewpoints of judges should be better taken into account 
and enhanced consideration should be given to judges’ strengths and weaknesses when evaluating and/or 
adapting existing forms of mass litigation tools. The second audience are judges themselves. The research 
contributes to shed some light on their new roles in the treatment of mass claims. It highlights the pitfalls 
that they may face, and errors that they may be prone to make on such circumstances. It also draws their 
attention to the consequences of their attitudes in mass disputes. When considering the prominent roles 
played by judges in this field, these findings will finally be of interest for all parties likely to be involved 
in mass claims. 
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 Samenvatting: Rechters en collectieve acties – Een (gedrags)rechtseconomisch 
perspectief 
 
De juridische taken van rechters reiken al decennia veel verder dan loutere traditionele rechtspraak omdat 
rechters steeds meer de rol van maatschappelijke probleemoplossers moeten vervullen. Ondertussen is de 
context waarin rechters opereren veranderd: massaschade lijkt steeds meer voor te komen en leidt tot 
nieuwe uitdagingen, niet alleen voor de juridische actoren, maar ook voor de samenleving als geheel. In 
voorjaar 2011 wezen de reacties die de Europese Commissie ontving op haar publieke consultatie over 
collectieve actie uit dat  Europese belanghebbenden er een sterk belang aan hechten dat de rechterlijke 
macht een prominente en leidende rol heeft in het toezicht  op en de controle van  de procedures die een 
groep eisers in staat stelt tezamen vergoeding van massaschade na te streven. Van rechters wordt dus 
verwacht dat zij neutraal en robuust zijn, terwijl zij een zware verantwoordelijkheid en last op zich moeten 
nemen. 
 
Nadat is besproken waarom de rationale van massaschadeclaims inderdaad de tussenkomst van rechters 
als waarborg vereist (hoofdstuk 2), wordt in dit proefschrift onderzocht welke nieuwe 
verantwoordelijkheden rechters met de komst van massaschadeclaims hebben gekregen en wat dit in de 
praktijk betekent. De vergelijkende analyse van vijf verschillende massaschadeprocedures belicht 
overeenkomsten in rechterlijke interventie en maakt duidelijk welk type rechters beleidsmakers 
tegenwoordig lijken te verwachten om massaconflicten te monitoren en te beslechten (hoofdstuk 3). 
Interessant is dat het onderzoek naar het gedrag en de besluitvorming van rechters sinds enige tijd is 
doorgedrongen tot de sociale wetenschappen en vervolgens is omarmd door juristen, economen en 
psychologen. Deze verschillende takken van onderzoek hebben een nieuw licht geworpen op de manier 
waarop rechters zaken behandelen en beslissingen nemen en gaan verder dan de traditionele 
veronderstelling dat zij louter de neutrale juridische besluitvormers zijn die simpelweg wetgeving op de 
feiten toepassen. Zulke inzichten vanuit de sociale wetenschapen geven aanvullende gezichtspunten die 
het waard zijn om in overweging te nemen in tijden waarin rechters steeds meer verantwoordelijkheden 
krijgen toegewezen in onze samenleving: als teveel wordt gevraagd van rechters die wellicht niet aan deze 
verwachtingen kunnen voldoen, kan dat schadelijk zijn voor het functioneren en de reputatie van de 
rechterlijke macht, en uiteindelijk voor de gehele behandeling van massaschadeclaims. Verwijzend naar 
de rationale keuzetheorie tracht dit proefschrift een perspectief ‘van binnen uit ’ voor te stellen van 
rechters die met massaschadeclaims te maken hebben. Het behandelt het punt van de prikkels die rechters 
krijgen en laat de invloed van de houding van de rechter zien bij de oplossing van massaschadeclaims 
(hoofdstuk 4). Vervolgens gaat het proefschrift een stap verder en, ervan uitgaande dat individuen zich 
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niet gedragen als rationele personen die naar nutsmaximalisatie streven, maar die een begrensde 
rationaliteit hebben en bevooroordeeld zouden kunnen zijn, laten inzichten vanuit de 
gedragsrechtseconomie zien hoe context – hier, de ‘massa’ context – de rechterlijke besluitvorming 
kunnen beïnvloeden. Er wordt met name onderzocht of besluitvormers de neiging hebben zich anders te 
bedragen wanneer zij geconfronteerd worden met  een groep of een groot aantal individuen, en de daaraan 
verbonden gevolgen voor de behandeling van massaschade claims worden benadrukt (hoofdstuk 5). 
Aangezien het onderzoek niet compleet zou zijn zonder dit empirisch te testen, zijn er twee reality checks 
uitgevoerd teneinde na te gaan of de theoretische ontwikkelingen die eerder beschreven zijn zich in de 
praktijk voordoen. De eerste check bestaat uit een online vragenlijst die is voorgelegd aan Franse rechters, 
gericht op het verzamelen van rechterlijke standpunten betreffende de Franse groepsactie. De tweede is 
een experiment dat bedoeld is om de invloed van meerdere eisers op rechterlijke besluitvorming te 
onderzoeken (hoofdstuk 6). Ten slotte bespreekt het onderzoek alternatieve oplossingen voor de 
rechterlijke kwetsbaarheid (hoofdstuk 7). 
 
Dit onderzoek maakt duidelijk dat beleidsmakers een zeer eenzijdig beeld hebben van de verhouding 
tussen rechters en massaschadeclaims: rechters hebben een sleutelrol in de behandeling en besluitvorming 
van massaclaims. Echter, inzichten vanuit sociale wetenschappen lijken te suggereren dat deze verhouding 
juist tweezijdig is: niet alleen spelen rechters een belangrijke rol in rechtspraak inzake massaschade, maar 
massaschadeclaims kunnen op hun beurt een grote invloed hebben op de rechterlijke houding en 
besluitvorming. Derhalve bestaat de doelgroep die dit onderzoek primair wil bereiken uit beleidsmakers, 
zowel op EU- als op lidstaat niveau, die recentelijk instrumenten voor massaclaims hebben 
geïmplementeerd, of hierover momenteel over nadenken. Er zou meer rekening gehouden moeten worden 
met de standpunten van rechters en de sterke en zwakke punten van rechters zouden meer in overweging 
genomen moeten worden bij het evalueren of aanpassen van bestaande vormen van massaschade-
instrumenten. De tweede doelgroep bestaat uit de rechters zelf. Het onderzoek draagt bij aan inzicht over 
hun nieuwe rol bij de behandeling van massaclaims. Het laat zien welke valkuilen zij zouden kunnen 
tegenkomen en welke fouten die zij onder zulke omstandigheden zouden kunnen maken. Het vestigt ook 
hun aandacht op de gevolgen van hun gedrag in massaschadezaken. Ten slotte zijn de uitkomsten van dit 
onderzoek, gezien de prominente rol die rechters spelen, van belang voor alle partijen die wellicht in 
massaschadeclaims betrokken kunnen raken.  
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 Resumé en francais: Les juges et le contentieux de masse: une perspective d'analyse 
économique (et comportementale) du droit  
 
L’office du juge a profondément évolué au fil des dernières années, les juges étant progressivement 
appelés à jouer le rôle d’ingénieurs sociaux intervenant dans tous les aspects de nos sociétés modernes. En 
parallèle, les contextes dans lesquels les juges évoluent ont connu d’importants bouleversements. En 
particulier, les dommages de masse résultant de la commercialisation à grande échelle de produits 
défectueux ou liés à des comportements d’entreprises frauduleux tendent aujourd’hui à se multiplier, et 
créent des défis d’un type nouveau tant pour le monde judiciaire que la société dans son ensemble. Au 
printemps 2011, les réponses reçues par la Commission européenne à sa consultation publique sur les 
mécanismes de recours collectifs ont souligné le souhait partagé par une vaste majorité d’acteurs 
européens de donner un rôle primordial aux juges pour la conduite et la supervision de procédures de 
recours collectif qui permettent à des demandeurs d’agir en justice ensemble en réparation de leur 
préjudice ou en cessation d’une pratique illicite. Dans ses recommandations de 2013 sur les recours 
collectifs, la Commission s’est à son tour fait l’écho de cette volonté en soulignant que ‘les juridictions 
devraient se voir confier un rôle clé dans la protection des droits et des intérêts de toutes les parties 
concernées par une action collective, ainsi que dans la gestion efficace de ce type de recours’.  Il est par 
conséquent requis et attendu des juges qu’ils agissent en agents neutres, capables d’assumer d’importantes 
responsabilités, tout en faisant face à une charge très conséquente de travail. 
Après avoir brièvement introduit le thème de cette recherche (Chapitre 1) et avoir clarifié en quoi la 
logique économique et le fonctionnement du contentieux de masse – entendu via le prisme des recours 
collectifs - en effet requiert l’intervention du juge afin de s’assurer que les coûts générés par ces 
procédures ne dépassent pas les bénéfices qui leur sont associés (Chapitre 2), cette recherche explore plus 
en détails les nouvelles responsabilités incombant aux juges et les nouveautés que le contentieux de masse 
apportent à la pratique judiciaire. L’analyse comparative de cinq procédures de masse en Europe et aux 
Etats-Unis permet de clarifier le type de juge qui est aujourd’hui idéalement souhaité pour une conduite et 
une supervision efficace des contentieux collectifs (Chapitre 3). Puis, cette recherche s’intéresse aux 
éclairages alternatifs qui permettent d’apprécier ce débat sous des angles différents. L’étude du 
comportement et de la prise de décision judiciaire est en effet devenue ces dernières années un important 
objet d’investigation pour les sciences sociales, et a été abordée par des juristes, des économistes ou 
encore par des chercheurs en économie comportementale et cognitive. Ces points de vue alternatifs sur les 
juges et le monde judicaire permettent d’envisager autrement la façon dont les juges agissent et décident. 
A une époque où les juges se voient donner une place croissante dans notre société, ces enseignements 
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méritent aujourd’hui d’être étudiés et pris en considération : trop attendre ou trop exiger des juges pour la 
conduite du contentieux de masse pourrait en effet s’avérer préjudiciable pour le fonctionnement et la 
réputation de la magistrature, et plus généralement, pour la résolution des litiges collectifs dans leur 
ensemble. S’appuyant tout d’abord sur la théorie économique dite du choix rationnel, cette recherche 
propose une vue ‘de l’intérieur’ des juges impliqués dans la résolution des contentieux de masse. Le juge 
est alors perçu comme un être rationnel ayant des préférences et répondant à des incitations. Ce point de 
vue permet de mettre en lumière l’influence de la personnalité du juge sur la résolution des litiges de 
masse (Chapitre 4).Puis, partant cette fois du postulat que les juges n’agissent plus comme des agents 
rationnels, mais ont une rationalité limitée et peuvent être sujets à des biais cognitifs, l’apport de 
l’économie comportementale et de la psychologie permet de mieux comprendre comment le contexte (ici 
tout particulièrement, le contexte de masse) est susceptible d’influencer la prise de décision judiciaire et la 
résolution des litiges collectifs (Chapitre 5). Deux travaux empiriques viennent ensuite tester ces 
hypothèses: le premier est un questionnaire en ligne conduit auprès de juges français et destiné à collecter 
des avis et perceptions de juges sur l’action de groupe récemment introduite en France. Le second est une 
expérience comportementale visant à mieux comprendre l’impact du nombre de demandeurs sur les 
décisions des acteurs judiciaires. Il s’agira en particulier de comprendre si - et si oui, de quelle manière - le 
nombre de personnes impliquées dans un contentieux de masse tend à modifier les décisions relatives à la 
responsabilité et à la fixation des dommages et intérêts alloués (Chapitre 6). La recherche s’achève en 
explorant différentes solutions pour pallier les vulnérabilités des juges qui auront été préalablement 
identifiées (Chapitre 7), et en suggérant plusieurs possibles voies pour des recherches ultérieures dans le 
domaine (Chapitre 8). 
Pour récapituler : cette recherche met en évidence que la relation entre les juges et le contentieux de masse 
est aujourd’hui encore essentiellement perçue comme étant à sens unique, les juges ayant un rôle essentiel 
à jouer pour la résolution des litiges collectifs. Néanmoins, les enseignements des sciences sociales 
tendent à montrer que cette relation est en réalité à double sens : les contentieux collectifs ont  également 
des conséquences sur les attitudes et les choix des juges. Leurs personnalités et leurs décisions sont 
susceptibles d’influencer de manière significative la conduite des litiges collectifs. 
 Le premier public auquel cette recherche s’adresse sont  les décideurs publics des pays - notamment au 
sein de l'Union européenne où ce débat reste d’une vive actualité - qui ont récemment  introduit, ou sont 
en voie  d'introduire, des mécanismes de recours collectifs dans leur système juridique. A la suite de cette 
étude, il apparait fortement souhaitable de mieux prendre en compte les opinions et vues des juges dans 
toutes discussions ayant trait au fonctionnement des mécanismes de recours collectifs. Cette étude 
s’adresse ensuite aux juges eux-mêmes. Cette recherche clarifie leurs rôles successifs dans la conduite des 
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contentieux collectifs, et met en avant les difficultés et erreurs susceptibles d’être commises.  Enfin, étant 
donné le rôle essentiel joué par les juges dans ce domaine, cette recherche sera également d'intérêt pour 
toute partie à même d'être un jour elle-même impliquée dans un litige de masse.   
 
 
 
 
 
